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Anticipation (type 12)
 No goal-achievement that is positively associ-
ated with anticipation resulting in not under-
taking influence attempts.
Bad luck (type 7)
 No goal-achievement that is positively associ-
ated with bad luck, while undertaking influence 
attempts.
Decision
 An issue that does get an agenda status, after 
which a selection of one or a combination of 
two or more decision options is laid down in 
the final Treaty text.
Domain (of an actor’s influence)
 The number of actors that are subject to an 
actor’s influence.
Domestic structure
 Domestic actors and factors constraining or en-
abling an actor during the negotiation process 
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Failure (type 5)
 No goal-achievement that is positively associ-
ated with unsuccessful influence attempts.
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 The extent to which it is possible to apply a 
method within the constraints of time and 
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Free ride (type 2)
 Goal-achievement that is positively associated 
with profiting from influence resources (no-
tably advantageous policy positions) or other 
actors’ influence attempts, while undertaking 
influence attempts itself.
Goal-achievement, extent of
 The extent to which the preferred decision op-
tion is reflected in the outcome.
Influence
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actions.
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shape of a non-decision, a not-decision or a 
decision.
Pivotal position
 Having a preference on an issue that lies be-
tween two or more different preferences of the 
other actors.
Policy position
 Having a ‘pivotal’ or ‘majority’ position during 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Case study
During the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000, there were several outstanding is-
sues as well as some others that had appeared to have been settled earlier that were again brought 
up and questioned. One of the latter issues concerned the question of whether one member 
state should be able to veto an initiative of a limited number of member states to integrate 
further within a particular policy area (closer cooperation). The Nice European Council was 
the culmination of a negotiation process between 15 member states and three EU level actors on 
a new EU Treaty that took place in 2000. In the course of the negotiation process, the outcome 
that took shape was that the veto possibility would indeed be abolished, but that the matter 
could still be referred to the European Council. In practice, this would only delay the decision on 
initiating closer cooperation that the Council would make with a qualified majority after all.
This outcome was again questioned during the end game in Nice. As a result, the outcome was 
altered in such a way that it was not guaranteed that the Council, after the matter was referred 
to the European Council, would indeed make a decision (‘may take a decision’ instead of ‘takes 
a decision’). The Dutch cabinet subsequently attempted to revert back to the previous outcome, 
suggesting an amendment in line with this to the French Presidency. When the Presidency 
proposed this amendment to the other Heads of State or Government, however, the United 
Kingdom objected. Following this, the Presidency proposed that the old text be maintained (‘may 
take a decision’) and asked if anyone objected to this. According to the Dutch cabinet, it had not 
explicitly agreed with the change at the request of the United Kingdom. Yet, according to the 
French Presidency, three of whom had listened to a recording of the European Council meeting, 
nobody, not even the Dutch cabinet, had objected. The final outcome was thus that the Council 
‘may take a decision’ and not necessarily ‘takes a decision’.
This partial description of the Nice Treaty negotiation process on a specific issue resulting 
in a particular outcome raises several significant questions about how this outcome can 
be explained. Could the putting up of the Closer cooperation dossier on the agenda be 
attributed to the efforts of the Dutch cabinet to begin with? To what extent has the Dutch 
cabinet contributed to abolishing the possibility of a veto? In addition, to what extent did 
the Dutch cabinet fail after all when the outcome was altered to one it preferred less at the 
end game in Nice? Was it simply negligence on the part of the Dutch cabinet or bad luck 
that the outcome requested by the United Kingdom was not revoked?
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1.2 The how and why of studying EU Treaties
1.2.1 Five perspectives on EU Treaties
How should the issue of EU Treaties be approached and why is it relevant? There are 
five discernable perspectives on EU Treaties. Each highlights a different aspect of their 
relevance. 
The first perspective seeks attention for their legal status within the EU (e.g. Stein, 1981; 
Weiler, 1991; Craig & De Búrca, 1999; Weiler, 1999; Stone Sweet, 2000; Barents, 2004; 
Castiglione & Schönlau, 2006; Curtin, 2008). EU Treaties and law adopted on the basis of 
these Treaties hold primacy over the laws of member states. This principle of the primacy 
of EU law has been established by the European Court of Justice in its case law over the 
course of time.1 In addition, EU Treaties hold the status of primary law, which implies 
that all EU legislation – secondary law – and actions must conform to the Treaties. More-
over, all EU legislation must be based on specific provisions in the Treaties (McDonagh, 
1998:3-4). The second point is especially relevant in the context of the closer cooperation 
outcome described earlier. It has to do with whether or not specific governments have the 
opportunity to veto a closer cooperation initiative in a particular policy area their citizens 
may not be in favour of or, inversely, whether or not further European integration within 
a particular policy area that citizens prefer may be blocked by a single member state. In 
general, this implies that EU Treaties form the basis of the functioning of the EU. They 
form the basis for the workings of the institutions, the operation of the decision-making 
procedures and the making of the different policies of the EU. Thus, EU Treaties are simply 
a starting point for the day-to-day functioning of the EU.
In this respect, a distinction can be made between the modifying and the codifying 
nature of EU Treaties. To a considerable degree, EU Treaties simply codify what has become 
established practice at the time. The extent to which EU Treaties actually modify the course 
of events in the Union is usually limited. More accurately, European integration proceeds 
through a complex interplay between the day-to-day functioning of the Union and the 
‘big bangs’ of EU Treaty reform (Peterson & Bomberg, 1999). The European Court of 
Justice is driving this process forward in particular, by producing jurisprudence while at the 
same time establishing practice on the basis of the current Treaty framework and shaping 
the agenda and substance of a new round of Treaty reform (Alter, 1998). The European 
Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament are also establishing practices 
in their daily functioning and in their mutual relations, which are reflected, for instance, in 
inter-institutional agreements. These practices may also subsequently be codified during a 
new round of Treaty reform (e.g. Farrell & Héritier, 2003). Thus, the Nice Treaty provision 
that equips the Commission President with the right to dismiss an individual Commis-
sioner was in fact a codification of a practice developed under the Prodi Commission (the 
‘lex-Prodi’).
In part, the Nice Treaty negotiations dealt with formal institutional matters for which 
the practices established during the day-to-day functioning of the Union were of limited 
1. This principle was established in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, but at the end of the 
negotiations resulting in the Treaty of Lisbon only a Declaration was adopted confirming this principle.
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importance. In light of the coming enlargement that would ultimately include 10 new 
member states by 2004, the way in and extent to which member states would be repre-
sented in the different institutions of the enlarged Union had to be revised. Decisions on 
whether each member state is entitled to a representative in the Commission and on the 
number of votes each state has in the Council could be classified as having a modifying 
rather than a codifying effect.
It is also important to note that EU Treaties are usually of a temporary nature. A new 
round of Treaty reform offers new opportunities for the actors involved to both create new 
codifications and modifications as well as alter earlier ones. This is what actually happened 
when the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – known in short as the Consti-
tutional Treaty – and, later, the Treaty of Lisbon were negotiated. Both contain several 
institutional provisions that alter and replace the Nice Treaty outcomes in this respect. 
This is not to deny that member state governments do their utmost to create and alter 
provisions that are in line with their preferences as much as possible in a specific instance 
of Treaty reform.
The second perspective on EU Treaties considers the role of citizens in and their attitudes 
toward the European integration process in general and EU Treaties in particular (e.g. 
Van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Ray, 2006). The legal status of 
EU Treaties does not necessarily imply that European citizens themselves consider them 
relevant to their daily lives. For a long time, cooperation between member states and 
the accompanying institutional framework at the European level seemed to have been 
something coming from a different world for many citizens. Not only did the European 
integration process take place far from home, where citizens live their daily lives, but it 
also did not profoundly affect their lives. There have recently been changes to the latter 
situation, particularly since the establishment of the Internal Market programme in the 
second half of the 1980s, followed by the launch of the Economic Monetary Union and 
the introduction of the euro in the 1990s. After some delay, citizens gradually seemed 
to become more aware of the impact of the European integration process on their own 
country and their daily lives. However, as this new sense of awareness was coupled with the 
as yet persistent experience of not really being involved in this process, as it was still taking 
place at a distance from their daily lives and homes, an inconvenient tension emerged in 
their perception of the EU.
In hindsight, the Nice Treaty negotiation process in the year 2000 – the year before the 
introduction of the euro – took place at a time of limited consciousness in this respect. 
At the same time, however, this was a critical juncture. The European leaders seemed to 
be aware of this as they stressed the importance of increasing citizen involvement in the 
Laeken Declaration of December 2001. This Declaration became the starting point for 
the work conducted by the European Convention in 2002-2003 and, following that, the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2003-2004, which resulted in the ‘European 
Constitution’. Citizens in France and the Netherlands did, in fact, become more involved 
as a result of the referenda that were held in those countries in 2005, but their no-vote – 
rather ironically – put the Union in a ‘constitutional’ crisis. Coinciding and interfering 
with the constitutional debate, the expansion to include 10 Central and Eastern European 
countries in 2004 raised fierce debates within the ‘old’ member states on the consequences 
of this enlargement for their labour markets. Together, these debates reflected both unprec-
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edented awareness and resistance on the part of European citizens. The Irish rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty in June 2008 made this all the more clear and further aggravated the 
crisis. This is not to say that European citizens had absolutely no role to play during earlier 
rounds of the EU Treaty reform process. Referenda had been held earlier in Denmark on 
the Maastricht Treaty and in Ireland on the Nice Treaty (Roberts-Thomson, 2001). Specific 
public opinion and (forthcoming) elections in member states have frequently played a role 
during EU Treaty negotiations, at least in the perception and tactics of European leaders.
The third perspective focuses on the negotiation process of which EU Treaties are the 
final outcome (e.g. Smith, 2002; Beach, 2005). Rather than concentrating on the legal 
interpretation and practical status of the Treaty text as such, this perspective focuses on 
the different actors involved during the negotiations and the extent to and ways in which 
they succeed in obtaining what they want. Member state governments sometimes present 
their stakes for the negotiations to parliament and – via the media – to their citizens. Thus, 
when the Dutch Second Chamber learnt in the run-up to the 2007 IGC that Foreign 
Affairs Minister Maxime Verhagen had presented eight proposals for amendment to the 
Constitutional Treaty during a meeting with Permanent Representatives, he was forced 
to make them public in parliament. As a result, the eight points were also reported in 
Dutch newspapers (e.g. NRC Handelsblad, 21 June 2007 and 23 June 2007). An informal 
report of this meeting contains more details of the eight wishes than was reflected in 
the newspapers (Commission political flash report, 8 May 2007). What exactly was the 
Dutch stake for the Lisbon Treaty negotiations? Was there a difference between the Dutch 
negotiation position presented behind the scenes and the one presented to parliament and 
the public? A case could also be made that in order to know the original Dutch stake for 
the Lisbon Treaty negotiations, the Dutch positions presented prior to the Constitutional 
Treaty negotiations should be revisited (see Leuffen & Luitwieler, 2006). It would then be 
discovered that several of the original positions were no longer a part of the Dutch stake 
several years later.
Whether or not citizens are aware of the relevance of EU Treaties, their leaders do consider 
them to be relevant. The fact that all EU legislation and actions must conform with and 
be based on the Treaties implies that EU Treaty negotiations are about shaping the rules of 
how the game is played among member states, EU institutions and bodies within the EU 
institutional framework. In other words, the negotiation of EU Treaties is a meta-game that 
prearranges or rearranges the day-to-day game (Van Schendelen, 2005:117). An EU Treaty 
negotiation process is also a meta-game in terms of power and influence. The outcomes 
of EU Treaty negotiations determine, at least partially, who has power in the day-to-day 
functioning of the Union. This was the case particularly for the Nice Treaty negotiations 
that dealt with the way in which and the extent to which individual member states would 
be represented in the EU institutions. This involved very sensitive matters, such as how 
many votes a member state has in the Council, how many persons it may delegate to the 
European Parliament and whether a member state government has personal entry to and 
a ‘recognisable face’ for the citizens in the Commission. It is therefore not surprising that 
member states and EU level actors take EU Treaty negotiations very seriously and attempt 
to exert influence on one another in order to realise their preferences in the outcomes of 
the negotiation process.
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In this respect, one sensitive issue for both European leaders and citizens concerns whether 
and to what extent member states suffer a loss of sovereignty due to their participation in 
the European integration process in general and the formation of EU Treaties in particular 
(Moravcsik, 1994, 1998; Wallace, 1999; Milward, 2000). This issue is particularly raised 
in the context of member states giving up their veto in particular policy areas as a result of 
the extension of what is known as qualified majority voting (QMV). However, the matter 
is more complicated than it often appears to be based on the public concern that is raised 
regarding it. It may be argued that member states have really transferred, or delegated, 
sovereignty within the policy areas in which the Union is exclusively competent, such 
as common commercial policy. These matters are completely settled by the Commission 
autonomously, and the member states no longer have a role to play in this respect. Most 
policy areas do, however, come under the category of shared competences between the EU 
and its member states. Instead of transferring their sovereignty, member states share, or 
pool, their sovereignty in the Council where they decide on these matters by QMV. It can 
even be argued that a member state has more autonomy to create policy in a specific area 
when participating in Council decision-making in this area than it would if it had its own 
policy on it.
The fourth perspective concerns the effectuation of EU Treaties after they have been 
negotiated. This perspective has several dimensions to it. EU Treaties have to be effectu-
ated in the sense that they must first be ratified by all member states before they can be 
enforced (e.g. Laursen & Vanhoonacker, 1994; Albi & Ziller, 2007). This ratification is 
done in line with the ‘constitutional requirements’ of the member states, which means that 
parliamentary approval and, in some cases, a referendum is required. EU Treaties also have 
to be effectuated in the sense that the Treaty text has to be juridical-linguistically checked 
and practically specified before it is ready for use. The juridical-linguistic check takes place 
after the conclusion of the IGC and before the Treaty is published in the Official Journal. 
During this check, inconsistencies and issues of interpretation may pop up, as a result of 
which, elements of re-negotiation may again emerge. For example, after the Nice Treaty was 
agreed upon but before the juridical-linguistic check, there appeared to be an inconsistency 
in the text related to provisions on the weighting of votes. This resulted in re-negotiations 
in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The inconsistency was cor-
rected, to the advantage of some actors but to the detriment of others.
The practical specification of an EU Treaty has to do with the fact that some provi-
sions require decisions to be made by the (European) Council before they can become 
operational, while others are rather general or vague in nature, so a lot depends on the 
way in which they are practically worked out (e.g. CEPS, EGMONT, & EPC, 2007). In 
terms of the former, the Lisbon Treaty, for instance, stipulates that the Commission will 
consist of two-thirds of the member states as of 1 November 2014, based on a strictly equal 
rotation system. The European Council should, however, still make a unanimous decision 
on this rotation system. This gives member states that have problems with giving up their 
Commissioner during a term of office, as France has for example voiced in the person of 
Sarkozy, the opportunity to block the reduction of the Commission after all. In terms of the 
latter, for instance, there remains much uncertainty about the entrenchment, staffing and 
functioning of the European External Action Service introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.
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The fifth and final perspective is on the implementation of EU Treaties after they have 
begun to be enforced (e.g. Neunreither & Wiener, 2000; Monar & Wessels, 2001; Andenas 
& Usher, 2003). This perspective is related to the first in the sense that it raises the question 
of to what extent the codifications as well as the modifications of a new EU Treaty impact 
the day-to-day functioning of the EU. For example, one may question the impact of formal 
institutional modifications in practice, such as the new system of QMV in the Council and 
the extension of QMV to areas that used to be decided by unanimity. After all, votes are 
counted in the Council only in a small minority of cases and the decision-making practice 
is based on aiming for consensus. Another example concerns the extent to which the new 
High Representative introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will result in a substantively different 
policy or new dynamics in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
compared to the current situation.
1.2.2 The negotiation process as a focal perspective
It can already be deduced from the case study outlined at the beginning that this study ap-
proaches EU Treaties from the third perspective described above: the negotiation process. 
The formation of EU Treaties in general and the Treaty of Nice in particular is a complex 
process, whose outcome cannot be predicted (e.g. Smith, 2002:2-3; Beach, 2005:2-3). It 
entails a negotiation process in which different actors with diverging preferences intervene 
on their own or within coalitions of actors at different moments in time to achieve an 
outcome that is as close to their preferences as possible. As a result, an EU Treaty negotia-
tion process is, to a large extent, a black box.
Within EU studies, it has not been common practice to focus on the process of EU Treaty 
negotiations until now. Some scholars and practitioners have provided (mainly) descriptive 
analyses of EU Treaty negotiations, such as of the Nice Treaty negotiation process (e.g. 
Galloway, 2001; Stubb, 2002; Laursen, 2006). These analyses have focused on the different 
actors, issues and outcomes of the negotiation process. Only a few scholars have examined 
the process of EU Treaty negotiations in order to explain its outcome (e.g. Smith, 2002; 
Beach, 2005). In general, the literature on EU Treaty negotiations draws attention to the 
participating actors – member states and EU level actors – and to several elements that 
structure the negotiations, such as the existence of different levels of negotiation. These 
agency and structural variables affect the negotiation process and thus co-determine its 
outcome. More specifically, some scholars have approached the negotiation process and 
its resulting outcome from the perspective of specific integration theories (e.g. Moravcsik, 
1998; Smith, 2002), while others have employed negotiation theory and examined the 
leadership of EU institutions to explain the outcome of the negotiations (e.g. Beach, 2005; 
Beach & Mazzucelli, 2007).
This study argues, however, that these studies do not explore the core of such a negotia-
tion process: the mutual exertion of influence by the participating actors. Although scholars 
have often explicitly or implicitly referred to power and influence (‘bargaining power’, 
‘influence’, ‘impact’), they do not treat power and influence as empirical Political Science 
concepts, by indicating how they define these concepts or how they aim to measure them. 
Therefore, until now relatively little attention has been paid within EU studies to EU 
Treaty negotiations as a process and – within this perspective – to the question how to 
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conceive of and measure power and influence. This study aims to contribute to filling 
this gap by approaching the explanation of the Nice Treaty negotiation process from the 
perspective of power and influence.
Power and influence are core Political Science concepts. Yet within Political Science 
generally and International Relations (IR) in particular, the study of (international) politics 
has focused mainly on the resources or potential influence of actors, without examining 
the process through which these resources are employed, resulting in the mutual exertion 
of actual influence as a relation between actors (e.g. Dahl, 1957; Frey, 1971; Baldwin, 
2002). As this study aims to focus on the process of the Nice Treaty negotiations in order 
to explain its outcome, it will adopt a relational influence perspective. In doing so, it also 
aims to contribute to filling a gap in the Political Science and IR literature on power and 
influence.
Applying a relational influence perspective to an EU Treaty negotiation process is not 
only scientifically relevant because it enables us to examine the actual influence of (one 
or more of ) the participating actors, but also because the challenge of how to measure 
this influence must be met. Just like the concept of influence itself, the measurement of 
influence has long been debated in Political Science and IR. This study participates in 
this debate and, by applying a method of actually measuring influence in the context of 
EU politics, also aims to make a methodological contribution. In adopting a relational 
influence perspective and applying a method of actual influence measuring, this study aims 
to open up the black box of the Nice Treaty negotiations.
It can thus be seen that this study adopts the third perspective on EU Treaties – the EU 
Treaty negotiation process, and not the other perspectives discussed in the previous subsec-
tion. This does imply that this study has its limitations, but it does not mean that the other 
four perspectives cannot be related to at all. A thorough legal analysis of the modifications 
and codifications of the Nice Treaty is not undertaken here, but in order to assess the exer-
tion of influence during the negotiation process, the Treaty text is precisely studied as the 
outcome of this process. The Nice Treaty negotiation process is not approached from the 
perspective of the citizens, but their role is accounted for in the sense that domestic factors, 
such as public opinion, possible referenda and elections, are included in the conceptual 
model. Another limitation is that the analysis ends with the Nice European Council of 
December 2000, when the Treaty text was concluded. The effectuation and implementa-
tion of the Nice Treaty is therefore not covered. Yet substantive differences between the 
Treaty text adopted by the Heads of State or Government and the one published in the 
Official Journal are taken into account. Although the ratification by the parliaments and 
the two Irish referenda are not included, the role that such domestic actors and factors 
played during the negotiation process itself will be accounted for.
1.3 Research design
1.3.1 Focus on the Dutch cabinet
A relational influence perspective draws attention to the possibility that although small 
member states, such as the Netherlands, may have few resources, they may still be influ-
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ential in specific instances of EU (Treaty) negotiations. The role of small member states 
in the EU generally and in EU Treaty negotiations in particular has been rather neglected 
in previous empirical studies. Some scholars have paid attention to the influence of small 
member states in the EU, but they have not defined and measured influence as a Political 
Science concept (e.g. Hanf & Soetendorp, 1998; Arter, 2000). Previous studies of EU 
Treaty negotiations have generally focused on large member states and have not adopted a 
(relational) influence perspective (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998). The latter also applies to the few 
studies that have focused on a small member state, such as the Dutch cabinet (e.g. Van den 
Bos, 2008).
The current study focuses particularly on the influence exerted by one small member 
state, the Netherlands. To what extent does a small member state such as the Netherlands 
exert influence in the EU? Was it indeed the case, as many have suggested, that the Dutch 
cabinet exerted only a little influence during the negotiation process that resulted in the 
Treaty of Nice, or has it, being in its own opinion ‘the largest of the small member states’, 
exerted considerable influence? More importantly, how can the extent of its influence be 
explained? The focus of this study on the Netherlands, a small member state, is additionally 
legitimised by the special access the author received to the archive of the Dutch Foreign 
Affairs Ministry (see Section 1.5) and the location of the author’s residence.
1.3.2 Focus on the Nice Treaty negotiation process
There is one important point to note about the focus of this study on the Nice Treaty 
negotiation process as an instance of EU Treaty reform. In order to be able to reasonably 
meet the challenge of measuring the actual influence exerted during a process, it was neces-
sary to limit ourselves to only one instance of EU Treaty reform. This being the case, the 
Treaty of Nice is relevant because it was the most recent concluded instance of EU Treaty 
reform at the time this study was undertaken. It was the Treaty that was in force when 
the empirical research for this study was begun and it remained in force until the end of 
the research period due to the ratification problems with the Constitutional Treaty and, 
following that, the Lisbon Treaty.
In addition, the Nice Treaty negotiation process is the most recent instance of Treaty 
reform that allowed for the possibility of obtaining special access to informal notes and 
reports from the archives of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry and the European Com-
mission. Given the sensitivity of the material and the ongoing negotiations, this kind of ac-
cess could not be obtained for the negotiation processes that resulted in the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, these Treaties have not (yet) been enforced.
Finally, compared to the previous negotiation processes that resulted in the Maastricht 
and Amsterdam Treaties, relatively few empirical analyses have been undertaken of the 
Nice Treaty negotiation process.
1.3.3 Objectives
This study presents an empirical influence analysis of the negotiation process that resulted 
in the Treaty of Nice, focusing primarily on the Dutch cabinet. In doing so, its main 
objective is to explain the outcome of the Nice Treaty negotiation process. Given that a 
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relational influence perspective is applied here, the objectives are to investigate the extent 
to which the Netherlands, as a small member state, has exerted its influence and the way in 
which this may be fruitfully measured.
This study is innovative in several different aspects. First, relational influence analyses, 
which focus on an assessment of the actual influence exerted during a process, are still 
generally rather rare in Political Science, let alone in IR and EU studies. This study aims 
to make both a theoretical and methodological contribution through its use of this type of 
analysis. Second, the particular focus on one actor is advantageous in that it allows for an 
examination not only of issues that have resulted in decisions, but also of issues that have 
not resulted in decisions but for which the actor had preferences that it wanted to realise in 
the Treaty text. The latter issues can be subdivided into issues that were not on the agenda 
to begin with – non-decisions – and issues that were put on the agenda but subsequently not 
decided on – not-decisions. This study argues that, in order to ensure a proper assessment of 
the influence an actor exerts, it is not only decisions that must be taken into consideration, 
but also non-decisions and not-decisions.
1.3.4 Central research question
These objectives yield the following research question for this study:
To what extent has the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence during the negotiation process that 
resulted in the Treaty of Nice, and how can this influence be explained?
Although the focus is on the Dutch cabinet, all participating actors are addressed in the 
analysis, so that the influence exerted by the Dutch cabinet can be assessed and explained 
in the context of the other participating actors. After all, this study considers influence to be 
relational and relative (see Chapter 3). The limited focus on one particular actor, however, 
was necessary to be able to reasonably fulfil the challenge of measuring actual influence 
exerted during the negotiation process.
1.3.5 Seven sub-questions
The central research question is divided into seven sub-questions. These sub-questions are 
modelled according to the subsequent phases of the empirical cycle (for a similar approach, 
see Homburg, 1999).
 1.  What did the negotiation process that resulted in the Treaty of Nice look like, what were 
its outcomes and how can it be characterised?
In order to be able to assess the exertion of influence during the Nice Treaty negotiation 
process, it is first necessary to know what this process was all about and what its outcomes 
were. In short, the object of study should first be empirically explored. This creates a 
contextual empirical framework for the influence analysis. The participating actors – both 
member states and EU level actors – negotiate with one another about many issues within a 
structural environment. This environment, for instance, concerns actors and factors operat-
ing at home and the existence of different levels of negotiation.
 2. How can the process of EU Treaty negotiations be analysed?
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After exploring the empirical context of the Nice Treaty negotiation process, it becomes 
necessary to ask how this process can be analysed most adequately. It will be argued that 
the agency and structural variables that make up the contextual empirical framework touch 
insufficiently on the core of an EU Treaty negotiation process. The mutual exertion of 
influence between the participating actors is considered to be the core of this process in this 
study. Actors attempt to exert influence on one another and thus on the outcomes of the 
negotiation process on the basis of the influence resources they possess and with the help 
of the influence attempts they undertake.
 3. Which variables can explain the process of EU Treaty negotiations?
As this study argues that the Nice Treaty negotiation process can be most adequately 
analysed in terms of influence, the question that then follows is what specific variables can 
explain this process. Together, these variables form the conceptual model of the study. The 
core of this model will be formed by the influence attempt mechanism as the intervening 
variable, backed up by the influence resources an actor possesses as the independent vari-
able. The dependent variable is the extent of influence exerted by an actor. In addition, the 
structural variables of the contextual empirical framework are expected to affect the process 
through which influence resources are converted into actual influence through influence 
attempts. The structural, contextual variables concern domestic actors and factors, negotia-
tion levels and phases, particularly timing, and external events and developments at the 
European level.
 4. What kinds of expectations can be identified for each of these variables?
Once the explanatory variables of the conceptual model have been identified, the next 
question is what kinds of relationships can be expected to be found between these vari-
ables. For each variable, an expectation can be formulated as to how it connects with the 
dependent variable, or the extent of influence. The expectations that are formulated will be 
tested on the basis of the empirical data.
 5.  What kinds of methods are available to measure influence and which is the most suitable 
for this research?
Before the model can be put to the test, it must first be known how influence is going to be 
operationalised and measured in this study. The debate on how to measure influence will 
be engaged with and a method that studies influence as a relationship between actors and 
as an effect brought about during a process will be searched out. An operational model for 
this study will be identified that consists of two parts. The first is a before-after analysis, 
i.e. assessing the extent to which the Dutch cabinet and the other participating actors have 
achieved their goals on a number of selected Nice Treaty issues. The second part involves 
a process analysis, with the aim of assessing and explaining the extent to which the Dutch 
cabinet has exerted its influence concerning a number of selected Nice Treaty issues.
 6. To what extent are the expectations supported by empirical evidence?
After selecting the method by which influence is measured, the next step is to apply this 
method to the empirical data. Following the application of the before-after analysis, the 
process analysis consists of three steps. First, the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence 
will be assessed by examining rival mechanisms that may account for the extent of its 
goal-achievement. Second, the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence thus found will be 
explained on the basis of testing the expectations for each of the variables of the conceptual 
model. Third, the possibility of whether other variables that are not included in the original 
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model can offer an explanation for the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence will be 
explored. On the basis of the before-after analysis and the three-step process analysis, the 
research question of this study can be answered. 
 7.  What kinds of recommendations can be drafted regarding the theory, methodology and 
practice of influence?
Answering the research question allows for reflection on the theory about EU Treaty nego-
tiations and influence, and the methodology of influence presented and used in this study. 
In addition, some lessons on the practice of influence can be learnt from this study.
1.4 Theoretical perspectives
It should be clear by now that this study does not simply aim to describe the Nice Treaty 
negotiation process and its resulting outcome, but also and especially seeks to explain it.
In explaining EU Treaty negotiations, Moravscik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach 
has become a prominent point of departure for other studies (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998, 1999; 
Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis, 1999). Moravcsik has developed and tested a model to explain 
the major decisions of the European integration process, which included the formation 
of several EU Treaties. His model consists of three stages: national preference formation, 
interstate bargaining and institutional choice. For the first stage, Moravcsik concludes 
that it is economic rather than geopolitical interests that determine the preferences of 
member states. In terms of the second stage, he states that the bargaining power of member 
states, based on asymmetrical interdependence rather than supranational entrepreneur-
ship, explains the efficiency and distributional outcomes of the negotiations. Regarding 
the third stage, Moravcsik concludes that the need to increase the credibility of national 
commitments rather than federalist ideology or the greater efficiency of centralising the 
generation of technocratic information explains why member states choose to delegate 
their sovereignty to or pool it in EU institutions. Thus, in stressing the dominance of 
member states in the process of EU Treaty reform, Moravcsik’s approach is in fact an 
application of an intergovernmental explanation of the European integration process in 
general (e.g. Hoffmann, 1966; Milward, 2000).
In the context of this study, there are three possible alternative perspectives that are 
important to discuss. According to a second perspective, the focus on member states – 
particularly the three large member states of Germany, France and the United Kingdom 
– as dominant actors in EU Treaty negotiations neglects the important role that other 
participating actors might play during these negotiations. Using negotiation theory and 
rational choice institutionalism, some scholars have argued that EU level actors, such as 
the Commission and the Council Secretariat (Beach, 2005), but also the member state 
holding the Presidency (Tallberg, 2006), may provide leadership that member state actors 
require in order to be able to come to an agreement, and in doing so may also exert influ-
ence themselves (Christiansen, 2002; Beach & Mazzucelli, 2007). As far as supranational 
institutions are concerned, this can be considered to be a supranational perspective, which 
is in fact an application of a neofunctionalist explanation of the European integration 
process in general (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970; Schmitter, 
1970; Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998).
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Box 1.1 Previous studies of EU Treaty negotiations
Moravcsik (1998) has developed and tested a three-stage model to explain the major decisions made during 
the European integration process, which included the formation of several EU Treaties. As to national preference 
formation, Moravcsik has concluded that economic rather than geopolitical interests determine the preferences 
of member states. In terms of interstate bargaining, he has stated that the bargaining power of member states, 
based on asymmetrical interdependence rather than supranational entrepreneurship, explains the efficiency 
and distributional outcomes of the negotiations. Regarding institutional choice, Moravcsik has concluded that 
the need to increase the credibility of national commitments rather than federalist ideology or the greater 
efficiency of centralising the generation of technocratic information explains why member states choose to 
delegate their sovereignty to or pool it in EU institutions.
 This study does not apply Moravcsik’s model, but does analyse his second stage of ‘interstate bargaining’, 
resulting in the Treaty of Nice. However, the aim is specifically to assess and explain the actual exertion of influ-
ence. In this way, it is distinct from Moravscik’s approach as it focuses on one of the small member states, the 
Netherlands, in the context of the other participating actors.
 Smith (2002) has analysed several ‘constitutional’ IGCs, including the Nice IGC, from the perspective of incre-
mentalism, which has four defining features: ambiguous objectives of governments, indirection in the negotia-
tions, unintended outcomes and postponement. He has argued that EU Treaty negotiations are best understood 
from this perspective rather than from the perspective of neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism.
 This study does not apply any of these three perspectives. Instead, it analyses the Nice IGC from an influence 
perspective, and will still include several ‘incremental’ features that will be revisited in the final chapter.
 Based on his personal involvement in the negotiations, Stubb (2002) has described and analysed the 
substance and process of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaty negotiations on one specific dossier, flexibility (i.e. 
closer cooperation, as it is called in this study). It concerns a mainly descriptive study of the agenda-setting, 
decision-shaping and decision-making stages of these negotiations, providing an overview of the preferences of 
all member states. In addition, Stubb has adopted integration and negotiation theory to explain the negotiations 
by looking at the environment, process and styles of these negotiations. Similar studies, that lean more towards 
a personal involvement in the negotiations, have been conducted by McDonagh (1998) and Galloway (2001).
 As with Stubb, this study is process-oriented and addresses all (member state) actors participating in the 
negotiation process. Unlike Stubb, however, this study analyses several negotiation dossiers and adopts a 
relational influence perspective rather than integration or negotiation theory.
 Starting from negotiation theory and rational choice institutionalism, Beach (2005) has argued that EU 
level actors, such as the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council Secretariat, may provide the 
leadership that member state actors need in order to come to an agreement, and in doing so may themselves 
exert influence. This influence varies according to their leadership resources, the negotiating context and their 
choice of strategy. Beach has applied his supranational leadership model to the Single European Act, Maastricht, 
Amsterdam, Nice and Constitutional Treaty negotiations. An edited volume in line with this study has been 
published by Beach and Mazzucelli (2007).
 This study focuses on one specific member state rather than on the three EU level actors mentioned above, 
and on assessing and explaining the Dutch cabinet’s influence on all other participating actors, including the 
Commission, European Parliament and the Council Secretariat.
 Laursen (2006) has provided a mainly descriptive analysis of all the participating actors, the main issues and 
the outcomes of the Nice Treaty negotiation process, although Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist model is 
used as a frame of reference in several contributions. This edited volume builds on the work of similar volumes 
about the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty negotiations (Laursen & Vanhoonacker, 1992; Laursen, 2002) and 
was followed by another one on the Constitutional Treaty negotiations (Laursen, 2008).
 This study similarly describes the preferences of all the participating actors on the main issues of the Nice 
Treaty negotiation process, but particularly aims to explain the outcomes of this process from a relational influ-
ence perspective focusing on the Dutch cabinet.
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A third, social constructivist perspective states that EU Treaty reform is in fact a continu-
ous process, of which IGCs are only the ‘summits’ and during which the (co-constituting) 
interplay between agency and structural elements is crucial to explain this process (Chris-
tiansen & Jørgensen, 1999; Christiansen, Falkner, & Jørgensen, 2002; Falkner, 2002; 
Sverdrup, 2002). In terms of agency, these scholars plead for the inclusion of a broader set 
of actors besides the member states in the analysis. In line with the second perspective, this 
broader set includes EU level actors, such as the Commission and the European Parliament. 
In terms of structure, this involves elements at the EU level, such as the existence of dif-
ferent levels of negotiation and external events and developments affecting the negotiation 
process, but also domestic factors, such as events and political conflicts, public opinion and 
referenda. In addition, the possibility of an internally divided member state government 
and other domestic actors, such as parliament and the constitutional court, are also of a 
structural nature for a member state government. Moreover, structural factors may concern 
somewhat ‘softer’ processes, such as the socialising effect of norms, ideas and practices that 
have developed among member state actors and EU institutions during their interactions 
at the EU level. These processes may shape or reshape the preferences that actors hold dur-
ing a specific EU Treaty negotiation process (see, more generally, Holzhacker & Haverland, 
2006). All in all, the structural elements create the context in which member state and EU 
level actors operate when they are negotiating with one another.
A fourth perspective argues that EU Treaty negotiations, rather than being rational pro-
cesses, are in practice incremental learning processes for the participating actors that are at 
the most ‘boundedly rational’ in their behaviour. In such a context, negotiation dynamics, 
such as unexpected developments, time pressure and the specific individuals sitting at the 
negotiation table, play a relatively important role (McDonagh, 1998; Gray & Stubb, 2001; 
Smith, 2002; Stubb, 2002).
This study does not apply Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach, nor does 
it fit neatly into any of the other three perspectives. As has been argued earlier, this study 
aims to explain the outcome of the Nice Treaty negotiation process from the perspective 
of influence, as the mutual exertion of influence between the participating actors can be 
considered to be the core of such a negotiation process. Some elements of the alternative 
perspectives will be integrated into the conceptual model, however (see Chapter 4).
This study certainly does analyse Moravcsik’s second stage of ‘interstate bargaining’, 
which resulted in the Treaty of Nice, but in doing so aims specifically to assess and explain 
the actual exertion of influence. It is distinct from Moravscik’s approach in that it focuses 
on a small member state, the Netherlands, in the context of the other participating actors. 
In addition and in keeping with the supranational perspective, these actors do not only 
concern member states, but also concern EU level actors. In terms of similarities with 
the social constructivist perspective, this study is certainly process-oriented, studying both 
agenda-setting and decision-making at the EU level, but in terms of differences, it does 
not analyse the ‘valleys’ before or after the Nice Treaty negotiation process. Besides a broad 
set of actors, including domestic actors, several structural elements are included in the 
analysis. In view of the influence analysis, establishing the preferences of the participating 
actors and changes therein as a result of the mutual exertion of influence are particularly 
important, but socialisation processes themselves are not the focus of this study. In terms 
of the fourth perspective, this study does not focus on the Nice Treaty negotiation process 
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as an incremental learning process as such, as the primary goal is to assess and explain 
the actual exertion of influence during this process. This is not to deny that negotiation 
dynamics may still play a role in this respect. This and the other theoretical perspectives 
will be revisited when the findings of this study are reflected upon in the last chapter.
1.5 Methodology
The influence analysis is based mainly on primary, written sources. First, formal written 
sources, such as position papers, Presidency papers and (draft) Treaty texts, are utilised to 
establish actor preferences and the outcomes of the negotiation process. Second, special 
access to two archives containing informal written sources was obtained, which allowed for 
the reconstruction of the negotiation process (cf. Arts, 1998; Beach, 2005). These included 
the archives of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry, European Integration Department (FA/
DIE) and the European Commission, Secretariat-General, Taskforce Future of the Union 
and institutional matters. These archives contain hundreds of internal, confidential notes 
and reports of the negotiations in general and of (almost) all the specific meetings. In the 
case of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry archive, the author was one of the first to obtain 
access – under a number of specified conditions – to these kinds of informal documents. 
References in this study to informal archive documents are preceded by ‘FA/DIE’ and 
‘Commission’ respectively. A precise description of the files that have been used and the 
way they are referred to in this study can be found under ‘References: informal documents 
(archives)’. Attempts were also made to obtain special access to the archive of the Council 
Secretariat, but it appeared to only be possible to obtain regular access to documents on the 
basis of Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council 
and Commission documents. A more detailed description of the access procedures and the 
general research process can be found in Annex 1: ‘The research process’.
Formal written sources, complemented with informal written sources, are used to apply 
the first part of the method of influence measuring – a before-after analysis (see Chapters 
5 and 6). This analysis consists of establishing the extent of goal-achievement of the par-
ticipating actors by comparing their original preferences with the outcomes on specific 
Nice Treaty issues. Informal written sources are employed to apply the second part of 
the method of influence measuring – a process analysis (see Chapter 7). This analysis is 
based on as accurate a reconstruction of the negotiation process as possible and applies the 
conceptual model developed in the first part of this study.
This study is thus mainly based on document analysis and not, for example, on interviews 
with representatives of the actors who participated in the Nice Treaty negotiation process. 
This has been done on purpose. In order to apply the influence analysis, documents are 
more reliable and more valid than the personal memories of actor representatives voiced 
during interviews. The formal documents, complemented with informal ones, which are 
used to assess actor preferences allow for the precise and objective establishment of what the 
participating actors originally wanted rather than what they presented as their stake for the 
negotiations at different moments in time and in different settings – including the moment 
and setting of the interview. The informal documents used for the process analysis allow 
for an assessment of how the negotiation process actually evolved, including the behaviour 
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of the participating actors, their preferences and their attempts to realise these preferences 
in the outcomes of the negotiation process. The special access to several archives made this 
undertaking feasible. Yet, several interview conversations were conducted to prepare the 
empirical research and to fill in some gaps that remained at the end of the study (see Annex 
2: ‘List of respondents’).
As the before-after and process analyses are rather labour-intensive, it was not feasible to 
study the Nice Treaty negotiation process in its entirety. Therefore, the following five dos-
siers, consisting of 24 issues in total, were selected for the empirical analysis. The reasons 
behind this selection will be clarified at the beginning of the first empirical chapter (Section 
5.2.1). In terms of the first dossier, the Court of Auditors, the main issue was whether or 
not the practice of one member per member state would be maintained after the coming 
expansion. In addition, several issues concerning the position and functioning of the Court 
of Auditors have also been discussed. Regarding the second dossier, the ESDP, the main 
question was whether or not it should be established within the Treaty and, if so, which 
elements to include. The third dossier, closer cooperation, had to do – among other things 
– with the possible relaxation of several conditions for entering into a closer cooperation 
that had been introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. In terms of the size and composition 
of the European Commission, the fourth dossier, the issue was (just as in the case of the 
Court of Auditors) whether the Commission would consist of one member per member 
state or be reduced in size after the expansion. The last dossier, the weighting of votes in 
the Council, concerned choosing a weighting system and drawing up a new distribution 
of votes for the enlarged Union and, related to this, involved the matter of how a qualified 
majority would be reached.
1.6 Outlook
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces broadly the empirical 
object of study, the Nice Treaty negotiation process, and – more theoretically induced – 
discusses several agency and structural elements that characterise this process. In order to 
delve into the core of an EU Treaty negotiation process, Chapter 3 turns to the central 
concepts of power and influence, indicating how they are defined and measured in this 
study. In Chapter 4, the different variables of the conceptual model will be elaborated 
upon, the model will be presented and the expectations for each of the variables will be 
outlined. The empirical findings will be presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In Chapters 
5 and 6, the first part of the influence analysis will be carried out for the Dutch cabinet 
and the other participating actors. This concerns a before-after analysis which is aimed 
at establishing the extent of their goal-achievement. In Chapter 7, the second part of the 
influence analysis is executed – a process analysis, that consists of three steps. This analysis 
is aimed at assessing and explaining the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. In the final 
chapter, Chapter 8, the main conclusions of this study will be presented, resulting in the 
answer to the research question being revealed, followed by some reflections on this and 
on the study as a whole.
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Chapter 2
The Nice Treaty negotiation process
2.1 Introduction
What did the negotiation process resulting in the Treaty of Nice look like, what were its 
outcomes and how can the process be characterised? Before these questions are addressed 
in this chapter, a general note will first be made in Section 2.2 on existing EU Treaties and 
the mechanism through which they are negotiated, which is generally referred to as an In-
tergovernmental Conference (IGC). Subsequently, Section 2.3 will present a global sketch 
of the object of study – the Nice Treaty negotiation process. In Section 2.3.1, the run-up 
to and course of the negotiation process is broadly outlined, with particular attention paid 
to the setting of the agenda. In keeping with the focus of this study on the Dutch cabinet, 
special attention is paid in Section 2.3.2 to the Dutch preparations for and input in the 
negotiation process. Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 discuss the subjects under negotiation and 
the resulting outcomes, respectively. A more detailed analysis of these matters is presented 
in the empirical Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
The second part of this chapter reviews the EU literature on IGC negotiations, which 
offers elements that are characteristic of these negotiations. This allows for the presentation 
of an empirical contextual framework, in which attention is paid to the participating actors 
and the structural environment in which they operate, the negotiation levels as well as the 
negotiation phases and timing. This framework is presented broadly in Section 2.4 and is 
illustrated by the Nice IGC discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 ends the chapter with 
some conclusions and reflections.
2.2 EU Treaties and IGCs
EU Treaty negotiations, i.e. the amendment of existing Treaties and/or the creation of new 
ones, generally take place through an IGC. Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) states that:
‘The government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council 
proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the Union is founded. If the Coun-
cil, after consulting the European Parliament and, where appropriate, the Commission, 
delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representatives of the governments 
of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council 
for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to those 
Treaties. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the case of institutional 
changes in the monetary area. The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by 
all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.’
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This article clearly highlights the intergovernmental nature of EU Treaty negotiations. First, 
the outcomes of the negotiation process, i.e. the decisions stated in a Treaty text, are adopted 
unanimously by the member states, which implies that each member state has a veto in this 
process. Second, the Treaty must be ratified by all member states in accordance with their 
constitutional requirements. For each member state, this involves seeking parliamentary 
approval and in some cases, a referendum may also be required (McDonagh, 1998:6).
IGCs have normally been convened under Article 48 TEU (or its predecessors). However, 
this does not apply to the negotiations that resulted in the Treaty on the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 as well as the Treaty on the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the Treaty on the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, 
or Euratom) in 1957. These negotiations were, after all, the processes that created the Trea-
ties. Though both the EEC and Euratom Treaties are officially referred to as the Treaties 
of Rome, in practice only the EEC Treaty is known as the Treaty of Rome. The European 
Economic Community was later renamed the European Community and the EEC Treaty 
began to be called the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC).
All IGCs since that time have been convened under Article 48 TEU. In 1985, an IGC 
was convened that resulted in the Single European Act (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998). This Act, 
which amended the TEC, was signed in 1986 and enforced in 1987. At the end of 1990, 
another IGC was begun that led to the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht at the end 
of 1991, which was signed in 1992 and came into effect in 1993 (e.g. Laursen & Van-
hoonacker, 1992, 1994; Dyson & Featherstone, 1999). Besides amending the TEC, this 
IGC also resulted in a new Treaty, the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In 1996-1997, 
an IGC was convened that resulted in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed in 1997 
and enforced in 1999 (e.g. Edwards & Pijpers, 1997; McDonagh, 1998; Laursen, 2002). 
The 2000 IGC resulting in the Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001 and took effect in 2003 
(e.g. Galloway, 2001; Laursen, 2006). The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties amended both 
the TEC and the TEU.
After being prepared by the European Convention, another IGC took place in 2003-
2004, resulting in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – known, in short, 
as the Constitutional Treaty (e.g. Amtenbrink, 2005; Curtin, Kellermann, & Blockmans, 
2005; Laursen, 2008). This Treaty would replace the TEC and the TEU, and also included 
new provisions. However, in the course of the subsequent ratification process, the Treaty 
was voted down in referenda held in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005, and 
could therefore not be entered into force. After a reflection period of two years, another 
IGC was convened in 2007 that resulted in the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 
December 2007 (e.g. Griller & Ziller, 2008; Pernice & Tanchev, 2008). The Lisbon Treaty 
included amendments to the TEC and TEU, which would remain in existence. It was 
planned to take effect on 1 January 2009, but this was not possible after 53.4% of Irish 
voters rejected it during a referendum held on 12 June 2008.
2.3 The IGC 2000
In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it became clear during the 1990s 
that the EU would sooner or later be expanded to include Central and Eastern European 
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countries. In order to ensure that EU institutions would continue to function efficiently 
after this enlargement, the widely-held opinion was that these institutions, which had 
originally been set up only for the six founding member states, had to be reformed. Al-
though this matter had already been on the agenda at the Maastricht IGC, it was during 
the Amsterdam IGC when member states really began to attempt to reform the institu-
tions. In particular, the size and composition of the Commission, the extension of QMV 
and the weighting of votes in the Council were discussed. Unfortunately, though, the 
Amsterdam Treaty negotiations failed in the reform attempts. The widely-held opinion 
then became that the IGC 2000 would have to settle these issues after all. In the meantime, 
the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 had opened accession negotia-
tions with six countries. These negotiations developed relatively smoothly after that. The 
Helsinki European Council of December 1999, on the eve of the IGC 2000 and sooner 
than expected, extended the group of accession countries to six other countries. These 
developments put even more pressure on the IGC 2000 to produce satisfactory reforms.
2.3.1 The run-up to and course of the IGC 2000
During the Amsterdam European Council of 16-17 June 1997, the Heads of State or 
Government were unable to come to an agreement on the size and composition of the 
Commission and the weighting of votes in the Council. They did, however, agree on a 
Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union. This 
Institutional Protocol consisted of the following two articles:
Article 1
‘At the date of entry into force of the first enlargement of the Union (…) the Commission 
shall comprise one national of each of the Member States, provided that, by that date, 
the weighting of the votes in the Council has been modified, whether by re-weighting of 
the votes or by dual majority, in a manner acceptable to all Member States, taking into 
account all relevant elements, notably compensating those Member States which give 
up the possibility of nominating a second member of the Commission.’
Article 2
‘At least one year before the membership of the European Union exceeds twenty, a con-
ference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened 
in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on the 
composition and functioning of the institutions.’
In addition to the Institutional Protocol, Belgium, France and Italy declared in Amsterdam 
that a significant extension of QMV, as part of the process of reinforcing the institutions, 
was indispensable for the EU to be prepared for enlargement.
It was stated at the Vienna European Council of 11-12 December 1998 that it would 
be decided at the Cologne European Council of June 1999 how and when the institu-
tional issues that had not been resolved by the Amsterdam Treaty would be dealt with (SN 
300/1/98 rev, 11-12 December 1998). One important and politically sensitive question 
related to this that had to be asked was what would be the scope of the agenda of a new 
IGC. A minor agenda in line with Article 1 of the Protocol and the Declaration mentioned 
above would only concern the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of 
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votes in the Council and the possible extension of QMV – the institutional ‘leftovers’ from 
Amsterdam. A moderate agenda would also consider several other institutional amend-
ments in connection with the three leftovers and in implementing the Amsterdam Treaty. 
A broad agenda in line with Article 2 of the Protocol would consist of a comprehensive 
review of the Treaty provisions concerning the composition and functioning of the institu-
tions (SN 501/99, 10 May 1999).
The first official discussions on the IGC took place in COREPER and the General 
Affairs Council in May 1999 (Gray & Stubb, 2001:8). The Cologne European Council 
(3-4 June 1999) confirmed its intent to convene an IGC starting in early 2000 and to be 
concluded at the end of that year (SN 150/99, 3-4 June 1999). In accordance with the 
Protocol and Declaration mentioned, it stated that the IGC would centre on the three 
leftovers. In addition, ‘other necessary amendments to the Treaties arising as regards the 
European institutions in connection with the above issues and in implementing the Treaty 
of Amsterdam’ could be discussed. In doing so, the Heads of State or Government thus 
initially aimed for a moderate agenda. The incoming Finnish Presidency was asked to 
draft ‘on its own responsibility’ a comprehensive report for the Helsinki European Council 
of December 1999 ‘explaining and taking stock of options for resolving the issues to be 
settled’. In doing so, it had to take into account proposals presented by member states, the 
Commission and Parliament.
To prepare this report – and thus the IGC, the Finnish Presidency announced its desire 
to organise ‘technical’ consultations with the Permanent Representatives collectively and 
individually about the subjects to be covered by the IGC. In addition, bilateral ‘political’ 
consultations with member states, the Commission and Parliament would be arranged (SN 
505/1/99 rev1, 7 July 1999). The ‘technical’ meetings of the Permanent Representatives, 
chaired by the Finnish Permanent Representative Satuli, took place after COREPER II 
meetings. On the basis of a Presidency non-paper (SN 506/99, 9 July 1999), the Permanent 
Representatives discussed the size and composition of the Commission (14 July 1999), the 
weighting of votes in the Council (15 September 1999), the possible extension of QMV 
(29 September 1999) and ‘other institutional issues’ (6 October 1999).
In the meantime, on 1 September 1999, the President designate of the Commission, 
Prodi, asked three ‘wise men’ to identify institutional problems that needed to be dealt 
with by the IGC and to present arguments for them. This group, chaired by Dehaene and 
also consisting of Von Weizsäcker and Simon, presented their report entitled ‘The insti-
tutional implications of enlargement’ to the Commission on 18 October 1999 (Dehaene, 
Von Weizsäcker, & Simon, 1999). This report served as the basis for the Commission’s 
contribution to preparations for the IGC of 10 November 1999 (European Commission, 
1999) and its opinion paper on the IGC of 26 January 2000 (see below). At the end of 
the fourth and last meeting of his group on 6 October 1999, the Finnish Permanent Rep-
resentative explicitly indicated that the stake and timing of the Presidency report would 
partly be dependent on the Dehaene report and the Commission’s contribution (FA/DIE/
Preparation report, 7 October 1999). The European Parliament also presented its view on 
the preparation of the IGC 2000 in a resolution that was adopted on 18 November 1999 
(European Parliament, 1999).
In terms of the bilateral ‘political’ consultations, the Finnish Presidency (Permanent 
Representative Satuli and Prime Minister Lipponen) took a tour of the capital cities of the 
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member states in November and early December 1999 to solicit views on the (scope of the) 
IGC agenda in order to be able to take them into account when drafting the Presidency 
report. During a bilateral meeting between Lipponen and the Dutch Prime Minister Kok 
on 1 December 1999, Lipponen showed himself to be sensitive to Kok’s idea of an ‘open 
door formula’ to be included in the Helsinki European Council conclusions; i.e. the idea 
of maintaining the possibility of adding subjects to the agenda later, particularly the ESDP 
and closer cooperation (FA/DIE/Preparation report, 3 December 1999).
On 7 December 1999, the Finnish Presidency issued its report for the Helsinki European 
Council, in which it indicated that the IGC 2000 should come up with solutions for the 
four subjects mentioned in the Cologne European Council conclusions (Council of the 
European Union, 1999a). These subjects included the three leftover issues for which the 
report had already broadly outlined possible solutions, as well as ‘other necessary amend-
ments’. The latter concerned the individual responsibility of Commissioners, the European 
Parliament (allocation of seats and legislative procedures, such as the extension of the co-
decision procedure), the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (e.g. 
organisation, composition and competences) and other institutions and bodies, such as the 
Court of Auditors (particularly its size) and possibly other EU bodies. The report stated 
that the development of a common ESDP and the drafting of a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the Union would be dealt with during separate exercises to be run parallel to the 
IGC. In terms of the ESDP process, the possibility remained that it would result in Treaty 
changes – and thus should be put on the agenda – at a later stage of the Conference. The 
report also stated that it had appeared from the consultations that the subjects of closer 
cooperation and restructuring of the Treaties should not be included on the agenda.
The Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 confirmed that the IGC would 
be convened in February 2000 and completed by December of that year (SN 300/1/99 rev, 
10-11 December 1999). It stated that the IGC would examine the four subjects outlined 
in the Presidency report, but also indicated that the incoming Portuguese Presidency ‘may 
propose additional issues to be taken on the agenda of the Conference’. In doing so, the 
‘open door formula’ Kok had insisted on vis-à-vis Lipponen was, in fact, incorporated. 
It thus left open the possibility of adding more subjects to the agenda, particularly the 
subject of closer cooperation. This occurred on the insistence of the Benelux countries, 
Italy and the Commission (Galloway, 2001:131; Gray & Stubb, 2001:9). The Portuguese 
Presidency would report to the Feira European Council of June 2000 on progress made in 
the IGC and could suggest additional subjects to be placed on the agenda in this report. 
In terms of the ESDP, the Portuguese Presidency was invited to draft an initial progress 
report for the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 and an overall report for the Feira 
European Council ‘containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an 
indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary’. Thus, this formula 
confirmed and worked out in a more concrete way the possibility of taking up ESDP on 
the agenda later in 2000.
Following this, Finland submitted to the Council, pursuant to Article 48 TEU, a pro-
posal for amendments of the Treaties on 13 December 1999 (Council of the European 
Union, 1999c). On 16 December 1999, the Council made a decision approving the letters 
consulting the European Parliament and the European Commission on the proposal to 
convene an IGC (Council of the European Union, 1999d). On 12 January 2000, the 
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Portuguese Presidency sent a letter to the member states, in which it indicated its intention 
to ask the Council at its meeting on 14 February 2000 to deliver an opinion in favour of 
convening the IGC. The Commission and Parliament delivered their respective opinions 
on 26 January 2000 (CONFER 4701/00) and 3 February 2000 (CONFER 4702/00). 
Following this, the Presidency invited the Council on 7 February 2000 to deliver an opin-
ion in favour of calling an IGC (CONFER 4703/00). This did, indeed, occur during the 
General Affairs Council of 14 February 2000, after which the Presidency formally opened 
the IGC in the margins of this Council. The next day, 15 February 2000, the IGC began 
its work with a discussion on the possible extension of QMV.
On 17 February 2000, the Committee of the Regions (COREG) offered its advice on the 
IGC (Committee of the Regions, 2000). The European Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance presented their contribution to the IGC on 25 February 2000 (CONFER/
VAR 3964/00, 28 February 2000). On 1 March 2000, the Economic and Social Committee 
(ESC) presented its advice to the Conference (Economic and Social Committee, 2000).
In line with the Helsinki European Council conclusions, the Portuguese Presidency 
presented a note on 1 March 2000, in which it suggested additional subjects that could 
be put on the agenda, such as a restructuring of the Treaties (CONFER 4716/00). It also 
indicated that it reserved the right to propose the ESDP and the Charter as agenda subjects 
in its report to the Feira European Council.
In the Presidency conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 23-24 March 2000 
(SN 100/1/00 rev, 23-24 March 2000), it was stated only that the European Council took 
note of the progress of the IGC’s work as well as the intention of the Presidency to present, 
on its own responsibility, a comprehensive report to the Feira European Council.
Although the Commission had already included its proposals for the IGC in its opinion 
paper of 26 January 2000, the European Parliament only adopted a resolution to this effect 
on 13 April 2000 (CONFER 4736/00, 3 May 2000). On 18 April 2000, the Court of 
Auditors presented proposals to the IGC (CONFER 4738/00, 2 May 2000).
In consideration of its report to the Feira European Council, the Presidency organised 
bilateral consultations with the member states and EU institutions participating in the 
IGC. In this report (CONFER 4750/00, 14 June 2000), the Presidency documented the 
progress that had been made and the main options that were on the table regarding all sub-
jects discussed thus far. These concerned the European Commission (size and composition, 
internal organisation and related issues, such as individual and collective responsibility), 
the weighting of votes (type of system and QMV threshold), the extension of QMV, the 
European Parliament (allocation of seats and legislative role), the Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance, other institutions and bodies, particularly the size and composition 
of the Court of Auditors, ESC and COREG, other issues, such as Article 7 TEU and 
the restructuring of the Treaties as well as closer cooperation. The Presidency officially 
proposed the addition of the subject of closer cooperation to the agenda. It made no such 
proposals for other subjects that it had earlier suggested as additional agenda subjects, such 
as the restructuring of the Treaties, ESDP and the Charter.
During the Feira European Council of 19-20 June 2000, the Heads of State or Govern-
ment explicitly agreed to put closer cooperation on the agenda (SN 200/1/00 rev, 19-20 
June 2000). As to the ESDP, the Presidency report entitled ‘Strengthening the Common 
European Security and Defence Policy’, annexed to the Presidency conclusions, suggested 
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that ‘the issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and 
Nice European Councils’ (Council of the European Union, 2000b).
No Presidency report was presented to the Biarritz European Council of 13-14 Octo-
ber 2000 and no Presidency conclusions were documented from this special, informal 
European Council. Yet during this European Council, Heads of State or Government 
made considerable progress on a number of subjects, particularly on the size of the Com-
mission (Gray & Stubb, 2001:12; see Chapter 7). Concerning the Charter, the Biarritz 
European Council agreed that it would be declared a political document in Nice, without 
being provided legal status, by establishing it in the Treaty. This idea met strong resistance 
particularly from Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland (Galloway, 2001:153). The 
Charter therefore never became a part of the IGC agenda.
The French Presidency presented an initial progress report on the negotiations on 3 No-
vember 2000 (CONFER 4790/00), followed by revised progress reports on 23 November 
2000 (CONFER 4810/00) and 30 November 2000 (CONFER 4815/00). On 6 Decem-
ber 2000, the Presidency issued a draft Treaty, which formed the basis of the negotiations 
during the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000. In the meantime, in order to 
prepare its documents, the Presidency conducted a tour of the capital cities in November 
and December 2000.
Only at a meeting on 28 November 2000 did the Presidency propose to include the 
issue of possible ESDP Treaty change as part of the broader package on the ESDP to be 
presented to the Nice European Council. Therefore this issue was only officially discussed 
in Nice, followed by a discussion on substantive Treaty changes based on the proposals Italy 
and the Benelux countries had earlier made on 23 October 2000 (CONFER 4788/00).
All meetings of the IGC 2000 are outlined in Table 2.1, where the subjects that have 
been discussed on the basis of which particular documents are indicated.
Table 2.1 The IGC 2000 (compiled by the author)
Date Meeting Subjects Documents*
14 February 2000 GAC Opening IGC
Organisation of work
4701/00, 4702/00, 
4703/00
4704/1/00 rev1
15 February 2000 PG Organisation of work
Mandate to Friends of the Presidency Group
QMV
4704/2/00 rev2
SN 501/00
4705/1/00 rev1, 
4706/1/00 rev1
22 February 2000 PG QMV
EP
Court of Auditors, ESC, COREG
Closer cooperation
4705/1/00 rev1
4706/1/00 rev1
4707/00
4708/00
4709/00
4710/00
4711/00
4713/00
4715/00
-
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Date Meeting Subjects Documents*
7 March 2000 PG QMV
Other possible agenda subjects
Commission size; weighting of votes
4707/00
4708/00
4709/00
4710/00
4711/00
4716/00
-
20 March 2000 GAC Commission size; weighting of votes Semi-formal Presidency 
letter, unknown date
28 March 2000 PG QMV
Commission
4710/00, 4711/00
4727/00
4 April 2000 PG Weighting of votes
Interim report Friends of the Presidency Group
4728/00
4729/00
10 April 2000 GAC QMV
Evaluation of work by PG
Provisional work programme
4734/00
-
4732/00
14 April 2000 PG Closer cooperation SN 502/00
2 May 2000 PG QMV 4737/00
6-7 May 2000 GAC (Conclave) ESDP (practically) -
16 May 2000 PG EP
Court of Auditors, ESC, COREG
Oral report Friends of the Presidency Group
4740/00
4741/00
-
22 May 2000 GAC EP; ECJ and CFI 4743/00
30 May 2000 PG Commission
Weighting of votes
4744/00; SN 2685/00
4745/00
6 June 2000 PG Weighting of votes
Presidency report Friends of the Presidency Group
Article 7 TEU
External economic relations
Legislative acts
Restructuring the Treaties
4745/00
4747/00
4739/00
SN 2705/00
SN 3068/00
-
12-13 June 2000 GAC Other possible additional agenda subjects (closer cooperation, Article 7 TEU, 
restructuring of the Treaties, ESDP, Charter)
-
19-20 June 2000 Feira EC Presidency report (Commission, weighting of votes, QMV, EP, ECJ and CFI, 
Court of Auditors, ESC and COREG, other issues, such as Article 7 TEU and 
restructuring of the Treaties as well as closer cooperation)
4750/00
6 July 2000 PG Organisation of work
QMV
Weighting of votes
4752/00
4753/00
4754/00
10 July 2000 GAC Follow-up Feira EC (in any case Commission, closer cooperation) and 
organisation of work
4755/00
14 July 2000 PG Commission
Closer cooperation
4757/00
4758/00
24 July 2000 GAC (Conclave) Closer cooperation
Commission
4761/00
4762/00
4 September 2000 PG QMV
Closer cooperation
4767/00
4766/00
11 September 2000 PG Report Friends of the Presidency Group
Commission
Other subjects (Article 7 TEU, restructuring of the Treaties, accession to ECHR, 
Belgian proposals – CONFER 4742)
SN 4048/00
-
4768/00
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Date Meeting Subjects Documents*
18 September 2000 GAC QMV
Commission
4770/00
-
25 September 2000 PG EP
Report Friends of the Presidency Group
Weighting of votes
Court of Auditors, ESC, COREG
4771/00
SN 4209/00, 4210/00, 
4279/00
-
4772/00, 4773/00 
(Dutch proposals)
2 October 2000 PG QMV
Statute for European political parties
4776/00
4764/00
8 October 2000 GAC (Conclave) Closer cooperation
Weighting of votes
Article 7 TEU
4780/00
4781/00
4782/00
9 October 2000 GAC Evaluation of work, particularly closer cooperation, weighting of votes and 
Article 7 TEU
-
13-14 October 2000 Biarritz EC Commission, weighting of votes, QMV, closer cooperation, Article 7 TEU -
23 October 2000 PG QMV
Article 7 TEU
Closer cooperation
Commission, weighting of votes
4784/00
4785/00
4786/00
-
30 October 2000 PG QMV
Closer cooperation
Report Friends of the Presidency Group
Statute for European political parties
European Public Prosecutor
ESDP (Italy and Benelux proposals)
Commission
4789/00
4786/00
SN 4840/00, 4841/00
4764/00
4779/00
4788/00
-
4 November 2000 PG Progress report (QMV, closer cooperation, EP, ECJ and CFI, Article 7 TEU)
Weighting of votes
4790/00, SN 506/00
-
13 November 2000 PG QMV
Weighting of votes
Commission
Closer cooperation
Report Friends of the Presidency Group
Other subjects (possible inclusion of reference to Charter in Article 6 TEU, 
inter-institutional agreements, accession to ECHR)
4795/00
4796/00
4797/00
4798/00
SN 5058/00, 5059/00
4792/00
19 November 2000 GAC (Conclave) QMV
Weighting of votes
Commission
Possible inclusion of reference to Charter in Article 6 TEU
4800/00
4801/00
4802/00
4804/00
20 November 2000 GAC Evaluation of work (Commission, weighting of votes, QMV, possible inclusion 
of reference to Charter in Article 6 TEU)
Closer cooperation
-
4803/00
24-25 November 
2000
PG Revised progress report
QMV, Commission, weighting of votes, closer cooperation, ECJ and CFI, EP, 
other institutions (in any case Court of Auditors and ESC),
other subjects (Eurojust, inter-institutional agreements, ESDP, ECSC Protocol)
4810/00
4806/1/00 rev1
3 December 2000 GAC (Conclave) Revised progress report
Closer cooperation
Other subjects
Commission
4815/00
4813/00
7-11 December 
2000
Nice EC Draft Treaty of Nice
ESDP
4816/00
4788/00
* Unless otherwise indicated, the documents mentioned are CONFER documents.
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The Treaty of Nice was officially signed on 26 February 2001 and published in the Of-
ficial Journal on 10 March 2001 (2001/C 80/01). The Treaty was ratified by parliamentary 
approval, except for Ireland, which also held a referendum. On 7 June 2001, 53.87% of 
Irish voters voted against the Treaty. A second referendum was then held on 19 October 
2002. This time 62.89% of the voters were in favour of the Treaty. The Treaty of Nice 
entered into force on 1 February 2003.
2.3.2 The preparations and input of the Dutch cabinet
The primary focus of this study is on the Dutch cabinet, so the preparations for and input 
of this actor in the IGC deserve special attention (see Luitwieler & Pijpers, 2006). At the 
time of the Nice IGC, the Netherlands was being governed by the second ‘purple’ coali-
tion (1998-2002), consisting of the Labour party (PvdA), the (conservative) Liberal party 
(VVD) and the smaller (social) Liberal party (D66). The cabinet was headed by Prime 
Minister Wim Kok (PvdA) at that time. The Foreign Affairs Ministry was principally 
responsible for the Dutch cabinet’s contribution to and representation in the negotiation 
process. Jozias van Aarsten was Foreign Affairs Minister and Dick Benschop was State 
Secretary for European Affairs in the Foreign Ministry. Kok, accompanied by Van Aartsen 
or Benschop, represented the Dutch cabinet in the IGC during European Council meet-
ings. Either Van Aartsen or Benschop, assisted by the Personal Representative Bernard 
Bot, acted as the Dutch representatives during General Affairs Council meetings. Bernard 
Bot, the Dutch Permanent Representative at the EU, was the Dutch representative at the 
Preparatory Group level (see Bot, 2003).
In early 1999, an IGC Taskforce was set up at the European Integration Department 
(DIE) of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, chaired by Aldrik Gierveld and also consisting of a 
couple of other officials. The officials of the Taskforce were primarily in charge of prepar-
ing for the IGC meetings by drafting notes, memoranda and ‘speaking points’, assisting 
their political superiors during these meetings and reporting on them afterwards both 
internally and to parliament. In addition, these officials undertook informal bilateral 
and multilateral contacts with other actors to convince them of the Dutch preferences 
and built networks with actors who had the same preferences. Moreover, the Taskforce 
officials made contact with ambassadors and officials from the Dutch embassies in the 
different member states and with officials from these member states’ embassies in The 
Hague. They consulted particularly and regularly in The Hague with officials from the 
Dutch embassies in the five big member states plus an official from the Permanent Rep-
resentation, Berend Jan Drijber, who usually assisted Bernard Bot (‘klankbordgroep’). 
The Director-General for European Cooperation (DGES) Tom de Bruijn, the Director 
of DIE Pieter de Gooijer and Bot’s assistant were also very much involved in all these 
activities.
The Dutch cabinet issued four position papers on the IGC, which were presented to 
the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament. The first position paper was issued on 21 
May 1999 and broadly dealt with the background, scope, way of preparation and negotia-
tion, and timing of the IGC (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1998-1999, 26 559, nr. 1). In 
view of the coming enlargement to include many small member states, the position paper 
formulated two Dutch interests that the IGC had to safeguard. First, the EU institutions 
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had to be strengthened, to prevent individual member states from acquiring too dominant 
of a role. Second, Dutch influence in an enlarged Union had to be maintained, considering 
that the Netherlands deserved to hold a strong position because of its demographic and 
economic weight. In light of these two interests, the Dutch cabinet adopted as operational 
yardsticks for the negotiations an improvement in both the efficiency and legitimacy of the 
EU. In this respect, the Dutch cabinet pleaded for a broad agenda for the IGC.
In its second position paper of 15 November 1999, the Dutch cabinet presented more 
specifically its preferences for the scope and issues on the agenda (Tweede Kamer, vergader-
jaar 1999-2000, 21 501-20, nr. 101). An English translation of this second position paper 
was presented to the IGC as the official Dutch position paper (CONFER 4720/00, 6 
March 2000). The Dutch cabinet advocated a broad scope for the agenda, in keeping with 
Article 2 of the Institutional Protocol, because several developments since Amsterdam had 
necessitated a ‘comprehensive review’. Most notably, accession negotiations had begun or 
were being prepared with twelve candidate countries in that time, which would probably 
result in an EU constituting more than 20 member states within a few years. A broad 
agenda would guarantee that the institutions were reformed to such an extent as to enable 
the Union to function well after enlargement. This would assist in avoiding the need for 
another IGC to be convened halfway through the enlargement process, which would fur-
ther delay the process. At the same time, the Dutch cabinet realised the contentiousness of 
the leftovers and felt that the agenda should not become unmanageable. After all, the IGC 
had to be concluded before the end of 2000 – again, to avoid a delay in the enlargement 
process. As such, the Dutch cabinet suggested the following agenda:
 -  the three leftovers;
 -  topics related to these issues, such as co-decision and the individual responsibility of 
Commissioners;
 -  issues crucial to the proper functioning of the Union in light of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
such as the division of labour in the Court of Justice as well as sound financial control 
and management (which included the Court of Auditors);
 -  conditions on closer cooperation between member states within the framework of the 
Union; and
 -  the institutional and legal provisions related to the ESDP.
The Dutch cabinet subsequently made known its preferences on these agenda issues. These 
preferences are discussed in the context of and as the starting point for the before-after 
analysis in Chapter 5.
The third position paper was presented on 9 May 2000 (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 
1999-2000, 26 559, nr. 2). The first part of this paper included the Dutch cabinet’s evalu-
ation of the organisation of work in the IGC and the state of affairs in terms of the scope 
and issues on the agenda. In discussing the agenda issues, the Dutch cabinet reacted to 
the Commission opinion of 26 January 2000. In the second part of this paper, the Dutch 
cabinet provided a rather detailed outline of its preferences for the third leftover – the 
extension of QMV. On 13 November 2000, the Dutch cabinet issued its fourth position 
paper (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 559, nr. 4). Here, the Dutch cabinet 
first provided a general outline of the run-up to and development of the IGC thus far 
and subsequently discussed the state of affairs and the Dutch stake in the issues under 
consideration. In doing the latter, the Dutch cabinet made a connection to the progress 
46 Chapter 2
report of the negotiations that was presented by the French Presidency on 3 November 
2000 (CONFER 4790/00).
The Dutch cabinet also presented, together with Belgium and Luxembourg, a Benelux 
memorandum on 6 December 1999, in which the three member states expressed their 
common preferences on the scope and content of the IGC agenda (CONFER 4721/00, 
7 March 2000). A second Benelux memorandum was presented on 29 September 2000 
(CONFER 4787/00, 19 October 2000). These memoranda are processed in the three 
empirical chapters.
2.3.3 The negotiation subjects
During a meeting of the Committee of Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament 
on 10-11 January 2000, the Portuguese Presidency expressed its intent to negotiate on 
three levels and on the basis of five ‘negotiation boxes’. The negotiation levels are discussed 
in Section 2.4.2. The negotiation boxes included the three leftovers, other institutional 
issues and possible additional issues (Commission/Organisation report, 11 January 2000). 
This subsection generally discusses the different subjects of the five negotiation boxes (see, 
more detailed, De Zwaan, 2001; Galloway, 2001; Van Nuffel, 2001).
In terms of the three leftovers, it has already been noted that the Amsterdam IGC did 
not deal with these subjects in a satisfactory manner. With regard to the first leftover – the 
size and composition of the European Commission, the main question was whether the 
Commission should consist of one Commissioner per member state or whether it should 
have a fixed size below the number of member states after the impending enlargement. De-
pending on the answer to this question, another relevant subject was the internal structure 
and functioning of the Commission and particularly the competences of its President.
The second leftover – the weighting of votes in the Council, was linked to the first, in 
the sense of the Institutional Protocol that the big member states had to be compensated 
for giving up their second Commissioner. Another possible reason for compensating the 
big member states with more votes in the Council was the fact that the future enlarge-
ment would consist mainly of small and medium-sized member states. This would further 
heighten the existing imbalance between large and small member states.
The third leftover – the possible extension of QMV, also had to be considered in light of 
the impending enlargement, in the sense that efficient decision-making in a Union of more 
than 20 member states requires a greater application of QMV in the Council. Successive 
IGCs in the past had resulted in the extension of QMV, as a result of which most decisions 
were already made with QMV and the more politically sensitive areas were left over.
The fourth negotiation box concerned other institutional issues related to the three 
leftovers and relevant to the proper implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty. Most of 
these had already been mentioned by the Finnish Presidency in its preparatory report to 
the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 (see Section 2.3.1). Thus, with regard 
to the European Parliament, the allocation of seats had to be revised in consideration of the 
coming accession of new member states and the co-decision procedure might be extended, 
which might be coupled with the extension of QMV. The size and composition of other 
institutions and bodies, such as the Court of Auditors, ESC and COREG, were also dealt 
with. In the case of the Court of Auditors, this also concerned – albeit secondarily – its 
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position and functioning. In relation to the first leftover, the IGC also discussed the indi-
vidual and collective responsibility of Commissioners, with the former type coming into 
prominence after the downfall of the Santer Commission in March 1999.
Another subject in this box was the reform of the European Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance. The problem of the Courts was one of overload, with an increasing 
number of cases taking an increasing amount of time. This problem would only become 
more pressing after enlargement. Thus, the IGC examined the size and composition of the 
Courts, their internal organisation and structure, a new allocation of jurisdiction between 
them and the possible establishment of specialised panels, as well as the matter of how and 
where to present the provisions in the Treaty, the (new) Statute and the Rules of Procedures 
of the Courts. Given the technical and detailed nature of this reform, the IGC decided to 
hand it over to a working group of legal experts (see Section 2.4.2). This working group, 
known as the ‘Friends of the Presidency’ Group, consisted of officials from the member 
states, Commission and European Parliament. Their mandate was discussed during the 
first meeting of the Preparatory Group on 15 February 2000 (SN 501/00, 15 February 
2000). The Group met several times during the IGC and regularly presented progress 
reports to the Preparatory Group.
Another subject in the fourth negotiation box concerned closer cooperation, more spe-
cifically the revision of the provisions for entering into closer cooperation introduced by 
the Amsterdam Treaty. These provisions, known as ‘enabling clauses’, specify the general 
principles, conditions and procedures for a limited number of member states to cooperate 
more closely on a case-by-case basis (Galloway, 2001:130). The revision mainly involved 
defining the scope of application of the provisions under the first and second pillars, relax-
ing the decision-making procedures for initiating closer cooperation, and – as a counterpart 
– safeguarding the interests of the non-participating member states.
The fifth negotiation box consisted of the possible subjects of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and ESDP. As has already been pointed out in Section 2.3.1, the Charter 
eventually was not put on the IGC agenda. The development of an ESDP, which had 
begun at the Cologne European Council of June 1999, implied that a number of decisions 
had to be made in order to put in place the definitive structures necessary for the EU to 
assume its responsibilities in military and civilian crisis management operations (Galloway, 
2001:155). The question regarding the IGC was whether or not Treaty change would be 
required to put these structures into place. At the end of the IGC, it was decided that the 
Treaty would indeed be changed in this respect.
Some other (minor) subjects were raised during the IGC that could be subsumed under 
the fourth negotiation box of other institutional issues (Galloway, 2001:143). One of these 
subjects concerned the possible amendment of Article 7 TEU relating to action by the 
Council in case of the determination of the existence of a ‘serious and persistent breach’ 
by a member state of the principles on which the Union was founded. This article was 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and again required the attention of the IGC in light 
of the bilateral measures of 14 member states against Austria after the formation of a 
government that included members of the Freedom Party.
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2.3.4 The negotiation outcomes
The Nice Treaty negotiation process resulted in many decisions being made on the subjects 
discussed in the previous subsection. However, decisions on some (parts) of these subjects 
and still other subjects were not made, because they were not on the negotiation agenda to 
begin with (‘non-decisions’) or were left undecided although they were a part of the agenda 
(‘not-decisions’; see Section 2.4.3).
In terms of the first leftover – the size and composition of the Commission, the Nice 
Treaty introduced the principle of one Commissioner per member state starting from the 
next Commission’s term of office in 2005. After the accession of the 27th member state, 
the Commission would, however, be composed of fewer members than the number of 
member states, based on a strictly equal rotation system. Considering that the Commission 
would grow in size at least initially, several changes were made to the internal structure 
of the Commission; in particular, the President’s competences were strengthened. The 
President would now decide on the internal organisation of the Commission, structure 
and allocate responsibilities among the Commissioners, appoint vice-presidents and may 
request a Commissioner to resign. For the latter two matters, the President would need to 
first obtain the approval of the College. The decision on the number of vice-presidents – 
until Nice, one or two – was left open and placed in the hands of the President. Another 
important point is that the President would, in the future, be nominated by the Heads of 
State or Government by QMV instead of unanimity.
Regarding the related matter of the individual and collective responsibility of Commis-
sioners (fourth negotiation box), the Nice Treaty did not introduce any changes in terms 
of collective responsibility, except for explicating the collegiate nature of the Commission 
in the Treaty. The existing informal arrangement for a Commissioner to resign if requested 
by the President – the ‘lex-Prodi’ – was codified in the Treaty.
Regarding the second leftover – the weighting of votes in the Council, the outcome was 
a ‘triple majority system’. A qualified majority required a majority of weighted votes, a 
majority of member states and – on demand – 62% of the EU population. A new weight-
ing was arranged for EU-27 that gave relatively more votes to the medium-sized and big 
member states. The Netherlands received 13 votes, one more than the other member states 
in its cluster, particularly Belgium.
In terms of the third leftover – the extension of QMV, the Treaty of Nice introduced 
QMV for around 40 provisions as from the entry into force of the Treaty or on various dates 
after that.2 For the first time, QMV was introduced for appointments to EU institutions, 
such as the Court of Auditors, the Commission President and the High Representative. In 
terms of the most politically sensitive matters, no agreement was reached on social security 
and taxation and only modest progress was made on social policy, while more significant 
changes were introduced for visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, and particularly for specific aspects of the common commercial policy.
Regarding the fourth negotiation box, a new allocation of seats was agreed upon for the 
European Parliament, which introduced a greater degree of proportionality in relation to 
population. The ceiling was raised to 732 seats and the number of seats ranged from five 
2. The exact number depends on how a ‘provision’ is defined.
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seats for Malta to 99 seats for Germany. The co-decision procedure was extended for about 
15 provisions. All concerned provisions for which the IGC had decided to move to QMV; 
no provisions were included for which QMV already applied. In addition, the Parliament’s 
standing before the Court of Justice has been improved in several ways. No decisions were 
made, for example, to clarify the notion of a ‘legislative act’, introduce a ‘hierarchy of 
norms’ or abolish the cooperation procedure.
On the Court of Auditors it was decided that each member state would (maintain to) be 
represented by one member, but this was complemented by the possibility of establishing 
internal chambers for certain categories of reports or opinions. As to strengthening the 
position and functioning of the Court, only minor reforms were made. The Nice Treaty 
created the possibility for the Court to supplement the general statement of assurance 
(SOA) with specific assessments for policy areas. In addition, Declaration 18 invited the 
Court and the national audit institutions to improve their level of cooperation, possibly 
by setting up a Contact Committee. Other reforms, such as granting the Court the right 
of appeal at the European Court of Justice and specifying its information and auditing 
competences, were not decided on.
The number of members from each member state in the ESC and COREG was extrapo-
lated for EU-27, increasing their size to 344 members. The maximum size of these bodies 
was fixed at 350 members. Changes were also made regarding their composition.
Closer cooperation under the first pillar may not undermine the internal market or 
economic and social cohesion. As to the second pillar, closer cooperation may only concern 
the implementation of a joint action or a common position, and security and defence was 
excluded. Several decision-making procedures have been relaxed. The minimum number 
of member states required for closer cooperation is now eight instead of a majority. The 
possibility for a member state to veto an initiative for closer cooperation was formally 
abolished, but the matter can still be referred to the European Council (see Section 5.5). In 
addition, the role of the Commission and the European Parliament has been strengthened 
somewhat. While on the one hand relaxing some conditions that might too easily block 
closer cooperation, on the other hand some principles and conditions have been (re)for-
mulated that protect the interests of the (initially) non-participating member states.
In terms of the ESDP, it was decided that it would be established in the Treaty. As the 
development of the ESDP implied that the EU would take over the tasks of the Western 
European Union (WEU), most references to the WEU in Article 17 TEU have been 
scratched. The new Political and Security Committee (PSC) was established within the 
Treaty and its responsibilities during crisis management operations were formulated. The 
other two bodies that were created as part of the development of the ESDP – the Military 
Committee and the Military Staff, were not established within the Treaty. The relationship 
and cooperation between the ESDP and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
were also not established in the Treaty.
Finally, concerning Article 7 TEU on fundamental rights, an early warning procedure 
was included to determine a risk of a serious breach by a member state of the principles on 
which the Union was founded.
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2.4 Agency and structure in EU Treaty negotiations
In the literature on EU Treaty negotiations, different elements are presented that char-
acterise these negotiations. These elements are both of an agency and structural nature. 
Agency concerns the participating actors and their (lack of ) internal cohesion (Section 
2.4.1). Structure has to do with domestic actors and factors as well as European events 
and developments that, in a way, form an external structure to the participating actors 
(Section 2.4.1) as well as with the levels and phases, particularly timing, which structure 
the negotiations (Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, respectively).
An important argument related to this is that over time, IGC negotiations have become 
more and more structured in terms of its participants and the organisation of the process. 
In this context, an ‘institutionalisation’ of the IGC can be said to have taken place, with the 
result that it is now ‘a regular feature on the European Union political landscape’ (Smith, 
2002:3). This has especially been the case since the mid-1980s, with IGCs taking place 
in 1985, 1990-1991, 1996-1997, 2000, 2003-2004 and 2007. It has been argued that as 
IGCs have begun to take place more frequently, they have become structured based on 
formal and informal rules (Christiansen, 2002; Christiansen et al., 2002; Sverdrup, 2002), 
implying that an ‘acquis conférenciel’ (Christiansen & Jørgensen, 1999; Falkner, 2002:7) 
has developed. It can be argued that the gradual institutionalisation of the IGC has to do 
with the development of formal and informal rules for the ways in which and extent to 
which actors participate, the negotiation levels and the negotiation phases. These will be 
touched on in the upcoming subsections.
2.4.1 The participating actors and their structural environment
With regard to the actors participating in EU Treaty negotiations and the structural environ-
ment in which they operate, the following five points are often emphasised in the literature.
First, as indicated by Article 48 TEU, an EU Treaty is formally negotiated by the member 
states, who determine the amendments to be made ‘by common accord’. Each member 
state therefore has a veto on the outcome of an IGC. This gives them – at least formally – a 
dominant position in IGC negotiations. This dominance is also clear from the extent of 
their participation at all levels of negotiation (see Section 2.4.2). Member state actors often 
present position papers to the IGC in which they outline their preferences for the IGC 
agenda in general and on specific subjects in particular.
There is one member state actor that plays a specific role and has particular responsibil-
ity in the negotiation of an EU Treaty, i.e. the Presidency (e.g. Svensson, 2000; Tallberg, 
2006). The Presidency of the Council of Ministers rotates between the member states of 
the EU, with each member state alternately holding the Presidency for a period of six 
months. The Presidency is the driving force of an IGC, organising the work, scheduling 
the meetings, chairing these meetings and producing discussion papers, progress reports 
and draft Treaty texts that form the basis of successive meetings. These papers are not only 
drafted on the basis of the discussions that take place during the IGC meetings, but also 
following bilateral meetings between the Presidency and the various actors. These meetings 
may take the shape of the Head of State or Government holding the Presidency visiting 
his counterparts in the different capital cities in preparation for (its progress report to) a 
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European Council (so-called ‘tour des capitales’). During these meetings, the Presidency 
may also operate as a broker of compromises among the various actors. It is important to 
be aware that the member state holding the Presidency has both government representa-
tives and Presidency representatives during the different IGC meetings. Therefore it, in 
fact, plays two roles, which may be a source of conflict during the negotiation process.
Second, in addition to member state actors including the one holding the Presidency, 
there are at least three EU level actors that also play a role during EU Treaty negotiations: 
the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council Secretariat, who as-
sists the Presidency during the negotiation process (e.g. Christiansen, 2002; Beach, 2005). 
In addition to there being formal rules concerning their participation, their role has also 
evolved through practice.
As Article 48 TEU makes clear, the European Commission has the right, as do the 
member state governments, to initiate the IGC process (see Section 2.2). Besides, the 
Commission may need to be consulted before an IGC can be convened in the first place. 
Moreover, over time, the European Commission has garnered an increasingly active role in 
the IGC negotiations themselves. This is not based on formal rules laid down in the Trea-
ties, but rather, on established practice. The ‘right’ of the Commission to participate in an 
IGC was established in the 1985 IGC (Christiansen, 2002:39). The Commission normally 
has a representative at the ministerial level and that of the Personal Representatives. As a 
member of the European Council, the Commission President also participates at this level, 
but without having a final say, i.e. a veto, on the outcome. The Commission usually puts 
forward opinions and proposals on the agenda and the subjects under consideration in an 
IGC. This may conflict with another role the Commission traditionally plays, which is 
to operate as a mediator and broker between the positions held by various member states 
(Christiansen, 2002:39-40).
The European Parliament must be consulted on the convention of an IGC, but it does 
not have the right of assent as to the outcome of the IGC – the final Treaty text. The Eu-
ropean Parliament has only recently become involved in the IGC negotiations themselves. 
Its role has developed through practice. During the 1996-97 IGC, two representatives 
from Parliament held additional meetings and at least one informal dinner per month with 
the Personal Representatives. During the Nice IGC this trend intensified, with the two 
representatives now being allowed to attend the meetings of the Personal Representatives 
as ‘observers’, although they were excluded from the (arguably more important) informal 
sessions. The President of the Parliament, assisted by the two representatives, is invited to 
participate during the official opening of the monthly meetings of the Foreign Ministers – 
as is generally the case with regard to the opening of European Council meetings – but has 
to leave when the actual negotiations begin. During the course of the Nice IGC, however, 
the two representatives were invited to participate during the informal ministerial meet-
ings. Like the Commission, the Parliament regularly tables positions on the agenda as a 
whole and on the specific issues that are discussed during the negotiations. Moreover, the 
commitment of some member states, such as Italy and Belgium, to ratify a Treaty only if 
the European Parliament provides its approval, gives it an ‘indirect veto’ over the results of 
Treaty reform (Christiansen, 2002:45; Smith, 2002:17).
The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers – in short, the Council Secretariat 
– is not mentioned at all in Article 48 TEU, but plays a significant de facto role in assisting 
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the Presidency during IGC negotiations. As one observer puts it in reference to the IGC 
negotiations of Amsterdam and Nice: ‘Although all Member States, large and small, played 
an important role in the IGC process, the most influential actors in both of the IGCs 
were the civil servants of the respective Presidencies and the Council Secretariat’ (Stubb, 
2002:8). The Council Secretariat functions as the secretariat for the Conference. In doing 
so, its role in an IGC is similar to the one it plays in secondary law-making between the 
EU institutions, giving it a great amount of experience. As mentioned earlier, the Council 
Secretariat assists the Presidency in its tasks. In addition to logistical support, it shares its 
expertise and experience with the Presidency when drafting the agenda and minutes of the 
meetings, as well as the discussion papers, progress reports and Treaty articles. In addition, 
the Council Secretariat’s Legal Service provides legal advice to the Conference in general 
and to the Presidency in particular. This has now become common practice since the Maas-
tricht Treaty negotiations. This legal advice has to do particularly with the interpretation 
of new or revised Treaty articles. As with the Presidency and the Commission, the Council 
Secretariat may act as a mediator between member state actors (Christiansen, 2002:40; 
Stubb, 2002:21). Given the considerable continuity of its staff in the course of successive 
IGCs – in contrast with the staff of member state actors – it has a lot of experience in this 
specific type of EU negotiation. All in all, the Council Secretariat therefore plays a special 
role and holds a unique position in the negotiation process.
However, it should be noted that in assisting the Presidency, this role is closely related to 
and dependent on the role of the Presidency during IGC negotiations. It may be argued 
that the more the Presidency is willing and able to play an autonomous role during the 
IGC negotiations, the less the Council Secretariat is able to steer the process, and vice 
versa (Christiansen, 2002:47-48; Stubb, 2002:161-162). The willingness and ability of the 
Presidency may be dependent on the nature and size of the member state holding the Presi-
dency, with smaller member states that are more dependent on the Council Secretariat for 
assistance making it more difficult to play an autonomous role (Smith, 2002:18). However, 
it could also be argued that if a Presidency wants to be successful in the IGC negotiations 
at all, it must collaborate closely with the Council Secretariat (Gray & Stubb, 2001:6). In 
reality, close cooperation between the two seems to be the rule, and a Presidency doing it 
on its own – leading to a less successful result – the exception (Christiansen, 2002:47-48). 
In any case, the close relationship and interdependence between the Presidency and the 
Council Secretariat makes it difficult in practice to make a distinction between the two 
actors.
Third, the 18 participating actors discussed above cannot be considered to be unitary 
actors. The unitary actor assumption must be countered (Katzenstein, Keohane, & Kras-
ner, 1998:658) through an understanding that there may be various preferences at play 
behind the apparent unitary actor, which may persist and lead to divergent actions in the 
course of the negotiations at the EU level. The absence of a coherence of preferences and 
a coordination of actions on the part of an actor can be termed the ‘internal divisiveness’ 
of an actor (Van Schendelen, 2005:191). An actor may be internally divided in two ways 
(Christiansen et al., 2002:13-14). Horizontally, there may be different preferences and/
or actions between and/or within different parts of an actor at the same (domestic or EU) 
level. Vertically, there may be different preferences and/or actions between different parts 
at different (national and EU) negotiation levels. For example, horizontally there may be 
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internal divisions between the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Economic Affairs Ministry, 
and vertically there may be internal divisions between the Foreign Affairs Ministry in the 
capital city on the one hand and the Permanent Representation of a member state located 
in Brussels on the other.
Fourth, the participating actors do not operate in a vacuum when negotiating at the 
EU level. Behind the backs of negotiating government representatives, there are all kinds 
of domestic actors and factors that may enable or constrain their behaviour during the 
negotiation process. These include the parliament, the constitutional court, a referendum 
that may be held, the prevailing public opinion, elections that may be held and events 
that occur or political conflicts (Christiansen et al., 2002; Sverdrup, 2002). From the 
perspective of a member state government, these actors and factors at home are in fact of 
a structural nature.
Fifth, in addition to events and political conflicts occurring at the domestic level, events 
and developments at the European and global level – external to the negotiation process – 
may also enable or constrain the participating actors, as they may affect the agenda-setting 
and decision-making processes (Smith, 2002:215-216; Sverdrup, 2002:133-134). For 
example, at the beginning of the Amsterdam IGC, a lot of attention was paid to the BSE 
crisis, while during the first part of the Nice IGC the Portuguese Presidency (and the other 
member state actors) had to cope with sanctions that had been imposed on Austria after 
the formation of a government that included a populist party.
2.4.2 The negotiation levels
IGC negotiations are in fact ‘multi-level’ negotiations that take place at three different 
levels (McDonagh, 1998:17-22; Stubb, 1998; Galloway, 2001; Christiansen, 2002; Smith, 
2002; Stubb, 2002; Beach, 2005). This three-tier structure is similar to the normal Council 
decision-making negotiation structure.
The Heads of State or Government plus the President of the Commission, who meet 
in the European Council, form the highest level of negotiations. The European Council 
meets in a formal session towards the end of a Presidency term in June and December, one 
of which usually constitutes the final summit of an IGC. At this level, the final and politi-
cally sensitive decisions in an IGC are made. It is here that the IGC and the resulting Treaty 
is completed. In addition, it has become normal practice to hold an informal meeting in 
the middle of a term of Presidency. Unlike the formal meetings, the informal European 
Council meetings do not issue official conclusions. The Heads of State or Government are 
accompanied by their Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Commission President is accom-
panied by a member of the Commission. National officials are not allowed to be present, 
except for Presidency officials. The meetings are preceded by an exchange of views with the 
President of the European Parliament.
The negotiating level in the middle is made up of the Foreign Ministers of the different 
member state governments. They usually meet monthly in the margins of the General 
Affairs Council. Whereas in regular EU decision-making the composition of the Council 
of Ministers depends on the subject under consideration, the general responsibility for 
an IGC rests solely with the Foreign Ministers. This level of negotiators is expected to 
provide a link between the higher, political level and the lower, official level. In practice, 
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however, the mid-level does not work well (McDonagh, 1998:20; Gray & Stubb, 2001:20; 
Smith, 2002:14-15; Stubb, 2002:14). Given the lack of time, the Foreign Ministers have 
difficulties making progress in the negotiations. In effect, when there is a political, sensitive 
issue, the Foreign Ministers are inclined to transfer it to the higher, political level, while 
in the case of a more technical, detailed issue they often leave it to the lower, official 
level of negotiators. In addition to the formal meetings, the Foreign Ministers also meet 
informally during ministerial ‘Conclaves’. In a formal meeting they are supported by three 
government officials and in informal meetings they are assisted by their Personal Represen-
tatives only. The Commission is also represented at this level. As is the case with European 
Council meetings, formal ministerial meetings are preceded by an exchange of views with 
the President of the European Parliament, this time accompanied by two representatives 
from this institution.
The third negotiation level involves the Personal Representatives of the Foreign 
Ministers or governments. These are mostly high-ranking officials and, in some cases, 
politicians. When this level is made up of Permanent Representatives, its composition 
is similar to COREPER, which, along with the working groups, does most of the work 
involved in regular EU decision-making on behalf of the Council in its weekly meetings. 
The Personal Representatives meet for one or two days several times a month. It is at this 
level that the bulk of the work – over 95% of it – in an IGC is done (Stubb, 2002:15). 
Issues are negotiated at the most technical and detailed level here, shaping the early 
decisions and draft articles, often in advance of the higher, political levels. Therefore, 
this level is commonly considered to be the most important and effective level of an IGC 
(Smith, 2002:15; Stubb, 2002:16, 161). In formal meetings three government officials 
accompany the representatives, while in informal meetings and ‘confessionals’ they are 
assisted by only one government official. In addition to the Commission, since the Nice 
IGC the European Parliament has also become involved at this level with (at least) two 
‘observers’.
Formal meetings at the ministerial or representative level may also take place in a ‘re-
stricted session’, which means that each delegation is restricted to only one or two members. 
Moreover, informal discussions may take place during lunch or dinner of formal ministerial 
or representatives’ meetings, with each delegation consisting of only one person.
In addition to these three levels, it is possible to distinguish a fourth level, called the 
‘Friends of the Presidency’ Group. This working group may be asked to handle a specific 
legal and technical issue, so as to relieve those at the representative level. It is composed 
of two low-level civil servants from each delegation, including the Commission and the 
European Parliament.
2.4.3 The negotiation phases and timing
Different phases do not formally exist, but practically, different phases can be discerned. 
For instance, a distinction could be made between a preparatory phase preceding an 
IGC and the IGC itself. There are three options for the preparatory work (Commis-
sion/Organisation Council note, 15 April 1999). The first is a group of ‘wise persons’, 
operating at a certain distance, which presents a report on the IGC agenda on the basis 
of rational considerations. The second option is a group consisting of representatives 
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from the member states, the Commission and the Parliament, which drafts an annotated 
agenda for the IGC. This option was chosen to prepare the Amsterdam IGC with the 
‘Reflection Group’. The third option is, in fact, a combination of the first, rational option 
and the second, political option. Here, all member states are involved in the preparations, 
but the drafting of the report is the sole responsibility of the respective Presidency. As was 
made clear in Section 2.3.1, this third approach was utilised in the case of the Nice IGC. 
The Finnish Presidency organised ‘technical’ consultations in the framework of the Satuli 
Group and bilateral ‘political’ consultations with the participating actors, which resulted 
in its preparatory report to the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. Depend-
ing on the option chosen, the actual negotiations already begin in the preparatory phase 
(option 2) or only during the IGC itself (options 1 and 3).
Others make a distinction between an agenda-setting phase, a decision-shaping phase 
and a decision-making phase of an EU Treaty negotiation process (McDonagh, 1998; 
Stubb, 2002).
When approaching an EU Treaty negotiation process from the perspective of power and 
influence, as does this study, it makes sense to distinguish solely between an agenda-setting 
phase and a decision-making phase. This makes sense because it at least allows us to make 
a distinction between three types of outcomes depending on the course of an issue through 
these two phases. An issue results in a non-decision if it is not put on the agenda to begin 
with, in a not-decision if it is part of the agenda but subsequently not decided on and 
in a decision if it is both part of the agenda and decided on (for further discussion, see 
Section 3.4).
There is much variation of when and to what extent agenda-setting and decision-making 
take place during the preparatory and IGC phases. In the case of the Nice IGC, for instance, 
the agenda was only partly defined at the start of the IGC and decision-making had not yet 
begun. This implies that although agenda-setting and decision-making can be analytically 
distinguished as two separate policy phases, in practice the two overlap. This then suggests 
that they cannot be separately studied or omitted. This is an additional reason for taking 
them both into account in this study.
The two phases of agenda-setting and decision-making appear to develop differently for 
different issues in practice. Some issues are put on the agenda and discussed early, whereas 
others only become part of the agenda and are discussed later on during the negotiation 
process. Different issues thus have different time courses across the negotiation process. 
The specific course of time of an issue may be called its ‘negotiation timing’. On the basis 
of the empirical analysis of this study, the distinction between agenda-setting and decision-
making will be evaluated in Section 8.5.1.
2.5 A closer look at the Nice Treaty negotiation process
Do the characterising elements discussed in the previous section make sense when the 
Nice Treaty negotiations are considered as a specific instance of an EU Treaty negotiation 
process?
Starting with the negotiation phases, the Nice Treaty negotiation process can be divided 
into an agenda-setting phase and a decision-making phase, with both taking place at the 
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EU level.3 When going back in time to determine the beginning of the agenda-setting 
phase of an EU Treaty negotiation process, a line must be drawn somewhere that in the 
end is always arbitrary. The natural starting point in the case of the Nice Treaty negotiation 
process is the Treaty of Amsterdam of June 1997, which already outlined some of the 
agenda subjects for the next round of Treaty negotiations. The actual start can be said 
to have been when member state representatives discussed the agenda for the Nice IGC 
for the first time, on the basis of the issues mentioned by the Amsterdam Treaty, which 
occurred in May 1999. The formal start of the decision-making process was the formal 
start of the IGC, on 14 February 2000, and its formal end was the Nice European Council 
of 7-11 December 2000. In practice, however, the agenda-setting process continued after 
the formal start of the IGC, while decision-making had yet to begin. Some issues were not 
put on the agenda at all (non-decisions), while others became part of the agenda but were 
ultimately not decided on (not-decisions) and still others were both put on the agenda and 
decided on (decisions). In terms of the negotiation timing, some issues were negotiated on 
relatively early, whereas others were discussed relatively late in the negotiation process.
In terms of the participating actors, at the time the Nice Treaty was negotiated the EU 
consisted of 15 member states. Although no evidence has been found of member states 
explicitly using their veto, the intergovernmental nature of the endeavour was highlighted 
when some member states objected to specific proposals and provisional outcomes in the 
course of the negotiation process. For example, when the United Kingdom objected to a 
newly proposed closer cooperation outcome, the existing outcome was maintained to the 
advantage of the United Kingdom, but to the disadvantage of the Dutch cabinet. In the 
case of the Nice IGC, eight member states presented formal position papers to the Confer-
ence, in which they outlined their preferences on the general scope and specific subjects 
on the agenda. These member states were the Dutch cabinet, Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. Some also issued common proposals, 
such as the Benelux countries that presented two Benelux proposals during the Conference 
(see empirical chapters).
Finland, as Presidency, prepared the Nice IGC in the second half of 1999. The IGC 
began under the Portuguese Presidency in the first half of 2000 and was completed by the 
French Presidency in December 2000. All three Presidencies held bilateral consultations 
with the member states (‘tour des capitales’) preceding and in preparation of (their progress 
reports to) the Helsinki, Feira and Nice European Councils, respectively.
Whereas the Portuguese Presidency cooperated closely with the Council Secretariat 
during the negotiation process, the French Presidency was an exception in that it oper-
ated rather autonomously. Instead of operating from Brussels in close cooperation with 
its Permanent Representation and the Council Secretariat as is usually the case, the French 
Presidency operated mainly from Paris in an attempt to control the negotiation process. 
In doing so, it exploited its position of holding the Presidency to further its own interests 
on particular subjects (Christiansen, 2002:48; see Chapter 7). As will be made clear in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the Council Secretariat has been more actively involved in some dossiers, 
particularly the ESDP, than in others (Christiansen, 2002:46).
3. It is set aside that prior to and during the agenda-setting and decision-making phases at the EU level, these 
two phases also take place considering the preference formation at the level of the different member states.
The Nice Treaty negotiation process 57
The Commission and the European Parliament have both been consulted on the con-
vention of the IGC. The Commission had already broadly outlined its preferences in its 
contribution to the Finnish preparations in November 1999, and these were further speci-
fied in its opinion paper of 26 January 2000. The European Parliament, on the other hand, 
was rather reluctant to present its preferences due to discontent with the narrow scope of 
the agenda that was agreed upon during the Helsinki European Council and its own role 
in the IGC. It presented its opinion in a short resolution on 3 February 2000, but more 
detailed preferences were only presented on 13 April 2000. Some have stated that this delay 
diminished the impact of the Parliament’s view at this stage of the negotiations (Gray & 
Stubb, 2001:9-10).
As to the role of the Commission and the Parliament during the IGC itself, the Hel-
sinki European Council conclusions of December 1999 provided some specific proposals 
regarding the negotiation levels and the participation of the EU level actors. Concerning 
the first level, the Lisbon European Council of March 2000, which was dedicated mainly 
to economic and social policy, hardly or did not at all discuss IGC matters. Heads of State 
or Government did discuss the IGC during the Feira European Council of June 2000, the 
Biarritz European Council of October 2000 and the Nice European Council of December 
2000, where the final Treaty was agreed upon. These European Council meetings were 
preceded by an exchange of views with the President of the European Parliament, Nicole 
Fontaine, but she had to leave when the negotiations actually began. The Commission was 
represented during the meetings by its President, Romano Prodi, who was accompanied by 
Commissioner Michel Barnier.
The Foreign Ministers in the General Affairs Council formed the second level of negotia-
tions and held the overall political responsibility for the IGC. Barnier was the Commission 
representative at this level. The formal meetings were also preceded by an exchange of views 
with the President of the European Parliament, who was assisted by two representatives of 
this institution. These representatives were not allowed to participate during the formal 
meetings themselves, but in the course of the Nice IGC they were invited to participate 
during the informal meetings.
The representatives of the member state governments met in the ‘Preparatory Group’, 
which was the third level of negotiations. The group consisted of 10 Permanent Represen-
tatives, three senior civil servants and two junior Ministers. Just as at the ministerial level, 
the Commission was represented by Barnier. For the first time, the European Parliament 
was represented at this level by two ‘observers’ – Elmar Brok (European People’s Party) and 
Dimitrios Tsatsos (Party of European Socialists).
The Friends of the Presidency Group, which can be considered to be the fourth level 
of negotiations, was in the case of the Nice IGC asked to deal with the reforms of the 
European Court of Justice, which have been considered in retrospect to be one of the major 
changes agreed upon in Nice (Gray & Stubb, 2001:17-18). The European Parliament and 
the Commission were also allowed to participate at this level.
In terms of the internal coherence of the participating actors, evidence has been found 
that several actors were internally divided on their preferences and/or actions concerning 
specific issues. Thus, within the Dutch cabinet, the Foreign Affairs and Finance Ministries 
had different preferences on the size of the Court of Auditors, which resulted in diverging 
actions during the negotiation process at the EU level (see Sections 5.3.1 and 7.3.1).
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Concerning domestic actors and factors, several – particularly neutral – member states 
were enabled by their parliaments, public opinion and the possibility of a referendum in 
their resistance against ESDP Treaty change (see Section 7.7.3).
Finally, concerning external events and developments at the EU level, the impending 
enlargement particularly affected the Nice Treaty negotiation process. For example, it was 
a constraint for member states that wanted to introduce the principle of one member per 
member state for the Court of Auditors and the European Commission (see Sections 7.4.6 
and 7.13.6, respectively). The German Foreign Affairs Minister Fischer and the French 
President Chirac delivered speeches on the future of the Union, in which they hinted at 
closer cooperation between a limited number of member states outside the Treaty frame-
work. This enabled actors that wanted to relax the conditions for closer cooperation within 
the Treaty framework introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty (see Section 7.10.6).
2.6 Conclusion
The object of study, the Nice Treaty negotiation process, is one specific instance of an 
EU Treaty negotiation process, which normally takes place through an IGC. The IGC 
2000 resulting in the Treaty of Nice primarily dealt with institutional issues in view of the 
coming enlargement to include a considerable number of new member states. The agenda 
for the Nice IGC was partly predefined by the three leftovers of the Amsterdam Treaty 
negotiation process, but was complemented by other issues prior to and during the IGC. 
The negotiation process resulted in many decisions, but several issues were not decided on 
(not-decisions) or had not even been put on the agenda to begin with (non-decisions).
An EU Treaty negotiation process is characterised by actors that negotiate with one 
another within a structural environment at different levels and during different phases. 
The actors participating in the Nice IGC included 15 member state actors and three 
EU level actors – the Commission, the Parliament and the Council Secretariat. The 
negotiation levels were the Heads of State or Government during formal and informal 
European Councils, the Foreign Affairs Ministers during formal and informal (Con-
claves) meetings in the margins of monthly General Affairs Councils and the Personal 
Representatives of the governments during regular formal and informal meetings of the 
Preparatory Group. A fourth level may be distinguished, namely legal experts that meet 
in the Friends of the Presidency Group. The Nice Treaty negotiation process can be 
subdivided into an agenda-setting phase and a decision-making phase. However, the 
extent to which it actually went through these two phases and what its time course was 
varied from issue to issue.
The literature on EU Treaty negotiations discussed in this chapter is useful for this study 
because it offers a contextual framework for the influence analysis, which will take ac-
count of the 18 participating actors, three negotiation levels and two negotiation phases. 
In addition, this discussion results in several agency and structural variables affecting and 
explaining the process of EU Treaty negotiations: the behaviour of the participating actors 
and their degree of internal coherence, the domestic structure (actors and factors) at the 
national level, the negotiation structure (negotiation levels and phases, particularly timing) 
at the EU level and external events and developments at the European and global level. 
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These factors constitute several of the building blocks for the conceptual model of this 
study, which will be presented in Chapter 4.
Though the EU literature that has been discussed thus asks for attention to be paid to 
agency and structure, offering explanatory variables that co-determine the outcome of an 
EU Treaty negotiation process, it is argued that this literature does not touch on the core of 
such a negotiation process: the mutual exertion of influence by the participating actors. For 
this, the central concepts of power and influence, the Political Science and IR literature is 
turned to in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Central concepts
Power and influence in EU Treaty negotiations
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was shown that an EU Treaty negotiation process can be char-
acterised as an increasingly structured multi-actor, multi-level and multi-phase process. 
This empirical contextual framework has several agency and structural variables that affect 
and explain the process of EU Treaty negotiations. These variables constitute several of the 
building blocks for the conceptual model of this study. However, answering the second 
sub-question of how the process of EU Treaty negotiations can be analysed requires turn-
ing to the Political Science and International Relations (IR) literature, particularly on the 
concepts of power and influence. The explanatory variables that came to the fore in the 
previous chapter do not touch on the core of an EU Treaty negotiation process: the mutual 
exertion of influence by the participating actors.
Power and influence are clearly essentially contested concepts. Although both are con-
sidered to be core concepts in Political Science, there has never been any agreement on 
their meaning (e.g. Riker, 1964:341; Baldwin, 2002:177). Any empirical study of power 
and influence inevitably joins a long debate within Political Science generally and IR in 
particular about how to conceptualise and operationalise power and influence (e.g. Riker, 
1964; R. Bell, Edwards, & Wagner, 1969; Baldwin, 2002; Haugaard, 2002). These are, in 
fact, two interrelated parts of the same debate. The choices made on how to define and 
conceptualise power and influence have a clear impact on the choices to be made about 
how to measure and operationalise power and influence.
The first part of this chapter contributes to the conceptual debate by discussing three 
types of distinctions in the debate in Sections 3.2 to 3.4. After discussing the distinctions 
that have been made in the literature, each section illustrates the relevance of each distinc-
tion by indicating how it has been empirically applied by previous studies and how this 
will be done in this study, i.e. the position this study takes and the choices that are made 
vis-à-vis the respective distinction.
Thus, in Section 3.2, the distinction between ‘power as resources’ and ‘power as rela-
tion’ is discussed, which leads to the definition of power and influence adopted by this 
study. In Section 3.3, attention is paid to the distinction between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ 
(anticipated) influence, ending with the identification of the influence attempt mechanism 
as the main focus of this study. Section 3.4 discusses the three faces of power and the 
agency-structure dilemma, leading to the study’s focus on visible decision-making, while 
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also paying some attention to less visible non-decision-making and several structural ele-
ments. There are many more distinctions that could be discussed – some of which will be 
touched on in relation to the three distinctions above – but these three distinctions can 
generally be considered to be particularly important, especially in the context of this study 
(e.g. Baldwin, 2002; Haugaard, 2002).
Although choices are made in each of these sections, it will also be made clear that, at the 
same time – albeit to a limited extent – the study aims to integrate the three distinctions. In 
doing so, several explanatory variables are identified that – together and overlapping partially 
with the variables identified in the previous chapter – form the building blocks of the con-
ceptual model. This model will be further specified and presented in the following chapter.
The second part of this chapter enters the debate on measuring power and influence. 
Section 3.5 discusses several methods of influence measurement that have come to the 
fore in this debate. For each method discussed, a general outline, an empirical application, 
indicating how the method operationalises influence, and some strong and weak points 
will be presented. On the basis of weighting these strong and weak points and in the light 
of this study’s research question and the conceptual choices made in the first part of this 
chapter, the selection of the method for this study is justified in Section 3.6. The selected 
method is a before-after analysis complemented by a process analysis. The chapter is closed 
in Section 3.7 with some conclusions and reflections.
3.2 Power as resources vs. power as relation
The first important distinction made in the debate is between power as resources and 
power as a relationship (Baldwin, 2002). The first subsection explores the distinction in the 
literature theoretically, while the second and third subsections look at how the distinction 
has been empirically applied in previous studies and how it will be applied in this study, 
respectively.
3.2.1 The distinction in the literature
The first distinction concerns two main approaches to power analysis, the ‘power as re-
sources’ approach and the ‘relational power’ approach (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950:75; Van 
Doorn, 1962/63; McFarland, 2001; Baldwin, 2002). In the first approach, the power of 
an actor is equivalent to the amount of resources the actor has at its disposal. Power is a 
possession, the property, capability or capacity of an actor. According to Hobbes ([1651] 
1991:Chapter 10), for example, ‘the power of a man is his present means to obtain some 
future apparent good’. A variant of this approach, which according to Baldwin (2002:178-
179) has traditionally dominated the study of international politics, is the ‘elements of 
national power’ approach. This variant assumes that the power of national states consists 
of several elements, such as its population, territory and army, which can be summed up 
in order to compute the power distribution between states. Examples of the use of this 
approach in the literature include Morgenthau ([1948] 1960) and Waltz (1979).
In the second half of the 20th century, the ‘power as resources’ and ‘elements of national 
power’ approach were challenged by the ‘relational power’ approach. This approach con-
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sidered power to be a relationship between actor A and actor B in which the behaviour 
of the former causes a change in the behaviour of the latter (Simon, 1953; March, 1955; 
Dahl, 1957, 1968; Frey, 1971; Nagel, 1975). This approach has several implications. 
First, conceiving of power and influence as a relationship between actors implies that it 
is only possible to say anything about the power or influence of an actor if it is compared 
to (the power and influence of ) other actors. There is no power-holder without one or 
more power-subjects. Secondly, conceiving of power relationally implies that there is a 
specific type of causation: there is a cause (the behaviour of actor A) and an effect (the 
change in behaviour of actor B) (Dahl, 1968; Nagel, 1975:9-11; Baldwin, 2002:178). 
The causality issue will be dealt with more extensively in the next chapter (Section 4.3). 
Thirdly, the idea of power as a causal relationship between two actors implies that there 
is a time period in between the cause and the effect, which some authors refer to as an 
influence process during which influence is exercised or exerted (e.g. Lasswell & Kaplan, 
1950:71; Simon, 1953:503). Whereas in the ‘power as resources’ approach power is seen 
as a capacity that one possesses without necessarily having to exert it in practice, in the 
‘relational power’ approach it is precisely this actual exertion that is seen as the essence of 
the concept of power. Fourthly, and combining the second and third points, the concept 
of power as a causal relationship between two actors focuses on the actual effect of a cause 
instead of resources or capacity as a potential cause of an effect; this effect is brought about 
in the course of the process in between the cause and effect (during which the exertion of 
influence takes place). For instance, Russell (1938:35) defines power as ‘the production 
of intended effects’.
The distinction between power as resources, property, possession, capability and capacity 
and power as relation and the effect of a capacity, property, etc. is well-expressed in the 
French language, which has a different word for each phenomenon: ‘puissance’, indicating 
capacity, and ‘pouvoir’, indicating an effect. Similarly, Wrong (1979) makes a distinction 
between a ‘dispositional’ and an ‘episodic’ conception of power, referring to ‘capacity’ and 
‘effect’, respectively (cf. Clegg, 1989). In his view, both should be a part of the definition 
of power. Hobbes’ definition is a good example of a dispositional conception, whereas 
Russell’s definition is clearly an episodic one.
Another well-known definition worth discussing to illustrate the distinction is that 
proposed by Dahl (1957:202-203): ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to 
do something that B would not otherwise do’. This definition would be a purely relational 
and episodic one if not for the word ‘can’, which causes Wolfinger (1971a:1079) to call 
it a power as capacity definition. He continues: ‘Since defining power as a capacity to get 
one’s way seems to lead to essentially unverifiable claims about potential power, it would 
be simpler to think of power as a relationship, which would produce a definition like this: 
power is a relationship in which A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ 
(Wolfinger, 1971a:1079; emphasis added, SL). From a relational power approach, the idea 
of power as resources thus only represents potential power. Setting aside the word ‘can’ in 
Dahl’s definition, his definition makes clear that the distinction could also be phrased in 
terms of ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, respectively. In some of his later work, for that matter, 
Dahl indeed omits the word ‘can’, offering a purely relational definition: ‘A influences B to 
the extent that he gets B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1963:40; 
cf. Dahl, 1991:32).
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3.2.2 Examples of this distinction in previous empirical studies
How does this distinction between power as resources, capacity and being dispositional on 
the one hand and power as relation, effect and being episodic on the other hand manifest 
in previous empirical studies about power and influence? More specifically, what choice did 
these studies make about which definition to adhere to?
As mentioned earlier, the relational power approach only came into use during the second 
half of the 20th century. Dahl stated in 1968 that ‘(…) the systematic empirical study of 
power relations is remarkably new’ (Dahl, 1968:414). At that time, the ‘community power 
debate’ had already been underway for some time, in which several scholars focused on 
actor properties or resources in determining how power was distributed in local communi-
ties in the United States. Some prominent studies included the one conducted by Hunter 
(1953) concentrating on the reputation of actors and another by Mills (1956) focusing on 
the positions that actors possess (see Section 3.5 for further discussion).
Dahl has criticised these and other studies for analysing only the potential power of actors 
and not their actual, exerted power (e.g. Dahl, 1958). In reaction to these studies, Dahl 
([1961] 2005) carried out an empirical study of New Haven, which became a pioneering 
example of the relational approach to power. In his study, Dahl reconstructed the making 
of several decisions in three ‘issue-areas’ – political nominations, urban redevelopment 
and public education – in order to establish which of the participating actors had really 
influenced these decisions. In Appendix B on methods and data in his book, Dahl referred 
to his 1957 article, cited in the previous subsection, for the conceptualisation of influence 
used in his study. His operational measure of influence consisted of examining which of 
the participating actors had most frequently initiated proposals that were later adopted 
(without or despite opposition from the other actors) or had vetoed proposals put forward 
by the other participants. It follows from this that Dahl conceives of influence as a causal 
relationship between actors in which one actor has an (episodic) effect on one or more of 
the other actors.
Braam (1981) has examined the influence of shipyards on road and water infrastructure 
policy in the Netherlands. He specifies influence as ‘the number of effects brought about in 
a given period’ (Braam, 1981:9). An effect, in the form of a decision made by the govern-
ment, can be caused by the influence attempt of a firm, or may be the result of anticipation 
by the government (of a firm’s interest). Braam’s study focuses primarily on the effects 
of influence attempts. According to Braam, such effects are the ultimate outcome of an 
influence process, which consists of two additional components: problems and influence 
attempts. Parallel to these three components (problems, influence attempts and effects), an 
influence process can be divided into three aspects of influence:
 -  ‘tested influence’: the percentage of influence attempts of an actor that are granted by the 
government
 -  ‘manifest anticipation’: the percentage of an actor’s problems for which it has undertaken 
influence attempts
 -  ‘latent anticipation’: the number of problems perceived by an actor
The inclusion of ‘potential’ in Braam’s (1981:12) definition of influence is a bit confusing. 
His focus on a government’s change in behaviour, influence as a process and actual effects, 
however, makes it clear that he does, in fact, adopt a relational approach to power.
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As mentioned earlier, the power as resources approach has traditionally dominated the IR 
literature. Despite the development of the relational power approach in the last 50 years, 
the power as resources approach continues to be very popular in this literature (Baldwin, 
2002:179). Examples of this approach are the studies of Morgenthau ([1948] 1960) and 
Waltz (1979).
Only a few IR scholars have attempted to incorporate the relational power approach in 
the study of international politics. Cox and Jacobson (1973), for example, studied (the 
structure of ) influence in eight international organisations. They wanted to understand 
the sources of influence and the way in which influence was exercised by analysing how 
decisions had been made in these organisations. They defined influence as ‘(…) the modi-
fication of one actor’s behaviour by that of another. It is thus a relationship between actors 
– something that emerges in the political process, not something “given” or calculable at 
any time’ (Cox & Jacobson, 1973:3-4). This definition explicitly makes clear that their 
study fits perfectly into the relational power approach.
Another example is the study conducted by Arts (1998). Arts aimed to assess and explain 
to what extent global NGOs (non-governmental organisations) influenced the formation 
and implementation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, which were signed at the United Nations Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. He defined influence as ‘the achievement of (a part of ) one’s policy 
goal with regard to an outcome in treaty formation and implementation, which is (at least 
partly) caused by one’s own and intentional intervention in the political arena and process 
concerned’ (Arts, 1998:58). Arts considered influence to be an episodic effect caused by an 
actor, taking place in and resulting from relations between actors; however, he preferred to 
refer in his definition to the outcome instead of an actor as the effect (Arts, 1998:58-59).
All in all, it turns out that empirical studies adopting a relational power approach have 
been and are still rather infrequent in Political Science generally and in IR in particular. 
Several handbooks and encyclopedia of the discipline were perused in order to be able to 
substantiate this statement (Dahl, 1968; Greenstein & Polsby, 1975; Finifter, 1983, 1993; 
Goodin & Klingemann, 1996; McFarland, 2001; Katznelson & Milner, 2002b; Lentner, 
forthcoming 2010). It is remarkably difficult to find substantial sections in the handbooks 
dealing with power and influence as generally accepted core concepts of Political Science. It 
is even more difficult to find empirical studies in both the handbooks and the encyclopedia 
that apply a relational power approach after Dahl’s pioneering example. In their introduc-
tory chapter, Katznelson and Milner (2002a:14-16) do, for example, distinguish between 
the relational power approach and a more critical, structural approach. Yet no examples are 
mentioned of empirical studies of the former, ‘dominant’ approach while they do further 
elaborate on the latter approach. McFarland (2001) does mention several empirical studies 
that have (indirectly) taken issue with Dahl’s New Haven study, but this was done by 
presenting alternative views competing with Dahl’s pluralism thesis and not by defining 
and measuring influence in line with the relational power approach.
3.2.3 Empirical application: towards defining power and influence
Someone with many power resources is probably generally in a good position to exert 
power in practice, while it is also true that someone not having many power resources may 
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nevertheless be able to exert power in a particular situation. The two are interrelated in 
the sense that the exertion of power is usually sustained by having a capacity for it, while 
at the same time exerting power in practice adds to this capacity. There is, however, no 
necessary connection between the two, because capacity has to be converted into an effect. 
Thus, capacity is only potential power that has to first be converted before we can speak of 
actual power.
In view of the research question on the extent to which the Dutch cabinet has actually 
exerted its influence during the Nice Treaty negotiation process, i.e. the extent to which it 
has particularly affected several decisions made on Nice Treaty issues, a relational approach 
to power is primarily adopted.
In keeping with Wrong (1979), however, it is argued that both capacity and effect are 
important and should be studied in a proper analysis of power and influence. Applying 
this in the context of EU Treaty negotiations, then, the participating actors can be seen to 
enter the negotiation process with a certain capacity that they attempt to convert into an 
effect in the course of this process. The main focus of this study will be on the relations 
between the participating actors, in particular the influence attempts that they undertake 
vis-à-vis one another, and the effect they have on one another and on the outcomes of the 
negotiation process. In order to explain this effect, however, resources are considered to be 
an important variable. Therefore, the resources of an actor form the independent variable 
in the conceptual model (see Section 4.2.2). Thus, although this study clearly chooses 
the relational power approach, to a certain extent it also takes into account the power as 
resources approach.
For some authors, the distinction between capacity and effect is so essential that they 
come up with precisely the terms power and influence, respectively, to name these two 
phenomena. Cox and Jacobson (1973:3-4), for example, state that: ‘(…) influence means 
the modification of one actor’s behaviour by that of another. (…) Influence is to be distin-
guished from power. Power means capability; it is the aggregate of political resources that 
are available to an actor. These resources may be material or not. Power may be converted 
into influence, but it is not necessarily so converted either at all or to its full extent’. Simi-
larly, Kuypers (1973) conceives of ‘power’ as capacity, while he uses the term ‘influence’ to 
describe the effect of the presence or usage of this capacity.
Following this line of reasoning, this study defines power in terms of resources and influ-
ence as a relation. Power is non-relational, but still relative. Power is seen as ‘power to’, 
whereas influence is understood as ‘power over’. In short, power is potential influence:
The power of an actor consists of its resources to exert influence on one or more other actors.
When defining power in terms of resources to exert influence, it is more proper to speak 
of influence resources rather than power resources. From now on, power will therefore be 
described as influence resources.
As was made clear in subsection 3.2.1, defining influence as a relation implies the inclu-
sion of the following elements: a relation between different actors, which is of a causal nature 
and in which one actor has an effect on another actor, brought about during a process. In 
addition, the definition should specify the direction of the effect we are interested in. An 
effect may be contrary to the wishes or preferences of an actor because of the very exertion 
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of influence by this actor. This can be called ‘negative influence’ (Dahl, 1957). This study 
is primarily interested in ‘positive influence’: when the effect caused is in keeping with the 
original preference of the influence-wielder. Therefore, this element is also included in the 
definition (cf. Dahl & Stinebrickner, 2003:17-18):
Influence is a relation between different actors in which the presence or usage of an actor’s 
resources causes an effect, in keeping with its preference, on one or more other actors in the course 
of a process.
In adopting a relational approach to power, this study connects to the research direction 
identified by Baldwin of using the relational power approach to treat power as a dependent 
variable in order to examine the actual power distribution within specified issue-areas and 
within specified regions (Baldwin, 2002:186, 188). It follows from this study’s definition 
of power as resources and influence as a relation that it is more appropriate to speak of 
a relational approach to influence instead of power. In the same vein, influence (and not 
power) is the dependent variable of this study and we are ultimately interested in the actual 
influence distribution regarding specific Nice Treaty issues within the EU, although the 
study will be limited to assessing and explaining the influence of the Dutch cabinet in the 
context of the other participating actors. Therefore, from now on, this study’s terminology 
on power and influence will be consistently utilised, although often the same phenomena 
that are labelled differently by different scholars will be referred to.
3.3 Explicit vs. implicit, anticipated influence
The second important distinction that can be made in the power and influence debate is 
between ‘manifest’ or ‘explicit’ influence and ‘implicit’ or ‘anticipated’ influence (Dahl, 
1970). The latter is usually discussed in connection with Friedrich’s ‘rule of anticipated 
reactions’ (Friedrich, 1941, 1963). Here, the first subsection inquires about the distinction 
in the literature, the second subsection examines how previous empirical studies have dealt 
with the distinction and the third outlines how it will be applied in this study.
3.3.1 The distinction in the literature
As indicated in the previous section, a relational conception of influence holds that the 
behaviour of an actor causes a change in the behaviour of another actor. In the relational 
influence literature, there are mainly two ways that have been identified in which a relation 
between two actors may result in the exertion of influence (Simon, 1953; March, 1955; 
Dahl, 1970; Nagel, 1975). One way for actor A to change the behaviour of actor B is by 
undertaking an influence attempt (e.g. March, 1955:448-450). Another is for actor B to 
change its behaviour because it anticipates a certain reaction from actor A.
In connection with anticipated influence, authors usually refer to Friedrich (1941; 1963), 
who introduced the phenomenon of ‘the rule of the anticipated reactions’. Actor B may 
change its mind or visibly behave in a certain way in order to conform to what it believes 
are the wishes of actor A, without actor A being conscious of this or making attempts to 
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allow actor B to conform to its wishes. Actor B does so because it anticipates a certain 
reaction from actor A: a reward if it conforms to the desires of actor A and punishment if it 
deviates from them. In such a case, actor A can be said to have exerted influence on actor B 
without doing something. Only the presence of actor A has led to the effect on actor B.
There are two other, related distinctions that deserve attention. First, the exertion of 
influence may involve both visible and invisible behaviour. Explicit influence usually in-
volves visible, overt behaviour, at least on the part of actor A, whereas implicit, anticipated 
influence involves less visible, covert behaviour, again at least on the part of actor A. The 
latter may be more covert and thus more difficult to detect empirically than the former, but 
is by no means less important (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, 1963).
Second, the exertion of influence may be intended or unintended. Some authors make 
intentionality conditional for the concept of influence. Weber (1947:152), for example, 
defines power as ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests’. For Wrong (1979), who adopts a revised version of Russell’s (1938) defi-
nition, intentionality is a necessary part of the concept of power. Other authors, however, 
have defined influence in such a way as to also include unintended effects. Nagel defines 
a ‘power relation’ as ‘an actual or potential causal relation between the preferences of an 
actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself ’ (Nagel, 1975:29; see also: Huberts, 
1994:39). Explicit influence is usually intended influence, whereas implicit, anticipated 
influence – not necessarily in all cases, but at least often – is unintended (Wolfinger, 
1971a:1065-1070). In the case of anticipated influence, actor A is often not conscious of 
and did not intend for the effect, brought about only by its presence, to occur. Nagel (1975) 
has rather explicitly elaborated on the working of the two types of influence. He states that 
the exertion of influence may result in an intended effect or an unintended effect, brought 
about through influence attempts and the rule of anticipated reactions, respectively. How-
ever, Nagel only dealt with this conceptually and did not apply it empirically.
3.3.2 Examples of this distinction in previous empirical studies
Most authors conceptually consider influence to be explicit and if they conceptually ac-
count for anticipated influence, they continue to focus mainly on explicit influence in their 
empirical research.
Dahl ([1961] 2005) focused in his empirical study of New Haven mainly on explicit 
influence, but he also paid some attention to implicit, anticipated influence. He found that 
only a few persons had much explicit (‘direct’) influence, in the sense that they successfully 
initiated or vetoed proposals for policies in the three issue-areas. Yet these persons – the 
leaders, had sub-leaders and followers (voters), whose real or imagined preferences (for vot-
ers, expressed through elections) were anticipated by the leaders when making decisions. 
In this way, sub-leaders and voters may exert a considerable amount of implicit (‘indirect’) 
influence. Yet it is clear that Dahl’s findings on anticipated influence were less rigorous than 
his findings on explicit influence, which he based on a precise operational measure. Such a 
precise measurement of anticipated influence was not possible, partly due to ambiguity in 
that leaders do not only respond to the preferences of voters, but also shape these prefer-
ences themselves (Dahl, [1961] 2005:163-165).
Central concepts 69
Similarly, Braam (1981) primarily focused on explicit influence via influence attempts, 
but also tried to detect implicit, anticipated influence without a firm undertaking an influ-
ence attempt (Braam, 1981:28-30, 116-119). He argued that this anticipation may express 
itself in two ways:
 -  in that a firm receives advantages
 -  in that disadvantages for a firm are prevented
In terms of the first option, Braam attempted to inventory decisions that were not made 
in response to influence attempts. The number of those decisions, however, appeared to 
be negligible; almost all decisions were connected to influence attempts. In terms of the 
second option, in addition to the ‘water infrastructure’ problems that were being experi-
enced by the firms themselves, Braam made an inventory of ‘other problems’ faced by the 
firms that were the result of threatening governmental actions (Braam, 1981:102-106). 
In this way, Braam operationalised anticipation as the difference in the extent to which 
small and big firms perceive any negative effects of governmental plans or decisions. An 
initial indicator is examining whether the percentage of ‘other problems’ (as a result of 
threatening governmental actions) in relation to the total number of problems is lower 
for big firms than for small firms. Braam also used some other indicators, in the form of 
specific questions to respondents during interviews. As these indicators did not suggest 
that anticipation by the government of big firms had indeed occurred, Braam left it out of 
consideration for the rest of his study.
The empirical lacuna concerning anticipated influence is also reflected in IR influence 
studies. Rather exceptionally, the case studies included in Cox and Jacobson (1973) did, 
to a certain extent, analyse the anticipated influence of what they call ‘controllers’ in inter-
national organisations. Arts (1998:58) recognised the possibility of unintended effects as 
a result of anticipation, but did not include them in his theoretical model for pragmatic 
reasons. Referring to Van Schendelen (1990) and Bos and Geurts (1994), he has stated that 
it would be very difficult to track down unintended influence in practice. His definition of 
influence, cited in the preceding section, thus explicitly refers to intentionality.
In a later article based on Arts’ dissertation, Arts and Verschuren (1999) did include the 
element of anticipated influence in their definition and measurement of political influence. 
They defined ‘political influence’ as: ‘the achievement of (a part of ) an actor’s goal in politi-
cal decision-making, which is either caused by one’s own intervention or by the decision-
maker’s anticipation’ (Arts & Verschuren, 1999:413). According to them, it could be a 
matter of NGO (A) influence as a result of anticipation by the governments (B) when: the 
own assessment of A’s influence is negative (‘ego-perception’), the governments’ assessment 
of A’s influence is positive (‘alter-perception’) and the researcher’s analysis indicates that A 
achieved its goal, but this goal-achievement could not be ascribed to A’s own intervention 
(Arts & Verschuren, 1999:419).
3.3.3 Empirical application: focusing on explicit influence via influence attempts
Considering that explicit and implicit, anticipated influence have been identified as two 
main types of influence in the literature, this study – at least conceptually – aims to account 
for both. In subsection 3.3.1, it became clear that explicit influence and implicit, anticipated 
influence are usually treated as intended and unintended influence, respectively. It is argued 
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here, though, that the main point is not whether influence is intended or unintended, but 
whether it is exercised explicitly (via influence attempts of A vis-à-vis B) or implicitly (via 
anticipation by B of A). There are two additional reasons not to use the intentionality 
terminology. Firstly, the terminology may be confusing, because an unintended effect can 
also be defined, apart from anticipation, as an unintended side-effect of an intended effect 
(Baldwin, 2002:180-181). Secondly, in the end it is empirically very difficult to prove 
whether an effect was intended or unintended.
At this point, it is worth discussing Nagel (1975) in more detail. Rather than because 
of the distinction he makes between intended and unintended influence, Nagel’s work is 
relevant to this study because he specifies the possible operation of each of the two types 
of influence. Nagel couples the rule of anticipated reactions with the issue of intentionality 
in formulating a mechanism of anticipated, unintended influence. He argues that when 
we take visible behaviour to cause an effect, it is not possible to account for unintended 
effects. In searching out a term that captures both intended and unintended effects, Nagel 
(1975:23-34) suggests taking the concept of ‘preference’ as the independent variable. For 
an intended effect, a preference of actor A causes A’s behaviour, which in turn has an effect 
on actor B. In the case of an unintended effect, a preference of actor A causes the anticipa-
tion by actor B of A’s future reaction, which in turn has an effect on actor B. Here, Nagel is 
in fact dealing with explicit and implicit, anticipated influence, respectively.
This study argues that the exertion of influence can take place both explicitly and implic-
itly and that, in keeping with Nagel, a separate conversion process or mechanism is at work 
for each. It is argued, however, that his choice for ‘preference’ as the independent variable 
is problematic, and that it may be better to use another concept and still account for both 
explicit and implicit, anticipated influence. The problem with ‘preference’ is that it cannot 
in and of itself cause an effect. Moreover, a preference cannot have a varying value, which 
is an expected property of an independent variable.
In keeping with the previous section, this study considers ‘influence resources’ as the 
independent variable causing the effect instead. Influence resources can have a varying 
value: an actor can have many or few and adequate or inadequate influence resources. In 
keeping with the relational influence approach, of which the process in between cause and 
effect is an important element, it is argued that more crucial than influence resources is the 
process through which these influence resources have to be successfully employed before 
we can speak of actual influence. It is argued that for each type of influence, a separate 
conversion process or mechanism is at work: the influence attempt mechanism and the 
anticipation mechanism. These two influence mechanisms thus form a specification of the 
process in between cause and effect. An additional reason for this study, following Kuypers 
(1973), to define influence as the effect of the presence or usage of capacity is to be able to 
account for both explicit (‘usage’) and implicit, anticipated (‘presence’) influence, working 
through the influence attempt mechanism and the anticipation mechanism, respectively.
Broadly put, the influence attempt mechanism operates through the active use of influence 
resources by an actor resulting in an effect. Power, i.e. influence resources, is converted 
into actual influence through influence attempts made by actor A resulting in explicit 
influence. The undertaking of influence attempts by an actor, not surprisingly, forms the 
core of this mechanism. An ‘influence attempt’ is defined as the way in which an actor 
employs its influence resources in order to realise its preference on a specific issue. The 
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anticipation mechanism, on the other hand, is expected to operate through the perception 
and subsequent anticipation by an actor of the reputation for influence of another actor, 
resulting in an effect. Actor B first anticipates the ‘behaviour’ of actor A, which in turn 
causes the effect (actor B making a decision). In the case of the anticipation mechanism, 
influence resources need not be actively employed in order to have an effect: only the 
presence of actor A and its influence resource ‘reputation for influence’ suffices for the 
conversion of this influence resource into actual influence. Reputation for influence is 
one of the influence resources deemed relevant in the context of this study (see Section 
4.2.2). Power is thus converted into influence through the anticipation by actor B of actor 
A resulting in implicit influence. ‘Power’ in the context of the anticipation mechanism 
exclusively denotes the influence resource ‘reputation for influence’ and thus has a narrow 
meaning in this respect.
Although this study conceptually accounts for two influence mechanisms, empirically the 
main focus will be on the influence attempt mechanism. It is not without reason that most 
students of power and influence have refrained from the empirical study of anticipated influ-
ence. As the empirical studies discussed in the previous subsection make clear, the difficulty 
lies in how to detect anticipated influence in practice (Van Schendelen, 1990; Bos & Geurts, 
1994). Some researchers are of the opinion that no method yet exists for measuring this type 
of influence (Huberts, 1994:54). As relational influence scholars have identified implicit, 
anticipated influence as an important type of influence, in addition to the explicit influence 
type, it does not seem to make much sense to exclude this type of influence beforehand 
from the empirical analysis. This study can at least explore what a method of measuring 
anticipated influence could look like. This topic will be revisited in Section 8.5.1.
The core of the anticipation mechanism is that actor B anticipates the reputation for 
influence of actor A, without actor A actively undertaking any influence attempts, but 
simply being there. In line with the study by Arts and Verschuren (1999) described in 
the previous subsection, it is now argued that when actor A has not undertaken influence 
attempts, but has to a greater or lesser extent realised its preference on a specific issue 
(goal-achievement), this might point to the anticipation mechanism being at work. This 
will be further elaborated upon in Section 4.3.3, where it is outlined that the combination 
of goal-achievement and the absence of influence attempts requires the consideration of 
alternative mechanisms, among which is anticipated influence.
Choices have to be made in this study. Regarding the distinction between explicit and 
implicit, anticipated influence, the study’s main focus will be on the influence attempts type 
of influence. This distinction is therefore integrated only to a very limited extent in this 
study. As outlined in Section 1.3.3, this study chooses innovations regarding the other two 
distinctions in applying a relational influence approach to the EU (see previous section) 
and paying attention to the second face of power (see next section). These innovations are 
evaluated in the final chapter (see Section 8.5.1).
3.4 Three faces of power and the agency-structure dilemma
The last distinction in the power and influence debate that is discussed concerns the 
identification of different faces of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974; Dahl, 
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[1961] 2005). The related distinction between ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ was raised in the 
context of the discussion about these faces. Again, the first subsection provides an overview 
of the distinction in the literature, while the second and third subsections outline how 
previous studies have empirically applied the distinction and how this study will deal with 
it, respectively.
3.4.1 The distinction in the literature
As outlined earlier, Dahl ([1961] 2005) has studied the visible behaviour of actors par-
ticipating in decision-making processes in three issue-areas, who attempted to realise their 
preferences in the decisions made. This has been called the first ‘face’ of power: the exercise 
of influence during the process of decision-making.
According to Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963), however, not only should the visible 
behaviour of actors that result in the making of decisions be studied, but attention should 
also be paid to the less visible process of ‘non-decision making’, ‘i.e., the practice of limit-
ing the scope of actual decision-making to “safe” issues by manipulating the dominant 
community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures’ (Bachrach & Baratz, 
1963:632). They call this the second face of power. The existing ‘mobilization of bias’ 
(Schattschneider, 1960) in a society or political community prevents a latent issue from 
becoming manifest, and thus no decision is made about this issue. In this way, the interests 
of some of the actors, whether they are allowed to participate in decision-making or not, 
are not attended to, whereas the interests of the actors that are in accordance with the 
existing ‘mobilization of bias’ are further strengthened. This process may occur consciously, 
when actors intentionally employ the mobilisation of bias against other actors, but also 
unconsciously, when the mere existence of this mobilisation of bias may suffice for the 
‘making’ of non-decisions. A non-decision is not the same as a decision not to decide or 
to decide later on, although these instances could also stem from a certain mobilisation of 
bias.
In addition to the first and second face of power, Lukes (1974) introduced yet another 
face. Lukes deemed the attention paid to non-decision making by the two-dimensional 
view to be a major advance from the one-dimensional view, but it did not go far enough 
for him. In paying attention to non-decision making, the two-dimensional view still had 
as its reference point a decision-making process by individual actors. Lukes rejected these 
views as continuing to be too behaviourist and methodologically individualistic. Instead, 
he asked for attention to be paid to ‘the socially structured and culturally patterned be-
haviour of groups, and practices of institutions’ (Lukes, 1974:22), which could also result 
in potential issues being kept out of politics. Therefore if, following the two-dimensional 
view, ‘grievances’ that are prevented from becoming issues on the political agenda cannot 
be uncovered, this does not imply that there is consensus on these issues and that no 
interests are harmed by the exertion of influence. In a famous quote, Lukes pointed to ‘the 
possibility of false or manipulated consensus’ by which the ‘real interests’ of those subjected 
to influence are suppressed: ‘Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to 
prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order 
of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it 
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as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?’ 
(Lukes, 1974:24).
To sum up, the first face of power is about getting one’s way in decision-making, the 
second face concerns setting the agenda of the available options for decision-making and 
the third face involves shaping the preferences of actors engaging (or not engaging) in 
agenda-setting and decision-making.
The introduction of a second and third face in addition to the first face of power reflects 
a move from an actor-oriented approach to a more structural approach to power and influ-
ence, where attention is paid to hidden, less visible underlying mechanisms. This touches 
on the ‘agency-structure dilemma’ (e.g. Giddens, 1984; Clegg, 1989). This dilemma or 
problem has to do with the question of where power and influence have to be located. Can 
they only or primarily be attributed to actors or to structure(s)? Are actors and structure(s) 
related to each other and, if so, how? While in the first and, to a lesser extent, the second 
face of power the behaviour of actors is considered to be determinative, in the third face 
it is structure that is considered to be the decisive element for the behaviour of actors. 
Giddens (1984) has proposed a middle ground between determinism (of structure vis-à-vis 
actors) and voluntarism (of actors vis-à-vis structure), stating that the behaviour of actors 
is not fully determined, but is still co-determined by structure offering opportunities and 
constraints to the actors.
3.4.2 Examples of this distinction in previous empirical studies
How have previous empirical studies of influence taken account of and applied the three 
faces of power and the agency-structure dilemma? First of all, the first face of power and 
an actor-oriented approach are clearly dominant in empirical studies. This is not surpris-
ing, as the visible behaviour of actors is easier to study than the less visible, underlying 
mechanisms and structure. Yet, there are some scholars who have attempted to find ways 
to take the other faces and structure into account.
A close reading of Dahl’s ([1961] 2005) New Haven study reveals that he did not confine 
himself to the first face of power. Although only marginally, he did also account for what 
he calls the ‘prevailing system of beliefs’ in the community, such as the ‘American creed 
of democracy and equality’ (Dahl, [1961] 2005:84). According to Dahl, for example, the 
limited influence of the social and economic ‘notables’ (see Section 3.5.5), were related to 
this belief system.
Crenson (1971) has carried out an empirical study of the second face of power. His 
study looked at two cities in Indiana with similar population characteristics and dirty 
air levels, and was mainly aimed at explaining why air pollution had already become an 
issue that resulted in local policy in 1949 in one (East Chicago), whereas in the other 
(Gary), air pollution remained a non-issue and no action was taken on it until 1962. His 
explanation for this was that Gary was dominated by one (steel) industry, US Steel, and 
had a strong party organisation, while in East Chicago there were several steel factories and 
no strong party organisation. US Steel was able to prevent the dirty air issue from being 
raised, backed by its reputation for exerting influence, without having to do anything: ‘The 
mere reputation for power, unsupported by acts of power, has been sufficient to inhibit 
the emergence of the dirty air issue’ (Crenson, 1971:124). In short, dirty air remained a 
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non-issue and the exertion of influence through non-decision-making made it such that no 
decision-making took place to begin with. Note also that in Crenson’s study the exertion 
of influence through non-decision-making was connected to the exertion of anticipated 
influence through a reputation for influence.
Braam (1981:35-37, 39-40) has attempted to detect non-decisions by distinguishing 
between three components of the influence process: problems, influence attempts and the 
effects of the firms involved. When firms had problems, but did not undertake influence 
attempts for these problems, Braam considered these to be instances of non-decisions. 
Non-decisions are connected to anticipation – not anticipation by the government of the 
firms as with implicit influence (see Section 3.3.2), but by the firms of the government. The 
extent to which the firms undertake influence attempts for the total number of problems 
they perceive is determined by the extent to which they anticipate that their influence 
attempts will be successful. As has already been outlined in Section 3.2.2, Braam calls this 
aspect of the influence process ‘manifest anticipation’.
Huberts (1988; 1989) aimed to assess and explain to what extent Dutch private actors 
(protest groups, pressure groups and lobby groups) and government bodies exerted their 
influence on 15 decision-making processes to do with the construction of national state 
highways. In his view, the effect caused can be a decision or a non-decision by a political 
decision-maker, but his empirical research was primarily aimed at decisions as the effect. 
Regarding Lukes’ third face, Huberts (1988:21-22) chose a middle ground between deter-
minism (of structure vis-à-vis actors) and voluntarism (of actors vis-à-vis structure). There 
is interaction between actors and structure, so that it can be said that both are important 
in analysing influence. Huberts, however, primarily focused his analysis on the influence 
of actors which was exerted within existing structures. Thus, Huberts treats structure as a 
given. The ‘game’ (between actors) was analysed, not the ‘rules of the game’ (structure). 
This implies that his study did not search out the influence of structure. Structure was, 
however, accounted for in another way. According to Huberts, attention can be paid to the 
‘consequences of structure’ by analysing who has benefited from the outcomes of political 
decision-making processes.
Later on in his book, it was made clear what benefiting means (Huberts, 1988:59-61, 
66-67), i.e. goal-achievement. Referring to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), Huberts stated 
that an important part of the ‘mobilization of bias’ – the ‘selectivity of the political system’ 
due to its ‘rules of the game’ – can be determined by analysing to what extent actors 
have achieved their goals. Huberts thus makes a distinction between benefit and influence, 
which do not necessarily have to go hand in hand. An actor may have reached its goals 
without exerting influence, and vice versa. When an actor systematically achieves its goals 
without exerting any influence, the rules of the game are operating to its benefit.
The rules of the game of a political system and decision-making process are thus a fac-
tor in explaining the extent of goal-achievement. In Chapter 4, Huberts (1988:68-80) 
subsequently drew attention to factors that explain the extent of influence. In addition to 
agency factors, namely the characteristics of the protest and pressure groups and of their 
influence attempts, he mentioned more structural factors, namely the characteristics of the 
political decision-making process, such as the prevailing decision-making procedure that 
determines to what extent an actor has access to the decision-maker, and changes in the 
political context in which the decision-making process takes place, such as cabinet changes 
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as a result of elections, changes in the economic context, notably the state of the economy, 
and changes in the cultural and ideological context, notably public opinion.
Huberts did not make clear what the relationship is between the factors explaining goal-
achievement and those explaining influence, although both contain factors of a structural 
nature. Moreover, the distinction he makes between benefit/goal-achievement and influ-
ence is somewhat problematic. Huberts himself was not being consistent when he argued 
that the exertion of influence by an actor is aimed at goal-achievement (Huberts, 1988:22-
23). This study purports the view that goal-achievement is inevitably tied to influence. 
However, Huberts (1988:278) was right to argue that goal-achievement cannot be equated 
with influence per se. Influence can only be indicated if and when the goal-achievement 
of an actor has been caused by its own influence attempts (cf. Arts, 1998:58-59). This 
is certainly difficult to assess, but this is precisely the reason why this study argues that 
analysing the causal mechanism that links power to influence is crucial for an explanation 
of influence. 
In this study goal-achievement is thus connected to influence, and the extent to which 
influence resources are converted into influence is co-determined by structural variables, 
which include some of the variables identified by Huberts to explain goal-achievement and 
influence: the rules of the game, characteristics of the decision-making process (which may 
be related to the former) and changes in the political, economic and cultural-ideological 
context.
Finally, Arts (1998:60) has added a ‘few structural elements’ to his mainly actor-oriented 
theoretical model. Firstly, he recognised the second face of non-decision-making theo-
retically, but empirically did not inquire into the process of agenda-setting, except for at-
tempts by actors to maintain or alter the agenda during the subsequent policy phases of 
decision-making and implementation. Secondly and in keeping with Giddens (1984), he 
rejected the third face proposed by Lukes as being too deterministic and followed Giddens’ 
‘middle road between determinism and voluntarism’ instead, holding that (the behaviours 
of ) actors are not fully determined by structure, but instead only co-determined by the 
rules of the game and the distribution of resources in a society, providing opportunities 
and constraints to actors. In the context of Arts’ study, rules of the game concern whether 
and how NGOs may participate – together with states and possibly other actors – in 
negotiations. The distribution of resources refers to how influence resources are distributed 
between NGOs, states and other actors in the negotiations. Arts (1998:61-73, 89-92) did, 
in fact, later add two other structural variables that enable and constrain the behaviour of 
the actors: regimes that function as frames of reference for the negotiating actors and events 
and trends in the global environment, economy and politics.
3.4.3 Empirical application: towards analysing actors in a structural context
This study is of the view that both agency and structure should be taken into account, 
however challenging this may be, in a proper analysis of power and influence. The question, 
of course, is how. The research question explicitly addresses the influence of an actor (the 
Dutch cabinet) during a negotiation process. As such and in keeping with the empirical 
studies discussed in the previous subsection, this study is mainly actor-oriented and con-
cerned with the first face of power in decision-making. A normative assumption certainly 
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lies behind the content of the research question, namely that power and influence have to 
be primarily attributed to actors. This is not to say that ‘structure’ is not important to the 
analysis of influence. On the contrary, this study purports the view that structure certainly 
‘matters’ to the analysis and explanation of influence, but not to such an extent that it fully 
determines the behaviour of actors.
The study is thus mainly concerned with the first face of power, but some steps are taken 
to go beyond the first face. In doing so, this study accounts for structure in three ways. 
First, although the primary focus is on the visible behaviour of actors exerting influence 
through the influence attempt mechanism, a second mechanism has been identified in 
the previous section – the anticipation mechanism, which is concerned with less visible 
influence of actors. This mainly conceptual element may not be explicitly structural, but 
goes at least one step further than the first face of power in focusing on the visible attempts 
of actors to influence decision-making.
Secondly, in keeping with Braam (1981), this study aims to detect non-decisions (and 
not-decisions) from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, by looking at the whole influence 
process, starting with the preferences of the Dutch cabinet and subsequently its influence 
attempts. One basic difficulty, however, is that there is no conceptual clarity about the 
definition of a non-decision and no agreement about its ‘researchability’ (e.g. Frey, 1971; 
Wolfinger, 1971a, 1971b; Van der Eijk & Kok, 1975). If a non-decision is about a latent 
issue that does not become manifest and therefore does not get on the political agenda and 
is not decided on, it might indeed be very difficult to trace such instances of non-decisions 
in practice. What can be traced empirically are, however, manifest issues that do not get an 
agenda status.
This study is comparable to Braam’s approach (comparing ‘problems’ with ‘influence 
attempts’). It starts from the preferences of the Dutch cabinet on manifest issues and ex-
amines to what extent the Dutch cabinet manages to get these issues on the agenda and 
subsequently assure that decisions are made in line with its preferences. Contrary to Arts 
(1998), this study therefore not only reconstructs the decision-making process, but also 
the preceding – and partly overlapping – process of agenda-setting, both of which take 
place at the EU level (see Chapter 2). In this study, the term ‘non-decision’ is thus reserved 
for an (manifest) issue that has not been put on the agenda of the Nice Treaty negotiation 
process. In addition, the term ‘not-decision’ is proposed to refer to the position between a 
non-decision and a decision: an (manifest) issue that is put on the agenda but subsequently 
not decided on. The study’s limitation in this respect is that non-decision-making and 
not-decision-making will be examined from the perspective of only one actor, the Dutch 
cabinet (see Chapter 5). Another difference with Braam is that anticipation by the Dutch 
cabinet (of the extent to which its influence attempts will be successful) is considered to 
be only one reason for non-decisions and not-decisions as the outcome of the negotiation 
process. Other reasons may still be theoretically distinguished and empirically detected (for 
further discussion, see Section 4.3.3).
Thirdly, the study rejects Lukes’ third face as being too deterministic and leaving too 
little room for the voluntary behaviour of actors. In addition, his concept of (real) in-
terest is problematic, because determining it depends on highly controversial theoretical 
assumptions (Dahl & Stinebrickner, 2003:14-18). Moreover, it is empirically difficult or 
impossible to detect an actor’s real interest and to assess to what extent it differs from 
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the interest actually expressed by an actor during the negotiation process.4 Therefore, the 
concept of ‘preference’ is taken as the starting point (cf. Nagel, 1975), which is both less 
theory-dependent than the concept of interest and more feasible to study empirically.
Instead, the study chooses, in keeping with Giddens (1984) and Arts (1998), a middle 
ground of structure co-determining the behaviour of actors by providing opportunities 
and constraints.5 More concretely, it is argued that structure co-determines the degree of 
conversion of the influence resources of an actor into actual influence. With the help of 
the empirical influence studies discussed in the previous subsection, in addition to agency 
variables, several structural variables can be discerned that affect and explain the process 
through which influence resources are converted into actual influence. They may enable 
or constrain the (degree of ) conversion of capacity into effect by providing opportunities 
or constraints.
Thus, in keeping with Arts, this study accounts for ‘influence resources’, which is con-
sidered to be an agency variable, but does not account for Arts’ ‘distribution of resources’ 
which were considered to be a part of the structural context in which the actors operated. 
In terms of Huberts’ ‘divisiveness of the political decision-maker’, the ‘internal coherence’ 
of an actor forms one of the influence resources of this study. As for Dahl, Braam, Huberts 
and Arts, ‘influence attempts’ are considered to be an important agency variable in this 
study. Regarding structural variables, this study includes the following ‘domestic structure’ 
variables, which Huberts places under the heading of ‘changes in the political context’: (a 
change in personnel for an actor as a result of ) elections and public opinion. This study 
does not take into account the prevailing decision-making procedure that determines the 
extent to which an actor has access to the decision-maker (for Huberts, a ‘characteristic 
of the political decision-making process’) or whether and how actors may participate 
in the negotiation process (Arts’ ‘rules of the game’). The reason for this is that all 18 
actors participating in the Nice Treaty negotiation process are addressed in the analysis 
and there is no one, single actor that is the decision-maker. Instead, in the case of EU 
Treaty negotiations, all member state actors make decisions together by unanimity (see 
Sections 2.2 and 3.6). Similar to Huberts’ ‘rules of the game’ and Arts’ ‘regimes’, this study 
takes into consideration the ‘negotiation structure’, in the sense of formal and informal 
rules concerning negotiation levels and phases, particularly timing, which structure the 
negotiation process. Finally, ‘external events and developments at the European level’ are 
included in the model, which is comparable to Huberts’ ‘changes in the political, economic 
and cultural-ideological context’ and Arts’ ‘events and trends in the global environment, 
economy and politics’ (see Table 3.1).
Although the study thus accounts for both agency and structure, the main focus remains 
on the actors and their influence attempts, where structure is considered to be the enabling 
or constraining context in which these actors operate. Therefore, the distinction is inte-
grated only to a certain extent.
4. For a further critique of the concept of ‘false consciousness’ and ‘real interests’, see Haugaard, 2002:39-40.
5. Although there is thus a resemblance with Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration, it should be explicitly 
recognised that this study does not ontologically adopt Giddens’ perspective.
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Table 3.1 Agency and structural variables in some empirical influence studies (see Section 4.9 for the 
operationalisation of this study’s variables)
Dahl ([1961] 2005) Huberts (1988; 1989) Arts (1998) Luitwieler (this study)
Agency variables
Influence resources
Yes Yes Yes (‘distribution of 
resources’)
Yes
Influence attempts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Anticipation Yes, but secondarily No No Yes, but only to a very 
limited extent
Structural variables
Domestic structure
Not applicable Not applicable No Yes, but only to a limited 
extent
Negotiation structure Yes, but more broadly 
conceived and in the 
margins (‘prevailing 
system of beliefs’)
Yes (‘rules of the game’; 
‘characteristics of the 
decision-making process’)
Yes (‘rules of the game’; 
‘regimes’)
Yes, but only to a limited 
extent
External events and 
developments
Yes Yes (‘changes in the 
political, economic and 
cultural context’)
Yes (‘events and trends in 
the global environment, 
economy and politics’)
Yes, but only to a limited 
extent
3.5 Methods of influence measurement
The long debate in Political Science about the concepts of power and influence is both 
about how to conceptualise, i.e. define, them, which was discussed in the first part of this 
chapter, and about how to measure them, a question which will now be turned to. These 
two parts of the debate are related to each other. Depending on the specific definition 
of power and influence, scholars may end up with different methods of measuring these 
concepts.
This section presents six methods of influence measurement: the reputation method, 
formal position method, network method, participation method, decision method and 
process analysis. In addition, attention will be paid to the frequent practice of combin-
ing two or more of these methods. Three methods were, in fact, already developed as 
part of the ‘community power debate’ that took place in the 1950s and 1960s (Polsby, 
1968:125-126). At that time, several scholars studied the influence distribution within 
local communities in the United States, using different methodologies: the reputation 
method, formal position method and decision method (Dahl, 1963; Clark, 1968). Still 
other methods can be identified, but these are mostly related to or deduced from the above 
three methods (Van Schendelen, 1990; Huberts & Kleinnijenhuis, 1994; Van Schendelen, 
1998). Another three are discussed – the network method, the participation method and 
process analysis. The first is related to the formal position method and the last two to the 
decision method.
For each method, a general outline, an empirical application indicating how the method 
operationalises influence and an evaluation on the basis of three criteria – feasibility, reli-
ability and validity, will be presented. The feasibility of a method is the extent to which it is 
possible to apply it within the constraints of time and money in a study like this one. The 
reliability of a method is the extent to which repeated applications of a method produce 
the same results. The validity of a method is the extent to which a method measures what 
it is supposed to measure.
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3.5.1 Reputation method
The first method of influence measurement is the reputation method (Dahl, 1963:52; 
Clark, 1968:74-78). The reputation method equates influence with reputation. A panel 
of judges is asked who they think are influential in a certain community in general or 
with respect to specific issues in particular. The answer to this question is treated as being 
in accordance with reality. What is at stake here is the importance that is attached to the 
perceptions that people hold on the influence of actors.
Hunter’s (1953) study of the ‘power structure’ in the community of Atlanta can be seen 
as the prototype research of the reputation method. According to Hunter, a small financial 
and economic elite ruled the city of Atlanta. How did Hunter arrive at this conclusion? 
First, he asked organisations representing four domains of Atlanta to provide him with a 
list of leaders in their domain. The Community Council, a council of civic organisations, 
provided a list of leaders in community affairs, the Chamber of Commerce provided a list 
of business and financial leaders, the League of Women Voters supplied a list of local politi-
cal leaders and newspaper editors and ‘other civic leaders’ provided a list of society leaders 
and ‘leaders of wealth’. Second, a panel of 14 judges was asked who they thought were ‘top 
leaders’ on each of the lists with a total of 175 persons. This resulted in a list of 40 ‘top 
leaders’ (Hunter, 1953:61, 262-271). One would expect them to be the 10 highest-ranking 
persons on each of the four lists, but this appeared not to be the case. Most of them (28) 
appeared to occupy positions in financial and business organisations (Hunter, 1953:76).
Hunter thus operationalised influence as the number of times an individual was men-
tioned as influential by a panel of judges.
How can the reputation method be evaluated in terms of feasibility, reliability and valid-
ity? A strong point of the reputation method is that it is relatively easy to apply in practice, 
i.e. to collect the data. The method can be seen as a valid measurement of an actor’s influ-
ence reputation, which can be an important influence resource. From a relational influence 
perspective, however, the method has a low validity. The argument is that the perceptions 
of panel judges about who they think are influential does not necessarily say much about 
who is actually influential. The validity of the method may be enhanced by increasing the 
number of judges, as Aristotle has already pointed out (Van Schendelen, 1998:16). Often, 
however, the number of judges is small. In terms of reliability, the selection of panel judges 
may be biased, as a result of which repeated selections may lead to different results.
3.5.2 Formal position method
The second method of influence measurement is the formal position method (Dahl, 
1963:52; Clark, 1968:73-74). This method equates influence with a formal position. In-
fluence is attributed to actors that occupy (important) formal positions in an organisation 
or collective.
Mills (1956) applied this method to detect a ‘power elite’ in American society at that 
time. He defined the power elite as ‘those political, economic, and military circles which as 
an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences’ 
(Mills, 1956:18). According to Mills, several developments taking place during and after 
the Second World War had resulted in increasingly enlarged, centralised and interlocking 
80 Chapter 3
hierarchies in the economic, political and military realms of the United States. The power 
elite consisted of those persons occupying the top positions in these three hierarchies and 
whose decisions or failures to make decisions had more consequences for more people than 
ever before.
According to Mills, influence could therefore be operationalised as the occupation of a 
(high) formal position in a hierarchy.
As with the reputation method, the feasibility of the formal position method is relatively 
high. It is rather easy to obtain data on the (important) formal positions within a specific 
organisation and the persons that occupy them. The reliability of the method is dependent 
on whether it is clear which formal positions should be taken into account and whether 
the sources used are distinct. If this is the case, repeated applications of the method should 
produce the same results. Just like the reputation method, the formal position method is 
a valid measure of position as an influence resource. When adopting a relational influence 
approach, however, validity is a weak spot. Occupying an (important) position is not the 
same as actually exerting influence in practice, but instead yields potential influence at best. 
However, even this need not necessarily be the case, as a position may also be a constraint 
for the exertion of influence. Thus, the formal position method need not measure even 
potential influence (Van Schendelen, 1990:125).
3.5.3 Network method
The network method can be seen as an extension of the formal position method (Mokken 
& Stokman, 1976:54; Van Schendelen, 1998:15-16). The network method does not just 
focus on actors who occupy single and formal positions, but on the relations between actors 
holding formal or informal positions within a network.
Mokken and Stokman (1978/79) examined the personal interlocks between the boards 
of directors of 86 large corporations representing 27 industrial sectors, and state and gov-
ernment institutions in 28 policy sectors in the Netherlands. They found 688 interlocks 
generated by 191 persons. These persons connected 80 of the 86 corporations directly with 
the state through one or more interlocks. Moreover, the 17 most central corporations were 
more closely connected with the policy sectors than the other corporations. According to 
Mokken and Stokman, the persons occupying the interlocking directorates have access to 
the decision-making process, which allows them to (partially) determine the outcomes of 
this process, i.e. to exert influence and also, if they possess a monopoly of information and 
access, to determine the set of alternative options for decision-making, i.e. according to 
their definition – to have power.
Though the operationalisation of influence by the network method may differ among 
specific applications of the method, in general influence is operationalised as the number 
and intensity of relations between actors occupying formal or informal positions.
As an extension of the formal position method, the network method can be evaluated 
similarly. Although more difficult than detecting single positions, the relations between ac-
tors in a network are still relatively easy to identify, resulting in a relatively high feasibility. 
The reliability of the method is more problematic than that of the formal position method 
because it is less clear which – particularly informal – positions should be included in the 
analysis, which are also more likely to be based on less rigorous sources. From the perspec-
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tive of relational influence, the validity of the method is again rather low. The existence 
and intensity of relations between different actors in a network does not necessarily imply 
that such a network of actors actually exerts influence on other actors outside the network. 
Again, being part of a network may be an influence resource for an actor, but – from a 
relational influence perspective – yields only potential influence.
3.5.4 Participation method
The fourth method is the participation method (Dahl, 1963:52-53; Van Schendelen, 
1990:126). The participation method equates influence with participation in decision-
making. Influence is attributed to those actors that actually participate in the making of 
decisions about specific issues. Participation is thus not only a necessary condition, but also 
a sufficient condition for the exertion of influence.
It is remarkably difficult to find empirical applications of the participation method stricto 
sensu. More broadly conceived, the method has often been applied in the more general 
sense of participation in social or political activities (see e.g. W. Bell, Hill, & Wright, 
1961). Agger and Ostrom (1956), for example, examined a randomly selected sample of 
260 persons for the extent of their participation in political activities in a local community. 
Although the ‘top leadership group’ of the ‘power structure’ was identified on the basis of 
the reputation method in particular, the 260 persons formed the ‘political sub-structure’, 
being more or less influential in decision-making depending on the extent of their partici-
pation.
In keeping with the narrow definition of the method, it may be stated that the participa-
tion method operationalises influence as the formal participation in a decision-making 
process.
One advantage of this method is that, in most cases, it is not difficult to obtain data 
on who the formal participants of a decision-making process are (feasibility). In terms of 
reliability, it is often quite clear who formally participates and who does not, but this is to a 
certain extent also dependent on the definition utilised. There may, however, be actors who 
do not formally participate in a decision-making process, but still (attempt to) exert influ-
ence informally, behind-the-scenes. This reveals the weakness of the participation method: 
its validity. Actors participating in a decision-making process may anticipate the influence 
of actors not (formally) participating in it, while participation itself may not result in 
actual exertion of influence. Just like having a reputation for influence, holding a position 
and being part of a network, formal participation implies only potential influence from a 
relational influence perspective.
3.5.5 Decision method
The fifth method of influence measurement, the decision method, goes one step further 
than the participation method (Dahl, 1963:53; Clark, 1968:78). Not only does this 
method examine which actors participate in a specific decision-making process, but it 
also examines the extent to which their activities, i.e. influence attempts, are successful 
in that they get their way with the decision that is made. This assessment is based on a 
comparison between the influence attempts of an actor regarding a specific issue and the 
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ultimate decision made on this issue. The more an actor’s influence attempts are reflected in 
the final decision, the more it can be concluded that it has exerted influence. Considering 
the comparison between two points in time, the decision method may also be called the 
‘before-after method’, although this method may also refer – as is the case in this study 
– to a comparison between preferences (instead of influence attempts) and outcomes (see 
Section 3.6).
Dahl’s ([1961] 2005) study of the influence distribution in New Haven, which has 
already been discussed in the first part of this chapter, is considered to be the prototype 
research of the decision method. In his study, Dahl reconstructed the making of several 
important decisions in three ‘issue-areas’ – political nominations, urban redevelopment 
and public education – in order to establish which of the participating actors had really 
influenced these decisions. His operational measure of influence involved examining which 
of the participating actors had most frequently initiated proposals that were later adopted 
(without or despite opposition from the other actors) or vetoed proposals put forward by 
other participants for each of the decisions in the three issue-areas. Dahl found that 50 
persons met the requirement of successfully initiating and vetoing proposals, but only 
three did so in more than one issue-area. More than half exerted influence with regard to 
only one decision. Among the actors successfully initiating or vetoing proposals more than 
once, only a few were social or economic ‘notables’. Thus, there appeared not to be such 
a thing as one ‘ruling elite’ in New Haven, drawn from a single homogeneous stratum, 
which exerted influence on all decisions in all three issue-areas. Instead, influence appeared 
to be distributed pluralistically: different actors exerted influence on different decisions in 
different issue-areas.
Dahl thus operationalised influence as the extent to which an actor’s influence attempts 
are reflected in the decision made.
How can the decision method be evaluated? The feasibility is more problematic than 
in the previous methods, because it is rather time-consuming to reconstruct a decision-
making process in order to identify the influence attempts of the participating actors and 
the ultimate outcome. Provided that the same criteria are used to weigh the activities of 
the participating actors, repeated use of the method should bring about the same results 
(reliability). In terms of validity, the decision method can be positively evaluated from a 
relational influence perspective in that it is at least focused on actual rather than potential 
influence, comparing the influence attempts of actors with the final outcomes of a decision-
making process. In this sense, the decision method is able to overcome the validity problem 
faced by the other methods discussed so far, which measure only potential influence.
Yet the decision method also has its weaknesses in terms of validity. First, the operational 
necessity of the decision method to specify precisely which activities of the participating 
actors are weighted inevitably raises the question of whether these (and not other) activities 
are indeed a valid indicator of influence. Second, depending on the operationalisation of 
the participants’ activities and the specific empirical context of a study, the reflection of 
an actor’s influence attempt in the decision made does not necessarily imply that an actor 
has exerted influence. When the ultimate decision made on an issue (fully or partially) 
coincides with the influence attempts of an actor concerning this issue, it cannot simply 
be concluded from this that it is because of this actor. The influence attempts of another 
actor may actually have resulted in the decision ultimately being made. Coincidence or 
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correlation is not the same as causation. Third, as has already been discussed in Section 
3.4.1, Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963) criticised Dahl’s decision method, stating that 
the exertion of influence may not only be expressed in a visible decision, but also in a less 
visible non-decision.
3.5.6 Process analysis
Related to and building on the decision method, several scholars have put forward variants 
to this method, which are summarised under the heading of ‘process analysis’ (e.g. Cox & 
Jacobson, 1973:24). These variants basically put the process at the core of the influence 
analysis in order to examine whether a correlation between an actor’s influence attempts 
and the ultimate decision – an actor’s goal-achievement – is a matter of causation by this 
actor. This examination is based on a detailed reconstruction of the decision-making pro-
cess and may include other variables in addition to influence attempts by the participating 
actors. The aim of this is to increase the plausibility of the conclusions about the exertion 
of influence.
Huberts (1988; 1989; 1994) developed and applied the ‘intensive process analysis’. As 
with the decision method, this method aims to assess to what extent actors have exerted 
influence in a political decision-making process. The question is which actor(s) has caused 
a specific effect, namely a decision (or a non-decision) of a political decision-maker, and 
to what extent. By producing a detailed reconstruction of the decision-making process, 
examining all participating actors, their influence attempts and the behaviour of the politi-
cal decision-maker, it should be possible to attribute influence to the participating actors. 
The more precise the reconstruction, the more plausible the statements about influence 
would be.
The analysis begins with an examination of the decision made by the political decision-
maker. After this, an examination to determine whether the participating actors have 
influenced the decision at all, or whether the political decision-maker has acted fully au-
tonomously in making the decision, is conducted. In the latter case, it would be – in causal 
terms – a matter of ‘auto-causation’. In order for the intensive process analysis to be applied 
fruitfully, it is important that the political decision-maker changes its preference during the 
decision-making process (‘policy change’). The method assumes that this change has to 
be attributed either to influence attempts (of participating actors) or to the entrance of a 
new political decision-maker (‘personnel’). Therefore, if no change of person took place, a 
preference/policy change has to be attributed to one or more of the participating actors.
The method does not simply make a distinction between actors that did exert influence 
and actors that did not exert influence, but also aims to discriminate further between the 
actors that did exert influence in trying to assess the extent of influence of each of these 
actors. The attribution of influence is based mainly on three factors, or criteria.
Firstly, for the attribution of influence only those actors qualify whose ‘interests and 
demands’ are at least partly met by the decision that is made (factor ‘interest’). Actors for 
which this is not the case can be eliminated from the analysis.
Secondly, actors that expressed a preference for a certain decision only after the political 
decision-maker took up this same preference cannot be attributed any influence (factor 
‘time’ I). These actors are also eliminated from the analysis. This leaves one or more actors 
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that have probably exerted influence on the particular decision. Generally, if the preference 
of an actor changes according to the same pattern as that of the political decision-maker, 
and if this preference change takes place prior to that of the decision-maker, this is an 
indication of the exertion of influence by the actor. Moreover, the exertion of influence 
becomes more likely the shorter the time period between an influence attempt and the 
preference change of the political decision-maker, unless it can be concluded that the 
decision-maker had a reason for suppressing its real interest for some time during the 
decision-making process (factor ‘time’ II).
Thirdly, in addition to the factors ‘interest’ and ‘time’ (I and II), the factor ‘access’ can be 
used to further discriminate between the remaining actors. This is done on the basis of two 
criteria: the ‘frequency’ of access and the degree of ‘directness’ of access. An actor may have 
access to the political decision-maker regularly or incidentally (‘frequency’), verbally or by 
written means (directly) and indirectly via other actors or the media. An actor who has had 
access to the decision-maker more frequently and more directly can be attributed more 
influence than another actor who had less access but also undertook influence attempts at 
the same time.
In general, in order to assess the relative influence of the remaining actors, it may be 
useful to examine the mutual relations between these actors. This can be done by once 
again applying the intensive process analysis just discussed, and by using the same criteria 
of interest, time and access. Thus, the intensive process analysis can be applied to both the 
relation between the actor and political decision-maker and, whenever necessary, to the 
mutual relations between the participating actors themselves.
If influence is attributed to a coalition of actors instead of to a number of separately 
operating actors as was the case until now, the intensive process analysis could again be 
applied to discriminate between the actors within the coalition, but in this case it suffices 
to assess the contribution, in terms of deployed resources, that each actor made to the 
(activities of the) coalition.
The intensive process analysis has been applied by Peters (1999; 2001) and, in a revised 
form and to a limited extent, by Arts (1998).
Since it is a variant of the decision method, the process analysis can be similarly evalu-
ated in terms of feasibility, reliability and validity. Yet including more process variables in 
the influence analysis also implies that the feasibility of the method becomes even more 
problematic. In terms of reliability, the attribution of influence is highly dependent on a 
detailed reconstruction of the decision-making process. Inevitably a selection is and should 
be made when meticulously reconstructing a decision-making process, as a result of which 
repeated reconstructions could lead to different influence distributions. The feasibility and 
reliability of a process analysis becomes more problematic as the decision-making process 
becomes more complex (Van Schendelen, 1990:126; Arts & Verschuren, 1999:415). From 
a relational influence perspective, a process analysis can be positively evaluated in terms of 
validity, because it explicitly focuses on the process during which the exertion of influence 
takes place. This facilitates an assessment of whether or not an actor’s goal-achievement is 
actually the result of its own influence attempts.
It should, however, be recognised that the way Dahl ([1961] 2005) applied the decision 
method in his New Haven study in fact already boiled down to a kind of process analysis. 
His study is not a static account of influence attempts on the one hand and outcomes on 
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the other; instead, these are embedded in a detailed reconstruction of the dynamic decision-
making processes, the participating actors and their interactions. Moreover, adding more 
variables to the analysis does not in itself contribute to more plausible conclusions about 
the exertion of influence. Adding more variables results in more correlations, which can 
still not be equated with causation. The crucial question remains how – with the help of 
these variables – to arrive at valid conclusions about the exertion of influence as a causal 
relation.
3.5.7 Methodological triangulation and/or combination
More often than not, scholars make use of two or more (of the above-mentioned) methods 
in their empirical studies (e.g. Clark, 1968:80-81; Van Schendelen, 1998:17). For instance, 
Cox and Jacobson (1973:24) applied the formal position method, reputation method, de-
cision method as well as a process analysis in their study of international organisations. Arts 
(1998:80-87) complemented the reputation method with a process analysis to assess the 
influence of global NGOs. Applying several research methods separately in order to end up 
with more valid conclusions – possibly after applying a certain weighting of the outcomes 
of the individual methods – is called methodological triangulation (Patton, 1990:187). 
Methodological triangulation is different from a combination or integration of (elements 
of ) different methods into one method. Such a method may be termed a combination 
method. Unlike methodological triangulation, a combination method produces a single 
outcome.
This study applies neither methodological triangulation nor a combination method for 
two reasons. First, there is a difference of opinion about the question of whether method-
ological triangulation and/or combination actually results in more valid findings (e.g. Van 
Schendelen, 1998:17; Arts & Verschuren, 1999). This is, in any case, far from obvious. If 
a single method produces errors, these errors may be multiplied rather than compensated 
by applying methodological triangulation and/or combination. Second and more funda-
mentally, it is argued here that it is possible to select a single method that best suits the 
research question and design of this study. The method for this study is primarily selected 
on the basis of the strengths and weaknesses of the different methods, judged in view of the 
research question. A method is searched out that best fits the relational influence approach 
(see next section). In addition, the method should best fit, i.e. make use of, the detailed, 
written sources of this study.
3.6 Selecting the method of influence measurement for this study
The research question in this study seeks to discover the extent and explanation of the 
influence of the Dutch cabinet during the negotiation process that resulted in the Treaty 
of Nice. In the first part of this chapter, it became clear that the primary interest is not 
in the capacity, or potential, of actors to exert influence, but in the exertion of actual 
influence – as a causal relation – in a decision-making process. This capacity, i.e. influence 
resources, such as the reputation for influence, positions and networks, is important, but 
represents at most potential influence. This will have to be converted in the course of the 
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decision-making process before actual influence is exerted. Influence as a causal relation 
cannot be determined without studying the decision-making process itself. It follows from 
this that a study of this very process is crucial to an analysis and explanation of influence.
Therefore, when selecting a method of influence measurement for this study, methods 
measuring only potential influence (power), because of their low validity, cannot be taken 
to constitute the core of an influence analysis. These include the reputation, position and 
network methods. Their proposed operationalisations can, however, still be useful for this 
study when measuring the power, i.e. influence resources, actors have at their disposal 
during the negotiation process. As stated earlier, and this is not accidental, the reputation 
for influence, positions and networks are considered to be relevant influence resources that 
actors can employ in the course of the process to exert actual influence. It is argued that 
reputation for influence on the one hand and positions and networks on the other hand 
constitute potential influence, which will have to be converted to actual influence through 
anticipation and influence attempts, respectively.
When looking for a method of measuring the exertion of actual influence, the participa-
tion method is a step in the right direction, as it at least focuses on participation in a 
decision-making process. The participation of an actor is at most a necessary condition for 
the exertion of influence during the negotiation process, but even this need not be the 
case (see Section 3.5.4). In any case, mere participation is not a sufficient condition and 
thus cannot be equated with actual influence itself. However, as the primary interest here 
is in the influence of the Dutch cabinet – and not in actors external to the negotiation 
process, even if they may be influential – the least that should be done is to address all other 
formally participating actors in the influence analysis. In this way, the study aims to take 
account of the reputation, position, network and participation methods in the research design 
without applying them as such.
The decision method is another step in the right direction, making a comparison between 
the influence attempts of the participating actors during a decision-making process and the 
decision made at the end of this process. The method aims to focus on the actual exertion 
of influence during this process. Yet a correlation between an actor’s influence attempts 
and the ultimate decision cannot be equated with influence per se. To deal with this is-
sue, a process analysis could be executed on the basis of a detailed reconstruction of the 
decision-making process, where, besides the influence attempts of the participating actors, 
several other variables are included. As indicated in Section 3.5.6, a proper application of 
the decision method requires that a detailed reconstruction of the decision-making process 
be done. In the author’s view, it is precisely this process or mechanism of causation that 
should be studied in order to examine whether a correlation between an actor’s influence 
attempts and a decision is a matter of causation by the actor itself. A process analysis cannot 
solve the problem that, in the end, it is impossible to prove the exertion of influence as a 
causal relation. Yet a process analysis might at least be of help in making the assessment of 
influence as plausible as possible.
Yet the ‘intensive process analysis’ as developed and applied by Huberts, and subsequently 
applied by Peters and partly by Arts, cannot be applied in this empirical study as such.
Section 3.5.6 highlighted the fact that a fruitful application of the intensive process 
analysis requires that the political decision-maker changes its preference during the decision-
making process (‘policy change’). The method assumes that such a change has to be at-
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tributed either to influence attempts by the participating actors or to the entrance of a new 
political decision-maker (‘personnel’). Thus, if no change of person took place on the part 
of the decision-maker, a preference change and a subsequent policy change – when making 
the ultimate decision – have to be attributed to one or more of the participating actors.
This study is, however, about a collective and unanimous decision-making process by 
the 15 member states, without any single one of them being the political decision-maker. 
Although the member state holding the Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat, has 
a special position in the decision-making process, it cannot be said to be the one and only 
decision-maker. This implies that actors do not attempt to exert their influence on only one 
actor who is the political decision-maker, but instead attempt to exert influence on all the 
other actors (to a greater or lesser extent), as in the end, all 15 member states have to agree 
with the decision before it can be made.
If there is no one, single political decision-maker in the study, there cannot be a preference 
change and a resulting policy change on the part of this decision-maker. Instead of focus-
ing on the individual preference (change) of such a political decision-maker, determining 
the ‘collective’ preference (change) of the 15 political decision-makers together could be 
considered. Apart from the empirical difficulty of ‘computing’ the collective preference 
of the 15 – or, when also including the three EU level actors, 18 – actors together and 
registering the changes that take place in this collective preference, the focus of this study 
is rather on analysing a collective process in which the participating actors mutually exert 
influence on one another, resulting in a specific outcome, whatever this outcome may be. It 
is simply assumed that a process of exerting influence takes place, as all participating actors 
want an outcome as close to their preference as possible, and this is not made dependent 
on whether or not a preference change and policy change occur. The solution proposed for 
this study is that it is assumed that the influence attempts by an actor (A) are ultimately 
aimed at all participating actors together as a collective, as if this is only one actor (B) (see 
several of the operationalisations of ‘influence attempts’ in Section 4.9.2, using the term 
‘IGC’ as the collective).
Huberts’ other criteria all assume and are connected to the existence of one, single po-
litical decision-maker and its preference and policy changes. It is this actor that the other 
actors want ‘access’ to, in order to exert their influence on this actor that will ultimately 
make the decision. In this study, the participating actors want to have and do actually have 
access to all the other participating actors, not just one. A similar situation applies to the 
criteria of ‘personnel’ and ‘time’. Therefore, it can be concluded that the intensive process 
analysis cannot be applied in the empirical context of this study as such.
However, a change in personnel of an actor as a result of elections is recognised to pos-
sibly result in a different preference and even in a different outcome of the negotiation 
process. Therefore, it will be incorporated into this study under the heading of the variable 
‘domestic structure’ (see Sections 2.4.1 and 4.4). Moreover, Huberts’ other operationalisa-
tions – of ‘goal-achievement’ and ‘influence attempts’ – may still be considered to be useful 
for this study. This will be revisited in Section 4.8.
As a result, the ‘intensive process analysis’ will not be applied in this study as such. 
However, a kind of process analysis will still be applied as the second part of the influence 
analysis. This study takes the decision method as a starting point for an influence analysis. 
It is argued that before examining the influence attempts of the participating actors, their 
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original preferences on specific issues and the extent to which these preferences are reflected 
in the outcomes of the negotiation process regarding these issues should first be established. 
Without establishing the original preferences of actors, it is not possible to assess whether 
or not they got what they originally wanted. An additional reason to start from actor 
preferences is that, as far as the Dutch cabinet is concerned, it allows for the detection of 
non-decisions and not-decisions in addition to decisions. This first part of the influence 
analysis results in an assessment of the degree of ‘goal-achievement’ of the participating 
actors on selected Nice Treaty issues. This ‘before-after analysis’ will help determine which 
actors potentially exerted influence in a specific instance. Only the actors that partially or 
fully achieved their goals are considered to be potentially influential.
The ‘descriptive’ before-after analysis will be complemented by an ‘explanatory’ process 
analysis. One outcome of the before-after analysis is the division of the Dutch cabinet’s 
goals into two parts: those that it (partially or fully) achieved and those that it did not 
achieve. For the goals that were (partially or fully) achieved, the process analysis will help 
establish whether the Dutch cabinet achieved them by itself, i.e. whether it actually exerted 
influence, and how this influence can be explained. This is done on the basis of as accurate 
a reconstruction of the negotiation process as possible, focusing on the Dutch cabinet, but 
in the context of the other participating actors. In doing so, the focus will primarily be 
on the influence attempts of the participating actors, but secondarily also on several other 
agency and structural variables.
3.7 Conclusion
In arguing that the core of a negotiation process is about the mutual exertion of influence 
by the participating actors, this chapter joined in the long debate about the central concepts 
of power and influence. The first, conceptual part of this chapter discussed three important 
distinctions in this debate. After providing an overview of the respective distinctions in the 
literature, each section discussed one distinction and pointed out how the distinction had 
been applied in previous empirical influence studies and how this study will apply it. This 
study makes the following choices.
First, with regard to the distinction between resources and relation, the study defines 
power as resources and the independent variable of the research, and influence as a relation 
and the dependent variable of the research.
Second, with regard to the distinction between explicit and implicit (anticipated) influ-
ence, the study argues that the crucial link between power and influence is formed by the 
(negotiation) process that takes place between the conversion of power into influence. 
Although two mechanisms of influence have been distinguished conceptually, empirically 
the study’s main focus is on the influence attempt mechanism of explicit influence rather 
than the anticipation mechanism of implicit influence.
Third, with regard to the three faces of power, the study is primarily focused on the first 
face of decision-making, but also analyses the agenda-setting process taking partial account 
of the second face of non-decision-making and, between the first and second face, of not-
decision-making. As to the related distinction between agency and structure, the study 
is mainly actor-oriented, but identifies, in addition to agency variables, several structural 
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variables that co-determine the extent to which power is actually converted into influence 
in the course of the negotiation process.
In a way, this study thus integrates each of the three distinctions, albeit one more than 
the other. Adopting an integrative approach is an attempt to do justice to the different 
dimensions and aspects of power and influence. It is clear that specific choices are made 
with regard to each of the three distinctions, so that the distinctions are integrated only 
to a limited extent: this study chooses relations rather than resources, influence attempts 
rather than anticipation and agency rather than structure. The conceptual choices made in 
the first part of this chapter answer the sub-question of this study of how the process of EU 
Treaty negotiations can be analysed. By taking a position on the three central distinctions, 
this chapter has thus identified several explanatory variables: influence resources, influence 
attempts, domestic structure, negotiation structure and external events and developments. 
Together and overlapping with the variables identified in the previous chapter, they form 
the building blocks of the conceptual model. This conceptual model will be elaborated 
upon and presented in the next chapter.
In the second part of this chapter, a contribution was made to the debate on how to 
measure influence. After discussing several methods of influence measurement, it was 
concluded that a process analysis, preceded by a before-after analysis, is most suited to the 
aims of this study. In doing so, the sub-question of what kinds of methods are available to 
measure influence and which is the most suitable for this research was answered.
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Chapter 4
The conceptual and operational model
Explaining the process of EU Treaty negotiations
4.1 Introduction
In the last two chapters, the sub-questions on how the process of EU Treaty negotia-
tions can be characterised and analysed were answered. Chapter 2 presented an empirical 
framework, showing that the participating actors operate in the context of domestic, ne-
gotiation and external structures. Chapter 3 dealt with the central concepts of power and 
influence, making clear the conceptual choices that are made in this study. This resulted 
in the identification of the different building blocks of the conceptual model. This chapter 
further specifies these building blocks and subsequently synthesises them in a conceptual 
model that guides the empirical analysis in this thesis. In doing so, this chapter will answer 
the sub-questions of which variables can explain the process of EU Treaty negotiations and 
what kinds of expectations can be identified for each of these variables.
The building blocks identified in the previous chapter are specified in the sense that it is 
made clear what the theoretical choices imply empirically in the context of this study. Thus, 
building on the definitions of power and influence set out in the previous chapter, Section 
4.2 elaborates on these central concepts and subsequently offers a specification of influence 
as the dependent variable and influence resources as the independent variable. In Section 
4.3, attention is paid to the crucial conversion process between influence resources and 
actual influence. After looking more generally at the causal nature of this process, the ways 
in which previous empirical studies have dealt with the causality issue is discussed and the 
approach taken by this study, i.e. how the influence attempt mechanism introduced in the 
previous chapter is expected to operate in practice will be identified. Building on the discus-
sion of the contextual empirical framework in Chapter 2 and the three faces of power and 
the agency-structure dilemma in Chapter 3, Section 4.4 will specify in more detail the final 
building block of the conceptual model, namely contextual, structural variables that affect 
and explain the process through which influence resources are converted into influence.
The conceptual model that has been finalised can then be presented in Section 4.5. Sec-
tion 4.6 focuses more closely on the relations between the building blocks of the conceptual 
model by specifying what kinds of relations are expected to be found in the empirics.
The second part of the previous chapter discussed several methods of influence measure-
ment, resulting in the selection of a before-after analysis complemented with a process 
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analysis for this study. The second part of this chapter will explicate how the different 
variables will be operationalised in the context of the selected method. To this end, Sec-
tion 4.7 first briefly introduces the operational model. In Section 4.8, the usefulness of 
operationalisations proposed by previous empirical studies is examined, after which this 
study’s own proposal for operationalisation is presented in Section 4.9. In Section 4.10, the 
chapter closes with some conclusions and reflections.
4.2 Influence resources and influence: independent and dependent variables
Regarding the distinction between resources and relation, Section 3.2.3 defined power as 
the resources of an actor and influence as a causal relation between actors. The treatment 
of influence as a type of causal relationship presupposes that there is a ‘cause’ and an 
‘effect’, an independent and a dependent variable. In Section 3.2.3, influence resources 
were identified as the independent variable of this study and influence as the dependent 
variable. The cause and the effect should be specified more clearly in order to distinguish 
influence relations from the broader category of causal relations (Nagel, 1975). Influence 
will first be discussed as the effect and subsequently, influence resources will be discussed 
as the primary cause.
4.2.1 Influence
Regardless of the specific definition of power and influence that is adopted, there is agree-
ment in the literature that the effect should be specified by at least stating the scope and 
domain (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950:77; Dahl, 1968; Frey, 1971; Nagel, 1975:14; Wrong, 
1979:14-20; Baldwin, 2002:178).
Stating the scope of the effect denotes the type of effect that is brought about by the 
influencer. The question is: which aspect of B is affected by A? Does the exertion of influ-
ence have to do with a specific attitude that B has or (also) with a concrete action that B 
takes? In the context of this study, the exertion of influence by actor A is eventually aimed 
at the visible behaviour of actor B, namely that actor B makes a decision that is as close as 
possible to the preference of actor A. It is assumed that each actor has a preference with 
respect to a specific issue, which it wants to fulfil in the decision that is made on this 
issue. In the meantime – in the course of the process through which an issue is negotiated 
resulting in a decision on this issue – the exertion of influence may also be aimed at the 
invisible behaviour of actor B, such as its opinion on a specific issue, which may however 
be expressed in the visible behaviour of actor B, such as an oral or written expression of 
its preference. In any case, whatever the kind of influence exerted by actor A during the 
negotiation process, it is always and eventually aimed at getting having actor B make a 
decision that is as close to the preference of actor A as possible. Thus, the ultimate scope 
of the effect caused by actor A is the visible behaviour of actor B in the shape of making a 
decision on a specific issue.
The issue of scope could also refer to the type of issue being negotiated and as such, may 
be subject to the exertion of influence. The influence of an actor may vary from one (type 
of ) issue to another. To conclude that the Dutch cabinet has exerted influence during the 
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Nice Treaty negotiation process does not mean that it has exerted influence with regard to 
the domestic politics of other member states or the ‘day-to-day’ politics of the EU. It may 
be the case that the Dutch cabinet has exerted influence with regard to some issues to do 
with the Nice Treaty, but not others. The scope of the effect in this study, then, refers to 
the Nice Treaty negotiations (and not to other EU Treaty negotiations or EU negotiations) 
and, within the Nice Treaty, to a limited number of negotiation issues. The selection of 
Nice Treaty issues for this study is further outlined and justified in Sections 5.2.1 and 6.2.
The domain of an actor’s influence refers to the number of actors that are subject to its 
influence. An influencer may have only one influence-subject (e.g. master-slave) or many 
(e.g. king-inhabitants). To put it another way, the question is: how many Bs are there? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there were 18 actors formally participating in the Nice Treaty 
negotiations: 15 member state actors and three EU level actors, namely the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council Secretariat. From the point of 
view of an individual actor in these negotiations, there are thus 17 actors to exert influence 
on. In other words, there are 17 Bs.
Specifying the scope and domain in this way raises some additional relevant issues to 
be discussed. Firstly, when adopting a relational approach to power and influence, many 
authors refer to a relation between (only) one actor A and one actor B as a dyadic influence 
relation. There may, however, also be interest in studying n-adic influence relations (Riker, 
1964:344). As was made clear in Section 3.6, several empirical studies are interested in 
n-adic influence relations, but within this n-adic context they pay special attention to 
the dyadic influence relations between one actor and another that, in the end, makes the 
decisions – the political decision-maker (Huberts, 1988, 1989; Arts, 1998; Peters, 1999, 
2001). It is this actor that all other participating actors in the decision-making process par-
ticularly attempt to exert their influence on. When referring to the 18 participating actors, 
it becomes clear that this study is, in fact, interested in n-adic influence relations. The focus 
on the Dutch cabinet, however, implies that interest is primarily in the dyadic influence 
relations between the Dutch cabinet (as actor A) and one of the other 17 participating 
actors (as actor B).
As was also pointed out in Section 3.6, one matter that complicates things in this regard 
is that in the case of EU Treaty negotiations, there is no one, single actor making the 
decisions as the political decision-maker. Instead, there is a process of collective decision-
making by unanimity, although the member state holding the Presidency, assisted by the 
Council Secretariat, has a special responsibility. The exertion of influence by the Dutch 
cabinet (or by any other actor) is aimed at the other 17 actors together as they collectively 
make decisions. The 17 actors could also be taken together and treated as one, single B. 
In the end, the 18 actors make the decisions together as a result of the mutual exertion of 
influence. Formally only the 15 member states make the decisions by unanimity, since the 
three EU level actors do not have a vote or veto. Practically, as is the case when there is one, 
single decision-maker, several analyses of influence will be confined to a limited number 
of actors, with or without the Dutch cabinet playing an influential role. Whether or not 
the object of study is conceptually delimited to one dyadic influence relation between the 
Dutch cabinet as actor A and the other 17 participating actors as actor B, empirically the 
dyadic influence relations between the Dutch cabinet and any of the other 17 actors will 
be studied.
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The second issue has to do with the question of whether the exertion of influence is aimed 
at an actor or an outcome. Riker (1964:344) makes a distinction between ‘ego-oriented 
power’, which is aimed at increasing ego’s utility by influencing an outcome, and ‘other-
oriented power’, which is only concerned with another actor, to decrease its utility, and not 
with an outcome. This study questions the extent to which the Dutch cabinet has exerted 
influence during the negotiation process resulting in the Treaty of Nice. In addition to 
actors, this study is clearly concerned with outcomes, i.e. primarily the decisions that have 
been made and subsequently laid down in a Treaty text, and thus with ‘ego-oriented’ influ-
ence, to use Riker’s terminology. That the study adopts a relational approach to influence, 
considering influence as a relation between different actors, does not make it concerned 
with ‘other-oriented’ influence, at least not in Riker’s terminology. This study is concerned 
with both actors and outcomes, because these actors are responsible for the outcomes. The 
relational approach to influence can be perfectly maintained by stating, as was done earlier, 
that the effect of an actor on another actor is a change in behaviour of the latter in the 
shape of making a decision (or a non- or not-decision).
Two things have to be further explicated when specifying influence as the effect, or de-
pendent variable. First, there is a possibility that a decision is made that is contrary to the 
preference of an actor because of the very exertion of influence by this actor. This can be called 
‘negative influence’ (Dahl, 1957). As has already been pointed out in the presentation of the 
definition of influence in Section 3.2.3, this study is not interested in negative influence; 
it confines its attention to the exertion of ‘positive influence’. However, secondly, exerting 
positive influence is not an all or nothing matter. An actor may exert more influence in 
one specific instance than in another. The exertion of influence is thus gradual. This has 
been referred to as the amount of influence (Dahl, 1957). The amount of influence that the 
Dutch cabinet has will be specified in this study by examining to what extent it has exerted 
its influence with regard to the total sum of Nice Treaty issues selected for this study.
To sum up, the effect of the presence or usage of actor A’s influence resources is that 
actor B makes a decision (or not) on a specific Nice Treaty issue that is as close to the 
preference of actor A on this issue as possible. The scope of the effect caused by actor A can 
be defined as the visible behaviour of actor B in the form of making a decision on a limited 
number of Nice Treaty issues. The domain of the effect caused by actor A are the 17 other 
participating actors in the Nice Treaty negotiations, who collectively – although formally, 
only the 15 member state actors – make the decisions and can therefore also be treated as 
one, single actor B.
4.2.2 Influence resources
Although it is argued that the crucial question is whether and to what extent actors succeed 
in converting their influence resources into actual influence in the course of the negotia-
tion process, without influence resources an actor has nothing to enter this process to begin 
with. Therefore, the capacity that an actor has at its disposal should be carefully studied. 
Capacity is not only about the quantity of influence resources. It is also related to the 
domain and scope of the effect that is caused. What may be an influence resource for one 
actor need not be an influence resource for another. In addition, an influence resource that 
is used in one issue-area may not be useful in another. This is referred to as the ‘fungibility’ 
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of an influence resource (e.g. Baldwin, 2002:180). The exertion of influence partly depends 
on having (a certain amount of ) influence resources at all and on actually using them, 
but also on having and using the ‘right’ influence resources in relation to a specific actor 
(domain) and a specific issue (scope).
An almost infinite number of influence resources are mentioned in the literature. ‘Influ-
ence resources’ are understood here as a rather broad category, containing all the resources 
that may be relevant for the exertion of influence. This category includes both material and 
non-material resources, as scholars have proposed from the beginning of the power and 
influence debate (e.g. Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950; Dahl, 1963, 1968; Kuypers, 1973). The 
type of research (question), which specifies domain and scope, provides additional guidance 
for which influence resources may be particularly relevant. On the basis of the domain and 
scope of this study, the following influence resources are expected to be relevant: positions, 
networks, internal cohesion and reputation for influence (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986; 
Van Schendelen, 2005).
The first influence resource concerns the positions of an actor (e.g. Christiansen et al., 
2002; Beach, 2005:29-30; Van Schendelen, 2005:198). A distinction is made between for-
mal positions and policy positions. Formal positions are connected to member state actors. 
A member state may hold the Presidency during a portion of the negotiation process. This 
position may enable an actor to exert its influence, but it could also be a constraint, as the 
Presidency may be expected to promote a compromise between the different actors instead 
of furthering its own interests as a member state. Another formal position is being part of 
what is known as the troika, as a result of holding the previous or upcoming Presidency. 
A third formal position of member states concerns the – threat of the – national veto. 
As the reform of an EU Treaty is decided by unanimity, this – at least in theory – is an 
important resource. It has even been called the ‘key legal resource of national governments’ 
(Christiansen et al., 2002:17).
It is questionable, however, whether a member state will use its veto in practice, as there is 
substantial pressure to bring the IGC negotiations to a successful conclusion (Christiansen 
et al., 2002:17). Threats are generally very rarely used in EU negotiations, but there have 
been exceptions to this rule (Stubb, 2002:22). Furthermore, on several occasions member 
states have received specific ‘opt-outs’ and only the threat, explicitly or implicitly, of a 
national veto may put an actor in a position to make strong demands concerning specific 
parts or issues of a Treaty. Christiansen (2002:45) has pointed to the indirect or quasi-veto 
of the European Parliament, as a result of member states committing to ratify a new Treaty 
only if the European Parliament would also approve it. This quasi-veto might have an effect 
during the negotiations themselves when other participating actors meet the preferences of 
the European Parliament in order to avoid non-approval by this institution.
In terms of policy positions, this is related to the particular preference of an actor on an 
issue. An actor can be considered to hold a ‘pivotal’ position when it has a preference on an 
issue that lies between two or more different preferences of the other participating actors. 
This might result in the realisation of its preference without much effort. Similarly, when 
an actor holds a ‘majority’ position – when its preference on an issue is shared by a majority 
of the participating actors – it might also not be difficult for it to realise its preference.
Second, networks are an influence resource for an actor (e.g. Van Schendelen, 2005:197-
198). Being part of a network is defined as an informal position that takes the form of 
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having contact with one (bilaterally) or more (multilaterally) other actors concerning an 
issue on which these actors have common preferences. A network can have a structural 
character, in the sense that it has already existed for some time before and separate from the 
negotiation process holding regular consultations. Examples are the Benelux cooperation 
and the Franco-German axis. This broad definition does, however, also include an ad-hoc 
network that is formed for the occasion of the negotiation process in general or for one or 
more issues in particular.
The third influence resource is the internal cohesion of an actor. This can be defined as the 
extent to which there is a coherence of preferences and a coordination of actions on the part 
of an actor (Van Schendelen, 2005:191). Many different factors may act upon an actor’s 
internal cohesion. One such factor is the staff or bureaucracy of an actor (e.g. Schlozman & 
Tierney, 1986; Christiansen, 2002; Beach, 2005:27-28; Van Schendelen, 2005:195-197). 
This is the quantity and quality of an actor’s personnel. Quality has to do with the expertise 
that an actor has at its disposal, among other things. A distinction can be made between 
three types of expertise. Technical expertise refers to knowledge of the content of an issue, 
legal expertise is knowledge about the workings of the ‘acquis communautaire’ and politi-
cal expertise, or skills, is the negotiation competence of an actor.
Finally, reputation for influence can be an influence resource (e.g. Dahl, 1970:34; Cren-
son, 1971; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986:103; Van Schendelen, 2005:200). An actor has 
a reputation for influence when other actors consider it to be influential, important or a 
force to be reckoned with. An actor possessing this resource may exert influence without 
actively undertaking influence attempts, but simply by being there. Other actors may 
anticipate the reputation for influence of this actor, resulting in anticipated influence (see 
Section 3.3.3).
There are two additional reasons to consider positions, networks, internal cohesion and 
reputation for influence as relevant influence resources in the context of this study. First, 
considering the relational, process-oriented approach to influence taken by this study, it is 
interested in ‘dynamic’ resources such as positions and networks rather than ‘static’ ones, 
such as the quantity of an actor’s staff or its expertise. Yet, with regard to the staff of an 
actor, its internal cohesion is taken into account as an indicator of quality, as this may feed 
more directly into the negotiation process. Second, the inclusion of positions, networks 
and reputation as influence resources does justice to alternative methods of influence mea-
surement from the one chosen for this study (see Sections 3.5 and 3.6). In keeping with 
the relational approach, positions, networks and reputation are not equated with influence 
itself, but considered to be only potential influence.
The influence resource formal positions is, however, not included in the empirical 
analysis. The reason for this is that this study focuses on an assessment and explanation of 
the influence of the Dutch cabinet and not of the other participating actors. The Dutch 
cabinet neither held the Presidency nor was it a part of the troika during the Nice Treaty 
negotiation process. In terms of the veto, there is no variation among the member state 
actors, which all possess this influence resource. Including the veto might make sense if a 
comparison is made between the (influence of ) member state actors and EU level actors, 
which do not have a veto, but this is not the case here. However, when actors make use 
of holding the Presidency, being a part of the troika or their veto during the negotiation 
process, this will be included in the empirical analysis as influence attempts.
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The influence resource reputation for influence is also not included in the empirical 
analysis for reasons of feasibility. In the case of this influence resource, data must be col-
lected on the part of the other participating actors (actor B) in order to assess the reputa-
tion for influence of actor A, in this case the Dutch cabinet. Since the study focused on the 
archives of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry and the European Commission, these data 
were not sufficiently collected to be able to make adequate measurements.
To sum up, this study considers the presence or use of actor A’s influence resources as the 
primary cause of the exertion of influence by actor A. This does not only have to do with 
the quantity of influence resources, but also with having and using the ‘right’ influence 
resources in relation to a specific actor (domain) and a specific negotiation issue (scope). 
On the basis of the domain and scope of this study, specified in the previous subsection, 
and in keeping with feasibility, the following influence resources are selected for this study: 
policy positions, networks and internal cohesion. These influence resources form the basis 
of the process, or mechanism, through which influence is exerted.
4.3 Influence mechanism
Up to this point, this study has outlined and specified the independent variable, influence 
resources, and the dependent variable, influence, of its conceptual model. However, it is 
argued that more crucial than the quantity and quality of influence resources is the process, 
or mechanism, through which these influence resources have to be successfully employed 
before being able to speak of actual influence. This mechanism linking the cause and the 
effect is, by definition, a causal mechanism. Therefore, attention is first paid to the issue of 
causality in the first subsection. The second subsection discusses how previous empirical 
studies have dealt with the causality issue. On the basis of this, the third subsection will 
outline how this issue will be approached in this study.
4.3.1 The issue of causality
Section 3.2.1 highlighted the fact that a relational approach to influence implies that influence 
is a specific type of causation: the behaviour of actor A causes a change in the behaviour of 
actor B. This implies that the issue of causality must be dealt with, particularly three aspects, 
or problems, of this notion (Dahl, 1968; Simon, 1968; Braam, 1981; Gadenne, 2001).
First, a causal relationship assumes that there is co-variation of A and B, i.e. there is a 
change in the behaviour of both A and B. Second, a causal relationship is asymmetrical, 
i.e. a change in the behaviour of B is the result of a change in the behaviour of A and not 
the other way around. It is widely accepted that this implies that the cause (the change 
in behaviour of A) precedes the effect (the change in behaviour of B). David Hume has 
already identified these two aspects of this issue. The problem for him was that although 
the changes in the behaviour of A and B and the temporal relation between them can 
be observed, the causal link between them cannot (Gadenne, 2001). The third problem 
follows from this: how to be sure that the relationship between A and B is not spurious, i.e. 
that a change in the behaviour of actor B is not the result of a change in the behaviour of 
a third actor or the result of a third variable?
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This third problem is related to the question of whether in a causal relationship A’s 
behaviour should be a necessary condition for B’s behaviour, a sufficient condition or 
both. According to Riker (1964:346), ‘A causes B’ means that ‘B occurs if and only if A 
has occurred’, i.e. the change in behaviour of A should be both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the change in behaviour of B. The relationship between the behaviours of A 
and B may, however, be indirect, in the sense that it develops via a third actor or variable. 
Alternatively, the relationship between the behaviour of A and B may be conditional on a 
third actor or variable. In both cases, the behaviour of A is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition. When the change in behaviour of A and B are both caused by a third actor or 
variable – to mention another type of spuriousness – the behaviour of A is neither a neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition. The problem with the notion of being both a necessary and 
sufficient condition is that although theoretically sound, it is empirically hardly or not at all 
possible to prove, because it involves the exclusion of the possibility that there is no other 
actor’s behaviour or variable that is sufficient to affect B’s behaviour (cf. Dahl, 1968:410). 
In keeping with several influence researchers, this study takes the position that the minimal 
proof required to maintain causality is that A’s behaviour is a necessary condition for B’s 
(Simon, 1953; March, 1955; Dahl, 1957; Braam, 1981). These three problems to do with 
the causality issue will be revisited in Section 8.5.2.
4.3.2 Previous empirical studies
How have previous empirical studies dealt with the causality issue, particularly the issue of 
spuriousness, and are they of any use to this study?
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, Braam (1981) has defined ‘tested influence’ as the per-
centage of influence attempts that are successful. Braam does recognise that ‘success’ is not 
the same as ‘influence’. In order to attribute influence to a firm whose influence attempt 
was granted, one must be certain that the specific governmental decision would not have 
been made if the firm had not undertaken the influence attempt. In other words, the firm 
must be a necessary condition for the decision. To examine this, the following information 
is required:
 -  There are no other firms that have undertaken influence attempts on the same problem. 
As long as the study is dealing with individual problems, as opposed to non-individual 
problems, this condition is met.
 -  The problem does not ‘accidentally’ fit into a government plan that was already intended 
for execution. In this case the problem could be ‘merged’ into a collective problem. Again, 
this condition is met as long as the study is dealing with individual problems.
Braam ‘solves’ the issue of spuriousness by classifying problems into individual, non-indi-
vidual and collective problems, only the first of which is connected to influence as a causal 
relation. When analysing an individual problem faced by only one firm that undertakes an 
influence attempt vis-à-vis the government, there are no other firms undertaking influence 
attempts that are potentially necessary conditions. When the decision by the government 
meets the influence attempt of the firm, i.e. solves its problem, it can thus be concluded 
that the influence attempt has been successful, i.e. the firm has exerted influence on the 
government.
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When dealing with non-individual problems, problems faced by more than one firm, 
attributing influence to the firms separately becomes much more complicated. Braam 
(1981:145) has noted: ‘As soon as there is more than one interested party, the assignment 
of influence becomes very difficult’. Attributing influence in such cases becomes ‘very dif-
ficult’ as it cannot be proven that one specific firm – and not another firm – was a necessary 
condition for the resulting effect. Therefore, Braam (1981:57, 145, 149, 160) prefers to 
speak of ‘gains’ (or ‘successes’) rather than ‘influence’ in this regard, although he seems to 
recognise that the phenomenon he is interested in does not change by changing the terms. 
More specifically, Braam speaks of separate firms obtaining ‘gains via coalitions’. At the 
level of a coalition as a whole it remains possible to speak of influence.
It is, however, precisely and particularly at this point that Braam’s study begins to be 
relevant to this study, which after all deals solely with non-individual problems involving 
more than one actor undertaking influence attempts. In terms of non-individual problems 
involving more than one actor, Braam thus refrains from undertaking a causal process 
analysis that results in the attribution of influence to the respective actors. Therefore, 
Braam cannot be of much use to this study at this point. Braam does, however, introduce 
an operationalisation of (influence attempts through) coalitions in the context of non-
individual problems, which may be useful for this study (see Section 4.8).
Huberts (1988) has dealt with the issue of spuriousness by introducing a limiting assump-
tion that only the actors participating in a decision-making process are seen as potentially 
necessary conditions for the resulting decision. In order to discriminate between these 
participating actors, he proposed several criteria that were already discussed in the previous 
chapter (Section 3.5.6). Huberts cannot prove that a specific actor was a necessary condi-
tion in a specific instance, but he has stated that he can make this plausible on the basis of 
as accurate a reconstruction of the decision-making process as possible.
This study adopts Huberts’ limiting assumption in that only the 18 actors participating 
in the negotiation process on the Nice Treaty are considered to be potentially necessary 
conditions for the outcomes of this process. A detailed reconstruction of the negotiation 
process on a specific issue could certainly make statements about the influence of a specific 
actor more plausible, but the crucial question remains how to discriminate between the 
different participating actors.
This study is in agreement with Huberts that the first criterion is whether or not an 
actor has (partially) achieved its goal. Only if the Dutch cabinet meets this criterion does 
it qualify for the subsequent causal process analysis on the basis of additional criteria. 
Section 3.6 has already pointed out that Huberts’ other criteria are not applicable to this 
study. However, his operationalisation of ‘influence attempts’ may still prove to be useful 
(see Section 4.8).
Arts has operationalised the extent of political influence as the extent of goal-achievement 
due to one’s own intervention (Arts, 1998:80-87). After assessing the NGOs’ extent of 
goal-achievement, the goal-achievement was found to have possibly been caused by the 
NGOs’ own interventions and not by those of government or other actors. In other words, 
whether or not the outcome was more in line with the NGOs’ goals than if they had not 
intervened was checked (‘different counterfactual’). In order to do this, the decision-making 
process about the topic concerned was reconstructed, with particular attention paid to:
 -  the possible goal-achievement by governments and other relevant players
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 -  the access of NGOs to the political arena and to (key) countries
 -  the interventions made by NGOs and other players with regard to the topic
 -  the number and intensity of those interventions
 -  the adoption of NGO views/proposals by governments (policy changes by states)
The extent of goal-achievement and the extent of one’s own intervention was measured in 
an ordinal manner: 0 = no, 1 = some, 2 = substantial and 3 = much.
As with Huberts’ study, there is a political decision-maker (the governments) external to 
the NGOs that makes the decisions (‘policy change’) and potentially offers ‘access’ to them. 
Again, the elements of ‘access’ and ‘policy change’ are not useful to this study. However, the 
elements of goal-achievement of other (participating) actors and the (number and intensity 
of ) interventions, i.e. influence attempts by the (participating) actors, are useful for this 
study’s process analysis (see Section 4.8).
4.3.3 Empirical application: influence attempt mechanism
How are the three aspects of causality dealt with in this study? With regard to the issue of 
co-variation, the (change in) behaviour of actor A in this study is primarily an influence 
attempt while the change in behaviour of actor B is a decision. The way of operationalising 
and measuring these variables is discussed in Section 4.9.
As to the issue of asymmetry, it is argued that when there is a period of time between an 
influence attempt by A and a decision by B, asymmetry can be established. Yet there may 
also be an asymmetrical relation operating in the opposite direction. This would mean that 
the influence relationship between A and B is reciprocal (cf. Simon, 1953). The reciprocity 
could, for example, consist of actor A undertaking an influence attempt, but at the same 
time (to a certain extent) anticipating actor B. This would imply that two types of influence 
are operating at the same moment and cross-cutting each other. It is recognised that each 
influence relationship could contain elements of anticipation, but it is considered to be 
empirically not feasible to study the two types of influence at the same moment. When an 
actor has undertaken influence attempts in a specific instance, this will be the main focus of 
the study, but when this is hardly or not the case, attention will be focused on the possibil-
ity of anticipated influence (see below). However, what is more fundamental, as outlined 
in Section 4.2.1, is that actor B in this study is not a single actor who makes the decisions, 
but consists of all the other participating actors that also attempt to exert influence on the 
other actors, which include the Dutch cabinet as actor A. They also undertake influence 
attempts, which implies that there may be asymmetrical relations operating from (parts of ) 
B to A. More often than not, influence relations are reciprocal.
This touches on the third issue, the issue of spuriousness. This is the most difficult issue 
to deal with, especially in the case of a multi-actor study such as this one. It will have to be 
established that there was no other, third actor’s behaviour or variable that was a necessary 
condition for the decision made by B. In general, this study aims to deal with this issue by 
taking the behaviour (mainly influence attempts) of all participating actors into account in 
the influence analysis as well as several contextual, structural variables (see Section 4.4). In 
terms of the (third) actors, the main approach to this issue is as follows (see Table 4.1).
To be a matter of influence exertion, an actor should at least have achieved its goal (to 
a greater or lesser extent). When an actor has both undertaken influence attempts and 
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achieved its goal, this could be a matter of ‘explicit influence’ (type 1). An influence attempt 
is defined as the way in which an actor uses its influence resources to realise its preference 
on an issue in the outcome of the negotiation process. Goal-achievement is defined as 
the extent to which an actor has realised its preference on an issue in the outcome of the 
negotiation process. In order to assess an actor’s goal-achievement, a comparison is made 
between its preference on an issue and the outcome regarding this issue in the shape of a 
specific (decision) option (see Section 4.9 for the operationalisations of influence attempts 
and goal-achievement). When an actor has (to a certain extent) undertaken influence at-
tempts and (to a certain extent) achieved its goal, this does not necessarily mean that is has 
exerted explicit influence. Yet the combination of influence attempts and goal-achievement 
is a necessary condition for speaking of explicit influence in this study.
Subsequently, the core question is whether or not an actor has actually caused its goal-
achievement itself. Only if this is the case can an actor be said to have exerted explicit 
influence. For example, when the Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence attempts 
on an issue and has achieved its goal, and this cannot (only) be attributed to the influence 
attempts of the other participating actors, it may be said to have exerted explicit influence. 
This cannot be definitively proven, but it can still be attempted to make it as plausible as 
possible. This study aims to do this by examining whether mechanisms other than explicit 
influence might account for the relationship between the variables of influence attempts 
and goal-achievement. These mechanisms can be imagined for the possible combinations 
of the two variables. In a specific instance of goal-achievement in combination with (the 
presence or absence of ) influence attempts, the study will examine whether mechanisms 
other than explicit influence might apply (types 2-4).
Thus, an actor gets a ‘free ride’ from other actors when it achieves its goal mainly because 
it profits from its influence resources, particularly advantageous policy positions, or from 
other actors’ influence attempts. For example, when the Dutch cabinet undertakes influence 
attempts to realise its preference on an issue, and this preference is shared by a majority of 
the participating actors, its goal-achievement may be the result of a free ride rather than ex-
plicit influence. An actor exerts ‘implicit, anticipated influence’ when it does not undertake 
influence attempts but still achieves its goal because other actors anticipate its ‘reputation 
for influence’. For example, when other actors meet the preference of the Dutch cabinet 
on an issue because they perceive the Dutch cabinet to be influential, without the Dutch 
cabinet having undertaken any influence attempts, it can be said to have exerted implicit, 
anticipated influence. An actor has ‘sheer luck’ when it does not undertake influence at-
tempts but still achieves its goal for no apparent reason. Practically, the latter implies that 
the study aims to exclude the possibility that any of the other mechanisms is at work.
When an actor has not achieved its goal, several alternative mechanisms could be at 
work, again varying with the presence or absence of influence attempts (types 5-12). Thus, 
when an actor undertakes influence attempts but does not achieve its goal because its influ-
ence attempts are not successful, this is considered as ‘failure’. This is the case when, for 
example, the Dutch cabinet has consistently and persistently undertaken many influence 
attempts on an issue, but has still not achieved its goal. When an actor undertakes influence 
attempts but does not achieve its goal because they are of a bad quality, this constitutes 
an ‘unforced error’. This is the case, for example, when the Dutch cabinet undertakes 
influence attempts on an issue only at the end of the negotiation process, resulting in the 
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absence of goal-achievement. When an actor undertakes influence attempts but does not 
achieve its goal for no apparent reason, this actor has ‘bad luck’. At a practical level, this 
again means that no evidence is found that one of the other mechanisms is at work. When 
an actor undertakes influence attempts but does not achieve its goal precisely because of its 
influence attempts, instead provoking the opposite reaction from other actors and having 
its influence attempts bounce back on it, it has exerted ‘negative influence’. This might be 
the case, for example, when other actors are annoyed about the number or nature of the 
Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts on an issue and are therefore not willing to meet the 
Dutch cabinet’s preference on that issue.
When an actor does not achieve its goal because it does not undertake influence at-
tempts, several mechanisms might be at work depending on the reason for the absence of 
influence attempts. When the reason is that an actor has neglected an issue in the course 
of the negotiations, its lack of goal-achievement is a ‘justified loss’. For example, the Dutch 
cabinet may have formulated a preference on an issue at the beginning of the negotiation 
process, but subsequently disregarded the issue and not undertaken influence attempts. 
When an issue is not important (enough) for an actor, it constitutes a ‘non-priority’. This 
might be the case, for example, when the Dutch cabinet has formulated a preference on 
an issue but does not achieve its goal because it has subsequently focused its influence 
attempts on other issues that it considered to be of greater importance. When an actor 
does not undertake influence attempts because it is internally divided on an issue, the 
‘internal divisiveness’ mechanism is at work. For example, a difference of opinion about an 
issue between two Ministries within the Dutch cabinet might result in a stalemate between 
them with the result that no action is undertaken at all. Finally, when an actor does not 
undertake influence attempts because it anticipates the behaviour of other actors, i.e. pos-
sible resistance, this is called ‘anticipation’. For example, when the Dutch cabinet thinks 
that influence attempts on an issue will be in vain because it expects that other actors will 
not agree with its proposal under any circumstances, this may constitute anticipation. This 
mechanism in fact mirrors the case of the implicit, anticipated influence mechanism.
It should be noted that the mechanisms discussed above are ‘ideal types’. The ideal types 
are used to indicate that generally the upper cells correspond with relatively more influence 
attempts and the lower cells with relatively fewer influence attempts. Some mechanisms, 
particularly the free ride mechanism, should be considered as borderline cases, as they lie 
somewhere between the extreme cases of no influence attempts at all and many influence 
attempts. In practice, the extent of influence attempts and goal-achievement may be more 
gradual than as black-and-white as it appears to be based on the ideal types. However, 
this does not conflict with the use of the ideal types as heuristic tools to make possible 
relations between two variables explicit. The mechanisms assume that a causal relationship 
exists between the two variables. It is important, at least theoretically, to stress the causal 
nature of the mechanisms. In practice, however, a definitive proof of the occurrence of the 
mechanisms cannot be done, but their occurrence can be made as plausible as possible 
through the strategy of verification and falsification. In keeping with this, the mechanisms 
are prudently formulated using the phrase ‘positively associated with’ (see Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1 Typology of possible combinations of influence attempts and goal-achievement
Goal-achievement
Yes No
Influence attempts Yes 1. Explicit influence
2. Free ride
5. Failure
6. Unforced error
7. Bad luck
8. Negative influence
No 3. Implicit, anticipated influence
4. Sheer luck
9. Justified loss
10. Non-priority
11. Internal divisiveness
12. Anticipation
1.  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with influence attempts in the sense of the active use of 
influence resources.
2.  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with profiting from influence resources (notably advantageous 
policy positions) or other actors’ influence attempts, while undertaking influence attempts itself.
3.  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with simply possessing the influence resource ‘reputation for 
influence’, while not undertaking influence attempts.
4.  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with luck, while not undertaking influence attempts.
5.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with unsuccessful influence attempts.
6.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with bad influence attempts.
7.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with bad luck, while undertaking influence attempts.
8.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with just the influence attempts themselves.
9.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with neglect resulting in not undertaking influence 
attempts.
10.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with non-priority resulting in not undertaking influence 
attempts.
11.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with internal divisiveness resulting in not undertaking 
influence attempts.
12.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with anticipation resulting in not undertaking influence 
attempts.
4.4 Variables affecting the influence process
At this point, the constituent building blocks of the conceptual model for this study that 
have been identified are the independent variable (influence resources), the dependent vari-
able (influence) and, in the previous section, the intervening variable: the process through 
which influence resources are converted into actual influence.
The final building block is formed by several contextual, structural variables that in turn 
affect the process through which influence resources are converted into actual influence. 
They may enable or constrain the (degree of ) conversion of capacity into effect by provid-
ing opportunities or constraints.
While the other building blocks have been primarily deduced from the theoretical 
literature on power and influence, the structural variables have been primarily induced 
from empirical studies on EU Treaty negotiations (Chapter 2) and empirical studies on 
power and influence (Chapter 3). What is striking is that the division between agency 
and structure in the Political Science and IR literature discussed in Chapter 3 were also a 
focus of the EU literature discussed in Chapter 2. The same contextual, structural building 
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blocks can be distilled from both for this study’s conceptual model: domestic structure, 
negotiation structure and external events and developments.
In keeping with the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, the domestic structure of an actor 
is specified as several actors (parliament, constitutional court) and factors (referendum, 
public opinion, elections and events and political conflicts), which may enable or constrain 
an actor during the negotiation process. In keeping with Chapter 2, negotiation structure 
is defined as formal and informal rules concerning levels and phases, particularly timing, 
which structure the negotiation process and may enable or constrain an actor. Consistent 
with Chapters 2 and 3, external events and developments occurring at the European level 
may also enable or constrain an actor during the negotiation process.
4.5 The conceptual model
Now that all the building blocks of the conceptual model have been identified and speci-
fied, they can be synthesised into one conceptual model (see Figure 4.1). 
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structure 
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual model
Firstly, as indicated in Chapter 1, the objective of this study is to describe and particularly 
to explain the outcome of the Nice Treaty negotiation process, particularly a number of 
decisions made on specific issues laid down in a Treaty text. The explanation of the Nice 
Treaty negotiation process is approached from the perspective of influence, i.e. that it is a 
result of the mutual exertion of influence among the participating actors. The dependent 
variable of this study – influence – is therefore defined in terms of both actors and outcomes 
(see Section 4.2.1). The dependent variable is the extent of influence of actor A on actor B 
making a decision on a specific Nice Treaty issue. Although a relational approach to influ-
ence is adopted and all 18 participating actors are addressed in the influence analysis, actor 
A is first and foremost the Dutch cabinet, as the research question of this study outlined 
in Chapter 1 indicates. Actor B is composed of the 17 other participating actors, although 
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formally only the 15 member states unanimously make decisions. The conceptual model 
is presented here for the Dutch cabinet as actor A, but may also be constructed for the 17 
other participating actors.
Secondly, this study considers influence resources to be the primary cause of the exertion 
of influence by actor A (see Section 4.2.2). The influence resources of actor A form the 
independent variable. The influence resources that are selected for this study are: policy 
positions, networks and internal cohesion.
Thirdly, having identified the cause and the effect, this study argues that the mechanism, 
or process, linking influence resources as capacity and actual influence as effect is most 
crucial to an explanation of influence (see Section 4.3). In the course of the negotiation 
process, an actor’s influence resources have to be converted to actual influence primarily 
by undertaking influence attempts. According to the influence attempt mechanism, as the 
intervening variable, an actor actively uses its influence resources to undertake a specific 
type of influence attempt that results in explicit influence.
Fourthly, this crucial conversion process is in turn affected by several contextual, struc-
tural variables, which enable or constrain the extent to which the influence resources of an 
actor are converted into actual influence by providing opportunities or constraints to this 
actor (see Section 4.4). It is here that ‘structure’ is accounted for in the influence analy-
sis. Although this study primarily attributes influence to actors and thus focuses mainly 
on agency variables – influence resources and the usage of influence resources through 
influence attempts – structural variables co-determine the extent to which the influence 
resources are converted into influence. The following structural variables are deemed to be 
relevant in the context of this study: domestic structure, negotiation structure and external 
events and developments at the European level.
In closing, a short note should be made on the ‘multivariate problem’. It should be 
explicitly recognised that this study does not execute a real multivariate analysis, in which 
all variables carry the same weight and impact one another. The analysis focuses mainly on 
the effect of influence resources on the extent of an actor’s influence via influence attempts. 
The three contextual variables are considered to be moderating variables, in the sense of 
enabling and constraining the main variables of the analysis.
4.6 Expectations per variable
Now that the conceptual model as a whole has been presented, the kinds of relations 
that are expected to be found in the empirical material between the constituting building 
blocks of this model can now be explicated. In other words, what do the various arrows 
in Figure 4.1 represent? As the research question focuses on the Dutch cabinet, from now 
on the Dutch cabinet will be considered to be actor A and the expectations will thus be phrased 
accordingly (see Box 4.1).
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4.7 The operational model
The previous chapter presented a two-part approach to assessing and explaining the extent 
of influence of the Dutch cabinet as actor A. In causal terms, this has to do with the question 
of whether actor A’s behaviour is a necessary condition for the decision made by actor B. 
The first part (before-after analysis) determines whether actor A and the other participating 
actors have (partially or fully) achieved their goals, and whether they can thus be considered 
as potentially necessary conditions for the decision, i.e. potentially influential actors. The 
second part (process analysis) establishes whether the Dutch cabinet has caused its (partial 
or full) goal-achievement by itself and has thus been an actual necessary condition in these 
cases, i.e. actually influential, and how this influence can be explained. The first part of 
the approach is purely descriptive, calling for an assessment of ‘goal-achievement’, first of 
the Dutch cabinet as actor A and then of the other participating actors. The second part is 
Box 4.1 The expectations of the conceptual model
The expectations, or propositions, can be subdivided into one general and several specific expectations. The 
general expectation indicates the causal relationship between the (main) independent variable and the depen-
dent variable:
 1.  The more influence resources the Dutch cabinet has, the more influence it will exert.
The specific expectations for the influence resources are as follows:
 2.  The more advantageous policy positions the Dutch cabinet holds, the more influence it will exert.
 3.  The more a part of a network the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
 4.  The more internally coherent the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
However, these expectations are only a starting point as influence resources are considered to be only potential 
influence, which will have to be converted before it can be considered to be actual influence. This conversion 
should take place during the negotiation process. This study focuses primarily on the influence attempt mecha-
nism of explicit influence as the intervening variable. This intervening variable is considered here to be most 
crucial for the explanation of influence. The following expectation focuses on the intervening process as the 
crucial link between influence resources and actual influence:
 5.  The more influence attempts the Dutch cabinet undertakes, the more influence it will exert.
This conversion process in turn takes place in a broader context in which structural variables come into play. 
These variables enable or constrain the degree of conversion of influence resources into actual influence. The 
arrows in the figure thus stand for ‘enabling/constraining’. The last set of propositions is made as follows:
 6.  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by domestic actors (parliament, constitutional 
court) and factors (referendum, public opinion, elections, events and political conflicts), the more (less) 
influence it will exert.
 7.  The lower the level at which an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet will exert.
This expectation connects to the idea that small member states are more likely to exert influence at the lower, 
official level, where a ‘problem-solving’ negotiation style would be dominant, than at the higher, political levels, 
where a tough ‘bargaining’ style would prevail (Christiansen, 2002:40; Christiansen et al., 2002:22-23).
 8.  The earlier an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet will exert.
This expectation is related to the previous one, in the sense that the ‘bargaining’ negotiation style might be 
expected to prevail over the ‘problem-solving’ style in the course of the negotiation process because of the 
pressure to successfully conclude the negotiations.
 9.  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by external events and developments, the more 
(less) influence it will exert.
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explanatory, involving a causal process analysis on the basis of as accurate a reconstruction 
of the negotiation process as possible, focusing on the Dutch cabinet but in the context of 
the other participating actors. This analysis focuses primarily on the influence attempts of 
the participating actors, but secondarily also on the other agency and structural variables 
that have been identified as building blocks of the conceptual model.
The process analysis consists of three steps. First, the aim is to assess whether or not 
the Dutch cabinet has exerted influence regarding the issues on which it has partially or 
fully achieved its goal. This will be done by examining whether mechanisms other than 
explicit influence might account for the relation found between the variables of influence 
attempts and goal-achievement (see Section 4.3.3). Second, the aim is to explain the extent 
of the Dutch cabinet’s influence thus found by testing the expectations of the variables of 
the conceptual model (see Sections 4.5 and 4.6). The third step will involve considering 
whether still other variables – that are not included in the conceptual model – might 
explain the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence.
All in all, the issue of spuriousness is dealt with in the analysis by addressing all the 
actors that formally participate in the negotiation process (see Section 4.3.3) as well as by 
including a limited number of structural variables that are deemed to be relevant in the 
context of this study (see Section 4.4). In incorporating a reasonably inclusive set of actors 
and variables, this two-part influence analysis should make it possible to arrive at plausible 
conclusions about the assessment and explanation of the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s 
influence.
The next section considers how previous empirical studies have operationalised this 
study’s main variables (goal-achievement, influence attempts) and the extent to which 
their proposals are useful to this study. Section 4.9 subsequently proposes the study’s own 
operationalisations.
4.8 Operationalisations in previous empirical studies
How have previous empirical studies operationalised the before-after analysis (goal-
achievement) and a process analysis (particularly influence attempts)?
Braam (1981) has begun from an individual problem faced by a firm, for which it requests 
a solution from the (local, regional or central) government (‘influence attempt’) who, as 
the political decision-maker, makes a decision that solves or does not solve the problem 
(‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’). Braam (1981:127) operationalised ‘success’ by asking re-
spondents (representing the 130 firms selected) during an interview: ‘has your objective 
been reached?’. In order to do justice to the nuanced reality, he initially distinguished 
another category – ‘partially successful’ – from the categories of ‘successful’ and ‘unsuc-
cessful’. However, he did not make clear how he determined which category applied in a 
specific case. Moreover, when the data were processed, the category ‘partially successful’ 
was combined with the category ‘successful’, thus resulting in a dichotomy.
Braam’s proposal is not useful to this study as it aims to determine the goal-achievement 
of an actor on the basis of (comparing) written documents. In addition, Braam did not 
make clear how he determined which category applied in a specific case. In this sense, his 
operationalisation was not precise enough.
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In order to operationalise ‘influence attempt’, Braam (1981:127) asked his respondents: 
‘Have you ever tried to find a solution for this problem a) by using your own resources b) by 
asking the government for help?’ An influence attempt was thus basically operationalised 
as a ‘request made to the government’, which was (presumably) of a written nature. In a 
revised form, this is useful as at least one type of influence attempt that can be observed in 
this study.
Braam proposed an operationalisation of (influence attempts through) coalitions in the 
context of non-individual problems, which may be useful to this study. For the analysis of 
non-individual problems, the unit of analysis remained the individual firm, but the ques-
tion was whether two or more firms undertook influence attempts through a coalition on 
the specific non-individual problem. To determine the goal-achievement of a specific firm, 
Braam (presumably) applied the same procedure as in the case of individual problems, by 
asking his respondents during an interview: ‘have you achieved your goal?’ (yes (‘success-
ful’) or no (‘unsuccessful’); ‘partially successful’ was later merged with ‘successful’). In this 
way, the ‘gains via coalitions’ were determined by examining the percentage of all coalitions 
in which a firm did participate of being successful (cf. ‘tested influence’ for individual 
problems). In fact, Braam thus did not assess the influence of individual firms participating 
in a specific coalition but rather, the number of times a firm did participate in a coalition 
that was successful as a whole.
In this regard, Braam (1981:147-149) thus introduced the concept of a ‘coalition’. When 
a non-individual problem is involved, this does not necessarily mean that the firms con-
cerned will form a coalition. In operationalising ‘coalition’, Braam distinguished between 
three types. An influence attempt should have taken place for all three types:
 -  Simultaneously but separately undertaking influence attempts concerning the same non-
individual problem.
During the interview, it was examined whether 1) the firms knew from each other 2) that 
the problem was also important for the other firm(s) and 3) have more or less simultane-
ously undertaken an influence attempt, preferably vis-à-vis the same governmental body.
 -  Undertaking a joint influence attempt concerning the same non-individual problem.
This was asked during the interview; at least one of the firms involved had to mention the 
joint influence attempt.
 -  A ‘spokesman’ undertakes an influence attempt, together with or separately from the 
firms involved, on behalf of these firms concerning the same non-individual problem.
These ‘spokesmen’ were tracked down, interviewed if need be, and the most important data 
were coded.
The first two types of coalitions proposed by Braam may be useful to this study. In terms of 
the first type, as the actors operate separately from one another, ‘coalition’ is not considered 
to be a proper description in this study and is instead treated as a type of influence attempt. 
Can Braam’s operationalisation in the form of interview questions be useful to this study, 
i.e. translated into questions that can be posed when studying written sources? As this 
study aims to observe a separate influence attempt of a specific actor, it is not important 
whether or not 1) actors knew from each other 2) that the problem was also important 
for the other actor(s), but it is important that 3) they have more or less simultaneously 
undertaken an influence attempt, preferably vis-à-vis the same governmental body. In this 
study, ‘more or less simultaneously’ means within one and the same negotiation process 
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(on the Nice Treaty). The condition of ‘preferably vis-à-vis the same governmental body’ is 
guaranteed at least in the sense that the same 18 actors participate in the entire negotiation 
process and it is to one or more of them that influence attempts are directed (see Section 
3.6). As a fixed set of 18 actors is involved in the negotiation process about specific issues, 
it is for that matter likely that they know from one another that particular issues are also 
important to the other actors.
Braam was right to state that as soon as more than one actor undertakes influence at-
tempts on the same issue, it cannot be absolutely proven that one of them was a necessary 
condition for the resulting decision. However, this study does not agree with his ‘solution’ 
for this by not talking about ‘influence’ anymore but instead about ‘gains’, as both Braam 
and the author of this study are still interested in the same phenomenon: whether or not 
an actor has caused a specific effect. The least that can be done is to make plausible that an 
actor was a necessary condition, i.e. has exerted influence in a specific case. This requires, 
at the least, an inventory, in addition to the influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet, of the 
influence attempts of the other participating actors on the same issue.
Turning to Braam’s second type of coalition – undertaking a joint influence attempt on 
the same non-individual problem, he further operationalised this by asking a question 
about it during an interview, where at least one of the firms involved had to mention the 
joint influence attempt. This is again considered to be a type of influence attempt rather 
than a coalition in this study, although such a joint influence attempt is usually backed by 
a coalition of actors (or, in the terminology employed in this study, a ‘network’; see Section 
4.9.2).
Huberts (1988; 1989) aimed to assess and explain the extent to which Dutch private actors 
(protest groups, pressure groups and lobby groups) and government bodies exerted their 
influence on 15 decision-making processes about the construction of national highways. 
To this end, these decision-making processes were reconstructed on the basis of archival 
research and interviews. Huberts operationalised ‘goal-achievement’ as whether or not an 
actor’s ‘demand’, or ‘goal’, is reflected in the decision that is ultimately made. The decision 
is a choice from several – often more than two – decision options, particularly alternative 
routes for a specific highway. Although Huberts made a distinction between no, much 
and complete goal-achievement, in practice he measured the extent of goal-achievement 
dichotomously (yes or no), except for one case. In keeping with Huberts, this study argues 
that the extent of an actor’s goal-achievement should be measured by comparing its prefer-
ence with the decision ultimately made. If a precise comparison is to be made, however, it 
is important that the actor preferences correspond as much as possible with the menu of 
alternative decision options. Moreover, since there are normally more than two decision 
options, it is appropriate to include a category between no and complete goal-achievement. 
Huberts operationalised an influence attempt as an attempt to realise one’s goal through 
one of the following ‘strategies’: argumentation, demonstration, persuasion, litigation and 
contestation. In general, this study agrees with Huberts’ operationalisation, but only the 
strategies or types of argumentation and persuasion seem to be applicable to the specific 
context of this study.
Arts operationalised the extent of political influence as the extent of goal-achievement 
due to one’s own intervention (Arts, 1998:83). First, he examined whether the NGOs 
concerned had – fully or partially – achieved their goals. Arts operationalised the extent 
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of goal-achievement by comparing the NGOs’ policy goals, deduced from documents and 
interviews, with the policy outcome. This resulted in an ordinal measurement of the extent 
of goal-achievement: 0 = no, 1 = some, 2 = substantial and 3 = much. If NGOs had not 
achieved their goals, no influence was attributed to them. The causal analysis only contin-
ued if NGOs had (partially) achieved their goals. This study agrees with the way Arts, more 
directly than Huberts, coupled an actor’s goal with the outcome of the decision-making 
process and more explicitly indicated how the extent of an actor’s goal-achievement is 
related to the extent of its influence. Arts also accounted for partial goal-achievement, 
but it is strange that the category of ‘complete goal-achievement’ is absent. In addition, 
Arts did not make completely clear how he determined whether the extent of the NGOs’ 
goal-achievement was 0, 1, 2 or 3. ‘(…) Crediting remains very much dependent on the 
researcher’s own impressions’ (Arts, 1998:86).
In the causal analysis, particular attention was paid to the interventions made by NGOs. 
In operationalising these interventions, Arts made a distinction between protest and pres-
sure interventions. Protest interventions concerned the organisation of activities such as a 
march or a ludicrous action. Pressure interventions in turn consisted of advocacy activi-
ties, such as the dissemination of a position paper, and lobby activities such as presenting 
an oral statement or legal advice to an individual policy-maker. The extent to which the 
NGOs’ goal-achievement was due to their own interventions was measured in an ordinal 
manner: 0 = no, 1 = some, 2 = substantial and 3 = much. Besides the fact that it is again 
not completely clear when each value was attributed, it should be noted that the extent of 
NGO interventions as such was thus not specifically operationalised and measured. This 
study subscribes to Arts’ focus in the process analysis on the influence attempts of the 
participating actors, but is of the opinion that their extent should be specified.
4.9 The proposal for operationalisation
This study has one important thing in common with the studies discussed in the previous 
section – the aim of assessing a causal relationship in a political decision-making process, 
the cause being one or more actors (primarily by undertaking influence attempts) and the 
effect (primarily) being a decision (made by one or more actors). In keeping with these 
studies, it is argued that only actors that have (partially) achieved their goals according to 
the before-after analysis qualify for the attribution of influence. In other words, having 
(partially) achieved its goal is a ‘necessary condition’ for an actor to qualify for being a nec-
essary condition for the effect, i.e. decision. The goal of the process analysis is subsequently 
to examine whether the Dutch cabinet has actually caused its goal-achievement by itself, 
i.e. has exerted influence, and how this influence can be explained.
What became clear from the discussion in the previous section, however, is that the 
purely descriptive part is in itself already rather difficult to execute, that is to say it is already 
difficult enough to operationalise and measure ‘goal-achievement’. It can be concluded that 
the proposed operationalisations are not precise enough. At the same time, the first part is a 
‘necessary condition’ for being able to move on to the even more difficult explanatory part. 
This study therefore propagates modesty, by proposing that as precise an operationalisation 
and measurement of goal-achievement as possible should first be offered, before venturing 
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into a causal process analysis in which plausibility is the most that can be achieved. Goal-
achievement is the minimum property that should be measured.
When the first, descriptive part is not properly carried out, it does not make much sense 
to even start with the second, explanatory part. The first part should enable us to prove 
which actors have (partially) achieved their goals, i.e. belong to the group of potentially 
influential actors. The second part does not enable us to prove whether the Dutch cabinet 
was also actually influential (a ‘necessary condition’) and how this influence can be ex-
plained, but ‘only’ to make this plausible on the basis of as accurate a reconstruction of 
the negotiation process as possible, taking account of several agency as well as structural 
variables. This is a separate exercise, however, and leaves more room for interpretation by 
the researcher, and is presented as such in Chapter 7 only after the before-after analysis is 
conducted in Chapters 5 and 6. Complementing the before-after analysis with a process 
analysis should better enable us to provide an adequate answer to the research question.
4.9.1 The before-after analysis variables
The 18 participating actors attempt to realise their preferences on specific issues in the 
outcomes of the negotiation process on the Treaty of Nice, resulting in the extent of their 
goal-achievement. In order to be able to carry out the first part of the influence analysis, 
the following operationalisations of ‘preference on an issue’, ‘outcome’ and ‘extent of 
goal-achievement’ are proposed. This is in fact an operationalisation of the before-after 
analysis.
Preference on an issue
What?
 -  The desired outcome of the negotiation process, in the shape of a specific decision option that an actor 
wants to realise, i.e. lay down in the Nice Treaty text.
How/Where?
 -  1) Looking for the proposal that has been made on a specific issue, in the shape of a specific decision 
option, as laid down in formal written sources presented to the IGC (formal individual or joint written 
proposals).
Only if 1) does not provide (enough) information, because of the absence of a formal position paper or an 
absence of the preference in the paper (no text), a lack of clarity (no concrete decision option) or a presentation 
only as a possibility:
 -  2) Informal written sources (internal, confidential notes and reports from the archives of the Dutch 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, European Integration Department and the European Commission, Secretariat-
General, Taskforce Future of the Union and institutional matters).
When?
 -  Between May 1999 (the actual start of the agenda-setting process) and 14 February 2000 (the formal 
start of the IGC/decision-making process), and only if required extended by two months until 14 April 
2000.
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Outcome (of the negotiation process)
What?
 -  The result of the negotiation process, in the shape of a non-decision, a not-decision or a decision.
	 	 •	 	Non-decision:	an	issue	that	did	not	get	an	agenda	status	at	all.
	 	 •	 	Not-decision:	an	issue	that	did	get	an	agenda	status,	but	was	subsequently	not	decided	upon.
	 	 •	 	Decision:	an	issue	that	did	get	an	agenda	status,	after	which	a	selection	of	one	or	a	combination	of	
two or more decision options was laid down in the final Nice Treaty text as adopted at the end of 
the IGC (SN 533/00 of 12 December 2000): article, Protocol annexed to the Treaty or Declaration 
annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty.
How/Where?
Concerning non-decisions:
 -  1a) The issue has not been officially put on the agenda by the Presidency in a formal document (e.g. 
CONFER document or Presidency conclusions of European Council)
and/or  1b) The issue has not been included in a formal (CONFER) or semi-formal (e.g. SN) Presidency 
document preparing a specific meeting on one of the four negotiation levels
 +  2) The issue has not been discussed in terms of content by the Conference on one or more of the four 
negotiation levels according to written sources.
Concerning not-decisions:
 -  1a) The issue has been officially put on the agenda by the Presidency in a formal document (e.g. 
CONFER document or Presidency conclusions of European Council) (formally on the agenda)
and/or  1b) The issue has been included in a formal (CONFER) or semi-formal (e.g. SN) Presidency document 
preparing a specific meeting on one of the four negotiation levels (semi-formally on the agenda)
 +  2) The issue has been discussed in terms of content by the Conference on one or more of the four 
negotiation levels according to written sources
 +  3) No selection of one or a combination of more decision options has been laid down in the final Nice 
Treaty text as adopted at the end of the IGC (SN 533/00 of 12 December 2000): article, Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty or Declaration annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty.
Concerning decisions:
 -  1a) The issue has been officially put on the agenda by the Presidency in a formal document (e.g. 
CONFER document or Presidency conclusions of European Council) (formally on the agenda)
and/or  1b) The issue has been included in a formal (CONFER) or semi-formal (e.g. SN) Presidency document 
preparing a specific meeting on one of the four negotiation levels (semi-formally on the agenda)
 +  2) The issue has been discussed in terms of content by the Conference on one or more of the four 
negotiation levels according to written sources
 +  3) A selection of one or a combination of more decision options has been laid down in the final Nice 
Treaty text as adopted at the end of the IGC (SN 533/00 of 12 December 2000): article, Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty or Declaration annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty.
When?
Ad 1a):
 -  Between May 1999 (actual start of the agenda-setting process) and the Nice European Council of 7-11 
December 2000 (formal end of the IGC/decision-making process).
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Ad 1b) and 2):
 -  Between 14 February 2000 (formal start of the IGC/decision-making process) and 11 December 2000 
(formal end of the IGC/decision-making process).
Ad 3)
 -  12 December 2000 (date of the final Nice Treaty text adopted at the end of the IGC, SN 533/00).
Extent of goal-achievement
What?
 -  The extent to which the preferred decision option is reflected in the outcome.
	 	 •	 	In	the	case	of	a	non-decision	as	the	outcome:
	 		  ‘Not achieved’ (0a)
	 	 •	 	In	the	case	of	a	not-decision	as	the	outcome:
	 		  ‘Not achieved’ (0b)
	 	 •	 	In	the	case	of	a	decision	as	the	outcome:
	 		  In the case where the decision (option) made is not the preferred decision option:
    •	 	‘Not achieved’ (0c)
	 		  In the case where the decision made is a compromise between two or more decision options, one 
of which was the preferred decision option:
    •	 	‘Partly achieved’ (1 or 2)
	 		  In the case where the decision (option) made is the preferred decision option:
    •	 	‘Completely achieved’ (3)
How/Where?
 -  A comparison by the author of the preferred decision option with the outcome on the basis of the 
sources mentioned above for ‘preference on an issue’ and ‘outcome’.
  •	  In the case of a decision as the outcome: comparing the wording of the preferred decision option with 
the decision made on the basis of the respective formal written sources.
4.9.2 The process analysis variables
For the process analysis – the second part of the influence analysis, the following operation-
alisations of the agency variables ‘influence resources’, ‘influence attempts’ and ‘extent of 
influence’ as well as the structural variables ‘domestic structure’, ‘negotiation structure’ and 
‘external events and developments’ are proposed. The operationalisations of the influence 
resources are in keeping with the empirical studies discussed in the context of the position 
and network methods (see Section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3). The operationalisations of the three 
structural variables build on the discussion of these variables in Chapters 2 and 3.
Policy positions
What?
 -  The extent to which an actor holds a policy position during the negotiation process on an issue.
	 	 •	 	1)	Having	 a	 ‘pivotal’	 position	 during	 the	 negotiation	 process	 on	 an	 issue	 as	 a	 result	 of	 having	 a	
preference on that issue that lies between two or more different preferences of the other participating 
actors.
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	 	 •	 	2)	Having	a	 ‘majority’	position	during	the	negotiation	process	on	an	 issue	as	a	result	of	having	a	
preference on that issue being shared by (in total) a majority of the member states and/or of the 
participating actors.
How/Where?
Ad 1):
 -  An actor prefers a decision option that lies between two or more decision options that are preferred 
by the other participating actors according to the sources mentioned for ‘preference on an issue’ and 
‘influence attempts’.
Ad 2):
 -  An actor prefers a decision option that is shared by (in total) a majority of the member states and/or of 
the participating actors according to the sources mentioned for ‘preference on an issue’.
When?
Ad 1):
 -  At the start and/or in the course of the IGC (14 February until 7-11 December 2000).
Ad 2):
 -  At the start of the IGC (14 February 2000, and only if required extended by two months until 14 April 
2000).
Networks
What?
 -  The extent to which an actor has an informal position, i.e. contacts with other actors, during the 
negotiation process on an issue on which they have common preferences.
How/Where?
 -  The number of times there has been contact (face-to-face, telephonic or written) between two (bilateral) 
or more (multilateral) actors during the negotiation process besides the formal and informal meetings 
on the four negotiation levels concerning one or more issues considering (realising) common prefer-
ences according to written sources.
When?
 -  During the IGC (14 February until 7-11 December 2000).
Internal coherence
What?
 -  The presence on the part of an actor of a coherence of preferences and/or a coordination of actions.
How/Where?
Absence of different preferences:
 -  1) Different preferences on an issue in different formal and/or informal written sources of one and the 
same actor
Or:
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 -  2) Different preferences on an issue within the same part or between different parts of an actor at the 
same (national) level (horizontally) or at different (national and EU) levels (vertically), according to 
written sources.
Absence of different actions:
 -  1) Expressing a different preference on an issue during an IGC meeting on a specific negotiation level 
than exists within the same or a different part (horizontally or vertically) of an actor according to 
written sources
Or:
 -  2) Expressing different preferences on an issue during different IGC meetings on the same negotiation 
level or at different negotiation levels according to written sources.
When?
 -  Absence of different preferences: between May 1999 and 7-11 December 2000.
 -  Absence of different actions: during the IGC (14 February until 7-11 December 2000).
Influence attempts
What?
 -  The way in which an actor uses its influence resources in order to realise its preference on an issue in the 
outcome of the negotiation process.
How/Where?
Formal individual written proposals
 -  Individually presenting a written document to the IGC (with a CONFER number) in which a specific 
decision option for a specific issue is proposed.
Semi-formal individual written proposals
 -  Individually presenting a written document on the IGC that is made public and/or presented to one 
or more actors of the IGC (but without a CONFER number) in which a specific decision option for a 
specific issue is proposed.
Formal joint written proposals
 -  Two or more actors collectively present a written document to the IGC (with a CONFER number) in 
which a specific decision option for a specific issue is proposed.
Semi-formal joint written proposals
 -  Two or more actors collectively present a written document on the IGC that is made public and/or 
presented to one or more actors of the IGC (but without a CONFER number) in which a specific 
decision option for a specific issue is proposed.
Informal bilateral contacts
 -  The number of times there has been contact (face-to-face, telephonic or written) between one actor and 
another during the negotiation process besides the meetings on the four negotiation levels concerning 
one or more issues considering realising its own preference, according to written sources.
Informal multilateral contacts
 -  The number of times there has been contact (face-to-face, telephonic or written) between one actor and 
two or more other actors during the negotiation process besides the meetings on the four negotiation 
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levels concerning one or more issues considering realising its own preference, according to written 
sources.
Formal and informal IGC meetings
 -  The number of times an actor expresses that it is in favour of or against a specific decision option during 
a formal or informal IGC meeting on one of the four negotiation levels according to written sources.
When?
 -  During the IGC (14 February until 7-11 December 2000) (exception for CONFER documents pre-
sented shortly before the start of the IGC).
Extent of influence
 -  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with influence attempts in the sense of the active use of 
influence resources (see Section 4.3.3 and Table 4.1 for this study’s approach to assessing the extent of 
the Dutch cabinet’s influence).
Domestic structure
What?
 -  Domestic actors and factors constraining or enabling an actor during the negotiation process in general 
or concerning an issue in particular.
	 	 •	 Actors:
	 		 Parliament
	 		 Constitutional court
	 	 •	 Factors:
	 		 Referendum
	 		 Public opinion
	 		 Elections
	 		 Events and political conflicts
How/Where?
Parliament:
 -  1) (The threat of ) a parliamentary statement, in the shape of a negotiation mandate, a motion, etc., 
prior to (a specific part of ) the negotiation process concerning an issue being in keeping with or a 
departure from the formal preference of an actor on that issue (‘ex ante’) according to written sources
Or:
 -  2) An actor referring to this (threat of a) parliamentary statement during meetings or contacts during 
the negotiation process concerning an issue according to written sources
Or:
 -  3) An actor referring during meetings or contacts during the negotiation process to the possibility or 
threat of a parliamentary statement by its own or another actor’s parliament during the ratification pro-
cess involving this parliament about the negotiation process outcome in general or an issue in particular 
(‘ex post’) according to written sources
Or:
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 -  4) An actor referring in written sources to the possibility or an actual threat by its own or another actor’s 
parliament of a parliamentary statement during the ratification process involving this parliament about 
the negotiation process outcome in general or an issue in particular (‘ex post’).
Constitutional court:
 -  1) (The threat of ) a judicial review or another constitutional ruling before, during or after the negotia-
tion process concerning this process in general or an issue in particular according to written sources
Or:
 -  2) An actor referring during meetings or contacts during the negotiation process to the possibility, 
threat of or an actual judicial review or another constitutional ruling by a constitutional court in its own 
or another member state before, during or after the negotiation process in connection with this process 
in general or an issue in particular according to written sources
Or:
 -  3) An actor referring in written sources to the possibility, threat of or an actual judicial review or another 
constitutional ruling by a constitutional court in its own or another member state before, during or 
after the negotiation process in connection with this process in general or an issue in particular.
Referendum:
 -  1) (The possibility of ) a referendum being held on the Nice Treaty (that can be) connected to the 
negotiation process in general or an issue in particular according to written sources
Or:
 -  2) An actor referring during meetings or contacts during the negotiation process to (the possibility of ) 
a referendum being held on the Nice Treaty in its own or another member state in connection with the 
negotiation process in general or an issue in particular according to written sources
Or:
 -  3) An actor referring in written sources to (the possibility of ) a referendum being held on the Nice 
Treaty in its own or another member state in connection with the negotiation process in general or an 
issue in particular.
Public opinion:
 -  1) The existence of a specific public opinion in the EU in general or a member state in particular before 
or during the negotiation process (that can be) connected to this process in general or an issue in 
particular according to written sources
Or:
 -  2) An actor referring during meetings or contacts during the negotiation process to the existence of a 
specific public opinion in the EU in general or its own or another member state in particular before 
or during the negotiation process in connection with this process in general or an issue in particular 
according to written sources
Or:
 -  3) An actor referring in written sources to the existence of a specific public opinion in the EU in general 
or its own or another member state in particular before or during the negotiation process in connection 
with this process in general or an issue in particular.
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Elections:
 -  1) Elections taking place prior to, during or after the negotiation process (that can be) connected to this 
process in general or an issue in particular according to written sources
Or:
 -  2) An actor referring during meetings or contacts during the negotiation process to elections taking 
place in its own or another member state prior to, during or after the negotiation process in connection 
with this process in general or an issue in particular according to written sources
Or:
 -  3) An actor referring in written sources to elections taking place in its own or another member state 
prior to, during or after the negotiation process in connection with this process in general or an issue in 
particular
Or:
 -  4) Elections taking place prior to or during the negotiation process resulting in a change in personnel 
of an actor according to written sources and/or resulting in a different preference on an issue (in turn 
possibly contributing to a different outcome) according to the sources mentioned for ‘preference on an 
issue’.
Events and political conflicts:
 -  1) The existence or occurrence of a specific event or political conflict prior to or during the negotiation 
process (that can be) connected to this process in general or an issue in particular according to written 
sources
Or:
 -  2) An actor referring during meetings or contacts during the negotiation process to the existence or 
occurrence of a specific event or political conflict in its own or another member state prior to or during 
the negotiation process in connection with this process in general or an issue in particular according to 
written sources
Or:
 -  3) An actor referring in written sources to the existence or occurrence of a specific event or political 
conflict in its own or another member state prior to or during the negotiation process in connection 
with this process in general or an issue in particular.
Negotiation structure
What?
 -  Formal and informal rules on levels and phases, particularly timing, which structure the negotiation 
process and may enable or constrain an actor during the negotiation process in general or concerning 
an issue in particular.
	 	 •	 	Formal	rules:	laid	down	in	the	Treaties
	 	 •	 	Informal	rules:	established	in	practice
	 	 •	 	Levels:	formal	and	informal	meetings	on	four	levels	(1.	European	Council;	2.	General	Affairs	Council;	
3. Preparatory Group; 4. ‘Friends of the Presidency’ Group)
	 	 •	 	Phases,	particularly	timing:	the	time	course	of	an	issue	through	the	weeks	that	the	IGC	takes	place
How/Where?
Levels:
 -  The level at which an issue is negotiated according to written sources.
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	 	 •	 	The	median	of	the	number	of	times	an	issue	is	discussed	during	the	formal	and	informal	meetings	on	
each of the four negotiation levels during the negotiation process according to written sources.
Phases, particularly timing:
 -  The time course of an issue through the IGC according to written sources.
	 	 •	 	The	average	IGC	week	number	during	which	an	issue	is	discussed	during	the	formal	and	informal	
meetings on each of the four negotiation levels during the negotiation process according to written 
sources.
External events and developments at the European level
What?
 -  External events and developments occurring at the European level.
How/Where?
 -  1) The occurrence of a specific event or development at the European level prior to, during or after the 
negotiation process (that can be) connected to this process in general or an issue in particular according 
to written sources
Or:
 -  2) An actor referring during meetings or contacts during the negotiation process to the occurrence of a 
specific event or development at the European level prior to, during or after the negotiation process in 
connection with this process in general or an issue in particular according to written sources
Or:
 -  3) An actor referring in written sources to the occurrence of a specific event or development at the 
European level prior to, during or after the negotiation process in connection with this process in 
general or an issue in particular.
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter aimed to develop the conceptual and operational model for this study. In 
order to develop the conceptual model, the first part of the chapter specified the constitu-
ent building blocks and their mutual relations. In doing so, it has answered the following 
two sub-questions of this study: which variables can explain the process of EU Treaty ne-
gotiations and what kinds of expectations can be identified for each of these variables? The 
explanatory variables can be subdivided into agency and structural variables. Some relevant 
agency variables are: influence resources and the use of influence resources by means of 
influence attempts. Some relevant structural variables are: domestic structure, negotiation 
structure and external events and developments at the European level. Chapters 2 to 4 offer 
a theoretical answer to the central research question posed in this study: to what extent 
has the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence during the negotiation process resulting in the 
Treaty of Nice, and how can this influence be explained? The value of this answer should, 
of course, be uncovered by confronting the conceptual model with the empirical material 
(Chapter 7).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study aims to integrate – albeit to a limited 
extent – three important distinctions of the power and influence debate. This chapter has 
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completed the integration by finalising the conceptual model and explicating the relations 
among the constituent building blocks. By now explicating, as a conclusion, the integrative 
elements of this model, the added value of this model – and, in fact, of this study – can be 
stated.
Concerning the first distinction (resources vs. relation), this study adopts a relational 
approach to influence, focusing on actual influence, which is still rather exceptional in 
the field of IR and EU studies, where a power as resources approach has traditionally been 
dominant. At the same time, influence resources are not simply set aside as irrelevant, but 
instead taken to be the primary cause or agency variable in the explanation of influence. 
With regard to the second distinction (explicit vs. implicit, anticipated influence), the in-
novative element is that the focus is on the process or mechanism between cause and effect, 
taking influence resources as just a starting point for the analysis. Empirically, attention will 
be paid primarily to explicit influence via influence attempts, but the possibility of implicit, 
anticipated influence will also be marginally considered. In terms of the third distinction 
(three faces of power and agency vs. structure), this study is primarily concerned with the 
first face of decision-making, just as most previous empirical influence studies were, but 
will also pay partial attention to the second face of non-decision-making, and – between 
these two faces – to not-decision-making. In addition, the model includes several structural 
variables that co-determine the extent to which actors succeed in converting their influence 
resources into actual influence.
After having selected the method of influence measurement in the previous chapter, 
the second part of this chapter presented the operational model of this study. To this end, 
it asked the question of how to operationalise the selected method in the context of this 
empirical study. The discussion of operationalisations in previous empirical studies and 
their usefulness to this study made it clear that just the descriptive part of this study’s 
method (before-after analysis) is itself already rather difficult to execute, let alone the 
explanatory part (process analysis). This study therefore propagates modesty, in that it 
will first be attempted to measure as precise as possible the extent of goal-achievement of 
the Dutch cabinet (Chapter 5) and the other participating actors (Chapter 6). Only after 
this will a causal process analysis be undertaken on the basis of a detailed reconstruction 
of the negotiation process, taking account of several explanatory agency and structural 
variables (Chapter 7). Although a process analysis leaves more room for interpretation by 
the researcher, complementing the before-after analysis in this way should better enable us 
to provide an adequate answer to the research question. This debate will be returned to in 
Section 8.5.2.
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The before-after analysis
Assessing the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s 
goal-achievement
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, the method of influence measurement for this study was selected, which 
consisted of two parts: a descriptive before-after analysis complemented by an explana-
tory process analysis. The conceptual model was then presented in Chapter 4 and it was 
made clear how the different variables of this model are operationalised in the context 
of the two-part influence analysis. This chapter will conduct the before-after analysis for 
the Dutch cabinet and the analysis will be conducted for the other participating actors in 
the next chapter. The before-after analysis involves a measurement of the extent of goal-
achievement. The extent of goal-achievement is determined by comparing the preference 
on an issue, as laid down in formal and informal written sources, with the outcome of 
the negotiation process on this issue, namely a non-decision, a not-decision or a decision. 
The operationalisations of preference, outcome and extent of goal-achievement have been 
presented in Section 4.9.1.
In Sections 5.3-5.7, the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement is assessed for 
all 24 selected issues within the five selected dossiers of the Nice Treaty negotiations. This 
is done in order to establish the issues that the Dutch cabinet qualifies for being a poten-
tially necessary condition for the outcome, i.e. making it a potentially influential actor. 
In general, these sections follow the format of successively outlining the respective issue, 
the possible outcomes, the negotiation process resulting in the final outcome, the Dutch 
cabinet’s preference and the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement. Each of these 
sections ends with a summary table, indicating for each of the issues in the respective 
dossier the Dutch cabinet’s preference, the outcome of the negotiation process and the 
extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement. More detailed versions of the summary 
tables, in which all the sources that were used to measure the three variables are included, 
can be found in Annex 4.
Before presenting the empirical results of the before-after analysis for the Dutch cabinet, 
a few notes are made in Section 5.2 on how the dossiers and issues were selected, the 
data sources used, the study’s choice of the ‘preference’ concept and the ‘deadline’ and 
establishment of the before-preference. Finally, Section 5.8 provides some conclusions and 
reflections on the analysis.
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5.2 Assessing the extent of goal-achievement of the Dutch cabinet
5.2.1 A note on the selection of dossiers and issues
As the before-after and process analyses are rather labour-intensive, it is not feasible to 
study the Nice Treaty negotiation process in its entirety (see Section 1.5). Therefore, a 
selection has been made from among the dossiers and issues that have been a part of 
the negotiation process. This matter is approached by connecting to the approach of the 
Portuguese Presidency during the first half of 2000 to divide the IGC agenda into the 
following five ‘negotiation boxes’ (see Section 2.3.3):
1) Size and composition of the Commission
2) Weighting of votes in the Council
3) Extension of QMV
4) Other institutional issues (‘other necessary amendments to the Treaties arising as regards the 
European institutions in connection with the above issues and in implementing the Treaty 
of Amsterdam’), according to the Presidency in any case:
 - the size and competences of the European Parliament
 - the size and working division of the Court of Justice (and the Court of First Instance)
 - the size and competences of the Court of Auditors
 - the individual responsibility of Commissioners
 - the conditions for closer cooperation
5) Possible additional issues (to be added to the agenda on the proposal of the Presidency later 
on during the Conference):
 - ESDP
 - Charter of Fundamental Rights
The first three boxes concern the ‘leftovers’, which in practice formed one category of 
subjects besides the two categories of other institutional issues and possible additional 
issues. This study speaks of ‘dossiers’, which most of the time in turn consisted of ‘issues’. 
If all three categories are to be represented in the selection, a selection should be made 
from each category. It appeared to be feasible to study five dossiers in total within the 
restricted time period of this study. As the three leftovers constituted the main dossiers of 
the agenda, two of them are selected: the size and composition of the Commission and 
the weighting of votes in the Council. From the rather large second category, two dossiers 
are also selected: the Court of Auditors and closer cooperation. From the third category, 
the ESDP is selected (the Charter of Fundamental Rights was eventually not put on the 
agenda of the IGC).
To determine which issues within the five selected dossiers to study, the decisions that 
have ultimately been made are not taken as the starting point, but rather, the preferences 
expressed by the Dutch cabinet in its formal position paper of 15 November 1999, which 
was presented to the IGC as CONFER 4720/00 on 6 March 2000. Thus, all the issues 
within the selected dossiers on which the Dutch cabinet expressed a preference are selected 
for the first round of the before-after analysis: the assessment of the extent of goal-achieve-
ment of the Dutch cabinet as actor A. In total, the Dutch cabinet presented preferences on 
24 issues within the five dossiers selected for this study (see Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1 The Nice Treaty dossiers and issues selected for this study
Court of Auditors ESDP Closer cooperation Commission Weighting of votes
Size Treaty change Minimum requirement Size and composition Type of system
Internal chambers WEU Veto possibility General weighting
SOA PSC Differentiated membership Individual weighting
Contact Committee NATO Treaty division
Appeal ECJ Military Committee
Same powers Military Staff
Financial management Financial articles
OLAF
Instruction
Issues within the selected dossiers on which the Dutch cabinet had no formal preference, 
but on which decisions were yet to be made, are not included in the analysis. It should 
therefore be explicitly stated and recognised that the original pool of issues has a bias in the 
direction of the Dutch cabinet. This starting point is not chosen just because of this study’s 
focus on the Dutch cabinet as actor A, but also because it enables us to pay attention to 
non-decision-making and not-decision-making (see Section 3.6). This is thus done only 
from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet and not of the other participating actors. By 
starting with preferences and not, for example, with influence attempts, a greater part of 
the whole influence process can be examined. The study can consider whether and to what 
extent the preferences of the Dutch cabinet were followed by influence attempts, resulting 
in issues being put on the agenda or not (non-decisions) and resulting in issues being 
decided on or not (not-decisions).
5.2.2 A note on the data sources used
Primary, written sources have been mainly used to collect the data required to apply the 
influence analysis (see Section 1.5). A distinction can be made between formal, semi-formal 
and informal written sources. This study mainly refers to formal written sources as those 
that were made public in the sense that they were presented to the IGC as CONFER 
documents. There are also formal sources that were made public but not presented to the 
IGC, but these are used rather exceptionally.
Informal written sources are documents that were not made public, but instead constructed 
for internal, confidential use by one or more of the participating actors. These documents 
were found in the two archives that were consulted for the purposes of this study. The first 
is the archive of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry, European Integration Department 
(FA/DIE). The second is the archive of the European Commission, Secretariat-General, 
Taskforce Future of the Union and institutional matters. References in this study to these 
informal archival documents are preceded by ‘FA/DIE’ and ‘Commission’, respectively. 
A precise description of the files that have been used and the way they are referred to in 
this study can be found under ‘References: informal documents (archives)’. In addition, 
a normal access to documents request was made at the Council of Ministers on the basis 
of Regulation 1049/2001, after it became clear that special access would not be granted 
to more informal documents of its archive as in the case of the Dutch and Commission 
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archives. This request did indeed result in access being provided to almost exclusively 
formal documents, except for some semi-formal documents. A more detailed description 
of the access procedures and the general research process is found in Annex 1.
The informal documents of the Dutch and Commission archives were mainly general 
notes and memoranda on the IGC, and preparatory notes for and reports of specific IGC 
meetings and all other kinds of bilateral and multilateral meetings. Preparatory notes usually 
contain instructions on the stake of the respective actor that should be put forward by its 
representatives during the meeting. This stake was often laid out in a complementary note 
with ‘speaking points’. Preparatory notes often also provide some background information 
about the negotiations, such as the (perceived) positions of the other participating actors. 
Reports of the meetings are usually made by one of the actor’s officials who are present 
(in this case from the Dutch IGC Taskforce, the Dutch Permanent Representation or the 
Commission IGC Unit). In the case of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry, the archive 
also included notes from the different Dutch embassies offering information about specific 
positions of the actor where the embassy is based and providing an account of (bilateral) 
meetings with that actor.
Documents that may be classified as being somewhere between formal and informal 
documents are referred to as semi-formal documents in this study. These are primarily 
Council documents issued by the Presidency, not with CONFER but with SN numbers. 
Sometimes these documents could be obtained via the Internet, other times they were 
(only) found in one of the archives.
This study primarily uses formal and semi-formal written sources to apply the before-
after analysis. Thus, in order to detect the preferences of actors, the position papers that 
were presented to the IGC as CONFER documents were taken as the starting point. 
Complementary informal written sources have also been made use of (see further Section 
5.2.4). Presidency papers and progress reports, as well as draft Treaty texts have been used 
to assess the outcome of the negotiation process on specific issues. These are all CONFER 
or SN documents. The final yardstick was the adoption of the draft Treaty text at the end 
of the Nice European Council (SN 533/00, 12 December 2000). The study has principally 
made use of informal written sources in applying the process analysis.
Thus, the Treaty text published in the Official Journal several months later on 10 March 
2001 (2001/C 80/01) was not used as the final yardstick in establishing the outcomes of 
the negotiation process. As indicated in Section 1.2.2, this study focuses on the negotia-
tion process, which was concluded during the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 
2000. The Treaty text adopted during the end summit of an IGC normally goes through a 
juridical-linguistic check before it appears in the Official Journal. This may result in a final 
Treaty text on a specific issue that is differently formulated. Most of the time, different for-
mulations do not have substantive consequences, but sometimes do. Although the Official 
Journal version was not used as the final yardstick, substantive differences with the draft 
Treaty text adopted at the end of the IGC will be reported. Moreover, in the specific case of 
the Nice Treaty, the text adopted by the European Council contained some contradictions 
to do with the outcome of the weighting of votes. This outcome had to be revised and an 
element of renegotiation inevitably crept into this undertaking. By way of exception, the 
result (SN 533/1/00 rev1, 22 December 2000) is taken into consideration as a yardstick as 
far as the Weighting of votes dossier is concerned (see Section 5.7 for further discussion).
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5.2.3 A note on the choice for the ‘preference’ concept
The before-after analysis as applied in this study makes a comparison between an actor’s 
preference on a specific issue, as laid down in formal (and secondarily, informal) written 
sources and the outcome of the negotiation process, namely a non-decision, a not-decision 
or a decision. The latter is laid out in the Treaty text adopted at the end of the negotiation 
process. Taking the concept of ‘preference’ as a starting point may, however, evoke several 
criticisms.
First, as was already touched on when discussing the third face of power (Section 3.4), 
Lukes (1974) has argued that one should focus on an actor’s ‘real interest’ rather than 
its expressed preference. When aiming to establish an actor’s real interest in a specific 
instance, however, one is dependent on highly controversial theoretical assumptions (Dahl 
& Stinebrickner, 2003:14-18). In addition, it is empirically hardly or not at all possible to 
detect an actor’s real interest. For this reason, this study takes the concept of ‘preference’ as 
its starting point (cf. Nagel, 1975), which is both less theory-loaded than the concept of 
interest and more feasible to study empirically.
Second, taking the concept of preference as a starting point certainly does not solve all 
problems. There are several reasons why a preference expressed by an actor in its formal 
position paper – this study’s starting point operationally – need not necessarily be its ‘real’ 
preference. An actor may express a ‘bargaining’ preference during the negotiation process, 
which is different from its ‘real’ preference. An actor might, for example, take a rather 
‘extreme’ position on an issue in order to increase the chances of arriving at a compromise 
that is as close to its ‘real’ preference as possible. In short, an actor may have a hidden, real 
agenda that is different from its visible, official agenda. This issue has been raised both in 
the power and influence literature (e.g. Dahl, 1963) and in the literature on EU (Treaty) 
negotiations (e.g. Stubb, 2002:27; Van Schendelen, 2005:158-159). An actor may also 
hide its internal divisiveness on an issue behind a general or ambiguous – in short, unclear 
– preference (Smith, 2002:213; Van Schendelen, 2005:158-159). As will be made clear in 
the empirical analysis in this and the next few chapters, an actor’s attempt to obscure its 
internal divisiveness may also be less successful: different documents on the same actor may 
reveal different preferences and/or different preferences may result in divergent influence 
attempts during the negotiations at the EU level. Finally, at the start of the negotiation 
process, but also thereafter, an actor may simply not (yet), or only vaguely, know what 
its preference on an – often very complex – issue is. As a result, an actor may include 
in its position paper or express during a meeting a general, i.e. unclear preference or no 
preference at all.
Third and as a result of the three reasons just mentioned, an actor’s preference on a 
specific issue is often not pre-defined and fixed, but may only be formed and change 
throughout the course of the negotiation process. More generally, an EU Treaty negotia-
tion process could be considered to be a messy and confusing learning process (see Section 
1.4), in which actors may easily change their preferences when reacting to the flow of 
the negotiations. These changes may be the result of new ideas, approaches, alternative 
options or information becoming available during the negotiation process, but sometimes 
preferences change for no apparent reason at all (Smith, 2002; Stubb, 2002:7-8, 25-28, 
152). To complicate matters even more, an actor’s preference may also change in the course 
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of the negotiation process as a result of the exertion of influence by one or more of the 
other participating actors. Yet the rationale behind distinguishing between a before-after 
analysis and a process analysis is precisely to separate the mutual exertion of influence 
between the participating actors from the original preferences of these actors at the start of 
the negotiation process. Despite all the problems involved with the concept of preference, 
applying a before-after analysis requires there to be an ‘original’ preference of an actor on a 
specific issue and requires that it be established.
5.2.4 A note on the ‘deadline’ and establishment of the before-preference
The foregoing touches on the question of how this study operationally aims to establish 
the preferences of the participating actors. In particular, where should the study fix the 
‘deadline’ of the before-preference and how can this preference be ultimately established?
Assuming that there is such a thing as an original preference of an actor is not to say that 
the study should go back as far as possible to discover this preference. As mentioned earlier, 
preferences may change over the course of time. In the context of this study in particular, 
an actor may have different preferences on the same issue during the Amsterdam Treaty 
negotiations on the one hand and the Nice Treaty negotiations on the other. What is at 
risk of being discovered when the deadline is fixed too early is the preference of an actor 
in the context of the Amsterdam Treaty negotiation process instead of the Nice Treaty 
negotiation process. What the study wants to find out is the preference with which an actor 
entered the Nice Treaty negotiation process. This negotiation process officially began on 14 
February 2000, when the IGC began. Yet the deadline should not be fixed too late either, 
because otherwise the original preferences of actors may get mixed up with their potentially 
altered preferences in the course of the negotiation process. In light of this study’s research 
question, these preference changes may particularly be the result of the mutual exertion 
of influence during the negotiation process. Although the negotiation process might have 
actually begun before the official start on 14 February 2000, this date is considered to be 
early enough to be an adequate deadline for the before-preference.
As preferences that are not yet concerned with the Nice Treaty negotiation process are 
not intended to be included, a date from when data on actor preferences are taken into 
account should also be fixed. The most logical date to choose is May 1999, when member 
state representatives discussed the agenda for the Nice IGC for the first time. There might, 
however, be a contradiction between a source dating from, for example, June 1999 and a 
source dating from, for example, January 2000. In such a case, the contradiction will be 
discussed and settled in view of the fact that the study wants to establish the preference 
with which the actor entered the negotiation process on 14 February 2000.
The problem with 14 February 2000 is, however, that often not enough data has been 
found prior to this deadline to establish an actor’s preference. From the 10 actors that 
presented a formal position paper to the IGC, only two – Austria and the European Com-
mission, actually meet this deadline. As these position papers are formal primary sources 
which can be assumed to contain more reliable and verifiable data than informal primary 
sources and formal and informal secondary sources, it is not reasonably justifiable to leave 
them out of consideration. Therefore, it has been decided to extend the deadline by two 
months until 14 April 2000 as far as the formal written sources are concerned, so that all 
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formal position papers can be included in the analysis, the last of which was the European 
Parliament’s opinion paper of 13 April 2000 (CONFER 4736/00, 3 May 2000).
In using the different sources of this study to assess an actor’s preference, a hierarchy is 
created between them. The formal position paper of an actor (if it issued one) is taken as 
the starting point and this is complemented by all the informal written sources that have 
been found for this actor prior to 14 February 2000. If these sources are consistent with 
one another, an actor’s preference can be concluded accordingly. If an actor did not table 
a formal position paper or the paper contained no or an unclear preference, or the formal 
written sources (before 14 April 2000) and informal written sources (before 14 February 
2000) contradict one another, the deadline is extended by two months until 14 April 2000 
as far as the informal written sources are concerned as well. As the negotiation process had 
already been underway for two months by 14 April 2000, however, only data from after 
14 February 2000 – apart from the formal position papers – will be processed if necessary, 
to assess an actor’s preference. If this is done, it would account for the possibility that an 
actor’s preference has already changed from its original preference.
In most cases, the proposed procedure provides clarity on an actor’s preference. In the 
rather exceptional case of contradictory sources, however, formal written sources normally 
precede informal written sources in this study and ‘direct’ informal written sources (a note 
by the actor itself or a report of a meeting) precede ‘indirect’ informal written sources (a 
note by another actor about the actor). Yet contradictory sources may be a result of an 
actor taking a ‘bargaining’ preference or being internally divided. In such a case, informal 
written sources might reveal the ‘real’ preference of an actor or make clear that an actor is 
actually internally divided on the issue. These possibilities will be taken into consideration 
in such a case.
An additional problem, however, is that although formally it can be stated that the 
agenda-setting process began in May 1999 and the decision-making process on 14 Febru-
ary 2000, in practice these two processes evolved differently for each dossier and each issue 
(see Section 2.5). As a result, it is in fact not possible to fix one, general deadline. Some 
dossiers or issues emerged or were put on the agenda only in the course, or even at the end, 
of the negotiation process. The result of this was that (the other participating) actors only 
then started to think about their preferences or at least only then expressed their prefer-
ences, which had not necessarily been the case until that point in time. In such a case, it is 
not always possible to assess the preferences of these actors. This is discussed and justified 
for each case separately when the before-after analysis for the other participating actors is 
conducted in the next chapter.
5.3 Court of Auditors
In general, the Court of Auditors dossier was officially put on the agenda by the Finn-
ish Presidency in its conclusions of the Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 
1999 (SN 300/1/99 rev), referring to the Presidency report to this European Council of 
7 December 1999 (Council of the European Union, 1999a). In this report, the Court of 
Auditors was mentioned in general as an agenda issue, particularly its size. However, in 
attempting to put the Court of Auditors dossier on the agenda, the Dutch cabinet was 
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primarily focused on strengthening the position and functioning of the Court rather than 
on its size and composition. To this end, the Dutch cabinet first came up with specific 
proposals in its formal position paper (CONFER 4720/00, 6 March 2000) on the follow-
ing issues: SOA, Contact Committee, Appeal ECJ, Same powers, Financial management, 
OLAF and Instruction. These issues do, in fact, originate from the proposals of the Dutch 
cabinet in its position paper. In the first Benelux memorandum (CONFER 4721/00, 7 
March 2000), no preferences were included on these issues. Except for the Instruction 
issue, the Dutch cabinet attempted to put them on the agenda by including the issues in 
a non-paper, made up by the Finance Ministry in collaboration with the Dutch Court of 
Auditors and the Foreign Affairs Ministry (DIE), which was eventually presented to the 
Conference as CONFER 4773/00 on 20 September 2000. This was a success in the sense 
that the Presidency asked for the attention of the delegations to the Dutch proposals in its 
note for the Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000 (CONFER 4772/00, 20 September 
2000). The proposals were indeed discussed during this meeting (Commission report, 25 
September 2000 and FA/DIE report, 28 September 2000). Thus, the issues were only put 
on the agenda by the Presidency on 20 September 2000. Before then, they were not yet a 
part of decision-making, but still part of the agenda-setting process.
5.3.1 Size
Although the Treaty did not prescribe that the Court of Auditors consist of one member 
from each member state, this had practically always been the case. The main question 
concerning the size of the Court of Auditors was whether or not this principle of one 
member from each member state should be maintained after the coming enlargement, 
or whether the size should be ‘frozen’ (at 15 members) or decreased (for example at 12 
members, as proposed by the European Commission in its opinion paper of 26 January 
2000, CONFER 4701/00). The following possible outcomes were at stake during the 
negotiation process:
Size: size of the Court of Auditors
A = one member from each member state
B = status quo; old Article 247(1) TEC: ‘The Court of Auditors shall consist of 15 Members’
C = decreasing to less than 15 members (e.g. 12)
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Options A and B boiled down to the same thing during the negotiations, as the EU con-
sisted of 15 member states at the time.
In a note by the French Presidency on 20 September 2000 (CONFER 4772/00), option 
A was for the first time presented as a draft amendment:
‘The Court of Auditors shall consist of one Member per Member State.’
In an informal Presidency document of 3 November 2000 (SN 506/00), option A was still 
presented as a proposal that had a high chance of being adopted by the Conference. In the 
first progress report by the French Presidency (CONFER 4790/00), presented on the same 
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date, option A was presented in the form of a slightly different draft amendment, which 
would become the final outcome:
‘The Court of Auditors shall consist of one national from each Member State.’
The same draft amendment was included in the revised progress reports of 23 November 
2000 (CONFER 4810/00) and 30 November 2000 (CONFER 4815/00), in the draft 
Treaty of Nice of 6 December 2000 (CONFER 4816/00) and in the final Treaty text 
adopted at the end of the IGC (SN 533/00, 12 December 2000). This also applies to the 
Official Journal version of the Nice Treaty (art. 247(1) TEC).
This decision thus resulted in the continuation of the existing practice of one member 
from each member state, but implied that the size of the Court of Auditors would increase 
with each new acceding member state.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper of 15 November 1999, presented to the Conference as CON-
FER 4720/00 on 6 March 2000, the Dutch cabinet did not explicitly express a preference 
for A, but did so implicitly. The first Benelux memorandum (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 
2000) did not specify a clear preference. Option A is confirmed as the Dutch cabinet’s pref-
erence by three informal sources – two that report on the Preparatory Group meeting of 
25 February 2000 (FA/DIE report, 28 February 2000 and Commission report, 14 March 
2000) and one FA/DIE note (unknown date). In another FA/DIE note from 5 April 2000, 
it became clear that the Dutch cabinet was internally divided on this issue: the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry (DIE) preferred A, but the Finance Ministry preferred B. In the course 
of the negotiation process, it appears that the Finance Ministry had ‘beaten’ the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry (DIE): the Finance Ministry’s preference for B is reflected in the (third) 
Dutch position paper of 9 May 2000 and in the non-paper version of 6 June 2000.
As the outcome was option A, it can be concluded that the Finance Ministry’s goal-
achievement is 0, but the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s (DIE) goal-achievement is 3. As the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry can be considered to have been the primary representative of the 
Dutch cabinet during the Nice Treaty negotiations, its preference for A is taken as the 
preference of the Dutch cabinet, which therefore has completely achieved its goal (3).
5.3.2 Internal chambers
The issue of creating (the possibility of ) internal chambers within the Court of Auditors 
was a derivation of the issue of its size. As a great majority of the delegations appeared to 
be in favour of one member from each member state during the Preparatory Group of 25 
February 2000 (FA/DIE report, 28 February 2000 and Commission report, 14 March 
2000), the Portuguese Presidency asked the question in a Presidency note on the Prepara-
tory Group of 16 May 2000 (CONFER 4741/00, 11 May 2000) whether the principle 
of one per member state would necessitate the possibility for the Court of Auditors to 
establish internal chambers. In doing so, the Presidency put the issue on the agenda of the 
IGC. The following outcomes were possible during the negotiation process:
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Internal chambers: (the possibility of ) establishing internal chambers within the Court of Auditors
A = yes: creating (the possibility of ) internal chambers within the Court of Auditors
B = no: not creating (the possibility of ) internal chambers within the Court of Auditors
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
The outcome of the negotiation process was option A, which was for the first time pre-
sented as a draft amendment in a note by the French Presidency on 20 September 2000 
(CONFER 4772/00):
‘[It [the Court of Auditors] shall adopt its annual reports, special reports or opinions 
by a majority of its Members.] However, it may establish internal chambers in order to 
adopt certain categories of reports or opinions under the conditions laid down by its 
Rules of Procedure.’
As with the Size issue, it continued to be presented as a proposal that had the highest chance 
of being adopted by the Conference in SN 506/00 of 3 November 2000. The same draft 
amendment as above was subsequently included in CONFER 4790/00 of 3 November 
2000, CONFER 4810/00 of 23 November 2000, CONFER 4815/00 of 30 November 
2000, CONFER 4816/00 of 6 December 2000 and in SN 533/00 of 12 December 2000 
(the final Treaty text adopted at the end of the IGC). The Official Journal version of the 
Nice Treaty also includes an identical formulation (art. 248(4) TEC).
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper of 15 November 1999 (CONFER 4720/00, 6 March 2000), 
the Dutch cabinet only presented option A as ‘worth considering’, but its preference for 
A is confirmed by three informal FA/DIE sources (FA/DIE note, 16 February 2000; FA/
DIE note, unknown date; FA/DIE note, 5 April 2000). No preference was specified in the 
first Benelux memorandum (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000). The Dutch cabinet has 
therefore completely achieved its goal (3).
5.3.3 SOA
As pointed out in Section 5.3, the SOA issue did actually originate from the Dutch cabi-
net’s proposal in its position paper rather than being an issue of concern for the actors in 
general. The decision options are therefore reconstructed and simplified as (being in favour 
of ) the Dutch cabinet’s proposal (A) and being against it (B). The following were thus the 
possible outcomes during the negotiation process:
SOA: producing, in addition to the ‘overall’ statement of assurance (SOA), ‘sectoral’ SOAs on specific policy 
areas
A = yes: producing, in addition to the ‘overall’ SOA, ‘sectoral’ SOAs on specific policy areas
B = no: not producing, in addition to the ‘overall’ SOA, ‘sectoral’ SOAs on specific policy areas
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
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In the first progress report by the French Presidency (CONFER 4790/00, 3 November 
2000), the following draft amendment was included:
‘This [overall] statement shall include an opinion in each major area of Community 
activity’. 
This almost literally resembled the Dutch proposal in CONFER 4773/00 of 20 September 
2000: ‘The statement shall include an opinion on each major individual area of Com-
munity activity’. However, it was a weakened version of its original proposal in CONFER 
4720/00 of 6 March 2000 and in earlier, internal versions of the non-paper up to and 
including the last internal version from 14 September 2000 (FA/DIE non-paper, 5 April 
2000, 6 June 2000 and 14 September 2000).
In the revised versions of the progress report of 23 November 2000 (CONFER 4810/00) 
and 30 November 2000 (CONFER 4815/00), a slightly different draft amendment was 
proposed: 
‘This [overall] statement shall be supplemented by a specific assessment for each major 
area of Community activity’.
In the draft Treaty of 6 December 2000 (CONFER 4816/00) and the final version of the 
Nice Treaty (SN 533/00, 12 December 2000), the amendment was somewhat weakened: 
‘This [overall] statement may be supplemented by a specific assessment for each major 
area of Community activity’ (bold added, SL).
In the Official Journal version of the Treaty of Nice, it is stated as ‘specific assessments’ in-
stead of ‘a specific assessment’, but this makes no substantial difference (art. 248(1) TEC). 
The ultimate outcome of the negotiation process can be said to be a combination of A and 
B. The Treaty of Nice did not create the possibility of complementing the overall statement 
of assurance with separate statements of assurance for policy areas, but only of supplement-
ing the overall statement of assurance with assessments for policy areas. Moreover, this is 
only a possibility (‘may’) and not an obligation (‘shall’, CONFER 4790/00, 4810/00 and 
4815/00).
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet was in favour of and actually ‘responsible’ for – proposing it in its 
formal position paper – option A with regard to the SOA issue. The Treaty of Nice did 
not produce the possibility of complementing the overall statement of assurance with 
separate statements of assurance for policy areas, as the Dutch cabinet preferred, but only 
of complementing it with assessments for policy areas. In addition, this is only a possibility 
(‘may’) and not an obligation (‘should’, as the Dutch cabinet originally wanted). For these 
two reasons, it can be concluded that the Dutch cabinet has achieved the greater part of its 
goal, but not completely (2).
5.3.4 Contact Committee
The following were the possible outcomes of the Contact Committee issue during the 
negotiation process:
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Contact Committee: establishing a Contact Committee, consisting of the Presidents of the Court of Auditors 
and the national auditing bodies
A = yes: establishing in the Treaty itself a Contact Committee, consisting of the Presidents of the Court of 
Auditors and the national auditing bodies
B = yes: establishing in a Declaration attached to the Final Act of the IGC a Contact Committee, consisting of 
the Presidents of the Court of Auditors and the national auditing bodies
C = no: not establishing in the Treaty itself or in a Declaration attached to the Final Act of the IGC a Contact 
Committee, consisting of the Presidents of the Court of Auditors and the national auditing bodies
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Although it was not included in the Treaty text itself, a draft proposal for a Declaration to 
be attached to the Final Act of the IGC creating the possibility of establishing a Contact 
Committee was for the first time included in CONFER 4815/00 of 30 November 2000:
‘The Conference invites the Court of Auditors and the national audit institutions to im-
prove the framework and conditions for cooperation between them, while maintaining 
the autonomy of each. To that end, a contact committee may be set up composed of the 
chairmen of the national audit institutions and the President of the Court of Auditors.’
A slightly differently formulated version of the draft Declaration was included in the draft 
Treaty of 6 December 2000 (CONFER 4816/00) and also in the final version of the Nice 
Treaty (SN 533/00, 12 December 2000):
‘The Conference invites the Court of Auditors and the national audit institutions to 
improve the framework and conditions for cooperation between them, while maintain-
ing the autonomy of each. To that end, the President of the Court of Auditors may set 
up a contact committee with the chairmen of the national audit institutions.’
The same Declaration (no. 18) was annexed to the Final Act of the IGC according to the 
Official Journal version of the Nice Treaty. The ultimate outcome of the negotiation process 
can be said to be a combination of B and C, in the sense that although a Declaration was 
indeed adopted, the establishment of a Contact Committee was only presented in it as a 
possibility (‘may’) and not as a certainty.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet was in favour of and actually ‘responsible’ for – proposing it in its 
formal position paper – option A with regard to the Contact Committee issue. The fact 
that the ultimate outcome was only a Declaration, whereas the Dutch cabinet preferred 
to give the Contact Committee a basis in the Treaty, should weigh rather heavily when 
determining the extent of its goal-achievement. Besides, the setting up of a Contact Com-
mittee was only a possibility, not a guarantee (Dutch cabinet: ‘should’). In addition, the 
Dutch cabinet suggested in its position paper the possibility for the Committee to release 
a yearly report to the European Parliament and the Council on the results of its activities. 
A specification of the responsibilities of the Committee of such a type did not make it into 
the Declaration. It can therefore be concluded that the Dutch cabinet has achieved its goal 
only to a limited extent (1).
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5.3.5 Appeal ECJ
As with the SOA issue, the possible outcomes of the Appeal ECJ issue that were at stake 
during the negotiation process can be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
Appeal ECJ: granting the Court of Auditors the right of appeal at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against 
a member state that fails to comply adequately with its request for information
A = yes: granting the Court of Auditors the right of appeal at the ECJ against a member state that fails to 
comply adequately with its request for information
B = no: not granting the Court of Auditors the right of appeal at the ECJ against a member state that fails to 
comply adequately with its request for information
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Although this issue was also put on the agenda by the Presidency on 20 September 2000 
and discussed at least once during the Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000, as in-
dicated earlier, no decision has been made on it. That is to say that no amendment has 
been included in the final Treaty, in a Protocol attached to the Treaty or in a Declaration 
attached to the Final Act of the IGC. The issue therefore resulted in a not-decision from 
the perspective of the Dutch cabinet.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet was in favour of and actually ‘responsible’ for – proposing it in its formal 
position paper – option A concerning this issue. As this issue resulted in a not-decision 
from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, it has not achieved its goal (0b).
5.3.6 Same powers
The possible outcomes of the Same powers issue during the negotiation process can be 
reconstructed and simplified as follows:
Same powers: requiring the member states to provide the national auditing bodies with the same powers as the 
Court of Auditors with regard to audits of flows of Community funds within the member state in question
A = yes: requiring the member states to provide the national auditing bodies with the same powers as the Court 
of Auditors with regard to audits of flows of Community funds within the member state in question
B = no: not requiring the member states to provide the national auditing bodies with the same powers as the 
Court of Auditors with regard to audits of flows of Community funds within the member state in question
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
As part of the Dutch proposals of CONFER 4773/00, this issue was put on the agenda by 
the Presidency on 20 September 2000 and discussed at least once during the Preparatory 
Group of 25 September 2000. As with the Appeal ECJ issue, however, no decision has 
been made on this issue, resulting in a not-decision from the perspective of the Dutch 
cabinet.
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The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet expressed a preference for option A in its formal position paper. As this 
issue resulted in a not-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, it can be said to 
not have achieved its goal (0b).
5.3.7 Financial management
The possible outcomes of the Financial management issue can be reconstructed and simpli-
fied as follows:
Financial management: some provisions to improve the financial management of the EU
A = yes: improving the financial management of the EU
B = no: not improving the financial management of the EU
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
This issue was also part of the Dutch proposals of CONFER 4773/00 and as such put on 
the agenda by the Presidency on 20 September 2000. It was discussed at least once during 
the Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000. Again, no decision has been made on this 
issue; it resulted in a not-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper, the Dutch cabinet called for option A. As this issue also 
resulted in a not-decision for the Dutch cabinet, it has not achieved its goal (0b).
5.3.8 OLAF
The possible outcomes of the OLAF issue can be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
OLAF: providing autonomy to the European anti-fraud office OLAF (Office européen de Lutte Anti-Fraude), 
i.e. making it independent from the European Commission
A = yes: providing autonomy to OLAF, i.e. making it independent from the European Commission
B = no: not providing autonomy to OLAF, i.e. making it independent from the European Commission
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
This issue was put on the agenda by the Presidency on 20 September 2000 – as part of the 
Dutch proposals of CONFER 4773/00 – and discussed at least once during the Prepara-
tory Group of 25 September 2000. No decision was made, resulting in a not-decision from 
the perspective of the Dutch cabinet.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper, the Dutch cabinet stated that it was in favour of option A. As 
this issue resulted in a not-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, it has not 
achieved its goal (0b).
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5.3.9 Instruction
Finally, with regard to the Instruction issue, as it has not (officially) been part of the nego-
tiation process, the possible outcomes can be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
Instruction: instructing the EU ‘legislator’ to specify in more detail the information and auditing competences 
of the Court of Auditors
A = yes: instructing the EU ‘legislator’ to specify in more detail the information and auditing competences of 
the Court of Auditors
B = no: not instructing the EU ‘legislator’ to specify in more detail the information and auditing competences 
of the Court of Auditors
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Instruction proposal (option A) was included in the position paper of 15 November 
1999, which was presented to the IGC – as an influence attempt – on 6 March 2000 
(CONFER 4720/00). This document was probably made up by FA/DIE. However, the 
issue was not reflected in the first draft of the non-paper, which was drafted by the Finance 
Ministry in collaboration with the Dutch Court of Auditors and FA/DIE (FA/DIE note, 5 
April 2000). According to the note from 5 April 2000, this proposal encountered resistance 
from the Dutch Court of Auditors and the Finance Ministry also thought it was going a bit 
too far. As the proposal was not included in the non-paper, which was later (20 September 
2000) presented to the IGC as the main Dutch influence attempt on this dossier, apart 
from its position paper the Dutch cabinet (probably) did not undertake further influence 
attempts regarding putting this issue on the agenda and realising its proposal in the Treaty 
text. The issue was thus not put on the agenda, let alone discussed, during the negotiation 
process. Therefore, it resulted in a non-decision from the perspective of FA/DIE (but not 
from the perspective of the Dutch Court of Auditors and the Ministry of Finance!). The 
Dutch cabinet has thus not achieved its goal (0a).
Table 5.2 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement for the Court of Auditors (see Table 1 in Annex 4 for more 
details)
Court of Auditors Preference Outcome Extent of goal-achievement
Size Decision option A Decision option A Full (3)
Internal chambers Decision option A Decision option A Full (3)
SOA Decision option A Decision option A/B Partial (2)
Contact Committee Decision option A Decision option B/C Partial (1)
Appeal ECJ Decision option A Not-decision (T) Zero (0b – not-decision)
Same powers Decision option A Not-decision (T) Zero (0b – not-decision)
Financial management Decision option A Not-decision (T) Zero (0b – not-decision)
OLAF Decision option A Not-decision (T) Zero (0b – not-decision)
Instruction Decision option A Non-decision (N) Zero (0a – non-decision)
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All in all, the Dutch cabinet achieved its goal completely on two issues of the Court of 
Auditors dossier (Size and Internal chambers) and partially on two other issues (SOA and 
Contact Committee). It has not achieved its goal regarding the Appeal ECJ, Same powers, 
Financial management and OLAF issues, due to not-decisions, and on the Instruction 
issue, which resulted in a non-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet (see 
Table 5.2).
5.4 ESDP
The developments on the ESDP have to be seen separately from the IGC 2000, which 
resulted in the Nice Treaty (see e.g. Colijn, 2003). The Nice European Council just com-
pleted the ESDP process, which had started at the Cologne European Council of June 
1999, making a number of decisions to put in place the definitive structures necessary for 
the EU to assume its responsibilities in military and civilian crisis management operations 
as part of the ESDP (Galloway, 2001:155). Several reports for the Nice European Council 
had been prepared in various forums, such as the General Affairs Council, the Political 
Committee (PoCo) and the interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC; see below). 
The question regarding the IGC was whether or not Treaty change would be required 
to put these structures into place. Therefore, the ESDP process was treated as a separate 
exercise, but in parallel with the IGC, as with the process on the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. In the course of the IGC negotiations, the question of whether or not to discuss the 
ESDP as part of the IGC (agenda) was repeatedly raised, that is whether or not to discuss 
the possibility of Treaty change in the IGC.
The report presented by the Finnish Presidency shortly before the Helsinki European 
Council of 10-11 December 1999 (Council of the European Union, 1999a) stated, con-
cerning the ESDP as a separate exercise run in parallel with the IGC, that ‘the need for 
possible Treaty amendments will become discernible only at a later stage of this process’. 
The Helsinki Presidency conclusions requested for the incoming Portuguese Presidency ‘to 
draw up a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to the 
Feira European Council containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as 
an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary’ (SN 300/1/99 rev, 
10-11 December 1999). The Helsinki Presidency conclusions also stated that the incoming 
Portuguese Presidency ‘may propose additional issues to be taken on the agenda of the 
Conference’.
On 1 March 2000, the Portuguese Presidency presented a note on other subjects that 
could possibly be put on the agenda (CONFER 4716/00), in which it stated: ‘in the light 
of the developments concerning security and defence and the Charter of fundamental 
rights which could possibly lead to the need for amendments to the Treaties, the Presidency 
reserves the right to submit to the Feira European Council in June proposals relating to 
these subjects’. The first progress report, entitled ‘Strengthening the Common European 
Security and Defence Policy’, submitted to the Lisbon European Council of 23-24 March 
2000, stated among other matters that the Council had adopted the decisions, to be applied 
as of 1 March 2000, establishing three interim bodies (Council of the European Union, 
2000a). These bodies had been identified in the Presidency report to the Helsinki European 
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Council, entitled ‘Strengthening the common European policy on security and defence’: 
the interim PSC, Military Committee and Military Staff (Council of the European Union, 
1999b). The Lisbon Presidency conclusions made no mention, as far as the ESDP was 
concerned, of the issue of possible Treaty change (SN 100/1/00 rev, 23-24 March 2000).
The Presidency report to the Feira European Council (19-20 June 2000) of 14 June 
2000 (CONFER 4750/00) did not mention the ESDP at all, including the issue of pos-
sible Treaty change. The Presidency report entitled ‘Strengthening the Common European 
Security and Defence Policy’, annexed to the Feira Presidency conclusions (SN 200/1/00 
rev, 19-20 June 2000), took note of the opinion of the Council’s Legal Service, whose 
conclusion was quoted at length:
‘“The Council’s Legal Service is of the opinion that the conclusions of the Cologne 
and Helsinki European Councils regarding European security and defence policy can 
be implemented without it being legally necessary to amend the Treaty on European 
Union. However, such amendments would be necessary if the intention is to transfer 
the Council’s decision-making powers to a body made up of officials, or to amend the 
Treaty’s provisions regarding the WEU. Furthermore, it is for member states to deter-
mine whether amendments to the Treaty would be politically desirable or operationally 
appropriate.”’
The Presidency left the issue open by continuing:
‘The Presidency suggests that the issue of Treaty revision should continue to be exam-
ined between the Feira and Nice European Councils’ (Council of the European Union, 
2000b).
The report subsequently asked for the incoming French Presidency to present an overall 
report to the Nice European Council and stated that the permanent structures should be 
put in place as soon as possible after the Nice meeting.
No Presidency report was presented to the Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 
2000 and no Presidency conclusions were documented of this special, informal European 
Council. Only during the PoCo of 28 November 2000 did the Presidency propose to 
include the issue of Treaty change as part of the broader package on the ESDP to be 
presented to Nice. Following this, the ‘Draft Presidency report on the European Security 
and Defence Policy’ plus annexes from 30 November 2000 presented to the General Affairs 
Council of 4 December 2000 and, in a revised form, to the Nice European Council of 7-11 
December 2000, contained the following passage: ‘The report will be submitted to the Nice 
European Council as a whole including, as provided for in Feira, the matter of revision of 
the Treaty’ (Council of the European Union, 2000c). In doing so, the Presidency put the 
Treaty change issue on the agenda.
The study first analyses the ESDP by focusing on the issue of possible Treaty change in 
general (yes or no; Section 5.4.1) and only after that on the substantive Treaty changes 
in particular (Sections 5.4.2-5.4.7). The reason for this is that until the Nice European 
Council, the dossier was essentially one of agenda-setting and not decision-making.
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5.4.1 Treaty change
The study thus initially analyses the ESDP as an agenda-setting issue, the question being 
whether or not an actor was in favour of putting the ESDP on the IGC agenda in order to 
make Treaty change possible at all. In the course of the negotiation process, an in between 
option emerged: that ESDP Treaty change would not (have to) take place now, but certainly 
still in the (near) future. This might be laid out in a separate text in Nice, for example as 
part of the Presidency conclusions or as a Declaration attached to the Final Act of the IGC. 
All in all, the following were the possible outcomes during the negotiations:
Treaty change: whether or not to establish the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the Treaty
A = Treaty change (now)
B = no Treaty change now, but in the future (announced in a separate text, for example a Declaration)
C = no Treaty change (at all)
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
During the Nice European Council, the issue was officially discussed. It was decided that 
the Treaty would indeed be changed, i.e. the outcome was option A.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet clearly expressed a preference for option A in its formal position paper 
of 15 November 1999, presented to the IGC as CONFER 4720/00 on 6 March 2000. Yet 
the first Benelux memorandum (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000) left open whether 
or not the Treaty should indeed be changed. This might be due to the fact that the Dutch 
partners were not (to the same extent) convinced of the necessity or desirability of Treaty 
change (see Section 6.4.1). However, the Dutch preference for option A, mentioned in its 
position paper, is confirmed by all informal FA/DIE and Commission sources prior to the 
deadline of the before-preference. The Dutch cabinet has therefore completely achieved its 
goal (3).
5.4.2 WEU
At the same time, the development of a security and defence policy in the EU implied 
a taking over of the tasks of the WEU, making the WEU more or less redundant. This 
could have consequences for Article 17 TEU, which had several references to the WEU. 
Therefore, if the text of the Treaty regarding the ESDP was indeed to be changed, one 
of the logical things to do would be to update Article 17 TEU and scratch the various 
references to the WEU. The possible outcomes of the WEU issue during the negotiation 
process can therefore be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
WEU: scratching the various references to the Western European Union (WEU) in Article 17 TEU
A = yes: scratching the various references to the WEU in Article 17 TEU
B = no: not scratching the various references to the WEU in Article 17 TEU
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T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Only after it was decided at Nice that there would be ESDP Treaty change did the partici-
pating actors discuss the Treaty changes in terms of content. This was based on the proposed 
amendments to Articles 17 and 25 TEU of Italy and the Benelux, which were first presented 
on 23 October 2000 (CONFER 4788/00) and which were again tabled in Nice (Galloway, 
2001:156). Considering the decision to change the Treaty in Nice, the substantive issues 
included in the Italy and Benelux proposals (WEU, PSC, NATO and Military Committee) 
were – in hindsight – also put on the agenda by the Presidency in its report on the ESDP 
to the Nice European Council (Council of the European Union, 2000c).
When considering the Treaty text adopted at the end of the IGC (SN 533/00, 12 De-
cember 2000), it can be seen that all references to the WEU in paragraphs 1 and 3 of 
Article 17 TEU have been scrapped. This does not apply to the reference in paragraph 4 to 
the WEU and NATO collective defence commitment, as the WEU’s Article V collective 
defence commitment remained in force (Galloway, 2001:156). It can therefore be stated 
that all references that could logically be scrapped have indeed been scrapped. The outcome 
of the negotiation process was therefore option A.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The first Benelux memorandum did not include a preference on this and the other substan-
tive issues. The Dutch cabinet’s formal position paper was not completely clear about the 
Dutch preference; it only implicitly seemed to indicate a preference for A. This preference 
was, however, confirmed by two informal FA/DIE sources (DIE/DVB note, 15 March 
2000 and DVB note, 16 March 2000). The Dutch cabinet has thus completely achieved 
its goal (3).
5.4.3 PSC
As stated earlier, three bodies were created as part of developing an ESDP first as interim 
bodies as of 1 March 2000 and subsequently as definitive bodies as of the time of the Nice 
European Council: the PSC (replacing the former PoCo), the Military Committee and the 
Military Staff. As with all the issues of the ESDP dossier, the question regarding the IGC 
was whether and, if so how, these three bodies would have to be established in the Treaty. 
Regarding the PSC, the possible outcomes during the negotiation process could therefore 
be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
PSC: establishing a Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the Treaty and formulating its responsibilities 
with regard to EU-led crisis management operations
A = yes: establishing a PSC in the Treaty and formulating its responsibilities with regard to EU-led crisis 
management operations
B = no: not establishing a PSC in the Treaty and formulating its responsibilities with regard to EU-led crisis 
management operations
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
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The negotiations that have taken place in Nice on the basis of the amendment proposals of 
Italy and the Benelux have resulted in the following outcome (SN 533/00, 12 December 
2000):
 -  Article 25 TEU about the PoCo was amended, establishing the PSC in the Treaty, add-
ing
 -  in a new paragraph that, ‘within the scope of this Title, this Committee shall exercise, 
under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis 
management operations’, and adding
 -  in yet another new paragraph that ‘the Council may authorise the Committee, for the 
purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the 
Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic 
direction of the operation, without prejudice to Article 47’.
The PSC has been established in the Treaty and its responsibilities have been formulated 
(‘political control and strategic direction’ and the possibility of delegated authority ‘to 
take the relevant decisions’, respectively). The outcome of the negotiation process was 
therefore A.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper, the Dutch cabinet made clear that it wanted to establish the 
PSC in the Treaty and formulate its ‘responsibilities’ in crisis management operations. It 
was not explicitly stated that ‘responsibilities’ also included the possibility of the Council 
delegating authority to the PSC, but this is confirmed by two FA/DIE sources (DIE/
DVB note, 15 March 2000 (possibility) and DVB note, 16 March 2000). According to 
its position paper, the Dutch cabinet also wanted to establish the relationship between 
the responsibility of the PSC and that of COREPER and other committees, which would 
make it necessary not only to adapt Article 25 TEU, but also Article 18 TEU (on the High 
Representative for the CFSP) and Article 207 TEC (on COREPER). However, this has 
not occurred. It can therefore be concluded that the Dutch cabinet has achieved the greater 
part of its goal, but not completely (2).
5.4.4 NATO
The possible outcomes of the NATO issue during the negotiations can be reconstructed 
and simplified as follows:
NATO: establishing the relationship and cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
in the Treaty
A = yes: establishing the relationship and cooperation with NATO in the Treaty
B = no: not establishing the relationship and cooperation with NATO in the Treaty
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
The issue was also included in the proposals of Italy and the Benelux countries that were 
presented to the IGC as CONFER 4788/00 on 23 October 2000. As these proposals 
formed the basis of the discussion on the substantive ESDP issues in Nice, the NATO issue 
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was a part of the agenda of the negotiators. However, no decision was made on this issue, 
and thus it resulted in a not-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
On this issue, the Dutch cabinet expressed a preference for A in its formal position paper 
of 15 November 1999. This was confirmed by an informal FA/DIE source (FA/DIE/
Weighting of votes Paris embassy note, 16 December 1999). As this issue resulted in a 
not-decision from its perspective, the Dutch cabinet has not achieved its goal (0b).
5.4.5 Military Committee
The possible outcomes of the Military Committee issue can be reconstructed and simpli-
fied as follows:
Military Committee: establishing a Military Committee in the Treaty, assisting the PSC
A = yes: establishing a Military Committee in the Treaty, assisting the PSC
B = no: not establishing a Military Committee in the Treaty, assisting the PSC
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
As part of the Italy and Benelux proposals that formed the basis of the discussion on the 
substantive ESDP issues in Nice, the Military Committee issue was a part of the agenda. 
As no decision was made on this issue, it resulted in a not-decision from the perspective of 
the Dutch cabinet.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet expressed a preference for A on this issue in its formal position paper of 
15 November 1999. As this issue resulted in a not-decision from its perspective, the Dutch 
cabinet has not achieved its goal (0b).
5.4.6 Military Staff
As the Military Staff issue has not (officially) been a part of the negotiation process, the 
possible outcomes can be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
Military Staff: establishing a Military Staff in the Treaty, supporting the Military Committee
A = yes: establishing a Military Staff in the Treaty, supporting the Military Committee
B = no: not establishing a Military Staff in the Treaty, supporting the Military Committee
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
This issue was, according to the informal written sources, not a part of the discussions 
between Italy and the Benelux countries that resulted in their proposals of CONFER 
4788/00 presented on 23 October 2000. The discussion in Nice on the ESDP was subse-
quently based on these proposals (not including the Military Staff proposal). The issue was 
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thus not a part of the agenda and not discussed. It has therefore resulted in a non-decision 
from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet called for option A in its position paper. As this issue resulted in a 
non-decision for the Dutch cabinet, it has not achieved its goal (0a).
5.4.7 Financial articles
Finally, as the Financial articles issue was not (officially) a part of the negotiation process, 
the possible outcomes can be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
Financial articles: (the extent to which EU-led operations require) amendment of the financial articles, in 
particular Article 28 TEU
A = yes: amending the financial articles, in particular Article 28 TEU
B = no: not amending the financial articles, in particular Article 28 TEU
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
This issue was not part of CONFER 4788/00, which formed the basis of the substantive 
negotiations in Nice. The issue was therefore not a part of the agenda and not discussed. 
The issue has thus resulted in a non-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet presented option A as a possibility in its formal position paper and 
also in a FA/DIE DVB note from 16 March 2000. The Dutch cabinet wanted the issue 
to at least be put on the agenda in order to consider the extent to which EU-led opera-
tions required an amendment of the financial articles, particularly Article 28 TEU. This 
was unsuccessful, because the issue resulted in a non-decision from the perspective of the 
Dutch cabinet. It has therefore not achieved its goal (0a).
Table 5.3 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement for the ESDP (see Table 2 in Annex 4 for more details)
ESDP Preference Outcome Extent of goal-achievement
Treaty change Decision option A Decision option A Full (3)
WEU Decision option A Decision option A Full (3)
PSC Decision option A Decision option A Partial (2)
NATO Decision option A Not-decision (T) Zero (0b – not-decision)
Military Committee Decision option A Not-decision (T) Zero (0b – not-decision)
Military Staff Decision option A Non-decision (N) Zero (0a – non-decision)
Financial articles Decision option A (possibility) Non-decision (N) Zero (0a – non-decision)
To sum up, then, the Dutch cabinet has achieved its goal fully on two issues (Treaty change 
and WEU) and partially on one issue (PSC) in the ESDP dossier. It has not achieved its 
goal on four issues, on two due to the fact that they resulted in not-decisions (NATO and 
Military Committee) and on two others because they resulted in non-decisions from its 
perspective (Military Staff and Financial articles) (see Table 5.3).
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5.5 Closer cooperation
The Amsterdam Treaty introduced provisions (‘enabling clauses’) on ‘closer cooperation’ 
under the first and third pillars. This involves the possibility for a limited number of mem-
ber states making use of the Treaty framework to integrate further in a certain policy area 
than the rest. Up until the Nice meeting, the closer cooperation provisions had not been 
applied in practice. Hitherto only ‘predefined’ forms of closer cooperation, or flexibility, 
have been put into practice in the shape of, for example, the Schengen agreement and the 
Euro group. Despite this, several actors already wanted to revise the Amsterdam provisions 
at the time of the Nice IGC, because they deemed the conditions for entering into a closer 
cooperation to be too tight, i.e. they wanted to relax the conditions (‘flexibilise flexibility’). 
There were two conditions in particular that called for the attention of the participating 
actors: the minimum number of member states required for the establishment of closer 
cooperation and the possibility for a member state to veto such a cooperation.
In general, the Closer cooperation dossier was officially only put on the agenda during 
the Feira European Council of 19-20 June 2000 (SN 200/1/00 rev, 19-20 June 2000), 
after the Presidency had proposed to do so in its report to the Feira European Council of 
14 June 2000 (CONFER 4750/00). In its note of 18 July 2000 (CONFER 4761/00), the 
Presidency practically put the Minimum requirement issue and the Veto possibility issue 
on the agenda.
5.5.1 Minimum requirement
The Amsterdam Treaty requested that a closer cooperation ‘concerns at least a majority of 
member states’, which in a Union of 15 member states boiled down to at least eight mem-
ber states. As the EU would soon be enlarged to include (more than) 25 member states, 
this minimum requirement implied that closer cooperation would become more difficult 
to engage in every time the EU expanded. Therefore, several actors aimed to lower this 
minimum requirement. Others felt that it was premature to revise this condition before 
it had even been applied in practice, or did not want to change anything because they 
expected that they would not be willing and/or able to enter into concrete closer coopera-
tion in the future. The following were the possible outcomes of the Minimum requirement 
issue during the negotiation process:
Minimum requirement: the minimum number of member states required for engaging in a closer cooperation 
initiative
A = at least eight member states
B = at least one third of the member states
C = status quo: at least a majority of the member states
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
The ultimate outcome of the negotiation process was option A. The Presidency proposed 
this option for the first time in its note of 18 October 2000 considering the Preparatory 
Group of 23 October 2000 (CONFER 4786/00). Option A was subsequently included 
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in the first progress report of the French Presidency of 3 November 2000 (CONFER 
4790/00), the Presidency notes of 9 November 2000 (CONFER 4798/00) and 17 No-
vember 2000 (CONFER 4803/00), the revised progress reports of 23 November 2000 
(CONFER 4810/00) and 30 November 2000 (CONFER 4815/00), the draft Treaty of 
Nice of 6 December 2000 (CONFER 4816/00) and in the final Treaty text agreed upon 
at the end of the Conference (SN 533/00, 12 December 2000). In the Official Journal 
version of the Nice Treaty, option A is part of Article 43 TEU.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
Based on its position paper of 15 November 1999 (CONFER 4720/00, 6 March 2000), it 
becomes clear that the Dutch cabinet was in favour of ‘revising’ the majority requirement, 
but it did not specify an option (A or B). In the first Benelux memorandum of 6 December 
1999 (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000), it did specify its preference that closer coopera-
tion ‘should also be possible with the same number of member states as is the case today’, 
which boiled down to eight member states (A). Most informal written sources prior to the 
deadline provide no additional clarity (A/B), but one explicitly confirms the preference for 
A, referring to – and interpreting – the formal position paper just mentioned (FA/DIE 
note, unknown date, probably between 31 January 2000 and 30 March 2000). The Dutch 
cabinet has therefore completely achieved its goal (3).
5.5.2 Veto possibility
The Amsterdam Treaty determined that the Council could establish closer cooperation by 
QMV. If a member state was, however, ‘for important and stated reasons of national policy’, 
against such closer cooperation, the matter could be referred to the European Council, 
which would decide by unanimity. In practice, each member state had a veto (possibility) 
on the formation of closer cooperation. As with the minimum requirement, several actors 
wanted to relax this condition, i.e. abolish the veto possibility, so as to make the formation 
of closer cooperation easier, whereas others wanted to maintain the status quo. In the 
course of the negotiations, an in between decision option emerged, which boiled down to 
formally abolishing the veto, while maintaining the possibility of the matter being referred 
to the European Council. Therefore, the following were the possible outcomes of the Veto 
possibility issue during the negotiation process:
Veto possibility: whether or not a member state has the ability to veto a closer cooperation initiative
A = abolishing the veto possibility, deciding by QMV
B = abolishing the veto possibility, but maintaining the possibility of referring the matter to the European 
Council
C = status quo: maintaining the veto possibility
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Option B was first presented as such by the French Presidency in its notes of 30 August 
2000 (in addition to option A) and 5 October 2000 (CONFER 4766/00 and 4780/00, 
respectively). From its subsequent note of 18 October 2000 (CONFER 4786/00) until 
The before-after analysis 145
the draft Nice Treaty text of 6 December 2000 (CONFER 4816/00), it took the following 
shape:
‘A member of the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European 
Council before the Council takes a decision [by QMV]’.
The ultimate outcome of the negotiation process, decided on in Nice, was formulated as 
follows (SN 533/00, 12 December 2000):
‘A member of the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European 
Council. After that referral, the Council may take a decision in accordance with the 
provisions of the first subparagraph [i.e. by QMV]’ (emphasis added, SL).
Formulated in this manner, the ultimate outcome thus left open whether the Council 
would actually make a decision (by QMV) or not. Therefore, the outcome was in fact a 
compromise between options B and C. In the Official Journal version of the Treaty of Nice 
(art. 11 TEC), the outcome is formulated as follows:
‘A member of the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European 
Council. After the matter has been raised before the European Council, the Council 
may act in accordance with the first subparagraph of this paragraph [i.e. decide by 
QMV]’ (emphasis added, SL).
This is a different wording than that in the final Treaty text agreed upon in Nice, but the 
outcome boils down to substantially the same thing.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper (CONFER 4720/00, 6 March 2000), the Dutch cabinet did 
not explicitly state that it wanted to abolish the veto, only that it was in favour of ‘revising’ 
this condition. The Dutch cabinet did, however, express a preference for option A in the 
first Benelux memorandum (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000). One FA/DIE source 
offers no additional clarity, pointing to a preference for A/B (FA/DIE/Court of Auditors 
preparatory note for Preparatory Group of 25 February 2000, unknown date). Yet all other 
FA/DIE sources prior to the deadline confirm the Dutch preference for A. As in the case of 
the Minimum requirement issue, in doing this one of these sources explicitly refers to the 
formal Dutch position paper (FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably between 31 January 
2000 and 30 March 2000).
The possibility to veto a closer cooperation initiative (after being referred to the Euro-
pean Council deciding by unanimity) has indeed formally been abolished and replaced by 
decision-making by a qualified majority. However, it is still possible to refer the matter to 
the European Council. In addition, after being referred to the European Council, there is 
only the possibility (‘may take’) and not the obligation (‘takes’, e.g. CONFER 4816/00, 6 
December 2000) that the Council makes a decision by QMV. It can therefore be concluded 
that the Dutch cabinet has only partially achieved its goal (1).
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5.5.3 Differentiated membership
As the Differentiated membership issue has not (officially) been a part of the negotiation 
process, the possible outcomes can be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
Differentiated membership: the possibility for a candidate member state to become a partial member, making it 
possible to accede earlier than when a candidate member may only become a full member (apart from possible 
derogations and transition periods)
A = yes: introducing the possibility for a candidate member state to become a partial member
B = no: not introducing the possibility for a candidate member state to become a partial member
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet proposed option A as a possibility in its formal position paper of 15 
November 1999 (CONFER 4720/00, 6 March 2000). It was also mentioned as an issue 
that the Dutch cabinet wanted to be put on the agenda of the IGC in an informal FA/DIE 
note from around 1 December 1999. According to two other informal written sources, the 
proposal was, however, abandoned shortly thereafter (FA/DIE London embassy report, 15 
December 1999; FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably between 20 December 1999 and 
31 January 2000). These two sources explicitly refer to and overrule the (possible) proposal 
made in the formal position paper. The latter note offers as an explanation for this that 
many member states think the proposal to be ‘premature’ and the Dutch Second Chamber 
had in a motion also expressed that they were against the proposal. At the time the position 
paper was presented to the IGC, 6 March 2000, the proposal included had thus practically 
already been abandoned for some time. The study still concludes that the Dutch cabinet 
had originally preferred option A, albeit as a possibility.
Apart from its formal position paper, the Dutch cabinet thus did not undertake any fur-
ther influence attempts to put the issue on the agenda. Subsequently, it was not discussed 
during the negotiation process either. The issue has therefore resulted in a non-decision 
from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, which has not achieved its goal (0a).6
5.5.4 Treaty division
Finally, as the Treaty division issue has not (officially) been a part of the negotiation process, 
the decision options can be simplified as follows:
Treaty division: dividing the Treaties into two parts, the first of which would be a ‘basic’ Treaty to be changed 
through an IGC and requiring the approval of all member states and the second of which would be one or more 
‘policy’ Treaties to be changed more easily
A = yes: dividing the Treaties into two parts
B = no: not dividing the Treaties into two parts
6. Although the issue held the status of a possible proposal in the formal position paper, the fact that two 
informal sources explicitly overruled it indicates that it was at least a serious possibility for the Dutch cabinet. 
Therefore it is considered to be a non-decision.
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T = not-decision
N = non-decision
In the run-up to the IGC, this issue popped up a few times during the fourth meeting 
of the Satuli Group, preparing the IGC, about ‘other institutional issues’ on 6 October 
1999 (FA/DIE/Preparation report, 7 October 1999; see Section 2.3.1). Shortly thereafter, 
option A was proposed in the Dehaene report of 18 October 1999 (Dehaene, Von Weiz-
säcker, & Simon, 1999). This report on institutional problems that should be dealt with 
at the forthcoming IGC was drawn up on the invitation of and for the Commission. The 
Commission subsequently included the proposal in its contribution of 10 November 1999 
(European Commission, 1999). The European Parliament did the same in its resolution of 
18 November 1999 (European Parliament, 1999). In its report to the Helsinki European 
Council of 10-11 December 1999, however, the Finnish Presidency indicated that during 
the preparatory consultations only very little support had been expressed for option A 
(Council of the European Union, 1999a).
In its note of 1 March 2000 (CONFER 4716/00), the Portuguese Presidency again 
mentioned the issue as a possible agenda subject to be proposed to the Feira European 
Council of 19-20 June 2000. In the Presidency report to the Feira European Council 
(CONFER 4750/00), however, the issue was conclusively removed as a possible agenda 
subject ‘in view of both the technical nature of the matter and its political sensitivity’. Yet 
it was suggested that the next Presidency would take up this issue.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper, the Dutch cabinet presented option A as a possibility. A prudent 
formulation has been chosen (‘could be’) and reference was made to the future (‘eventu-
ally’). Similarly, the first Benelux memorandum of 6 December 1999 stated that the IGC 
should conduct an ‘examination’ of option A. During a bilateral meeting with the Finnish 
Permanent Representative on 19 November 1999 regarding the preparations for the IGC, 
the Dutch cabinet indicated that it was ‘reserved’ on option A (FA/DIE PR report, 19 
November 1999). In another informal written source, option A was again mentioned as a 
possible agenda subject for the IGC (FA/DIE note, around 1 December 1999).
All in all, it is therefore not absolutely clear what the status of this Dutch proposal was. 
It seems that the Dutch cabinet was itself not sure whether it was in favour of option A. 
The inclusion of A as a possibility in two formal documents presented to the IGC, on the 
other hand, suggests that the Dutch cabinet wanted to at least discuss the proposal. It can 
therefore be concluded that the Dutch cabinet preferred A, albeit as a possibility. As the 
issue has not officially been put on the agenda and discussed, it is concluded that it has 
resulted in a non-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet. The Dutch cabinet 
has therefore not achieved its goal on this issue (0a).
In conclusion, the Dutch cabinet has achieved its goal fully on one of the issues in the 
Closer cooperation dossier (Minimum requirement) and partially on another issue (Veto 
possibility). In two instances (Differentiated membership and Treaty division), the Dutch 
cabinet has not achieved its goal due to the fact that the outcomes of the negotiation 
process were non-decisions from its perspective (see Table 5.4).
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Table 5.4 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement for Closer cooperation (see Table 3 in Annex 4 for more 
details)
Closer cooperation Preference Outcome Extent of goal-achievement
Minimum requirement Decision option A Decision option A Full (3)
Veto possibility Decision option A Decision option B/C Partial (1)
Differentiated membership Decision option A (possibility) Non-decision (N) Zero (0a – non-decision)
Treaty division Decision option A (possibility) Non-decision (N) Zero (0a – non-decision)
5.6 Commission size
Until the Nice Treaty, Article 213 TEC read as follows:
‘The Commission must include at least one national of each of the Member States, but 
may not include more than two Members having the nationality of the same State.’
From the start of the European integration process, the Commission consisted in practice 
of two Commissioners from the four, later five, big member states and one Commissioner 
from the other member states. At the time of the Nice Treaty negotiations, the Commis-
sion was thus composed of 20 Commissioners: two Commissioners each from Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, and one Commissioner each from the other 
10 member states.
In view of enlargement, the IGC negotiations resulting in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
engaged in a reform of the size and composition of the Commission, but during the 
Amsterdam European Council of June 1997 the Heads of State or Government did not 
come to an agreement on this issue. They did, however, agree on an Institutional Protocol, 
understanding that the institutional provisions be reviewed before the first upcoming 
enlargement. In view of an enlarged Union of 20 member states, Article 1 of the Protocol 
stated that:
‘(…) The Commission shall comprise one national of each of the Member States, pro-
vided that, by that date, the weighting of the votes in the Council has been modified, 
whether by re-weighting of the votes or by dual majority, in a manner acceptable to all 
Member States, taking into account all relevant elements, notably compensating those 
Member States which give up the possibility of nominating a second member of the 
Commission.’
This article thus already foresaw a reduction of the Commission to 20 member states (in 
an EU-20), with the five big member states giving up their second Commissioner, but 
compensating them for this through a new weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers. 
However, at the time of the Nice IGC this article was already outdated, as in the meantime 
the Union had been negotiating with 12 candidate member states that would lead to an EU 
with more than 20 member states in the near future. Therefore, Article 2 of the Protocol 
seemed to be more appropriate to the situation:
‘At least one year before the membership of the European Union exceeds twenty, a con-
ference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened 
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in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on the 
composition and functioning of the institutions.’
Such a ‘comprehensive review’ could imply fixing the size of the Commission at a lower 
number than the number of member states. In addition to the Institutional Protocol, 
Belgium, France and Italy declared in Amsterdam that a significant extension of QMV, 
as part of reinforcing the institutions, was also indispensable in order for the EU to be 
prepared for enlargement.
The starting point for the IGC 2000 was thus that the size and composition of the 
Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council and the possible extension of QMV 
– the institutional ‘leftovers’ of Amsterdam – would be a part of the agenda. The Cologne 
European Council (3-4 June 1999) confirmed that the IGC should be about the three 
leftover issues, thereby officially putting the size and composition of the Commission on 
the agenda (SN 150/99, 3-4 June 1999).
In light of the above, the following were the possible outcomes during the negotiation 
process:
Size: size and composition of the European Commission
A = status quo (two Commissioners each for Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, France and Italy, one each 
for the other 10 member states)
B = one Commissioner per member state
C = one Commissioner per member state, a fixed number of Commissioners – being less than the number of 
member states – later on or to be determined later on, from a certain date or a certain number of member states 
(with or without a strictly equal rotation system)
D = a fixed number of Commissioners now – being less than the number of member states (with or without a 
strictly equal rotation system)
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
In its first progress report of 3 November 2000 (CONFER 4790/00), the French Presidency 
indicated that it considered it to be ‘premature’ at that stage to present draft amendments 
on the ‘politically highly sensitive’ issues of the weighting of votes in the Council, the size 
and composition of the Commission and the allocation of seats in the European Parlia-
ment. In the revised progress report of 23 November 2000 (CONFER 4810/00), a similar 
statement was made, adding that it was ‘generally acknowledged’ that the respective issues 
could only be decided on at the highest level. This implied that they would only be decided 
on during the Nice European Council itself. Similar statements were made in the revised 
progress report of 30 November 2000 (CONFER 4815/00) and the draft Treaty of Nice 
of 6 December 2000 (CONFER 4816/00). In CONFER 4810/00, 4815/00 and 4816/00 
a draft ‘Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union’ was included with Article 4 
on the Commission only indicating two dates on which the Treaty provisions on the size 
of the Commission would be amended: 1 January 2005 and 1 January 2010. In addition, 
CONFER 4816/00 indicated in the context of the earlier date that each new member 
state would have a Commissioner from the moment of its accession until the end of the 
respective term of office of the Commission.
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On 1 December 2000, the Presidency pointed out in a note (CONFER 4813/00) that 
a majority of the delegations appeared to be willing to consider option C (the ‘deferred 
ceiling’ or ‘plafonnement différé’). It also suggested a draft text on the arrangement for a 
rotation system based on the principle of equality.
On 9 December 2000, during the Nice European Council, the Presidency presented a 
global agreement on the three most sensitive issues and QMV, including option C with 
regard to the size and composition of the Commission: from 2005 the Commission would 
be composed of one member per member state and when the Union had 27 member 
states a decision would be made to fix the number of Commissioners at a level less than 
27, with equal rotation (SN 514/00). This proposal was thus different from the proposals 
mentioned above, in the sense that for the moment of application of the fixed-size Com-
mission, a number of member states would be decisive rather than a certain date.
On 10 December 2000, the Presidency proposed a global agreement of the IGC, includ-
ing option C in the form of a detailed draft text for Article 4 of the Protocol on the 
enlargement of the European Union (SN 521/00). The same draft text was included in the 
final Treaty text (SN 533/00, 12 December 2000), which was therefore the final outcome 
of the negotiation process:
‘1. From 1 January 2005, Article 213(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity shall be amended as follows: “(…). The Commission shall include one national 
of each of the Member States (…).”
2. When the Union consists of 27 Member States, Article 213(1) of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community shall be amended as follows: “(…). The number of the 
Members of the Commission shall be less than the number of Member States. The 
Members of the Commission shall be chosen according to a rotation system based on 
the principle of equality, the implementing arrangements for which shall be adopted by 
the Council, acting unanimously.
The number of Members of the Commission shall be set by the Council, acting unani-
mously.”
This amendment shall apply as from the date on which the first Commission following the 
date of accession of the twenty-seventh Member State of the Union takes up its duties.
3. The Council, acting unanimously after signing the Treaty of accession of the twenty-
seventh member state of the Union, shall adopt:
- the number of Members of the Commission;
- the implementing arrangements for a rotation system based on the principle of equal-
ity containing all the criteria and rules necessary for determining the composition of 
successive colleges automatically on the basis of the following principles:
(a)  Member States shall be treated on a strictly equal footing as regards the determination 
of the sequence of, and the time spent by, their nationals as members of the Commis-
sion; consequently, the difference between the total number of terms of office held by 
nationals of any given pair of Member States may never be more than one;
(b)  subject to compliance with subparagraph (a), each successive college shall be so 
composed as to reflect satisfactorily the demographic and geographical range of all 
the Member States of the Union.
4. Any State which accedes to the Union shall be entitled, at the time of its accession, to 
have one of its nationals as a member of the Commission until the date of application 
of paragraph 2.’
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The Official Journal version of the Protocol adds, concerning 1 January 2005, in the first 
paragraph that the principle of one member per member state would come into effect 
‘from when the first Commission following that date takes up its duties’. This is a relevant 
addition, because the then Prodi Commission would remain in office until 22 January 
2005. However, it is important to note that in the accession Act concerning the 10 coun-
tries that would become members of the EU on 1 May 2004, it was determined in Article 
45 that the following Commission would already take up its duties on 1 November 2004. 
Therefore, the date of 1 November 2004 was substituted for the date of 1 January 2005 in 
Article 4 of the Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union (Official Journal, L 
236, 23 September 2003).
The final outcome, option C, is in fact a compromise between B and D, in the sense that 
as of the following Commission’s term of office it would consist of one Commissioner per 
member state, but would be replaced by a fixed-size Commission after the accession of the 
27th member state and from the subsequent Commission’s term of office. At that time the 
exact number of Commissioners would also have to be determined, under the condition 
that it would be less than the number of member states. The fixed-size Commission would 
be based on a strictly equal rotation system that had already been rather specifically spelled 
out in the Nice Protocol.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper of 15 November 2000 (i.e. the Dutch version), the Dutch 
cabinet indicated that it was, in principle, in favour of option B. This is confirmed by the 
first Benelux memorandum of 6 December 1999 (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000) 
and all FA/DIE sources prior to the deadline. According to a FA/DIE memorandum from 
15 February 2000, option D, under the condition of an equal rotation system, was also 
mentioned in an earlier version of the position paper of 15 November 1999, but disap-
peared in the final (Dutch) version. In the English version of the position paper, however, 
which was presented to the IGC as CONFER 4720/00 on 6 March 2000, the following 
sentence was added:
‘If it eventually proves necessary to discuss limiting the size of the Commission, the 
government will formulate stringent conditions for such a reduction.’
These ‘stringent conditions’ are an equal rotation system, which most clearly appears from 
an FA/DIE preparatory note for the Preparatory Group of 28 March 2000. This note states 
that option B is the Dutch point of departure and that although the Dutch cabinet does 
not prefer D, it is only imaginable in combination with an equal rotation system. All in all, 
it is concluded from this that the Dutch cabinet in principle preferred B and, secondarily, 
D, but only in combination with an equal rotation system.
As the final outcome (C) was a compromise between B and D, the Dutch cabinet can be 
said to have achieved its goal at least to a certain extent. It achieved its goal for the short 
term, but not for the longer term. Yet with the inclusion of the additional sentence in its 
formal position paper as presented to the IGC, the Dutch cabinet had already reckoned 
with option D. In this respect, it has achieved its goal in the sense that ‘stringent condi-
tions’ have indeed been formulated in the shape of a strictly equal rotation system. The 
Dutch cabinet can therefore be attributed a goal-achievement of 2.
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Table 5.5 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement for the Commission (see Table 4 in Annex 4 for more 
details)
European Commission Preference Outcome Extent of goal-achievement
Size and composition Decision option B (D only in combination 
with an equal rotation system)
Decision option C (in combination with 
an equal rotation system)
Partial (2)
To conclude, the Dutch cabinet has partially achieved its goal with regard to the size and 
composition of the Commission (see Table 5.5).
5.7 Weighting of votes
According to the old Article 205 TEC, the votes of the member states when deciding by 
QMV in the Council were weighted as follows:
Belgium 5
Denmark 3
Germany 10
Greece 5
Spain 8
France 10
Ireland 3
Italy 10
Luxembourg 2
Netherlands 5
Austria 4
Portugal 5
Finland 3
Sweden 4
United Kingdom 10
The system was based on the principle of ‘degressive proportionality’, which basically means 
that the bigger member states were under-represented and the smaller member states were 
over-represented. Population size was thus not reflected in the weighting distribution in 
an absolute, linear way but a compromise had been struck between the principles of ‘one 
state, one vote’ and ‘one citizen, one vote’. The threshold for achieving a QMV was set at 
62 out of 87 votes, which boiled down to 71.26%. In practice, a QMV always represented 
at least half of the member states, but this was not formally laid out in the Treaty as a 
separate condition.
In the course of successive enlargements, the weighting system, which was originally 
constructed in 1957, had been adjusted without any essential changes being made to it. 
The Amsterdam IGC attempted to review the weighting system in view of enlargement, 
but did not reach an agreement. However, Article 1 of the Institutional Protocol, agreed 
upon in Amsterdam, stated that:
‘At the date of entry into force of the first enlargement of the Union (…), the Com-
mission shall comprise one national of each of the Member States, provided that, by 
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that date, the weighting of the votes in the Council has been modified, whether by re-
weighting of the votes or by dual majority, in a manner acceptable to all Member States, 
taking into account all relevant elements, notably compensating those Member States 
which give up the possibility of nominating a second member of the Commission.’
The Protocol thus contained the formal requirement to compensate the big member states 
for giving up their second Commissioner. In keeping with this, the Cologne European 
Council (3-4 June 1999) officially put the weighting of votes on the agenda of the IGC 
2000 (SN 150/99, 3-4 June 1999). Another incentive for fundamentally changing the 
system at the time of the Nice IGC was the fact that most of the 12 candidate member 
states with whom the EU was negotiating were small or medium-sized countries. Their 
accession would further increase the imbalance between the already under-represented big 
member states and the already over-represented small member states. Moreover, and related 
to this, when extrapolating just the current system to EU-27, the minimum population 
threshold for QMV would decline to 50.2%, which was considered to be undesirable from 
a legitimacy point of view (Galloway, 2001:66-67).
5.7.1 Type of system
The institutional Protocol quoted above already presented the two basic options for revising 
the weighting of votes: a re-weighting or a dual majority system. The Finnish Presidency 
report to the Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 also referred to these 
two options as well as to the possible need to change the QMV threshold (Council of 
the European Union, 1999a). The proposals of the participating actors can be subsumed 
into six decision options (cf. Galloway, 2001:69-76). Together with the other possible 
outcomes, this results in the following:
Type of system (and QMV threshold): the type of system and, if applicable, QMV threshold for the new weight-
ing of votes
A ‘Simple’ dual majority system (a simple majority of member states + a simple majority of the EU popula-
tion)
B Dual majority system (a (simple) majority of member states + a majority of the EU population)
C ‘Weighted’ dual majority system (a majority of weighted votes + a majority of the EU population)
D ‘Re-weighting’ of votes under the existing system, QMV threshold below the current level (71.26%)
E ‘Re-weighting’ of votes under the existing system, QMV threshold at the current level
F ‘Re-weighting’ of votes under the existing system, QMV threshold above the current level
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
As outlined in the previous section, the French Presidency pointed out in its first progress 
report of 3 November 2000 (CONFER 4790/00) that it deemed it to be premature at 
that stage to produce draft texts on three politically highly sensitive issues: the weighting 
of votes in the Council, the size and composition of the Commission and the allocation 
of seats in the European Parliament. The revised progress report of 23 November 2000 
(CONFER 4810/00) contained a similar formulation and also stated that it was ‘generally 
acknowledged’ that the three issues could only be decided on at the highest level. This 
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meant that they would only be decided on during the Nice European Council itself. The 
revised progress report of 30 November 2000 (CONFER 4815/00) and the draft Treaty of 
Nice of 6 December 2000 (CONFER 4816/00) contained similar statements.
In a preparatory note for the Conclave of 19 November 2000, the Presidency suggested 
concentrating the discussion on the re-weighting model and variants of it, because it had 
appeared from the Preparatory Group of 13 November 2000 that this model was accept-
able to a large majority of the delegations, provided that the population and the number 
of member states would still be taken into account (CONFER 4801/00, 16 November 
2000). This formulation represented a kind of preview of the ‘triple majority’ system that 
would be the final outcome (see below). CONFER 4810/00, 4815/00 and 4816/00 indeed 
outlined a re-weighting model in a draft Article 3 of the Protocol on the enlargement of the 
European Union and a draft ‘Declaration on the enlargement of the European Union’, but 
without filling in the new weightings and thresholds. Only ‘for the record’ did they refer 
to the ‘problem of number of member states’, which probably anticipated the majority of 
member states requirement that would be included in the final outcome.
On 9 December 2000, during the Nice European Council, the Presidency presented 
a global agreement on the three issues mentioned above plus QMV, but still no text was 
included with regard to the Weighting of votes dossier (SN 514/00). The next day, the 
Presidency proposed a global agreement of the IGC, including an outline of Article 3 
of the Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union and the Declaration on the 
enlargement of the European Union (SN 521/00, 10 December 2000). This outline was 
more extensive than the one included in CONFER 4810/00, 4815/00 and 4816/00. It 
included more explicitly the majority of member states requirement and also more con-
cretely touched on the QMV threshold that would change with the accession of each new 
member state. With regard to the latter, it was stated that the threshold would be calculated 
in such a way that it would correspond to the new threshold that would apply as of 1 
January 2005, under reserve of an adjustment margin of 1.5% more or less.
In the final Treaty text, adopted at the end of the Conference, the new weightings and 
thresholds for the EU-15 were included in Article 3 of the Protocol on the enlargement of 
the European Union (SN 533/00, 12 December 2000):
‘1. On 1 January 2005:
(i) Article 205(2) and (4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall be 
amended as follows:
“2. Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, the votes of its members 
shall be weighted as follows:
Belgium 12
Denmark 7
Germany 29
Greece 12
Spain 27
France 29
Ireland 7
Italy 29
Luxembourg 4
Netherlands 13
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Austria 10
Portugal 12
Finland 7
Sweden 10
United Kingdom 29
Acts of the Council shall require for their adoption at least 170 votes in favour cast by 
at least a majority of the members where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a 
proposal from the Commission.
In other cases, for their adoption acts of the Council shall require at least 170 votes in 
favour, cast by at least two thirds of the members.
[Paragraph 3 unchanged]
4. When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, a member of 
the Council may request verification that the qualified majority comprises at least 62% 
of the total population of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have been met, 
the decision in question shall not be adopted.”
(ii) Corresponding amendments shall be made to the third subparagraph of Article 
23(2) and to Article 34(3) of the Treaty on European Union.
2. At the time of each accession, the threshold referred to in the second subparagraph of 
Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall be calculated 
in such a way that the qualified majority threshold expressed in votes does not exceed 
the threshold resulting from the table in the Declaration to be included in the Final Act 
of the Conference on the enlargement of the European Union.’
The new weightings and thresholds for the EU-27 were included in the Declaration on the 
enlargement of the European Union:
‘The common position to be adopted by the Member States of the European Union at 
the accession conferences, as regards the distribution of seats at the European Parliament, 
the weighing of votes in the Council, the composition of the Economic and Social 
Committee and the composition of the Committee of the Regions will correspond to 
the following tables for a Union of 27 Member States.
[1. The European Parliament]
2. The weighting of votes in the Council
Germany 29
United Kingdom 29
France 29
Italy 29
Spain 27
Poland 27
Romania 14
Netherlands 13
Greece 12
Czech Republic 12
Belgium 12
Hungary 12
Portugal 12
Sweden 10
Bulgaria 10
Austria 10
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Slovakia 7
Denmark 7
Finland 7
Ireland 7
Lithuania 7
Latvia 4
Slovenia 4
Estonia 4
Cyprus 4
Luxembourg 4
Malta 3
Total 345
Acts of the Council shall require for their adoption at least 258 votes in favour, cast by a 
majority of members, where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a proposal from 
the Commission.
In other cases, for their adoption acts of the Council shall require at least 258 votes in 
favour cast by at least two thirds of the members.
When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, a member of 
the Council may request verification that the Member States constituting the qualified 
majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that condition is 
shown not to have been met, the decision in question shall not be adopted.’
A Council decision by QMV would thus require at least 170 votes (or 71.73%) in the 
EU-15 and at least 258 votes (or 74.78%) in the EU-27, and at least a majority of member 
states. In addition, a member state could ask for verification of whether the qualified 
majority comprised at least 62% of the total EU population. If this was not the case, the 
respective decision would not be made.
In terms of the changing QMV threshold in the course of successive accessions of new 
member states, the text of the final Protocol differed from SN 521/00 of 10 December 
2000 in that it was stated that it might not exceed the threshold resulting from the table in 
the Declaration on the enlargement of the European Union (i.e. 258 votes or 74.78% in 
the EU-27). At the same time, another Declaration was included ‘on the qualified majority 
threshold and the number of votes for a blocking minority in the context of enlarge-
ment’:
‘On 1 January 2005, when the new vote weightings take effect and insofar as all the 
candidate countries listed in the declaration to be included in the Final Act of the 
Conference on the enlargement of the European Union have not yet acceded to the 
Union, the percentage of votes constituting a qualified majority will be lower than the 
current percentage. The applicable percentage will increase until it reaches a maximum 
of 73.4%. When all the candidate countries mentioned above have acceded, the block-
ing minority will rise from 88 to 91 votes.’
The number of 91 votes, however, corresponded with a qualified majority of 255 votes or 
73.91%, which was different from the qualified majority of 258 votes or 74.78% men-
tioned in the Declaration on the enlargement of the European Union.
Therefore, SN 533/00 had to be revised after the formal end of the IGC, which resulted 
in SN 533/1/00 rev1, adopted on 22 December 2000. The Declaration on the qualified 
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majority threshold and the number of votes for a blocking minority in the context of 
enlargement was changed to the following:
‘Insofar as all the candidate countries listed in the Declaration to be included in the 
Final Act of the Conference on the enlargement of the European Union have not yet 
acceded to the Union when the new vote weightings take effect (1 January 2005), the 
threshold for a qualified majority will move, according to the pace of accessions, from 
the percentage below the current one to a maximum of 73.4%. When all the candidate 
countries mentioned above have acceded, the blocking minority, in a Union of 27, 
will be raised to 91 votes, and the qualified majority threshold resulting from the table 
given in the Declaration on enlargement of the European Union will be automatically 
adjusted accordingly.’
The revision implied that the Declaration on the qualified majority threshold in fact over-
ruled the Declaration on the enlargement: when the EU consisted of 27 member states the 
qualified majority would not be 258 votes (74.78%) but lower – 255 votes (73.91%).
In addition, the 170 votes (or 71.73%) required for the EU-15 was replaced with 169 
votes (or 71.31%).
In the Official Journal version of the Nice Treaty, the outcome has been laid out in Article 
3 of the Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union and in Declarations 20 (on 
the enlargement of the European Union) and 21 (on the qualified majority threshold and 
the number of votes for a blocking minority in an enlarged Union). This version differs 
from SN 533/1/00 rev1 in the sense that some editorial changes have been made, but the 
outcome is substantially the same.
The outcome of the negotiation process was officially a re-weighting of votes under the 
existing system (D, E and mostly F), but in practice also included elements of the other 
decision options (A, B, C). First, in order to achieve a qualified majority, a qualified major-
ity of weighted votes is required (C, D, E, F). This QMV threshold is set at 71.31% for 
EU-15 (F) and 73.91% for EU-27 (F). Second, a qualified majority should be supported 
by a majority of member states (A, B). This would no longer automatically be the case in 
EU-27, as it would be possible to achieve a qualified majority with less than half of the 
member states if all the biggest member states would be in favour of a decision and all the 
smallest member states would be against it. Although this is a rather hypothetical situation, 
the smaller member states were principally in favour of the member state condition as a 
safeguard (Galloway, 2001:80-81). Third, the minimum population threshold in EU-27 
is 58.29%, but a member state may ask for the application of a 62% population threshold 
(B, C; see Section 5.7.3). Because of these three separate conditions that must be met, the 
outcome may be called a ‘triple majority’ system.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
According to its position paper (CONFER 4720/00, 6 March 2000), the Dutch cabinet 
was in favour of a re-weighting of votes, which leaves open whether it preferred D, E or 
F. In the first Benelux memorandum of 6 December 1999 (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 
2000), it was stated that one was open to discussing both a re-weighting of votes and a 
dual majority system. This statement, however, was made due to the fact that Belgium and 
Luxembourg, in contrast with the Dutch cabinet, were in favour of a dual majority system 
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(see Section 6.7.1). All informal written sources confirm the Dutch cabinet’s preference for 
a re-weighting. One of them confirms the Dutch preference for a re-weighting, but states 
that a dual majority system would only be acceptable for the Dutch cabinet if the ‘simple’ 
majorities were maintained (option A, as proposed by the Commission). As it was probable 
that these majorities would be increased in the course of the negotiations, the Commission 
proposal was considered to be unattractive after all. Moreover, some of the informal written 
sources make it clear that the Dutch cabinet was in favour of a QMV at or possibly below 
the current level. All in all, the Dutch cabinet was therefore in favour of E(/D).
As the outcome of the negotiation process was a re-weighting of votes under the existing 
system (D, E and mostly F), but also contained elements of the three dual majority options 
(A, B, C), all actors have achieved their goals at least to a certain extent. Some options are, 
however, better represented than others. The member state and population conditions (A, 
B and – partially – C) of the triple majority outcome are considered to be less important 
than the primary condition of a qualified majority of weighted votes (D, E, F and – partially 
– C). In keeping with this, the following goal-achievement values are attributed. Actors 
preferring option F are attributed a goal-achievement of 3, actors in favour of D, E and also 
the hybrid option C get a goal-achievement of 2 and actors preferring A or B get a score of 
1. The Dutch cabinet, preferring E(/D), is therefore attributed a goal-achievement of 2.
5.7.2 General weighting
In terms of the weighting distribution, an important question that was raised during the 
negotiation process was whether the big member states should only be compensated for the 
loss of their second Commissioner or also for the coming accession of mainly small member 
states that would further deteriorate the imbalance between big and small member states in 
the Union. The former was in keeping with Article 1 of the institutional Protocol, whereas 
the latter was more consistent with Article 2 of this same Protocol. Not surprisingly, the 
small member states tended towards a ‘single’ compensation, whereas (most) big member 
states were in favour of a ‘double’ compensation.
In general, it could thus be stated that the big member states were in favour of weight-
ing population size more heavily in determining the number of votes. That is to say that 
they wanted to tone down the ‘degressive proportionality’ system, which would result in 
more votes for the big member states. The smaller member states, on the other hand, did 
not want to lose too much weight. That is to say, they wanted to maintain the ‘balance’ 
between the big and small member states as much as possible and thus the ‘degressive 
proportionality’ system (cf. FA/DIE note of December 1999). The possible outcomes of 
the negotiation process can therefore be reconstructed and simplified as follows:
General weighting: the general distribution of votes between the member states in the new weighting
A = toning down the ‘degressive proportionality’ system, i.e. weighting the population size of a member state 
more heavily
B = maintaining the ‘degressive proportionality’ system as much as possible, i.e. weighting the population size 
of a member state not too much
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
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The outcome was laid out in the Declaration on the enlargement of the European Union 
(see Section 5.7.1). In general, the existing votes of the member states were doubled, but 
additional votes were provided to the medium-sized member states and, to a greater extent, 
the big member states. With regard to the 15 member states that participated in the Nice 
Treaty negotiations, the votes of Luxembourg were doubled (4), the votes of Denmark, 
Finland and Ireland were doubled plus one (7), the votes of Sweden and Austria were 
doubled plus two (10), the votes of Greece, Belgium and Portugal were doubled plus two 
(12), the votes of the Netherlands were doubled plus three (13), the votes of Spain were 
doubled plus 11 (27) and the votes of Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy 
were doubled plus nine (29).
Although the ‘degressive proportionality’ system has certainly been maintained to a 
certain extent (B), it has to a greater extent been weakened to the advantage of the big 
member states (A). The outcome of the negotiation process was therefore A>B.
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
The Dutch cabinet stated in its formal position paper that population size should be the 
deciding factor in the re-weighting of votes (A), but also that the balance between the big 
and small member states should be preserved (B). Similarly, the first Benelux memoran-
dum indicated that both the global balance between big and small countries (B) and the 
‘representativeness of the decisions’ should be taken into account. An informal FA/DIE 
memorandum following consultations on the draft Benelux memorandum on 1 Decem-
ber 1999 confirms that ‘representativeness of the decisions’ referred to the importance of 
population size (A), which connected to the Dutch position. The Dutch cabinet thus had 
a dual interest in this respect. All other informal written sources, except for one, also refer 
to option A as well as B. As the outcome was A>B, actors preferring A have achieved more 
of their goals (2) than actors preferring B (1). It could be argued that the Dutch cabinet, 
which preferred A/B, has achieved its goal even more than actors favouring A, but it is 
still – conservatively – attributed a goal-achievement of 2 as well.
5.7.3 Individual weighting
In addition to the general weighting distribution, several actors also had specific prefer-
ences on their individual weightings. One controversial issue, particularly for France and 
Belgium, was whether Germany and the Netherlands, respectively, should get additional 
votes because of their greater population size compared to the other member states in their 
cluster (in the case of Germany: France, Italy and the United Kingdom; in the case of the 
Netherlands: Belgium, Greece and Portugal). Regarding the Netherlands and Belgium, the 
possible outcomes of the negotiation process were as follows:
Individual weighting: the individual number of votes of specific member states in the new weighting
A = the Netherlands gets a greater weight than Belgium (also if Germany does not get a greater weight than 
France)
B = the Netherlands does not get a greater weight than Belgium if Germany does not get a greater weight than 
France
T = not-decision
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N = non-decision
As has already been made clear by the General weighting outcome, the outcome of the 
negotiation process was option A: the Netherlands (13) got a greater weight than Belgium 
(12), even though Germany (29) did not get a greater weight than France (29).
The Dutch cabinet’s preference and goal-achievement
In its formal position paper, the Dutch cabinet pointed out that it wanted a relatively 
greater weight (in general), which is confirmed by several informal written sources (FA/
DIE/Preparation preparatory note for COREPER II meeting, 7 September 1999; FA/DIE 
note, January 2000; FA/DIE memorandum, 27 January 2000). Although Belgium was not 
specifically mentioned in these sources, it is logical to assume that it was about having a 
greater weight than Belgium (and Greece and Portugal) as together, they formed the cluster 
with five votes, but the Netherlands had a significantly greater population size.
The other informal written sources that have been found certainly make it clear that the 
Dutch cabinet particularly wanted more weight than Belgium (A). One of these sources 
stated that for the Dutch cabinet, it was not about getting one or two votes more than 
Belgium, but about the ‘politically psychological effect’ that after the enlargement the 
Netherlands was not going to belong to the group of small member states (FA/DIE note, 
December 1999).
Belgium, on the other hand, could only accept a greater weight for the Netherlands if 
Germany would get a greater weight than the other three big member states (B) (FA/DIE 
London embassy note, 24 November 1999; FA/DIE memo following consultations on 
draft Benelux memorandum, 1 December 1999; FA/DIE preparatory note for Benelux 
summit on 6 December 1999, unknown date; FA/DIE Paris embassy report of bilateral 
meetings with France on 13 December 1999, 16 December 1999; FA/DIE preparatory 
note for bilateral meeting with Belgium on 31 January 2000, 27 January 2000).
The difference of opinion between the Dutch cabinet and Belgium can be nicely illus-
trated by the consultations on the draft Benelux memorandum on 1 December 1999 (FA/
DIE memorandum, 1 December 1999) and the final version of the Benelux memorandum 
of 6 December 1999 (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000). In an earlier version of the 
Benelux memorandum, it was stated that in addition to the factors of the global balance 
between big and small member states and the representativeness of decisions, the ‘equal 
application of differentiation to equal situations’ should be included as a decisive factor. 
According to the FA/DIE memorandum of the consultations on 1 December 1999, this 
implied that Belgium maintained the right to reject a difference between Belgium and the 
Netherlands, if there would be no difference between the big member states. This coupling 
could be problematic for the Dutch cabinet in due time. Therefore, it was proposed to 
replace the passage mentioned with ‘as much as possible equal application of differentiation 
to similar situations’. The words ‘as much as possible’ would express the intention to re-
weight according to equality principles, but reality demanded that each re-weighting was 
a political choice. The Dutch cabinet could not accept that the current voting distribution 
(‘situation’) between member states was a fixed point and that re-weighting according to 
equal differentiation methods was applied to all member states to exactly the same degree. 
In the final Benelux memorandum, the passage was phrased as ‘equal differentiation ap-
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plication to similar situations’, which in turn could be considered to be a compromise 
between the passage in the earlier draft version and in the Dutch proposal just discussed 
(A/B).
As the outcome of the negotiation process was that the Netherlands got a greater voting 
weight than Belgium, although Germany did not get a greater weight than France (A), the 
Netherlands has completely achieved its goal (3), whereas Belgium has not achieved its 
goal (0).
Table 5.6 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement for the Weighting of votes (see Tables 5a-b in Annex 4 for 
more details)
Weighting of votes Preference Outcome Extent of goal-achievement
Type of system (and QMV threshold) Decision option E (possibly D) Decision option D/E/F (mostly)-A/B/C Partial (2)
General weighting Decision option A/B Decision option A>B Partial (2)
Individual weighting Decision option A Decision option A Full (3)
All in all, the Dutch cabinet has completely achieved its goal on one issue of the Weighting 
of votes dossier (Individual weighting) and partially on two issues (Type of system (and 
QMV threshold) and General weighting) (see Table 5.6).
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has measured the extent of goal-achievement of the Dutch cabinet on all Nice 
Treaty issues within the five dossiers selected for this study, on which the Dutch cabinet 
has expressed a preference in its formal position paper (24 issues in total). The results can 
be summarised as follows. The Dutch cabinet has achieved its goal fully for six issues and 
partially for seven of the issues. For another 11 issues, the Dutch cabinet has not achieved 
its goal, interestingly enough not due to the fact that the outcomes for these issues were 
decision options that the Dutch cabinet did not prefer, but instead because they resulted in 
not-decisions (six issues) or non-decisions (five issues) from its perspective.
The goal of this before-after analysis for the Dutch cabinet was to establish for which and 
how many issues the Dutch cabinet could be considered as a potentially necessary condi-
tion for the outcomes and thus a potentially influential actor. It can be concluded that this 
is the case for the 13 (out of 24) issues on which the Dutch cabinet has partially or fully 
achieved its goal. Whether or not the Dutch cabinet has actually been influential – as far as 
the ‘sample selection’ of issues is concerned (see Section 6.2) – will be assessed in Chapter 
7. Before that, the next chapter will determine the extent of goal-achievement of the other 
participating actors on the sample selection of issues.
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Chapter 6
The before-after analysis
Assessing the extent of the other participating 
actors’ goal-achievement
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the first part of the influence analysis, a before-after analysis, 
was carried out for the Dutch cabinet. This before-after analysis involved establishing the 
extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement for all 24 Nice Treaty issues in the five 
dossiers selected for this study. In this chapter, the before-after analysis is conducted for 
the other actors participating in the Nice Treaty negotiation process. The extent to which 
these actors have achieved their goals with regard to the ‘sample selection’ of issues will 
be assessed. This sample selection, which is a subset of 16 issues from the original pool of 
issues, is first justified in Section 6.2. In Sections 6.3 to 6.7, the assessment of the extent 
of goal-achievement of the other actors is done concerning the sample selection of issues 
for each of the five dossiers. This is to determine which of the other participating actors 
can be considered as potentially necessary conditions for the respective outcomes, i.e. as 
potentially influential. Although this study does not aim to assess the extent of influence 
of each of the participating actors, an assessment of their goal-achievement is required in 
order to be able to assess and explain the Dutch cabinet’s influence in the context of the 
other participating actors (see Section 1.3.4). The assessment and explanation of the extent 
of the Dutch cabinet’s influence is the aim of the process analysis, which is the subject of 
the next chapter. Each of the Sections 6.3 to 6.7 ends with a summary table indicating the 
extent of goal-achievement of the other participating actors on the issues of the respective 
dossier. Detailed tables, particularly presenting all sources used to assess the other actors’ 
preferences, can be found in Annex 5. The Council Secretariat is only addressed in this 
chapter and included in the summary and detailed tables if evidence on it was found in the 
data. Some conclusions and reflections are made in Section 6.8.
6.2 Sample selection of issues
In principle, the issues that are selected are those that, according to Chapter 5, offer the 
greatest variety in the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement as to the three pos-
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sible outcomes of the negotiation process: decisions (0c, 1, 2 or 3), not-decisions (0b) and 
non-decisions (0a). In case there are issues with the same value, the selection is based on 
additional specified criteria. The sample selection is made in consideration of the process 
analysis in Chapter 7, so as to be able to examine the extent to which the different variables 
of the conceptual model can explain the Dutch cabinet’s extent of influence. As the (varia-
tion in the) extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence is not yet known at this stage of the 
study, a selection is made on the basis of the (variation in the) Dutch cabinet’s extent of 
goal-achievement, although both variables can, of course, not be equated with each other.
Regarding the Court of Auditors dossier, the following issues are selected: Size (the Dutch 
cabinet’s goal-achievement: 3), SOA (2), Contact Committee (1), Appeal ECJ (0b) and 
Instruction (0a). Size is selected over Internal chambers because the Size issue is one of the 
two categories of the dossier (the second category being issues related to the functioning 
of the Court). Appeal ECJ is selected over Same powers, Financial management or OLAF 
because it is more representative of the second category of the dossier. The Instruction issue 
is selected because it is the only non-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet in 
this dossier.
With regard to the ESDP dossier, the following issues are selected: Treaty change (the 
Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement: 3), PSC (2), NATO (0b) and Military Staff (0a). Treaty 
change is selected over WEU because it was the general, basic issue in the dossier, of which 
the WEU and other issues were substantive specifications. NATO is selected over Military 
Committee because much more data were available on the former than on the latter. Mili-
tary Staff is selected over Financial articles because it had a higher priority for the Dutch 
cabinet considering that the Financial articles proposal was only presented as a possibility 
in its position paper.
In terms of the Closer cooperation dossier, the following issues are selected: Minimum 
requirement (the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement: 3), Veto possibility (1) and Differenti-
ated membership (0a). The Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues are the only 
issues in this dossier with the respective goal-achievement value for the Dutch cabinet. The 
Differentiated membership issue is selected over Treaty division because more data were 
available on this issue.
The Commission dossier consists of only one issue in this study, Size (the Dutch cabinet’s 
goal-achievement: 2), which is therefore automatically selected.
Finally, regarding the Weighting of votes dossier, all three issues are selected because they 
are closely interlinked and only separated from one another in this study for analytical 
purposes: Type of system (the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement: 2), General weighting (2) 
and Individual weighting (3).
The justification of the sample selection of 16 issues is visually reflected in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 Justification of the sample selection of Nice Treaty issues
Dossier
Selected issues (additional selection criterion)
Outcome Extent of the Dutch cabinet’s  
goal-achievement
Court of Auditors
Size (representativeness)
Decision 3
Internal chambers Decision 3
SOA Decision 2
Contact Committee Decision 1
Appeal ECJ (representativeness) Not-decision 0b
Same powers Not-decision 0b
Financial management Not-decision 0b
OLAF Not-decision 0b
Instruction Non-decision 0a
ESDP
Treaty change (basic issue)
Decision 3
WEU Decision 3
PSC Decision 2
NATO (data availability) Not-decision 0b
Military Committee Not-decision 0b
Military Staff (priority) Non-decision 0a
Financial articles Non-decision 0a
Closer cooperation
Minimum requirement
Decision 3
Veto possibility Decision 1
Differentiated membership (data availability) Non-decision 0a
Treaty division Non-decision 0a
Commission
Size and composition
Decision 2
Weighting of votes
Type of system
Decision 2
General weighting Decision 2
Individual weighting Decision 3
6.3 Court of Auditors
6.3.1 Size
Size: size of the Court of Auditors
A = one member from each member state
B = status quo; old Article 247(1) TEC: ‘The Court of Auditors shall consist of 15 Members’
C = decreasing to less than 15 members (e.g. 12)
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
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In terms of the participating actors other than the Dutch cabinet, the following actors 
had a preference for decision option A: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. Denmark (CONFER 4722/00, 7 
March 2000) and Finland (CONFER 4723/00, 7 March 2000) had made their preference 
explicitly clear in formal position papers tabled at the start of the IGC. Their preference 
for A is confirmed by FA/DIE’s and the Commission’s informal reports of the Preparatory 
Group of 25 February 2000 (dated 28 February 2000 and 14 March 2000, respectively). 
The other actors that preferred option A did not table formal position papers (Belgium, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden) or did not include a preference on this 
issue in their position papers (Austria, Greece), but all of them preferred option A accord-
ing to FA/DIE’s and/or the Commission’s informal reports of the Preparatory Group of 
25 February 2000. Belgium and Luxembourg did not express a clear preference in the first 
Benelux memorandum (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000). Portugal, which held the 
Presidency during the first half of 2000, expressed a preference for A, based on the Com-
mission’s report, in which it is presented as ‘Portugal’ and not as ‘Presidency’. However, it 
is not completely certain that Portugal expressed its preference as a member state actor and 
not as the Presidency.
Italy left some room for interpretation in its position paper of 3 March 2000, by stat-
ing that ‘the number of members (currently 15, one per State) is due to rise’ (CONFER 
4717/00). This statement tends to suggest a preference for A rather than B or C. However, 
from an earlier informal source from 28 February 2000 (FA/DIE’s report of the Prepara-
tory Group of 25 February 2000), it becomes clear that Italy could agree to B/C. Yet, it is 
questionable whether ‘Italy could agree to B/C’ is the same as ‘Italy preferred B/C’; perhaps 
Italy preferred A, but could also agree to B/C. However, since the formal source is unclear, 
it cannot take complete precedence over the informal source. Therefore, Italy’s preference is 
summarised as A-B/C (equally in favour of A and B/C). As the outcome of the negotiation 
process was option A, all actors preferring A have completely achieved their goals (3), while 
Italy can be attributed a goal-achievement of 1.
The European Commission, on the other hand, preferred option C. In its contribution 
of 10 November 1999, its preference for a fixed-size Court of Auditors remained implicit 
(European Commission, 1999), but in its formal opinion paper of 26 January 2000 the 
Commission explicitly proposed C (12 members; CONFER 4701/00, 1 February 2000). 
In doing this, the Commission was actually ‘responsible’ for this option. The United King-
dom did not include a preference on the size of the Court of Auditors in its position paper, 
but indicated – just like Italy (see above) and Spain (see below) – that it could agree with 
B/C, during the Preparatory Group of 25 February 2000 according to the FA/DIE’s and 
Commission’s informal reports of this meeting. Again, this does not necessarily imply that 
the United Kingdom did actually prefer B/C (over A). However, contrary to Italy’s case 
as discussed above, no (possible) evidence was found that the United Kingdom did (also) 
prefer A, so it can be concluded that its goal-achievement, as with that of the Commission, 
is 0.
Germany did not include a preference in its formal position paper (CONFER 4733/00, 
30 March 2000). It indicated during the Preparatory Group of 25 February 2000, just like 
Spain, that the issue of the Court of Auditor’s size was a derivation of the issue of the size of 
the European Commission (FA/DIE report, 28 February 2000). This could be interpreted 
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in the sense that the German and Spanish preferences on the Court of Auditor’s size were 
dependent on the outcome of the Commission size issue and that they were thus open to A, 
B and C. However, according to a preparatory note by the Commission for the Preparatory 
Group of 16 May 2000, Germany did not indicate that it could agree with B/C during 
the Preparatory Group of 25 February 2000, whereas Spain did. Therefore, following the 
same line of reasoning as in the case of the United Kingdom, Spain can be said to prefer 
B/C and has not achieved its goal. The German preference, on the other hand, is actually 
unknown, as is its goal-achievement.
The European Parliament did not include a preference in its resolution of 18 November 
1999 (European Parliament, 1999). In its resolution of 13 April 2000 (CONFER 4736/00, 
3 May 2000), however, it did express a preference for a fixed number of members, which 
would possibly be lower than the number of member states. This can be summarised as a 
preference for B/possibly C. As the decision options are rather clear-cut for this issue, it is 
argued that even a (partial) preference for B yields no goal-achievement for an actor, so the 
European Parliament’s goal-achievement is also 0.
6.3.2 SOA, Contact Committee, Appeal ECJ and Instruction
SOA: producing, in addition to the ‘overall’ statement of assurance (SOA), ‘sectoral’ SOAs on specific policy 
areas
A = yes: producing, in addition to the ‘overall’ SOA, ‘sectoral’ SOAs on specific policy areas
B = no: not producing, in addition to the ‘overall’ SOA, ‘sectoral’ SOAs on specific policy areas
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Contact Committee: establishing a Contact Committee, consisting of the Presidents of the Court of Auditors 
and the national auditing bodies
A = yes: establishing in the Treaty itself a Contact Committee, consisting of the Presidents of the Court of 
Auditors and the national auditing bodies
B = yes: establishing in a Declaration attached to the Final Act of the IGC a Contact Committee, consisting of 
the Presidents of the Court of Auditors and the national auditing bodies
C = no: not establishing in the Treaty itself or in a Declaration attached to the Final Act of the IGC a Contact 
Committee, consisting of the Presidents of the Court of Auditors and the national auditing bodies
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Appeal ECJ: granting the Court of Auditors the right of appeal at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against 
a member state that fails to comply adequately with its request for information
A = yes: granting the Court of Auditors the right of appeal at the ECJ against a member state that fails to 
comply adequately with its request for information
B = no: not granting the Court of Auditors the right of appeal at the ECJ against a member state that fails to 
comply adequately with its request for information
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
168 Chapter 6
Instruction: instructing the EU ‘legislator’ to specify in more detail the information and auditing competences 
of the Court of Auditors
A = yes: instructing the EU ‘legislator’ to specify in more detail the information and auditing competences of 
the Court of Auditors
B = no: not instructing the EU ‘legislator’ to specify in more detail the information and auditing competences 
of the Court of Auditors
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
No clear data have been found on the preferences of the other participating actors re-
garding the SOA, Contact Committee, Appeal ECJ and Instruction issues prior to the 
deadline of the before-preference. The actors that issued position papers did not express 
themselves on these issues and neither did Belgium and Luxembourg in their first Benelux 
memorandum. As was made clear in Section 5.3, these issues were specific Dutch proposals 
rather than general negotiation issues. Except for the Instruction issue, which resulted in 
a non-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, they were part of an agenda-
setting process until 20 September 2000, when the Presidency put them on the agenda of 
the IGC. This might explain why the other actors did not express a (clear) preference on 
these issues during this period of time.
Some data were, however, found on the preferences of most of the other actors, although 
they were unclear. The Commission report of the Preparatory Group of 25 February 2000 
states that the great majority of the member states were of the opinion that the discussion 
on the ‘other institutions’, such as the Court of Auditors, should be limited to their size 
and composition and not cover their mandate or functioning. This implies that this ‘great 
majority’ was also not in favour of discussing the SOA, Contact Committee, Appeal ECJ 
and Instruction issues. It can subsequently be argued that when actors were against discuss-
ing these issues, they were eventually also against the Dutch proposals and thus in favour 
of option B.
The FA/DIE report of the same meeting does offer a more nuanced – although still not 
very detailed – view. The report indicates that there was much support for the Dutch view 
that cooperation between the Court of Auditors and the national audit institutions should be 
improved upon, the internal organisation of the Court of Auditors strengthened and its in-
struments refined. The four specific Dutch proposals come under these three general descrip-
tions. The European Parliament, Italy, Finland, Greece, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom expressed their support. France, Spain, Sweden and Germany, on 
the other hand, took a reserved position. However, firstly, it is not completely clear whether 
or not the Dutch cabinet has actually already mentioned and mobilised support for its specific 
proposals during this meeting. Secondly, even if this was the case, the report provides insuf-
ficient details on which proposals were supported or rejected by which actors.
In the absence of clear preferences from most of the other actors in favour or against 
the Dutch proposals, it is in fact not possible to speak in terms of the extent of their goal-
achievement, as they had no (clear) ‘goal’ to begin with. Following this line of reasoning, 
these actors had no clear preference to begin with and therefore their goal-achievement is 
also described as ‘unclear’. No data were found on the Commission at all, so its preference 
and goal-achievement is unknown.
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Table 6.2 The extent of the other actors’ goal-achievement for the Court of Auditors (see Tables 1-5 in Annex 5 for 
more details)
Court of Auditors Size SOA Contact Committee Appeal ECJ Instruction
Austria Full (3) Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Belgium Full (3)
Denmark Full (3)
Finland Full (3)
France Full (3)
Germany Unknown
Greece Full (3)
Ireland Full (3)
Italy Partial (1)
Luxembourg Full (3)
Portugal Full (3)
Spain Zero (0c – not preferred decision option)
Sweden Full (3)
United Kingdom Zero (0c – not preferred decision option)
European Commission Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown
European Parliament Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
The goal-achievements of the other participating actors regarding the five Court of Audi-
tors issues from the sample selection are summarised in Table 6.2.
6.4 ESDP
6.4.1 Treaty change
Treaty change: whether or not to establish the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the Treaty
A = Treaty change (now)
B = no Treaty change now, but in the future (announced in a separate text, for example a Declaration)
C = no Treaty change (at all)
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Italy expressed a preference for option A in its formal position paper (CONFER 4717/00, 
3 March 2000). Earlier it had pleaded for this option during the General Affairs Council 
of 6 December 1999 (Commission report, 6 December 1999). Greece took a prudent 
position on the Treaty change issue during the COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999 
(Commission report, 12 November 1999), but indicated in its formal position paper that 
it was in favour of A (CONFER 4719/00, 3 March 2000). The European Commission 
did not express a preference in its formal opinion paper of 26 January 2000 (CONFER 
4701/00, 1 February 2000), but had already stated that it was in favour of option A in its 
formal contribution of 10 November 1999 considering the Finnish Presidency report to 
the Helsinki European Council (European Commission, 1999).
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The other actors that did table a formal position paper did not explicitly express that 
they were either in favour of or against Treaty change, but on close reading they could 
still be differentiated. Austria indicated that the ESDP ‘might require Treaty amendments 
that could be dealt with by the Intergovernmental Conference at a later date’ (CONFER 
4712/00, 15 February 2000). Finland, on the other hand, stated that ‘the development of 
crisis management capabilities does not automatically require amendments to the Treaty 
on European Union. The examination to be made during the Portuguese Presidency should 
focus on the delegation of decision-making powers. In case it were concluded that amend-
ments to the Treaty are necessary, the issue should be thoroughly prepared and included 
on the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference towards the end of the Conference’ 
(CONFER 4723/00, 7 March 2000). Denmark pointed out, concerning the ESDP, that 
‘it cannot be excluded, that these discussions could result in demands for Treaty amend-
ments to reflect the agreement reached. The Danish government will monitor carefully 
the developments in this area and will participate actively in all discussions to safeguard 
Danish interests and positions in the ongoing process – with due respect for Denmark’s 
opt-out’ (CONFER 4722/00, 7 March 2000).
A close reading of these three position papers and a mutual comparison leads to the 
conclusion that Austria tends towards option A, but Finland and more obviously Den-
mark tend towards C. No informal written sources prior to the deadline were available for 
Austria, so it is concluded that it preferred A>C. With regard to Finland, only a Commis-
sion report of the COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999 that stated that the Finnish 
Presidency found it premature at that stage to decide on the necessity of Treaty change 
has been found. Thus, it is concluded that it was in favour of C>A. Commission reports 
of COREPER meetings of 10 and 30 November 1999 and 3 December 1999 confirm 
Denmark’s preference for C.
During the COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999, Germany was of the opinion 
that it is necessary to have a separate body that makes the decisions in the case of a crisis 
situation (i.e. delegating authority to the PSC; see Section 6.4.2). This would require Treaty 
change, which implies that the issue should be taken up at the IGC 2000 (Commission 
report, 12 November 1999). Germany did not make a choice in its position paper when 
indicating that in light of the Presidency report to the Feira European Council, which 
should indicate whether or not Treaty amendment is judged to be necessary, ‘it will have to 
be decided to what extent the intergovernmental conference will also take up this question’ 
(CONFER 4733/00, 30 March 2000). This can be interpreted as a preference for A/C, 
which is confirmed by an informal written source indicating that Germany had not yet 
answered the question of whether or not Treaty change is needed (FA/DIE Berlin embassy 
note, 22 March 2000).
The United Kingdom stated during the COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999 that for 
the most part, the existing Treaty did suffice for the ESDP (option C), but that the situation 
would become more complicated in the case of a military intervention, which would require 
a new decision-making body with a mandate from the Council (i.e. delegating authority to 
the PSC; see Section 6.4.2) (Commission report, 12 November 1999). The United Kingdom 
left the possibility of Treaty change open in its position paper by stating that if the ESDP 
discussions parallel to the IGC ‘result in the need for Treaty change, these changes could be 
folded into the IGC process later in the year’ (CONFER 4718/00, 3 March 2000). In an FA/
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DIE note of the London embassy from 6 March 2000, it is stated that the United Kingdom 
has ‘yet’ come to the conclusion that Treaty change is necessary, which is confirmed by an 
informal FA/DIE note from 16 March 2000. The word ‘yet’ is taken to mean that the United 
Kingdom was originally not in favour of Treaty change (thus, option C).
The European Parliament included no preference in its resolution of 18 November 1999 
(European Parliament, 1999) and left open whether or not the Treaty should be changed 
regarding the ESDP in its resolution of 13 April 2000 by stating that ‘where appropriate, 
the following modifications should be made to the EU Treaty (…)’ (CONFER 4736/00, 
3 May 2000). This could at best be interpreted as a preference for A/C.
Belgium and Luxembourg did not present a position paper, but the first Benelux memo-
randum of 6 December 1999 stated with regard to the ESDP that ‘the IGC can be used 
to modify or to complete the Treaty if this should turn out to be necessary’ (CONFER 
4721/00, 7 March 2000). This statement in fact leaves open whether or not the Treaty 
should indeed be changed. As it is known for sure that the Dutch cabinet wanted to change 
the Treaty, this prudent formulation could be due to the fact that Belgium and Luxembourg 
were less sure about this. What is known from a Commission report (6 December 1999) 
is that only Italy and the Dutch cabinet explicitly pleaded for Treaty change during the 
General Affairs Council of 6 December 1999. No additional informal written sources prior 
to the deadline were available for Luxembourg. Belgium stated during the COREPER 
meeting of 10 November 1999 that Treaty change could not be excluded, but that before 
aiming at delegating authority to a new committee, which would require Treaty change, the 
existing instruments should first be examined (Commission report, 12 November 1999). It 
could at least be concluded from this that Belgium and Luxembourg were less in favour of 
A than the Dutch cabinet. This is interpreted as a preference for A/C.
During the COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999, France stated that ESDP Treaty 
changes should be as limited as possible (Commission report, 12 November 1999). The 
following informal written source found on France, a FA/DIE DVB memorandum from 
16 March 2000, reveals a preference for C. This does not exclude a preference for B, which 
appears from most subsequent informal written sources on France after the deadline, the 
first of which is dated 28 April 2000. However, as these sources date from after the deadline, 
it is concluded that France preferred C. Although option B lies between A (the ultimate 
outcome) and C, for the attribution of the extent of goal-achievement it does not, for that 
matter, make any difference whether France preferred C or B.
The Legal Service of the Council Secretariat had explicitly been asked for its advice on 
the necessity of ESDP Treaty change, which was written by the Legal Adviser to the IGC 
Piris and presented on 8 May 2000 (see Section 5.4). In it, the Legal Service expressed in 
principle a preference for C, but indicated some conditions under which Treaty change 
would be necessary from a juridical point of view, and otherwise stated that it was up to the 
member states to determine whether Treaty change would be politically desirable or opera-
tionally opportune. This could be summarised as C>A. This advice was presented after the 
deadline, but the Council Secretariat’s advice, i.e. its preference for C>A, had already come 
into focus in the Commission report of the COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999.
From the Commission reports of the COREPER meetings of 10 and 30 November 
and 3 December, and of the General Affairs Council of 6 December 1999, it appears that 
Spain preferred option C. From the Commission report of the COREPER meeting of 10 
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November 1999, it is clear that Sweden generally deemed Treaty change to be unnecessary, 
but the issue could be taken up at the end of the IGC. An informal FA/DIE note of 
2 February 2000 confirms the former statement, and thus it is concluded that Sweden 
preferred C. According to the Commission report, Ireland agreed with what Sweden had 
put forward during the COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999, adding that any Treaty 
change would require a referendum, which could create some difficulties. From this, it is 
concluded that Ireland also preferred C. For Portugal, only one, rather unclear Commission 
source (report COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999) has been found. It is therefore 
concluded that both its preference and goal-achievement are unknown.
As the outcome of the negotiation process was option A, all the actors in favour of A 
have completely achieved their (original) goals. Austria, which was in favour of A>C, and 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the European Parliament, which favoured A/C, can 
be attributed a goal-achievement value of 2. Actors in favour of C>A, Finland and the 
Council Secretariat, get a goal-achievement of 1. All the actors favouring option C have 
not achieved their goals at all.
6.4.2 PSC
PSC: establishing a Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the Treaty and formulating its responsibilities 
with regard to EU-led crisis management operations
A = yes: establishing a PSC in the Treaty and formulating its responsibilities with regard to EU-led crisis 
management operations
B = no: not establishing a PSC in the Treaty and formulating its responsibilities with regard to EU-led crisis 
management operations
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
For many actors, no data or inadequate data have been found to establish their preference 
on the PSC issue. The lack of data might have to do with the fact that actors may only have 
expressed a preference on this substantive issue after the ESDP became a part of the IGC 
agenda in general, which was only the case in Nice itself. In general, however, it can be 
argued that actors that were not in favour of Treaty change on the ESDP in general and to 
begin with were not in favour of changing the Treaty with regard to the PSC in particular 
either.
An exception should be made for those actors that, although not (very much) in favour 
of ESDP Treaty change in general, were of the opinion that establishing the PSC and 
delegating authority to it would require Treaty change. This opinion was expressed by 
Belgium, the United Kingdom and the Council Secretariat during the COREPER meeting 
of 10 November 1999 (Commission report, 12 November 1999). Germany, which was in 
favour of A/C with regard to the Treaty change issue, also expressed this opinion during 
this meeting. This opinion is interpreted as a preference for A regarding the PSC issue. In 
its formal position paper, Finland tended towards option C on the Treaty change issue, but 
left open the possibility of A with regard to the PSC issue (CONFER 4723/00, 7 March 
2000). Except for Finland, all these actors can be attributed a goal-achievement value of 3. 
Finland, which considered A as a possibility, is attributed a goal-achievement of 2.
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The preference on the PSC issue of the other opponents of Treaty change – Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Spain and Sweden – is derived from their opposition to ESDP Treaty 
change in general: they were (probably) also not in favour of establishing the PSC and its 
responsibilities in the Treaty, thus favouring option B. The preference of Denmark and 
France for B is – albeit indirectly – confirmed by an informal written source (Commission 
report COREPER of 30 November 1999 and 3 December 1999, 3 December 1999 and 
FA/DIE embassy Berlin note, 22 March 2000, respectively). All these actors have not 
achieved their goals.
During the COREPER meeting of 10 November 1999 (Commission report, 12 No-
vember 1999), Italy stated that a possible crisis management mechanism should have 
decision-making powers that were currently not provided for by the Treaty. This could be 
interpreted as a preference for option A, which is confirmed by a FA/DIE Rome embassy 
note of 15 March 2000. Italy has thus also completely achieved its goal. Greece’s preference 
for A was less clear in that it wanted the ‘status’ of the PSC to be settled in the Treaty 
(CONFER 4719/00, 3 March 2000). Therefore it receives a goal-achievement value of 2. 
The European Parliament was in favour of replacing the PoCo with the PSC in Article 25 
TEU, in case the Treaty would indeed be changed with regard to the ESDP (CONFER 
4736/00, 3 May 2000). As it does not express itself on the possible responsibilities of 
the PSC, this can be considered to be a preference for A/B, which corresponds to a goal-
achievement value of 1.
For the other (moderate) proponents of Treaty change – Austria, Luxembourg and the 
European Commission, no data on their preference on the PSC issue have been found. 
It is argued that actors that were in favour of Treaty change in general cannot necessarily 
be said to also favour Treaty change on the PSC in particular. Therefore, it is concluded 
that the preferences and goal-achievements of Austria, Luxembourg and the European 
Commission are unknown. This also applies to Portugal, whose preference on the Treaty 
change issue was unknown.
6.4.3 NATO
NATO: establishing the relationship and cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
in the Treaty
A = yes: establishing the relationship and cooperation with NATO in the Treaty
B = no: not establishing the relationship and cooperation with NATO in the Treaty
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
For most actors, no data or inadequate data have been found to establish their preference. 
The lack of data might have to do with the fact that actors would only express a preference 
on this substantive issue after the ESDP became a part of the IGC agenda in general, 
which was only the case in Nice itself. In general, however, it can be argued that actors that 
were not in favour of Treaty change on the ESDP in general and to begin with were also 
not in favour of changing the Treaty with regard to the NATO in particular. Therefore, 
their preference on the NATO issue may be derived from their opposition to ESDP Treaty 
change in general: option B. The preference for B of some of these opponents – France 
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and the ‘neutral countries’, is explicitly confirmed by informal written sources. However, 
except for France, albeit implicitly (FA/DIE DVB memorandum, 16 March 2000), these 
sources date from after the deadline. For that matter, it is unclear whether and to what 
extent the preference for B applies to the individual actors – Austria, Finland, Ireland and 
Sweden – that make up the neutral countries (see Section 7.6.2). As Austria was in favour 
of ESDP Treaty change in general rather than against it, it cannot be derived from this that 
it preferred B on the NATO issue. Therefore, it is concluded that its preference and goal-
achievement are unknown. As the outcome of the negotiation process was a not-decision, 
which practically boiled down to the same as option B, all opponents of Treaty change in 
general have completely achieved their goals on the NATO issue.
According to informal written sources after the deadline, some of the (moderate) propo-
nents of Treaty change – Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, also appeared to be more or less 
against NATO Treaty change during the negotiation process. Yet, their original preferences 
are simply not known. As pointed out in Section 6.4.2 for the PSC issue, they cannot 
be derived from their support for ESDP Treaty change in general either. Therefore, the 
preferences and goal-achievements on the NATO issue of the (moderate) proponents of 
Treaty change are also unknown. This applies to Portugal as well, whose preference on the 
Treaty change issue was unknown.
6.4.4 Military Staff
Military Staff: establishing a Military Staff in the Treaty, supporting the Military Committee
A = yes: establishing a Military Staff in the Treaty, supporting the Military Committee
B = no: not establishing a Military Staff in the Treaty, supporting the Military Committee
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Except for Greece, no data on the preferences of any of the other participating actors 
were found with regard to the Military Staff issue. Greece implicitly indicated that it was 
in favour of option A in its formal position paper (CONFER 4719/00, 3 March 2000). 
Again the lack of data might have to do with the fact that actors may only have expressed a 
preference on this issue after it had been put on the agenda. This never happened, because 
the issue was not part of the Italy and Benelux proposals that formed the basis of the 
discussion on the substantive ESDP Treaty changes in Nice. As a result, the Military Staff 
issue eventuated in a non-decision from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet (see Section 
5.4.6).
However, as in the case of the PSC and NATO issues, it could be argued that the actors 
that were against ESDP Treaty change in general were also against changing the Treaty with 
regard to the Military Staff in particular and thus in favour of option B. As the Military 
Staff issue resulted in a non-decision, which practically coincided with option B, these 
actors have completely achieved their goals. The preferences and goal-achievements of the 
other actors are again unknown. Only Greece, which implicitly preferred A, can be said to 
not have achieved its goal.
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Table 6.3 The extent of the other actors’ goal-achievement for the ESDP (see Tables 6-9 in Annex 5 for more details)
ESDP Treaty change PSC NATO Military Staff
Austria Partial (2) Unknown Unknown Unknown
Belgium Partial (2) Full (3) Unknown Unknown
Denmark Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Full (3) Full (3)
Finland Partial (1) Partial (2) Full (3) Full (3)
France Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Full (3) Full (3)
Germany Partial (2) Full (3) Unknown Unknown
Greece Full (3) Partial (2) Unknown Zero (0a – non-decision)
Ireland Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Full (3) Full (3)
Italy Full (3) Full (3) Unknown Unknown
Luxembourg Partial (2) Unknown Unknown Unknown
Portugal Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown
Spain Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Full (3) Full (3)
Sweden Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Full (3) Full (3)
United Kingdom Zero (0c – not preferred decision 
option)
Full (3) Full (3) Full (3)
European Commission Full (3) Unknown Unknown Unknown
European Parliament Partial (2) Partial (1) Unknown Unknown
Council Secretariat Partial (1) Full (3) Full (3) Full (3)
The goal-achievements of the other participating actors on the four ESDP issues from the 
sample selection are shown in Table 6.3.
6.5 Closer cooperation
What were the preferences of the other participating actors in the Closer cooperation dos-
sier? In general, an important ‘direct’ informal written source, just at the deadline, concerns 
the Dutch report of the informal Preparatory Group in Sintra on 14 April 2000 (FA/DIE 
report, 17 April 2000). As this report clearly indicates which actor preferences on the 
minimum requirement and veto possibility conditions were changing – only a few – the 
original preferences of the actors can be derived from this. In this way, the report serves as 
a confirmation of the preferences found in earlier formal and/or informal sources.
6.5.1 Minimum requirement
Minimum requirement: the minimum number of member states required for engaging in a closer cooperation 
initiative
A = at least eight member states
B = at least one third of the member states
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C = status quo: at least a majority of the member states
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
The first Benelux memorandum of 6 December 1999 (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000) 
stated that closer cooperation ‘should also be possible with the same number of member 
states as is the case today’, which boiled down to eight member states (A). Belgium and 
Luxembourg thus preferred A, although two informal written sources do not discrimi-
nate between A and B when indicating that Belgium and Luxembourg were in favour of 
changing the minimum requirement condition (FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably 
between 31 January 2000 and 30 March 2000; FA/DIE report, 17 April 2000). The latter 
also applies to Italy, which indicated in its formal position paper that it was in favour of 
lowering the threshold (CONFER 4717/00, 3 March 2000). Italy’s preference is therefore 
interpreted as A/B (A and/or B, which is unclear).
France did not table a position paper, but from informal written sources it appears that 
France also favoured A/B (FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably between 31 January 
2000 and 30 March 2000; FA/DIE report, 17 April 2000). Germany did not express a 
preference in its formal position paper. According to the FA/DIE report, Germany did 
(probably) express a preference for A and/or B during the Preparatory Group of 14 April. 
Moreover, an ‘indirect’ informal written source confirming Germany’s preference for A/B 
has been found (FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably between 31 January 2000 and 30 
March 2000).
The Commission did not indicate a preference in its contribution of 10 November 1999 
(European Commission, 1999), but in its opinion paper of 26 January 2000 (CONFER 
4701/00, 1 February 2000) expressed a preference for B. The European Parliament indi-
cated in its resolution of 18 November 1999 that ‘the rules adopted should aim at reducing 
the possibility of blocking actions by any of the Member States’ (European Parliament, 
1999). This could be interpreted as a preference for lowering the minimum requirement 
(A/B), but it is at most an unclear preference. Yet the European Parliament clearly expressed 
a preference for B in its resolution of 13 April 2000 (CONFER 4736/00, 3 May 2000).
Greece expressed a preference for C in its formal position paper. Finland and the United 
Kingdom also indicated in their formal position papers that they were in favour of C, 
although implicitly rather than explicitly. The preference of these three member states is 
confirmed by informal written sources (FA/DIE London embassy note, 31 January 2000 
(only for the United Kingdom); FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably between 31 Janu-
ary 2000 and 30 March 2000; FA/DIE report, 17 April 2000).
According to an ‘indirect’ informal written source (FA/DIE note, unknown date, prob-
ably between 31 January 2000 and 30 March 2000) and the ‘direct’ Sintra report (FA/DIE 
report, 17 April 2000), the following actors were in favour of C: Denmark (which did not 
express a preference in its position paper), Ireland (see also Commission note, 12 April 
2000), Portugal and Spain (see also Commission note, 12 April 2000). For Sweden, the 
Sintra report indicates that it provided some opening concerning the minimum require-
ment (thus A/B), from which it can be derived that its original preference was C (see also 
Commission note, 12 April 2000). The ‘indirect’ informal written source mentioned above 
still left some doubt about this.
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Austria is the only actor for which (possibly) contradictory sources have been found. 
Austria did not express a preference in its position paper. The ‘indirect’ informal written 
source leaves some doubt about whether Austria’s preference is unknown or A/B. The 
Sintra report, on the other hand, classifies Austria as being among the original opponents 
of relaxing the two conditions, indicates that Austria had no problem with abolishing the 
veto possibility, but provided no ‘opening’ in terms of the minimum requirement. From 
this, it can be concluded that Austria preferred C. This is confirmed by the fact that several 
later informal written sources (after the deadline) indicate a preference for C, which make 
it plausible that Austria’s original preference was also C (as a preference change from A/B 
to C is theoretically not logical, but a preference change from C to A/B is what empirically 
occurred in several instances).
The actors preferring C get a goal-achievement value of 0, actors favouring A/B (where 
it is in fact unclear whether they preferred A and/or B) a goal-achievement of 1, actors in 
favour of B get a goal-achievement of 2 and actors preferring A get a goal-achievement 
of 3.
6.5.2 Veto possibility
Veto possibility: whether or not a member state has the ability to veto a closer cooperation initiative
A = abolishing the veto possibility, deciding by QMV
B = abolishing the veto possibility, but maintaining the possibility of referring the matter to the European 
Council
C = status quo: maintaining the veto possibility
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Belgium and Luxembourg expressed a preference for option A in the first Benelux 
memorandum. This is confirmed by an ‘indirect’ informal written source (FA/DIE note, 
unknown date, probably between 31 January 2000 and 30 March 2000) and the ‘direct’ 
report of the Preparatory Group of 14 April 2000 in Sintra (FA/DIE report, 17 April 2000). 
Germany expressed a preference for A in its formal position paper, which is confirmed by 
the ‘indirect’ source just mentioned. Italy stated in its formal position paper that the veto 
possibility should be ‘reviewed’. This can be interpreted as a preference for A. This prefer-
ence is confirmed by two informal written sources (FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably 
between 31 January 2000 and 30 March 2000; FA/DIE report, 17 April 2000).
The Commission was in favour of A according to its opinion paper of 26 January 2000 
(CONFER 4701/00, 1 February 2000). It had expressed this preference only implicitly in 
its earlier contribution of 10 November 1999 (European Commission, 1999). As became 
clear in the previous subsection, the European Parliament pointed in its resolution of 18 
November 1999 to ‘reducing the possibility of blocking actions by any of the Member 
States’, which could be interpreted as a preference for A (European Parliament, 1999). The 
Parliament explicitly expressed this preference in its resolution of 13 April 2000 (CONFER 
4736/00, 3 May). France did not present a position paper, but based on informal writ-
ten sources it appears to have a preference for A (FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably 
between 31 January 2000 and 30 March 2000; FA/DIE report, 17 April 2000).
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Finland, Greece and the United Kingdom expressed a preference for C in their formal 
position papers, although implicitly rather than explicitly. In addition to an ‘indirect’ 
informal written source (FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably between 31 January 2000 
and 30 March 2000), the Sintra report (FA/DIE report, 17 April 2000) helps to confirm 
the (original) preference for C of the following actors: Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland 
(see also Commission note, 12 April 2000), Portugal, Spain (see also Commission note, 12 
April 2000), Sweden and the United Kingdom (see also FA/DIE London embassy note, 
31 January 2000). In Sintra, Greece, Portugal, Spain (first pillar), Sweden and the United 
Kingdom indicated that they were still in favour of C, whereas Denmark, Ireland and 
Finland provided some openings towards A. The ‘indirect’ informal written source leaves 
some doubt as to the preference of Sweden, but the Sintra report makes explicitly clear that 
its original preference was C (see also Commission note, 12 April 2000).
Austria is the only actor for which (possibly) contradictory sources have been found. 
Austria did not express a preference in its position paper. The ‘indirect’ informal written 
source leaves some doubt about whether Austria’s preference is unknown or A, whereas the 
Sintra report treats Austria as an original opponent of relaxing the two conditions (thus 
favouring C), but now indicating that it has no problem with A. As the Sintra report is a 
clear source and gives an indication of the original preferences of the actors, it can safely be 
concluded that Austria preferred C.
As the ultimate outcome, option B/C, lies between A and C, all actors have achieved 
their goals at least to a certain extent. As the ultimate outcome approximates C more than 
A, it is justified to attribute actors preferring C a goal-achievement value of 2 and actors 
favouring A a goal-achievement of 1.
6.5.3 Differentiated membership
Differentiated membership: the possibility for a candidate member state to become a partial member, making it 
possible to accede earlier than when a candidate member may only become a full member (apart from possible 
derogations and transition periods)
A = yes: introducing the possibility for a candidate member state to become a partial member
B = no: not introducing the possibility for a candidate member state to become a partial member
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
No specific data on the preferences of the other actors on this issue have been found. The 
only general reference to other actors is made in an informal written source of the Dutch 
cabinet (FA/DIE note, unknown date, probably between 20 December 1999 and 31 Janu-
ary 2000). Here it is stated that ‘many member states’ consider option A as ‘premature’. 
From this, it is derived that ‘many’ member state actors were in favour of B, but actually 
and specifically it is not known which actors favoured which options. If it is indeed true 
that several member states were in favour of B, these actors have certainly achieved their 
goals, as the outcome of the negotiation process was a non-decision. Yet as specific data on 
the other actors’ preferences are lacking, it is concluded that the preferences and extent of 
goal-achievement of the other actors on this issue are unclear.
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Table 6.4 The extent of the other actors’ goal-achievement for Closer cooperation (see Tables 10-12 in Annex 5 for 
more details)
Closer cooperation Minimum requirement Veto possibility Differentiated membership
Austria Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2) Unclear
Belgium Full (3) Partial (1)
Denmark Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2)
Finland Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2)
France Partial (1) Partial (1)
Germany Partial (1) Partial (1)
Greece Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2)
Ireland Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2)
Italy Partial (1) Partial (1)
Luxembourg Full (3) Partial (1)
Portugal Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2)
Spain Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2)
Sweden Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2)
United Kingdom Zero (0c – not preferred decision option) Partial (2)
European Commission Partial (2) Partial (1)
European Parliament Partial (2) Partial (1)
The extent to which the other participating actors have achieved their goals on the three 
sample selection issues of the Closer cooperation dossier is shown in Table 6.4.
6.6 Commission size
A = status quo (two Commissioners each for Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, France and Italy, one each 
for the other 10 member states)
B = one Commissioner per member state
C = one Commissioner per member state, a fixed number of Commissioners – being less than the number of 
member states – later on or to be determined later on, from a certain date or a certain number of member states 
(with or without a strictly equal rotation system)
D = a fixed number of Commissioners now – being less than the number of member states (with or without a 
strictly equal rotation system)
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
What were the preferences of the other participating actors on the size and composition 
of the Commission? According to their formal position papers, the following actors 
preferred option B: Denmark (CONFER 4722/00, 7 March 2000), Finland (CONFER 
4723/00, 7 March 2000) and Greece (CONFER 4719/00, 3 March 2000). While Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden did not present position papers, they also preferred 
B according to unanimous informal written sources. In the case of Luxembourg, its prefer-
ence for B was formally established in the first Benelux memorandum of 6 December 
1999 (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000) and confirmed by informal written sources. 
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This also applies to Belgium, but there is one dissenting informal FA/DIE source dating 
from 15 February 2000 indicating that Belgium and also Austria were positive concerning 
a reduction of the Commission (under the condition of an equal rotation system). This 
is interpreted as complementing rather than replacing their primary preference for B (as 
confirmed by the other informal written sources). For Austria, its preference for B was also 
stated in its formal position paper (CONFER 4712/00, 15 February 2000). Austria and 
Belgium therefore preferred B more than D (B>D).
In its contribution of 10 November 1999, the European Commission did not express a 
clear preference, but the contribution tended towards option D (European Commission, 
1999). In its opinion paper of 26 January 2000 (CONFER 4701/00, 1 February 2000), 
the Commission presented D (20 Commissioners) and B as two alternative options. This 
is confirmed by several informal written Commission sources. However, in an informal 
preparatory Commission briefing note for the presentation of this opinion paper, dated 12 
January 2000 and presented by President Prodi and Commissioner Barnier, the following 
is stated: ‘Does the Commission agree to consider that stabilising the number of Commis-
sioners is an objective to pursue during the next IGC? Given the existing viewpoints of a 
significant number of Member States, should we also present the option of a Commission 
composed with all the nationalities whatever the future number of Member States?’ It may 
be concluded from this that formally the Commission remained neutral by expressing a 
preference for B/D, but in actual fact, its representatives in the IGC Prodi and Barnier 
preferred D in any case. All in all, the Commission’s preference is therefore summarised as 
D>B.
The European Parliament did not express a preference in its resolution of 18 November 
1999 (European Parliament, 1999), but expressed an equal preference for D (20 Commis-
sioners) and B in its resolution of 13 April 2000 (CONFER 4736/00, 3 May 2000).
France did not table a position paper. According to the FA/DIE report of the first 
technical meeting preparing the IGC on 14 July 1999 (Satuli Group; see Section 2.3.1), 
none of the member states were willing to abandon the principle of one Commissioner 
per member state (B). The big member states, which included France, were prepared to 
forgo their second Commissioner, but wanted to be compensated with more votes in the 
Council. However, three informal written sources closer to the deadline of the before-
preference indicate that France preferred D (FA/DIE memorandum, 15 February 2000; 
Commission preparatory note for General Affairs Council of 20 March 2000, unknown 
date; Commission report of Preparatory Group of 28 March 2000, 28 March 2000). In the 
informal written source of 15 February 2000, it becomes clear that France was in favour 
of an equal rotation system in this respect. As has already been explained in Section 5.6, 
the developments in the area of enlargement had accelerated since the first meeting on the 
subject in July 1999, which probably explains why France now preferred D instead of B. 
The informal sources closer to the deadline, indicating a preference for D, are therefore 
considered to represent the French preference.
Following the same line of reasoning, the July 1999 source indicating a preference for B 
of the other big member states is disregarded. Germany expressed a preference for D in its 
formal position paper, adding that ‘the related issue of a second Commissioner for Germany 
depends, however, on a satisfactory outcome in other areas, particularly as regards the 
weighting of votes’ (CONFER 4733/00, 30 March 2000). That Germany did not intend 
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to give up its second Commissioner a priori is confirmed by the informal written source 
of 15 February 2000, in which it is stated that Germany preferred D, but seemed to be 
in favour of an unequal rotation system (in which only the small member states would be 
rotated). This also becomes clear in an informal Commission note considering the General 
Affairs Council of 20 March 2000, which indicates that Germany had informally pointed 
out that it could support the reduction of the Commission to 20 Commissioners according 
to a system that assured a place for a German Commissioner.
Italy stated in its position paper that it could accept D, but also, ‘as a compromise’, B 
(CONFER 4717/00, 3 March 2000). In the FA/DIE memorandum of 15 February 2000 
and the Commission report of the Preparatory Group of 28 March 2000, it is made clear 
that Italy preferred option D. The former source indicates that Italy was in favour of an 
equal rotation system in this respect. Italy’s preference is all in all summarised as D>B.
For Spain, which did not present a position paper, two contradictory informal written 
sources have been found. The FA/DIE memorandum of 15 February 2000 states that 
Spain was in favour of D and also of an unequal rotation system in which only the small 
member states would rotate. The informal Commission preparatory note for the General 
Affairs Council of 20 March 2000, on the other hand, indicates that according to Spain, 
option B was ‘the most realistic’. The most realistic decision option according to Spain 
need not, of course, necessarily coincide with the most preferred decision option of Spain, 
which might still be D. An informal Commission report of the Preparatory Group of 28 
March 2000 confirms Spain’s preference for D, although the negotiation process regarding 
the Commission issue had already been underway for some time and this might therefore 
not represent the original Spanish preference. All in all, it is concluded that Spain (prob-
ably) preferred D.
The United Kingdom stated in its position paper that the IGC should ‘examine’ option 
D, recognised that there were also arguments in favour of B and presented as a possible 
solution option C (CONFER 4718/00, 3 March 2000). According to the FA/DIE memo-
randum of 15 February 2000 and the Commission report of the Preparatory Group of 28 
March 2000, the United Kingdom was in favour of D. The FA/DIE memorandum points 
out that it preferred an equal rotation system in this respect. It is concluded that the United 
Kingdom preferred D/C.
As the final outcome of the negotiation process (C) was a compromise between B and 
D and all actors were in favour of B and/or D, they have all achieved their goals to a 
certain extent. Actors in favour of B or D are attributed a goal-achievement value of 1. This 
applies to Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. 
Germany and Spain, which were in favour of D, also get a goal-achievement score of 1, 
although they were in favour of an unequal rotation system, which was not realised in the 
final outcome. The actors that were in favour of B and D are attributed a goal-achievement 
of 2: Austria, Belgium, Italy, the European Commission and the European Parliament. The 
United Kingdom can be said to have achieved its goal to the greatest extent, since it was 
in favour of D/C and of an equal rotation system, resulting in a goal-achievement score 
of 3.
The goal-achievements of the other participating actors regarding the size and composi-
tion of the Commission are summarised in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5 The extent of the other actors’ goal-achievement for the Commission (see Table 13 in Annex 5 for more 
details)
European Commission Size and composition
Austria Partial (2)
Belgium Partial (2)
Denmark Partial (1)
Finland Partial (1)
France Partial (1)
Germany Partial (1)
Greece Partial (1)
Ireland Partial (1)
Italy Partial (2)
Luxembourg Partial (1)
Portugal Partial (1)
Spain Partial (1)
Sweden Partial (1)
United Kingdom Full (3)
European Commission Partial (2)
European Parliament Partial (2)
6.7 Weighting of votes
6.7.1 Type of system
Type of system (and QMV threshold): the type of system and, if applicable, QMV threshold for the new weight-
ing of votes
A ‘Simple’ dual majority system (a simple majority of member states + a simple majority of the EU popula-
tion)
B Dual majority system (a (simple) majority of member states + a majority of the EU population)
C ‘Weighted’ dual majority system (a majority of weighted votes + a majority of the EU population)
D ‘Re-weighting’ of votes under the existing system, QMV threshold below the current level (71.26%)
E ‘Re-weighting’ of votes under the existing system, QMV threshold at the current level
F ‘Re-weighting’ of votes under the existing system, QMV threshold above the current level
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
What did the other participating actors prefer as the type of system for the weighing of 
votes? Option A was originally proposed by the European Commission in its opinion 
paper of 26 January 2000 (CONFER 4701/00, 1 February 2000). According to a FA/DIE 
memorandum of 27 January 2000, this part of the Commission’s advice had ‘according to 
Commission sources’ been proposed at the last moment by Commission President Prodi 
himself. In its earlier contribution of 10 November 1999 (European Commission, 1999), 
the Commission did not express a preference for a particular type of system, but did indi-
cate wanting to fix the QMV threshold at the current level or perhaps even lower: E(/D). 
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Strictly speaking, this was not at odds with option A of the opinion paper in which the 
QMV threshold would indeed be replaced by lower, ‘simple’ majorities, but the opinion 
paper, which was officially presented to the IGC, takes precedence anyway. The Commis-
sion thus preferred option A. The Commission proposal was supported by the European 
Parliament in its resolution of 13 April 2000 (CONFER 4736/00, 3 May 2000). It had 
presented no preference in its earlier resolution of 18 November 1999 (European Parlia-
ment, 1999).
According to informal written sources, the following actors were in favour of a dual ma-
jority system (probably option B): Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
It is not completely clear whether these countries preferred the Commission option (A) or 
option B. The FA/DIE report of the Preparatory Group of 4 April 2000, which was the 
first Preparatory Group meeting on this dossier, indicates that none of these countries sup-
ported the Commission option, but rather, that most of them preferred a simple majority 
of member states combined with 60% of the EU population (option B). The Commission 
report of this meeting states that Belgium and Luxembourg preferred a dual majority 
system, while Austria and Portugal were open to discussing this option. Contrary to the 
FA/DIE report, the Commission report indicates that Ireland preferred a re-weighting. 
All previous informal written sources for Ireland, however, indicate a preference for a dual 
majority system, so that the conclusion that it preferred this option is maintained.
Although this meeting was the first Preparatory Group on the dossier and it could be 
argued that actors expressed their original preferences on this occasion, it was also a rather 
late occasion. The possibility can therefore not completely be excluded that (some of ) these 
actors originally preferred option A and, only after that, B. For Austria, all informal written 
sources indicate that it was in favour of – or at least open to – a dual majority system, 
except for the first, albeit ‘indirect’, FA/DIE source from 2 March 2000 (re-weighting). 
Austria is concluded to have preferred a dual majority system, but the fact that it may have 
originally preferred a re-weighting of votes cannot simply be excluded. In the first Benelux 
memorandum of 6 December 1999, it was stated that one was open to discussing both 
a re-weighting of votes and a dual majority system. However, this formulation was due 
to the fact that the Dutch cabinet, unlike Belgium and Luxembourg, was in favour of a 
re-weighting (see Section 5.7.1).
In its formal position paper (CONFER 4719/00, 3 March 2000), Greece stated that ‘if 
the system were to be changed’, it preferred option B (60% of member states plus 60% 
of the EU population). However, this is contradicted by a FA/DIE source, although an 
‘indirect’ one, which reported that Greece preferred a re-weighting. The formal ‘direct’ 
source, which is confirmed by the two informal reports of the Preparatory Group of 4 
April 2000, precedes the informal ‘indirect’ source. Therefore, it is concluded that Greece 
preferred B. Denmark indicated in its formal position paper that it was in favour of option 
C, with a QMV threshold around the current level and at least 50% of the population 
of the EU (CONFER 4722/00, 7 March 2000). The informal written sources that were 
found state that Denmark preferred a (kind of ) dual majority system, with the Commis-
sion report of the Preparatory Group of 4 April 2000 confirming its specific preference for 
C. In its position paper of 30 March 2000 (CONFER 4733/00), Germany stated that it 
could consider both option C (with e.g. 60% of the EU population) and a re-weighting 
of votes. Yet the informal written sources that were found state that Germany preferred a 
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dual majority system and three of them specify that it preferred B. Germany’s preference 
for both a dual majority system and a re-weighting of votes included in its position paper 
might be an example of a ‘bargaining’ preference concealing its ‘real’ preference for a dual 
majority system. All in all, it is therefore concluded that Germany preferred B/C.
Finland and Italy preferred option E according to their formal position papers (CON-
FER 4723/00, 7 March 2000 and CONFER 4717/00, 3 March 2000, respectively). Their 
preference for a re-weighting type of system is unanimously confirmed by informal written 
sources.
The FA/DIE and Commission reports of the Preparatory Group of 4 April 2000 specifi-
cally indicate that in the case of re-weighting, all member states were in favour of E with 
regard to the QMV threshold. France was in favour of a re-weighting according to all 
informal written sources. Only one source indicates that France was in favour of lowering 
the QMV threshold (Commission note, 31 March 2000). This is interpreted conservatively 
by concluding that France preferred E/D. Sweden was also in favour of a re-weighting 
according to all informal written sources. The two reports of the Preparatory Group of 4 
April 2000 specify its position with regard to the QMV threshold (E).
For Spain, two Commission notes indicate that it was ‘reserved concerning a dual major-
ity system’ (Commission preparatory note for General Affairs Council of 20 March 2000, 
unknown date; Commission note, 31 March 2000). The other informal written sources 
state that Spain preferred a re-weighting, with one source making clear that Spain wanted 
to increase the QMV threshold and another one at least hinting at this (FA/DIE/Prepa-
ration PR report of 2nd technical meeting on 15 September 1999, 16 September 1999; 
Commission note, 31 March 2000). This is again interpreted conservatively by concluding 
that Spain was in favour of E/F. According to the FA/DIE report of the Preparatory Group 
of 4 April 2000, Spain indicated that it was in favour of a 70% population threshold in 
case of a dual majority outcome. These Spanish preferences were related to its desire to be 
treated as a big member state and as a ‘special case’ (see Section 6.7.3).
The United Kingdom was in favour of a re-weighting according to its formal position pa-
per (CONFER 4718/00, 3 March 2000). This is confirmed by all informal written sources, 
three of which state that the United Kingdom wanted to maintain the current QMV 
threshold. It is therefore concluded that it preferred option E. For the Council Secretariat, 
only a preference for a QMV threshold below the current level has been found (FA/DIE/
Preparation PR report of 2nd technical meeting on 15 September 1999, 16 September 
1999). Its general preference is unclear, as is the extent of its goal-achievement.
As the outcome of the negotiation process was a re-weighting of votes under the exist-
ing system (D, E and mostly F), but also contained elements of the three dual majority 
options (A, B, C), all the actors have achieved their goals at least to a certain extent. As 
has already been discussed in Section 5.7.1, however, some options are better represented 
than others. In keeping with this, actors that (partially) prefer option F are attributed a 
goal-achievement value of 3, actors in favour of D and/or E or (partially) the hybrid option 
C get a goal-achievement of 2 and actors preferring A or B get a score of 1.
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6.7.2 General weighting
General weighting: the general distribution of votes between the member states in the new weighting
A = toning down the ‘degressive proportionality’ system, i.e. weighting the population size of a member state 
more heavily
B = maintaining the ‘degressive proportionality’ system as much as possible, i.e. weighting the population size 
of a member state not too much
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Although not many data were found for most of the member state actors, the divide be-
tween the big and small member states with regard to the general weighting was at least 
clearly put forward during the Preparatory Group of 4 April 2000 (FA/DIE report, 5 April 
2000). The small member states did not want to give much more weight to population 
size in order to keep the balance between big and small member states (B), whereas the big 
member states preferred to give much more weight to population size (A). According to the 
data, all big and smaller member states fit into the categories of A and B, respectively.
The small member states Austria and Denmark indicated their preference for B in their 
formal position papers (CONFER 4712/00, 15 February 2000 and CONFER 4722/00, 
7 March 2000, respectively). Belgium and Luxembourg preferred A/B according to the 
first Benelux memorandum (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000), but this compromise 
position was related to the dual interest of the Dutch cabinet (see Section 5.7.2). As small 
member states, they were first and foremost in favour of B, which is confirmed by informal 
written sources. Finland and Greece did not indicate a preference on this issue in their 
position papers. The big member states Germany (CONFER 4733/00, 30 March 2000), 
Italy (CONFER 4717/00, 3 March 2000) and the United Kingdom (CONFER 4718/00, 
3 March 2000) expressed their preference for A in their position papers. According to one 
informal written source, Germany was in favour of both A and B (FA/DIE memorandum, 
9 February 2000). However, this does not exclude the fact that it may have primarily 
preferred A, and its formal position paper takes precedence anyway.
As the outcome of the negotiation process was A>B, the big member states have achieved 
their goals to a greater extent (2) than the small member states (1). No data have been 
found for the Commission and the Parliament on this issue. This might have to do with the 
fact that the issue does not directly concern them, but also with their preference for A with 
regard to the type of system (in which every member state holds the same weight in the first 
key). The preferences and goal-achievements of these two actors are therefore unknown.
6.7.3 Individual weighting
In addition to the general weighting distribution, several actors had specific preferences on 
their individual weightings. A controversial issue, particularly for France and Belgium, was 
whether Germany and the Netherlands, respectively, should get additional votes because 
of their greater population size compared to the other member states in their cluster. For 
Germany and France, the possible outcomes of the negotiation process were as follows:
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A = Germany gets a greater weight than France, Italy and the United Kingdom
B = Germany does not get a greater weight than France, Italy and the United Kingdom
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
According to Galloway (2001:83), France could not accept during the endgame in Nice 
that Germany would get more votes than the United Kingdom, France and Italy, but this 
is not reflected in the data as France’s original preference. The two informal sources that 
have been found in relation to this indicate that France could accept – or was at least open 
to – a ‘decoupling’ of Germany (A). This might, of course, be a ‘bargaining’ preference, 
France’s ‘real’ – and most logical – preference being option B. Another possibility is that 
France was internally divided and that these sources only represent one side of the story. 
This internal divisiveness appears from a later informal written source after the deadline 
(FA/DIE memorandum, 20 September 2000; see Section 7.16.1, Internal coherence), but it 
is not clear whether this was already an issue at the start of the IGC, i.e. the deadline of the 
before-preference. All in all, it is concluded that France’s preference is unclear.
Germany expressed no preference in its formal position paper (CONFER 4733/00, 30 
March 2000). Yet it pointed out during the Preparatory Group of 4 April 2000 that the 
existing clusters were not a satisfactory form of voting distribution and that introducing 
more differentiation between member states on the basis of population size would be justi-
fied (FA/DIE report, 5 April 2000). In doing so, it (implicitly) expressed a preference for 
A. The FA/DIE memorandum of 20 September 2000 mentioned above also points to the 
possible internal divisiveness of Germany, but it is not clear whether a part of Germany 
actually preferred option B. The United Kingdom did not express a preference in its posi-
tion paper (CONFER 4718/00, 3 March 2000), but the two informal written sources that 
were found indicate that it wanted the same number of votes as Germany (B). Italy also did 
not express itself on this issue in its position paper (CONFER 4717/00, 3 March 2000) 
and no informal sources were found for it. Therefore, Italy’s preference is unknown.
After it became clear in Nice that France could not accept a decoupling of Germany, 
the following population threshold was agreed upon ‘to reconcile that position with the 
German desire to see its greater relative size reflected’ (Galloway, 2001:82):
‘When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, a member of 
the Council may request verification that the Member States constituting the qualified 
majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that condition is 
shown not to have been met, the decision in question shall not be adopted.’
This will enable Germany in EU-27 to form a blocking minority with any two of the 
following countries: the United Kingdom, France and Italy. As the blocking minority 
threshold is fixed at 91 in EU-27, the population condition has the same effect as giving 
four additional votes to Germany when it forms a blocking minority with two of the other 
three big member states. Therefore, formally no decoupling of Germany has taken place, 
but practically it has (A>B). On this basis, it is concluded that Germany has for the greater 
part achieved its goal (2), but the United Kingdom has done so only to a limited extent (1). 
France’s and Italy’s extent of goal-achievement are unclear and unknown, respectively.
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The possible outcomes of the negotiation process for Spain were as follows:
Individual weighting: the individual number of votes of specific member states in the new weighting
A = Spain gets the same weight as the four big member states
B = Spain does not get the same weight as the four big member states, but still (practically) more than is 
currently the case
C = neither A nor B (status quo)
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
Spain had been identified as a ‘special case’ in Declaration 50 attached to the Final Act of 
the Amsterdam IGC:
‘Until the entry into force of the first enlargement it is agreed that the decision of the 
Council of 29 March 1994 (“the Ioannina Compromise”) will be extended and, by that 
date, a solution for the special case of Spain will be found.’
As with Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, Spain had two Commissioners, 
but it had two fewer votes in the Council than these member states. As a compensation for 
the loss of its second Commissioner, Spain wanted as many votes as the other big member 
states (FA/DIE/Preparation PR report of 2nd technical meeting on 15 September 1999, 16 
September 1999). It was, however, not possible to give Spain the same number of votes 
as the other big member states because of its considerably lower population size. In order 
to be able to still treat Spain as a big member state, it was given 27 votes in Nice so that 
it would have the same blocking power as the other four big member states. This required 
the blocking minority threshold to be established at 88, which boiled down to a QMV 
threshold of 74.78% in EU-27 (Declaration on the enlargement of the European Union). 
However, this high threshold was not acceptable particularly to Belgium, Portugal and 
Finland. As a compromise, another Declaration was adopted in which it was stated that 
in EU-27 the blocking minority would be 91, which corresponded to a QMV threshold 
of 73.91% (Declaration on the qualified majority threshold and the number of votes for 
a blocking minority in the context of enlargement). The QMV threshold for EU-15 was 
established at 71.31% (blocking minority of 69), which was a compromise between a 
QMV threshold of 168 (blocking minority of 70) – the level immediately below the exist-
ing threshold – and a QMV threshold of 170 (blocking minority of 68) and which would 
improve Spain’s current position in terms of blocking power (in the spirit of the ‘Ioannina 
compromise’) (Galloway, 2001:83-86).
Although Spain did not receive the same number of votes as the big member states (A), it 
certainly has achieved its goal to a great extent, in the sense that practically, its position in 
terms of blocking power, both in EU-15 and EU-27, has been improved (B), although not 
by as much as it aimed for during the end game in Nice and the subsequent renegotiations 
resulting in SN 533/00 rev1 at 22 December 2000 (see Section 5.7.1). Spain is therefore 
attributed a goal-achievement score of 2.
With regard to the other member states, Sweden wanted a relatively greater voting weight 
in any case, according to informal written sources. The possible outcomes of the negotia-
tion process for Sweden were as follows:
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A = Sweden gets a greater weight than is currently the case
B = Sweden does not get a greater weight than is currently the case
T = not-decision
N = non-decision
The outcome of the negotiation process was option A: Sweden got two additional votes (see 
Section 5.7.2). Sweden has therefore completely achieved its goal (3).
Table 6.6 The extent of the other actors’ goal-achievement for the Weighting of votes (see Tables 14, 15 and 16a-c in 
Annex 5 for more details)
Weighting of votes Type of system (and QMV threshold) General weighting Individual weighting
Austria Partial (1) Partial (1) Not applicable
Belgium Partial (1) Partial (1) Zero (0c – not preferred decision option)
Denmark Partial (2) Partial (1) Not applicable
Finland Partial (2) Partial (1) Not applicable
France Partial (2) Partial (2) Unclear
Germany Partial (2) Partial (2) Partial (2)
Greece Partial (1) Partial (1) Not applicable
Ireland Partial (1) Partial (1) Not applicable
Italy Partial (2) Partial (2) Unknown
Luxembourg Partial (1) Partial (1) Not applicable
Portugal Partial (1) Partial (1) Not applicable
Spain Full (3) Partial (2) Partial (2)
Sweden Partial (2) Partial (1) Full (3)
United Kingdom Partial (2) Partial (2) Partial (1)
European Commission Partial (1) Unknown Not applicable
European Parliament Partial (1) Unknown Not applicable
Council Secretariat Unclear Unknown Not applicable
The extent to which the other participating actors have achieved their goals on the sample 
selection issues of the Weighting of votes dossier is outlined in Table 6.6.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter has determined the extent to which the other participating actors have achieved 
their goals with regard to the sample selection of issues for each of the five Nice Treaty 
dossiers of this study (16 issues in total). The results have been presented in Tables 6.2-6.6. 
The goal of this before-after analysis was to establish which of the other participating actors 
could be considered to be potentially necessary conditions for the respective outcomes, 
i.e. potentially influential. These potentially influential actors are addressed in the process 
analysis in the next chapter, which will answer the question of the extent to which the Dutch 
cabinet – rather than these other potentially influential actors – has actually exerted its 
influence with regard to the sample selection of 16 issues, and how this can be explained.
189
Chapter 7
The process analysis
Assessing and explaining the extent of 
the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.1 Introduction
The first part of this study’s influence analysis was conducted in Chapters 5 and 6. This 
involved a before-after analysis, i.e. establishing the extent of goal-achievement of the 
Dutch cabinet and the other participating actors with regard to all 24 Nice Treaty issues 
selected and the sample selection of 16 issues, respectively. In this chapter, the second part 
of the influence analysis, a process analysis, is conducted. The process analysis consists of 
three steps. The first step is an assessment of whether the Dutch cabinet has actually exerted 
its influence with regard to the issues in the sample selection on which it has partially or 
fully achieved its goals. The second, deductive step aims to explain the extent of the Dutch 
cabinet’s influence thus found by testing the expectations of the agency and structural 
variables of the conceptual model. The third, inductive step is to consider whether yet 
other variables that were not included in the model can offer an explanation for the extent 
of the Dutch cabinet’s influence.
Some general remarks are made in Section 7.2, particularly with regard to the specific 
operationalisation and measurement of some variables in the process analysis. The process 
analysis is then conducted for the issues of the sample selection. The three sections after 
that are successively devoted to an assessment of the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influ-
ence, its explanation on the basis of deduction and conclusions and reflections for each 
of the five dossiers (Sections 7.3-7.17). In the latter section, the explanatory value of the 
conceptual model for the respective dossier is evaluated and the third, inductive step is 
conducted. The empirical material presented for the three steps of the process analysis 
enable us to answer the research question of this study in Section 7.18, but the next, final 
chapter further elaborates on this.
7.2 General remarks
The process analysis carried out in this chapter consists of three steps, namely an assess-
ment (first step) and an explanation (second and third steps) of the extent of the Dutch 
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cabinet’s influence. In terms of the first step, how do we know whether the Dutch cabinet 
has caused its goal-achievement resulting from the before-after analysis by itself, i.e. has it 
actually exerted its influence? To answer this question, the descriptive before-after analysis 
should be complemented with an explanatory process analysis. It is precisely this process, 
or mechanism of causation that should be studied in order to examine whether a correla-
tion between an actor’s preference and a decision – an actor’s goal-achievement – is also a 
matter of causation by the actor itself.
This study focuses primarily on influence attempts as the mechanism through which 
the exertion of influence takes place. Therefore, when the study wants to find out whether 
and to what extent the Dutch cabinet has actually exerted influence regarding the issues 
on which it has partially or fully achieved its goal, the influence attempts undertaken by 
the Dutch cabinet as well as the other participating actors are particularly important. The 
process analysis therefore begins with an examination of the influence attempts by the 
Dutch cabinet and the other participating actors. This is the topic of Sections 7.3.1 (Court 
of Auditors dossier), 7.6.1 (ESDP dossier), 7.9.1 (Closer cooperation dossier), 7.12.1 
(Commission dossier) and 7.15.1 (Weighting of votes dossier). The number of influence 
attempts by the Dutch cabinet for each of the five dossiers is summarised in a table in three 
categories: low, medium and high. ‘Low’ corresponds to the number of influence attempts 
within the first third of the total number of occasions for influence attempts, ‘medium’ 
corresponds to the second third and ‘high’ to the last third. The total number of occasions 
consists of the sum of ‘objective’ occasions (the number of IGC meetings in which one 
or more issues of the dossier have been discussed) and ‘subjective’ occasions (the highest 
number of other kinds of influence attempts by the Dutch cabinet found for an issue 
within the dossier). Unlike influence attempts that probably have been undertaken, influ-
ence attempts that have possibly taken place are not counted. The former often includes 
influence attempts that are announced in notes and/or ‘speaking points’ to prepare for 
a specific IGC meeting. Detailed tables on the influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet 
and the other participating actors can be found in Annex 6. A description of the decision 
options – A, B etc. – for each issue is found in Chapters 5 and 6.
Based on this, the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence is assessed by examining rival 
mechanisms – mechanisms other than explicit influence – to which specific combinations 
of (the lack of ) Dutch influence attempts and goal-achievement might be attributed. These 
mechanisms were already suggested by the typology of possible combinations of influence 
attempts and goal-achievement, which was presented in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1). In doing 
so, the mechanisms that did plausibly apply (verification) and that did not (falsification) 
are considered for each of the issues of the sample selection. An assessment of the extent 
of the Dutch cabinet’s influence is the subject of Sections 7.3.2 (Court of Auditors), 7.6.2 
(ESDP), 7.9.2 (Closer cooperation), 7.12.2 (Commission) and 7.15.2 (Weighting of 
votes).
For a proper attribution of influence, the following four issues have to be split up into 
two issues each:
 -  SOA-1: producing, in addition to the ‘overall’ SOA, assessments on specific policy areas
 -  SOA-2: producing, in addition to the ‘overall’ SOA, ‘sectoral’ SOAs on specific policy 
areas
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 -  Contact Committee-1: establishing in a Declaration attached to the Final Act of the IGC 
a possible Contact Committee
 -  Contact Committee-2: establishing in the Treaty itself a Contact Committee, which 
reports yearly on the results of its activities to the European Parliament and the Council
 -  PSC-1: establishing a PSC in the Treaty and formulating its responsibilities with regard 
to EU-led crisis management operations
 -  PSC-2: establishing a PSC in the Treaty and formulating its responsibilities with regard 
to EU-led crisis management operations, including the relationship between the respon-
sibility of the PSC and that of COREPER and other committees
 -  Veto possibility-1: formally abolishing the veto possibility (but maintaining the possibil-
ity of referring the matter to the European Council and Council decision-making (by 
QMV) not guaranteed)
 -  Veto possibility-2: practically abolishing the veto possibility (Council actually deciding 
by QMV)
If it is adequate, reference is made to these issues separately, but this does not occur when 
the distinction is not relevant. The total number of issues of the sample selection is now 
20 (instead of 16).
While the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement is the dependent variable for 
the assessment of the extent of its influence, for the explanation (second and third steps), 
the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence is the dependent variable. The second step 
consists of presenting the empirical evidence for each of the expectations of the variables 
in the conceptual model. This second step is made in Sections 7.4 (Court of Auditors), 7.7 
(ESDP), 7.10 (Closer cooperation), 7.13 (Commission) and 7.16 (Weighting of votes). In 
order to indicate the level of support for the expectations, a distinction is made between 
no, very little, little, mixed, ample, considerable and full support. The particular label 
that applies in each particular situation is justified in Annex 3. Each time, the evidence is 
summarised in tables within the text, while more detailed tables can be found in Annex 6. 
The evidence presented in this chapter mainly concerns the Dutch cabinet, for which 
the expectations are tested. The evidence that has been found in the data for the other 
participating actors is also presented, particularly if it is relevant to an explanation of the 
extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. All evidence found for all the participating actors 
is included in the detailed tables in Annex 6. The Council Secretariat is only addressed in 
this chapter and included in the detailed tables if evidence on it was found in the data.
Following the explanatory value of the conceptual model resulting from the second step, 
a third, inductive step is taken that considers whether still other variables can explain the 
extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. The results of this step are presented in Sections 
7.5 (Court of Auditors), 7.8 (ESDP), 7.11 (Closer cooperation), 7.14 (Commission) and 
7.17 (Weighting of votes).
Finally, some remarks should be made on the precise measurement of some other vari-
ables in the process analysis. As with the influence attempts variable, a distinction is made 
between three categories of the network variable: hardly or not at all, considerable and 
much. Unlike the influence attempts variable, however, the total number of networks for 
an issue is not related to the total number of networks found within the dossier, but to 
the highest number of networks found within all five dossiers together. This is because 
networks do consist of ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective’ ‘occasions’. Thus, ‘hardly or not 
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at all’ corresponds to the number of networks within the first third of the total number of 
networks found in this study, ‘considerable’ corresponds to the second third and ‘much’ 
to the last third. As with the influence attempts variable, probable networks are counted 
whereas possible networks are not.
The median is used to measure the negotiation level variable.7 It includes the IGC meet-
ings during which an issue was probably discussed, but not the meetings during which an 
issue was possibly discussed. If deviating, the median placed between brackets includes the 
latter, indicating the ‘uncertainty margin’.
With regard to the negotiation timing variable, the average IGC week number also 
includes the meetings during which an issue was probably discussed, but not those during 
which an issue was possibly discussed. If deviating, the number placed between brackets 
includes the latter, indicating the ‘uncertainty margin’.
7.3 Court of Auditors: assessing the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.3.1 The extent of influence attempts
Formal individual written proposals
The Dutch cabinet has undertaken an influence attempt by propagating its preferred deci-
sion option (A) with regard to all five issues in its position paper (see Section 5.3). In an 
additional contribution, it expressed a preference for A/B with regard to the SOA issue (a 
weakened version of its original proposal) and a preference for A with regard to the Contact 
Committee and Appeal ECJ issues (CONFER 4773/00, 20 September 2000). The Dutch 
cabinet also expressed a preference for B regarding the Size issue, but this is not counted as 
an influence attempt, because it is contrary to its official preference for A. No preference 
was stated on the Instruction issue.
In terms of the other participating actors, the following actors indicated their prefer-
ences on the Size issue in their position papers to the IGC: Denmark, Finland, Italy, the 
Commission and the European Parliament (see Section 6.3.1). Germany did not indicate a 
preference in its position paper, but expressed a preference for B/C with regard to the Size 
issue and a preference for B with regard to the SOA issue in an additional contribution 
to the IGC on 5 December 2000 (CONFER 4817/00). The other actors did not express 
themselves on the other issues in the form of individual written proposals.
Formal joint written proposals
The Benelux countries did not express a (clear) preference on the Court of Auditor issues in 
the first Benelux memorandum presented to the IGC (CONFER 4721/00, 7 March 2000). 
However, they preferred option A – albeit implicitly – with regard to the SOA, Contact 
Committee and Appeal ECJ issues in the second memorandum (CONFER 4787/00, 19 
October 2000).
7. The median is used rather than the average because this variable is measured at a nominal level; the average 
can only be used for variables that are measured at the interval or ratio level.
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Semi-formal individual and joint written proposals
In the data examined in this study, no evidence of semi-formal individual or joint written 
proposals for the Court of Auditors dossier was found.
Informal bilateral and multilateral contacts
No evidence was found in the data on bilateral or multilateral contacts between the partici-
pating actors regarding the Court of Auditors dossier.
Formal and informal IGC meetings
Actors also undertook influence attempts by expressing their preferences during IGC meet-
ings. The Size issue was discussed for the first time during the formal Preparatory Group 
of 25 February 2000 (FA/DIE report, 28 February 2000; Commission report, 14 March 
2000). The Dutch cabinet, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden expressed a preference for option A. Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom could agree with B/C. Germany did not express a preference; it stated 
– just as Spain did – that the issue of the size of the Court of Auditors was a derivation of 
the issue of the size of the European Commission. The Commission was in favour of C and 
the European Parliament did not express a preference.
With regard to the other issues, the Commission report states that the great majority 
of the member states were of the opinion that the discussion on the ‘other institutions’, 
such as the Court of Auditors, should be limited to their size and composition and not 
cover their mandate or functioning. This implies that this ‘great majority’ was also not in 
favour of discussing the SOA, Contact Committee, Appeal ECJ and Instruction issues. It 
could subsequently be argued that when actors are against discussing these issues, they are 
eventually also against the Dutch proposals and thus in favour of option B.
The FA/DIE report of the same meeting does, however, offer a more nuanced – although 
still not very detailed – view. The report indicates that there was much support for the Dutch 
view that cooperation between the Court of Auditors and the national audit institutions 
should be improved, the internal organisation of the Court of Auditors strengthened and 
its instruments refined. The specific Dutch proposals – SOA, Contact Committee, Appeal 
ECJ and Instruction – come under these three general descriptions. Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the European Parliament 
expressed support for this, whereas France, Germany, Spain and Sweden took a reserved 
position. However, it is not completely for sure whether the Dutch cabinet has actually 
already mentioned and mobilised support for these specific proposals during this meeting. 
In addition, even if this was the case, the report is insufficiently detailed with regard to 
which proposals were supported or rejected by which actors. It is concluded that the actors 
mentioned above have undertaken influence attempts regarding the other issues – albeit in 
a weak form because of their general and diffuse nature.
The Court of Auditors dossier was subsequently discussed during the formal Prepara-
tory Group of 16 May 2000 (Commission reports, unknown date and 19 May 2000). 
Regarding the Size issue, the Dutch cabinet indicated a preference for option C during this 
meeting, which is not counted as an influence attempt because, due to internal divisiveness, 
it is contrary to the preference for A that is taken to be its official preference. Austria and 
Italy expressed that they were in favour of B, which in the case of Austria was contrary to 
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the preference for A that it expressed during the Preparatory Group of 25 February 2000. 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden again 
indicated that they were in favour of A. France and Spain stated that they were open to 
both B/C and A. This time Germany did express a preference, namely for C (12 members), 
just like the United Kingdom and the Commission. The European Parliament (implicitly) 
indicated that it was in favour of B and/or C (this is not made clear in the reports).
No explicit evidence has been found that the Dutch cabinet (again) mobilised support for 
the other Court of Auditor issues. The Commission report (unknown date) only indicates 
that the Dutch cabinet wanted to improve the link between the Court and the national 
audit institutions, referring to its proposal in this respect, which is probably the Contact 
Committee proposal (decision option A). Whether the Dutch cabinet also expressed its 
preference for A regarding the SOA and Appeal ECJ issues is thus unclear. According to 
the Commission report, only the European Parliament expressed that it was in favour 
of a stronger link between the Court and the national audit institutions, which can be 
interpreted as support for A on the Contact Committee issue.
The Court of Auditors dossier was discussed for the third time during the formal Prepa-
ratory Group of 25 September 2000 (FA/DIE report, 28 September 2000; Commission 
report, 25 September 2000). With regard to the Size issue, the Dutch cabinet expressed a 
preference for B, as laid out in its proposals that were presented to the IGC on 20 Septem-
ber 2000 (CONFER 4773/00). This is again not counted as an influence attempt, because 
it is contrary to the official Dutch preference. Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, the 
Commission and the Parliament expressed a preference for B and/or C. However, Spain 
indicated that it could also agree with A. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France 
(probably), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden all expressed a prefer-
ence for A, although Sweden did show sympathy towards the Dutch proposal (B).
In clarifying its proposals, after which they were discussed, the Dutch cabinet expressed 
a preference for A/B with regard to the SOA issue and a preference for A regarding the 
Contact Committee and Appeal ECJ issues. The FA/DIE report states that these Dutch 
proposals were ‘generally welcomed by a number of delegations, the Commission and the 
Parliament, but most delegations first wanted to study them more closely’. This cannot be 
interpreted as wholehearted support for A regarding the SOA, Contact Committee and 
Appeal ECJ issues, but the Commission report at least states that they were kept under 
examination and thus not a priori rejected. This is supported by another Commission 
note of (around) 27 October 2000: ‘The Netherlands have proposed a number of changes 
to the Treaty provisions (…). These proposals have only been discussed once [during the 
Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000], but were not rejected. Parts of it may end up in 
the Treaty of Nice’ (emphasis added, SL). In terms of the Appeal ECJ issue, however, the 
Commission report explicitly indicates that there was ‘very weak support’ for the Dutch 
proposal (decision option A) and the FA/DIE report makes it clear that the Commission 
itself criticised the Dutch proposal, because it would damage the balance between the in-
stitutions and was thus in favour of B. As no draft amendments on this issue were included 
in the subsequent draft Treaty text proposals up to and including the final Treaty text, it 
seems that the Appeal ECJ proposal of the Dutch cabinet had already practically been 
rejected at this Preparatory Group meeting of 25 September 2000. In conclusion, apart 
from the Commission’s influence attempt, it is not clear which actors have undertaken 
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which influence attempts with regard to the SOA, Contact Committee and Appeal ECJ 
issues during this meeting.
The Court of Auditors dossier was subsequently discussed during the informal Prepara-
tory Group of 25 November 2000, the informal General Affairs Council (Conclave) of 
3 December 2000 and the formal European Council of Nice of 7-11 December 2000. It 
is not completely clear which actors have undertaken influence attempts with regard to 
which Court of Auditor issues on these occasions. 
No data have been found on the Dutch cabinet as far as the informal Preparatory Group of 
25 November 2000 is concerned. According to its own ‘speaking points’, the Commission 
expressed its preference for B/C regarding the Size issue during this meeting (Commission 
preparatory note, unknown date).
The Dutch cabinet probably undertook influence attempts during the Conclave of 3 
December 2000 (FA/DIE preparatory note, unknown date). According to the ‘speaking 
points’ in this note, probably in reference to the Presidency proposals of 30 November 
2000 (CONFER 4815/00), the Dutch cabinet expressed a preference for option B with 
regard to the Size issue, indicated that it was glad with the fact that the overall SOA will be 
complemented with specific appreciations of the main Community priorities (compromise 
between A and B) and stated that is was important for the Declaration on the Contact 
Committee to be adopted (decision option B). Of these three expressions, only the one 
on the Contact Committee is counted as an influence attempt. Furthermore, it is stated 
in the informal note that the Presidency has taken up the proposal of a Declaration on the 
Contact Committee from the Dutch proposals. The note also points out that the Dutch 
cabinet maintained its proposal with regard to the Appeal ECJ issue (decision option A), 
although no ‘speaking point’ was included on this. However, it is concluded from this 
that the Dutch cabinet has probably undertaken an influence attempt with regard to this 
issue.
In a preparatory FA/DIE note for the Nice European Council, it is stated that the Dutch 
cabinet can agree with the current Presidency proposals on the Court of Auditors (prob-
ably CONFER 4816/00 of 6 December 2000), some of which (namely those regarding the 
SOA and Contact Committee issues) have been taken from the Dutch proposals. Thus, it 
is stated that the Dutch cabinet (Finance Ministry) rather preferred option B with regard 
to the Size issue but that it could agree with the Presidency proposal (option A), that it was 
positive that on Dutch insistence the overall SOA would be complemented by specific ap-
preciations of the main Community priorities (compromise between A and B) and that it 
was important that the Declaration on the Contact Committee, for which there was broad 
support, would be adopted (option B). No ‘speaking points’ were included in this note, 
so it is unclear whether the Dutch cabinet has actually expressed itself in this way or not, 
but if so, only the recommendation to adopt the Declaration on the Contact Committee 
would count as an influence attempt. It is concluded from the note that an influence 
attempt has probably been undertaken. It is striking that no text is included (anymore) on 
the Appeal ECJ issue, which – also considering the statement mentioned that the Dutch 
cabinet ‘can agree’ with the current Presidency proposals – might point to the fact that the 
Dutch cabinet has dropped its proposal (option A).
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Table 7.1 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts for the Court of Auditors (see Tables 2a-e in Annex 6 for 
more details)
 Influence attempts
Goal-achievement
Few Considerable Much
0 Instruction Appeal ECJ
1 or 2 SOA Contact Committee
3 Size
All in all, the Dutch cabinet undertook only a few influence attempts (in keeping with its 
official preference) with regard to the Size and Instruction issues (two out of 10 occasions), 
a considerable number with regard to the SOA (five) and Appeal ECJ (six) issues and many 
attempts with regard to the Contact Committee issue (eight). The other participating ac-
tors undertook at least as many influence attempts as the Dutch cabinet on the Size issue, 
but far less – and moreover of a general and diffuse nature – regarding the SOA, Contact 
Committee, Appeal ECJ (and Instruction) issues.
7.3.2 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
The Dutch cabinet undertook only a few influence attempts in line with its official prefer-
ence regarding the Size issue, but still fully achieved its goal. It is not plausible to conclude 
that the Dutch cabinet has exerted explicit influence in this case (type 1), because most of its 
influence attempts were not aimed at realising its official preference due to internal divisive-
ness. Although only imperfect data have been collected on this, no evidence has been found 
that other actors anticipated the behaviour of the Dutch cabinet (type 3). As the previous 
subsection made clear, the majority was in favour of option A (the eventual outcome) each 
time the Size issue was discussed during the negotiation process. As the Dutch cabinet 
barely did anything to realise this outcome, the two remaining mechanisms – free ride (type 
2) and sheer luck (type 4) – seem to be the most plausible ones. It is concluded that this was 
a matter of sheer luck rather than a free ride, because the Dutch cabinet did not try to profit 
from its majority position at all, but instead undertook opposite influence attempts.
The Dutch cabinet hardly undertook any influence attempts with regard to the Instruc-
tion issue and did not achieve its goal. To assess which mechanism was at work here, the 
reason why the Dutch cabinet hardly undertook influence attempts must be uncovered. 
This was not out of neglect (type 9), as the issue had explicitly been included in the Dutch 
cabinet’s position paper and was subsequently discussed between the Dutch Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the Dutch Court of Auditors during their preparations 
for the non-paper. In the informal notes and reports that consider these preparations, no 
evidence is included on the possible anticipation of (resistance from) other actors (type 
12). Instead, it becomes clear from an informal note that the issue was not included in 
the non-paper due to internal divisiveness between three Dutch sub-actors (type 11). In 
addition, the issue may have been less important for the Foreign Affairs Ministry than 
some of the other issues in the dossier, as a result of which it did not make further at-
tempts to include the issue (type 10). However, no explicit evidence has been found for 
this mechanism, so if it already applied at all, this was at most subordinate to the internal 
divisiveness mechanism.
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The Dutch cabinet undertook a considerable number of influence attempts with regard 
to the SOA issue and many attempts regarding the Contact Committee issue. It partially 
achieved its goals on these issues. It also undertook a considerable number of influence 
attempts regarding the Appeal ECJ issue, but did not achieve its goal. No evidence has 
been found that any other actors attempted to put these issues on the agenda or to realise 
the Dutch proposals (option A) on these issues in the Treaty text. Some actors expressed 
(some) support for the Dutch proposals at the most, but this was rather general and dif-
fuse. Two informal documents of FA/DIE (preparing the Conclave of 3 December 2000 
and the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000) and one of the Commission 
(around 27 October 2000) make it plausible that the Presidency, in presenting its (draft 
Treaty) proposals, has taken the SOA and Contact Committee proposals from (and on the 
insistence of ) the Dutch cabinet.
Given the Dutch initiative and activity regarding the SOA and Contact Committee 
issues, in contrast to the rather passive behaviour of the other actors, it is not plausible 
to conclude that the Dutch cabinet got a free ride in these instances. To the extent that 
the Dutch cabinet achieved its goal on the SOA and Contact Committee issues – SOA-1 
and Contact Committee-1 – this seems therefore to indeed have been caused by its own 
influence attempts, so that it has exerted explicit influence (type 1).
It is not by accident that the Dutch cabinet has not achieved its goal regarding the SOA-2, 
Contact Committee-2 and Appeal ECJ issues. These issues have explicitly been discussed 
between the actors. Although the other actors perhaps did not reject the Dutch proposals 
outright, they were generally not really in favour of putting the Dutch proposals on the 
agenda and incorporating them in the Treaty text. The Appeal ECJ proposal in particular 
received very weak support during the Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000 and was 
probably (already) rejected during this meeting. Therefore it is not plausible to attribute 
the lack of goal-achievement to bad luck (type 7). In light of its isolated position in trying 
to reform the functioning of the Court of Auditors, the possibility that the Dutch cabinet 
exerted negative influence cannot be excluded in these instances – its influence attempts 
bouncing back on it (type 8). However, no explicit evidence has been found that points in 
this direction. It is more plausible that other actors have exerted explicit influence. From 
the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, its lack of goal-achievement can be attributed to 
failures (type 5).
Two other mechanisms should be considered in connection with this. First, the Dutch 
cabinet might have anticipated possible resistance against its proposals and weakened its 
original proposals on the SOA (from A to A/B) and Contact Committee (from A to B) 
issues in the course of the negotiations. Although no explicit evidence for this has been 
found, the fact is that the Dutch cabinet weakened its proposals. Other actors might 
have exerted anticipated influence in this respect. Even the fact that the Dutch cabinet 
(probably) dropped its Appeal ECJ proposal at the end of the negotiation process may 
be interpreted as anticipation of possible resistance after its influence attempts on this 
issue received so little support from the other actors. Although the main mechanism, as 
mentioned earlier, was explicit influence by other actors, anticipated influence on their side 
may have complemented this. From the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, these outcomes 
may therefore have (partly) been the result of anticipation (type 12). Second, although 
the Dutch cabinet had already realised the importance of gathering support for its reform 
198 Chapter 7
proposals in February 2000, they were eventually only submitted on 20 September 2000. 
This was rather late, and might have been too late for (completely) realising the controver-
sial proposals. Thus, the lack of goal-achievement might also be (partly) attributed to an 
unforced error (type 6).
7.4 Court of Auditors: explaining the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.4.1 Influence resources
Policy positions
 -  The more advantageous policy positions the Dutch cabinet holds, the more influence it 
will exert.
Table 7.2 Court of Auditors: policy positions (see Table 1 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Policy positions
Influence
No Yes
No SOA-2
Contact Committee-2
Appeal ECJ
Instruction
Size (‘majority’ position)
Yes SOA-1
Contact Committee-1
The Dutch cabinet did not have a ‘pivotal’ position regarding the Court of Auditors issues, 
as it was in favour of (the ‘extreme’) option A for all the issues. The Dutch cabinet held 
a ‘majority’ position regarding the Size issue, because 11 other member state actors, who 
together constituted a majority, shared its preference for A.
The expectation gets mixed support. Although the Dutch cabinet did hold an advanta-
geous policy position with regard to the Size issue, it did not exert influence because it 
hardly undertook any influence attempts in line with its official preference due to internal 
divisiveness (see Section 7.3.2 and Internal coherence section below). As to the SOA-1 
and Contact Committee-1 issues, which do not meet the expectation, influence attempts 
can explain why the Dutch cabinet still exerted its influence on these issues (see Section 
7.4.2).
Networks
 -  The more a part of a network the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
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Table 7.3 Court of Auditors: networks (see Table 1 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Networks
Influence
Hardly or not at all Considerable Much
No Size
SOA-2
Contact Committee-2
Appeal ECJ
Instruction
Yes SOA-1
Contact Committee-1
According to the data collected, the Dutch cabinet was not a part of a network with regard 
to the Court of Auditors dossier.
The expectation receives ample support. In terms of the Size and Instruction issues, in-
ternal divisiveness – rather than a lack of networks – as a result of which the Dutch cabinet 
undertook divergent and only a few influence attempts, respectively, can explain its lack 
of influence. A lack of networks may have contributed to the absence of influence on the 
Appeal ECJ issue, although the Dutch cabinet was also not a part of a network for both 
the SOA and Contact Committee issues. Influence attempts can explain why the Dutch 
cabinet still exerted influence with regard to the SOA-1 and Contact Committee-1 issues 
(see Section 7.4.2).
Internal coherence
 -  The more internally coherent the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
Table 7.4 Court of Auditors: internal coherence (see Table 1 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Internal coherence
Influence
No: divided with regard to 
preferences and/or actions
Yes
No Size
Instruction
SOA-2
Contact Committee-2
Appeal ECJ
Yes SOA-1
Contact Committee-1
According to the data collected, the Dutch cabinet was internally coherent with regard to 
the SOA, Contact Committee and Appeal ECJ issues. This was not the case with regard to 
the Size and Instruction issues. There were different preferences within the Dutch cabinet 
regarding the Size issue, which resulted in different actions at the EU level. According to 
a FA/DIE note of 5 April 2000, FA/DIE was in favour of one member per member state 
(A), whereas the Finance Ministry preferred to fix membership at the status quo level 
of 15 members (B). According to the note, FA/DIE was of the opinion that a provision 
concerning this issue should be added to the non-paper the Finance Ministry was working 
on in collaboration with the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Dutch Court of Auditors. 
To this end, FA/DIE proposed a text that was in keeping with its own preference for one 
member per member state.
The internal divisiveness on preferences explains the fact that the Dutch cabinet also 
expressed different preferences, i.e. undertook different actions during different IGC meet-
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ings, although all these preferences were articulated by representatives of the same Ministry 
(Foreign Affairs, which primarily represented the Dutch cabinet during the IGC). During 
the Preparatory Group of 25 February 2000, the Dutch cabinet indicated that it was in 
favour of one member per member state (FA/DIE report, 28 February 2000; Commission 
report, 14 March 2000); during the Preparatory Group of 16 May 2000, it expressed – in 
keeping with its third position paper of 9 May 2000 – a preference for 12 members (Com-
mission report, unknown date); during the Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000, it 
was in favour of 15 members (FA/DIE report, 28 September 2000) – in keeping with the 
(English) non-paper versions of 6 June 2000 and 14 September 2000, which was finally 
presented to the IGC as CONFER 4773/00 on 20 September 2000.
There were also different preferences within the Dutch cabinet regarding the Instruction 
issue (see Section 5.3.9). Although option A had been proposed in the Dutch position 
paper, which was probably made up by FA/DIE, it was not reflected in the first draft of 
the non-paper mentioned above (FA/DIE note, 5 April 2000). According to the note of 
5 April 2000, this proposal met resistance from the Dutch Court of Auditors, and the 
Finance Ministry also thought it went too far. As the proposal was not included in the 
non-paper, which was later presented to the IGC as the Dutch main influence attempt on 
this dossier, the Dutch cabinet (probably) did not undertake further influence attempts 
regarding putting this issue on the agenda and realising it in the Treaty text. The different 
preferences on this issue were thus not followed through with different actions at the EU 
level. The issue resulted in a non-decision from the perspective of FA/DIE.
All in all, the expectation receives mixed support. The Dutch cabinet’s internal divisive-
ness on the Size issue seems to offer an explanation for the absence of influence, because 
as a result the Dutch cabinet did undertake divergent influence attempts. In other words, 
it undertook only a few influence attempts in keeping with its official preference. Internal 
divisiveness can also explain the lack of influence on the Instruction issue, because as a re-
sult the Dutch cabinet undertook – after and apart from its position paper presented to the 
IGC on 6 March 2000 – no further influence attempts regarding this issue. For the three 
issues that do not meet the expectation (SOA-2, Contact Committee-2 and Appeal ECJ), 
they cannot be satisfactorily explained by any of the variables in the conceptual model. 
Therefore, still other variables should be considered in these cases (see Section 7.5).
7.4.2 Influence attempts
 -  The more influence attempts the Dutch cabinet undertakes, the more influence it will 
exert.
As has already been made clear in Section 7.3.1, the Dutch cabinet undertook only a few 
influence attempts regarding the Size and Instruction issues (two out of 10 occasions), a 
considerable number concerning the SOA (five) and Appeal ECJ (six) issues and many 
attempts regarding the Contact Committee issue (eight).
The expectation receives mixed support. The variable influence attempts offer an explana-
tion for the absence of influence in the case of the Size and Instruction issues; as became 
clear in the previous subsection, the fact that the Dutch cabinet undertook only a few 
influence attempts (in line with its official preference) can in turn be explained by its 
internal divisiveness. The variable influence attempts seem to offer an explanation for the 
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extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence on the SOA-1 and Contact Committee-1 issues. 
Its lack of influence regarding the SOA-2, Contact Committee-2 and Appeal ECJ issues 
cannot be explained by this variable or satisfactorily by any other variable in the conceptual 
model. Yet other variables should therefore be considered (see Section 7.5).
7.4.3 Domestic actors and factors
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by domestic actors (parliament, 
constitutional court) and factors (referendum, public opinion, elections, events and 
political conflicts), the more (less) influence it will exert.
No evidence has been found in the data that there were domestic actors or factors either 
enabling or constraining the Dutch cabinet (or the other actors) regarding the Court of 
Auditors dossier (see Table 3 in Annex 6). Therefore, the variable does not apply to this 
dossier and the expectation cannot be tested.
7.4.4 Negotiation level8
 -  The lower the level at which an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet 
will exert.
Table 7.6 Court of Auditors: negotiation level (see Table 4 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation level
Influence
High Moderate Low
No SOA-2
Contact Committee-2
Appeal ECJ
Size
Yes SOA-1
Contact Committee-1
The Size issue has been discussed three times at the formal level 3 (Preparatory Groups of 
25 February, 16 May and 25 September 2000), once at the informal level 3 (Preparatory 
Group of 25 November 2000), once at the informal level 2 (Conclave of 3 December 
2000) and once at the formal level 1 (Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000). 
The median is 3.
The SOA issue has been discussed at least once at the formal level 3 (Preparatory Group 
of 25 September 2000), possibly also during the formal Preparatory Group of 25 February 
8. This variable does not apply to the Instruction issue, because this issue was not put on the agenda, let alone 
discussed and decided upon (non-decision).
Table 7.5 Court of Auditors: influence attempts (see Tables 2a-e in Annex 6 for more details)
 Influence attempts
Influence
Few Considerable Much
No Size
Instruction
SOA-2
Appeal ECJ
Contact Committee-2
Yes SOA-1 Contact Committee-1
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2000, once at the informal level 3 (Preparatory Group of 25 November 2000), once at 
the informal level 2 (Conclave of 3 December 2000) and once at the formal level 1 (Nice 
European Council of 7-11 December 2000). The median is 2.5 (-3).
The Contact Committee issue has been discussed at least once at the formal level 3 
(Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000), probably also during the formal Preparatory 
Group of 16 May 2000 and possibly during the formal Preparatory Group of 25 February 
2000, possibly once at the informal level 3 (Preparatory Group of 25 November 2000), 
once at the informal level 2 (Conclave of 3 December 2000) and once at the formal level 1 
(Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000). The median is 2.5 (-3).
The Appeal ECJ issue has been discussed at least once at the formal level 3 (Preparatory 
Group of 25 September 2000), possibly also during the formal Preparatory Group of 25 
February 2000, possibly once at the informal level 3 (Preparatory Group of 25 November 
2000), probably once at the informal level 2 (Conclave of 3 December 2000) and possibly 
once at the formal level 1 (Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000). The median 
is 2.5 (-3).
The expectation receives mixed support in the data. The lack of influence attempts by the 
Dutch cabinet in line with its official preference due to internal divisiveness can explain its 
lack of influence with regard to the Size issue, despite the fact that the issue was negotiated 
on a relatively low level (see Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2).
7.4.5 Negotiation timing9
 -  The earlier an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet will exert.
Table 7.7 Court of Auditors: negotiation timing (see Table 4 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation timing
Influence
Late Moderate Early
No SOA-2
Appeal ECJ
Size
Contact Committee-2
Yes SOA-1 Contact Committee-1
The negotiation dates of the Size issue, which were already mentioned in the previous 
subsection, correspond to IGC weeks 2, 14, 33, 41, 42 and 43, resulting in an average 
of 29.2. The SOA issue was negotiated during IGC weeks 2 (possibly), 33, 41, 42 and 
43, resulting in an average of 39.8 (-32.2). The Contact Committee issue was negotiated 
during IGC weeks 2 (possibly), 14 (probably), 33, 41 (possibly), 42 and 43, resulting in an 
average of 33 (-29.2). The Appeal ECJ issue was negotiated during IGC weeks 2 (possibly), 
33, 41 (possibly), 42 (probably) and 43 (possibly), resulting in an average of 37.5 (-32.2).
The expectation receives mixed support. The fact that the Dutch cabinet still exerted 
influence on the SOA-1 issue, which does not meet the expectation, can be explained by 
its influence attempts (see Section 7.4.2).
9. This variable does not apply to the Instruction issue, because this issue was not put on the agenda, let alone 
discussed and decided upon (non-decision).
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7.4.6 External events and developments
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by external events and develop-
ments, the more (less) influence it will exert.
Table 7.8 Court of Auditors: external events and developments (see Table 4 in Annex 6 for more details)
 External events and 
developments
Influence
Constrained Enabled
No Size SOA-2
Contact Committee-2
Appeal ECJ
Instruction
Yes SOA-1
Contact Committee-1
Regarding the Size issue, the impending enlargement was an external development con-
straining the Dutch cabinet, as it acted as an external pressure to diminish the size of 
the Court of Auditors, whereas the Dutch cabinet wanted to maintain one member per 
member state for this institution.
The stepping down of the Santer Commission in March 1999, due to accusations of fraud 
and irregularities within the Commission, was an external event that enabled the Dutch 
cabinet in its goal to reform the organisation and functioning of this institution, in the 
shape of its proposals on the SOA, Contact Committee, Appeal ECJ and Instruction issues. 
The Dutch cabinet itself also laid out this connection in a FA/DIE note of 17 June 1999, in 
which it was pointed out that the stepping down of the Santer Commission would create 
‘momentum’ for reforms, in the form of better financial control and the fight against fraud.
The expectation receives mixed support. As indicated earlier, the Dutch cabinet’s lack of 
influence regarding the SOA-2, Contact Committee-2 and Appeal ECJ issues cannot be 
satisfactorily explained by the conceptual model, so other variables should be considered 
(see Section 7.5). Internal divisiveness, which resulted in the Dutch cabinet undertaking 
only a few influence attempts, offers an explanation for the absence of influence regard-
ing the Instruction issue (see Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2). These variables – rather than the 
constraining impending enlargement – also contribute to the explanation of the Dutch 
cabinet’s lack of influence on the Size issue.
7.5 Court of Auditors: conclusions and reflections
The Dutch cabinet undertook only a few influence attempts regarding the Size and In-
struction issues, a considerable number with regard to the SOA and Appeal ECJ issues and 
many attempts regarding the Contact Committee issue.
The Dutch cabinet has exerted explicit influence with regard to the SOA-1 and Contact 
Committee-1 issues and not with regard to the Size issue (sheer luck), Instruction issue 
(internal divisiveness) and SOA-2, Contact Committee-2 and Appeal ECJ issues (failures; 
possibly and subordinately also unforced error and anticipation).
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The internal divisiveness of the Dutch cabinet regarding the Instruction issue, as a result 
of which the Dutch cabinet hardly undertook any influence attempts, offers an explanation 
for the absence of influence on this issue. The lack of influence attempts by the Dutch 
cabinet in keeping with its official preference – due to internal divisiveness – on the Size 
issue can explain why it did not exert influence in this regard.
The variable influence attempts offer an explanation for the Dutch cabinet’s influence 
on the SOA-1 and Contact Committee-1 issues. The Dutch cabinet has undertaken a 
considerable number of influence attempts regarding the former issue and many regarding 
the latter. Two informal documents of FA/DIE (preparing the Conclave of 3 December 
2000 and the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000), and one of the Com-
mission (around 27 October 2000) make it plausible that in presenting its (draft Treaty) 
proposals, the Presidency has taken the SOA and Contact Committee proposals from (and 
on the insistence of ) the Dutch cabinet.
With regard to the Appeal ECJ issue, the Dutch cabinet’s absence of influence can at 
most only partly be explained by the lack of networks. After all, the Dutch cabinet was not 
part of a network with regard to the SOA and Contact Committee issues either, but still 
exerted its influence in these cases (i.e. SOA-1 and Contact Committee-1). Moreover, the 
difference cannot be explained by the number of influence attempts the Dutch cabinet has 
undertaken regarding these issues. Therefore, other variables that might have played a role 
in the case of the Court of Auditors dossier, particularly the SOA-2, Contact Committee-2 
and Appeal ECJ issues, should be considered.
First, although no evidence has been found for this, a practical ‘exchange’ may have taken 
place among the various Dutch proposals. The Presidency may have included the SOA and 
Contact Committee proposals of the Dutch cabinet – albeit weakened versions – in its 
draft Treaty text proposals in order to compensate the Dutch cabinet for its other propos-
als, such as the Appeal ECJ issue, that did not make it into the final Treaty text at all.
This point also suggests an alternative or complementary explanation for the Dutch cabi-
net’s goal-achievement with regard to the Size issue. In addition to the linkages mentioned 
between issues within one and the same (Court of Auditors) dossier, there was a linkage 
between two separate dossiers: the Court of Auditors and the Commission. The decision 
on the Court of Auditor’s size was partly dependent on the decision on the Commission’s 
size (and vice versa), which some actors explicitly pointed out during the negotiation 
process (see Section 7.3.1). Some (big) member states might have exerted less pressure to 
reduce the size of the Court, because they strived for, and (partly) realised, a reduction in 
the case of the Commission’s size instead. After all, the actors that did completely achieve 
their goals regarding the Court size issue did so to a lesser extent regarding the Commission 
size issue. Galloway states that one reason that the outcome of the Court size issue was one 
member per member state was ‘(…) a tactical desire on the part of the Presidency not to 
push too hard on limiting the size of the Court of Auditors in order to deploy maximum 
political effort on limiting the size of the Commission’ (Galloway, 2001:151).
Second, although the Dutch cabinet was timely – beginning in February 2000 – in 
realising the importance of gathering support for its reform proposals, they were eventually 
only submitted on 20 September 2000, right before the crucial Preparatory Group of 
25 September 2000. It was during this meeting that the main decisions on the Court of 
Auditors – those related to its size and composition – seem to have been agreed upon. The 
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timing of the main Dutch influence attempt, 20 September 2000, was rather late, and 
might have in fact been too late to (completely) realise the controversial Dutch reform 
proposals. Thus, rather than being externally enabled or constrained by the ‘negotiation 
timing’ of issues (see Section 7.4.5), the negotiation timing of the SOA, Contact Commit-
tee and Appeal ECJ issues was (largely) in the Dutch cabinet’s own hands.
Third, the Dutch cabinet may have anticipated (possible) resistance to its proposals from 
other actors during the negotiation process and weakened its original proposals on the 
SOA (from A to A/B) and Contact Committee (from A to B) issues in the course of the ne-
gotiations. Although no explicit evidence for this has been found, the fact remains that the 
Dutch cabinet weakened its proposals. The fact that the Dutch cabinet (probably) dropped 
its Appeal ECJ proposal at the end of the negotiation process might also be interpreted as 
an anticipation of (possible) resistance after its influence attempts on this issue received 
so little support from the other actors. The difference between the three issues is that 
the Dutch cabinet continued its influence attempts with regard to the SOA and Contact 
Committee issues until it (partly) realised its – albeit weakened – preferences, whereas it 
did not do so regarding the Appeal ECJ issue. Although its lack of goal-achievement was 
mainly a matter of failure, anticipation may have complemented this.
Fourth, from the Dutch reform proposals, the Appeal ECJ proposal appeared to be a 
particularly salient issue, getting very little support from the other participating actors. It 
may have been relatively difficult for the Dutch cabinet to exert its influence in such an 
instant.
7.6 ESDP: assessing the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.6.1 The extent of influence attempts
Formal individual written proposals
The Dutch cabinet undertook an influence attempt regarding all four issues in its position 
paper (see Section 5.4). Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the United 
Kingdom and the European Parliament undertook influence attempts on the Treaty change 
issue. In addition, Finland, Greece and the Parliament undertook an influence attempt 
regarding the PSC issue and Greece did this also regarding the Military Staff issue (see 
Section 6.4).
Formal joint written proposals
The first Benelux memorandum presented on 7 March 2000 (CONFER 4721/00) left 
open whether or not the Treaty should be changed (option A/C) and did not express a 
preference regarding the other issues. The second Benelux memorandum of 19 October 
2000 (CONFER 4787/00) propagated A with regard to the Treaty change, NATO and, 
implicitly, PSC and Military Staff issues. Italy and the Benelux countries officially pre-
sented their proposals on 23 October 2000 (CONFER 4788/00), pleading for option A 
with regard to the Treaty change, PSC and NATO issues. The Military Staff issue was not 
included in the proposals.
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Semi-formal individual and joint written proposals
The Legal Service of the Council Secretariat had explicitly been asked for advice on the 
necessity of ESDP Treaty change, which was presented – although not officially to the 
Conference – on 8 May 2000 (see Section 5.4). In it, the Legal Service expressed a prefer-
ence for C in principle, but indicated some conditions under which Treaty change would 
be legally necessary, one of which was the delegation of the Council’s decision-making 
powers to a body made up of officials. This boiled down to option A of the PSC issue. 
Towards the end of the Conference, the Council Secretariat issued another paper entitled 
‘Suggestions for EU crisis management procedures’, in which it propagated option C 
regarding the Treaty change issue and B with regard to the PSC issue. These two Council 
Secretariat documents have played an important role in the discussion on the necessity of 
Treaty change during the negotiation process.
On 14 September 2000, France as the Presidency sent out a paper with a draft Declara-
tion for Nice on future Treaty change (FA/DIE note, 14 September 2000) and tabled a 
draft text on this during the PoCo meeting of 28 November 2000 (Commission report, 
30 November 2000).
On 14 March 2000, Italy and the Dutch cabinet made public a joint text with points of 
agreement for the IGC, which however was not officially presented to the IGC (FA/DIE 
Rome embassy note, 15 March 2000). In it, they stated that they were in favour of option 
A regarding the Treaty change issue and, implicitly, the PSC and Military Staff issues.
Informal bilateral and multilateral contacts
According to the data found in this study, the Dutch cabinet had informal contact with 
another actor during the negotiation process 13 times for sure and four times in all prob-
ability in order to promote its preferences regarding the ESDP dossier. It is not completely 
clear which issues, besides the Treaty change issue, were discussed in these meetings, but it 
is likely that the PSC and NATO issues were raised during most of these contacts as they 
were a part of the core of the Dutch stake in this dossier. The Military Staff issue, on the 
other hand, was probably not discussed, because the Dutch cabinet had probably already 
dropped its proposal (A) rather early in the negotiation process (see Section 7.6.2).
Prime Minister Kok had a conversation with President Chirac probably in early De-
cember 2000 about several IGC dossiers (FA/DIE/Weighting of votes preparatory note, 
unknown date). Kok (probably) supported option A with regard to the Treaty change, PSC 
and NATO issues.
In the margins of the Preparatory Group of 23 October 2000, a lunch meeting was held 
between the Dutch cabinet, Austria and Sweden about the weighting of votes and ESDP. 
During this meeting, the Dutch cabinet asked them to approach the proposals of Italy 
and the Benelux countries positively (option A with regard to the Treaty change, PSC and 
NATO issues). Austria and Sweden confirmed that A was an appealing element of the 
proposals for the NATO issue.
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Formal and informal (IGC) meetings10
The Dutch cabinet probably pleaded for option A with regard to the Treaty change issue 
during the iPSC of 10 March 2000 (FA/DIE preparatory note, 9 March 2000).
The Dutch cabinet backed A regarding the Treaty change, PSC and NATO issues during 
the informal Conclave of 6-7 May 2000. Ireland stated that it had difficulties with Treaty 
change (C), but the United Kingdom and Germany were open to it (A/C) at this meeting 
(FA/DIE report, 9 May 2000).
On 11 May 2000, there was a PoCo meeting based on the advice of the Legal Service of 
8 May 2000 (FA/DIE report, 12 May 2000). Only the Dutch cabinet supported option A 
with regard to the Treaty change issue. Belgium indicated that Treaty change was required, 
but did not specify when (A/B). France, Germany, Greece and Italy agreed with the advice 
(C>A), but indicated that Treaty change would be politically desirable in the longer term 
(B). Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom were against Treaty change (C).
On 5 June, a PoCo meeting was held about a draft Presidency report to the Feira European 
Council of 19-20 June 2000 regarding the ‘indication whether or not Treaty amendment is 
judged necessary’ (FA/DIE report, 7 June 2000). In it, the Portuguese Presidency stated in 
principle that Treaty change was not necessary, but that the issue might be taken up in the 
IGC between Feira and Nice (A/C). The Benelux countries and Italy expressed themselves 
to be in favour of A with regard to the Treaty change and PSC issues. Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom were 
in favour of C with regard to the Treaty change issue.
During the iPSC of 28 September 2000, the Dutch cabinet pleaded for option A regard-
ing the Treaty change issue and was supported by Austria, Italy and Luxembourg (FA/DIE 
report, 29 September 2000). Belgium’s intervention implied hesitation (A/C). This was 
related to the last Dutch proposal of 14 September 2000 to include option A regarding 
the NATO issue in the joint Italy and Benelux proposals (see Section 7.7.1, Networks). 
This was not acceptable to Belgium, so much so that it threatened to drop out. Germany 
and the United Kingdom were in favour of C. This also applied to the French Presidency, 
who declared that the Treaty change discussion was ‘out of order’, because it belonged to 
the IGC. The Council Secretariat stated that it was in favour of B with regard to the PSC 
issue.
Italy and the Benelux countries presented their proposals (option A regarding the Treaty 
change, PSC and NATO issues) during the informal Biarritz European Council of 13-14 
October 2000 (Commission fax containing Italy and Benelux proposals of 13 October 
2000, 16 October 2000).
During the iPSC of 27 October 2000 on the permanent structures of the ESDP, the 
Dutch cabinet expressed a general reservation: its remarks had a preliminary character and 
did not prejudice the debate within the IGC about Treaty change. It was supported in this 
by Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg. This can, at least implicitly, be considered as support 
for option A regarding the Treaty change issue. Portugal, however, stated that the issue of 
possible Treaty change was situated in the IGC (FA/DIE report, 30 October 2000).
10. The ESDP dossier was, for the most part, discussed outside of but parallel to the IGC before it was officially 
put on the agenda on 30 November 2000. Considering the specific nature of this dossier, the respective non-
IGC meetings are – by way of exception – also discussed here.
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During the Preparatory Group of 30 October 2000, the Dutch cabinet, on behalf of 
Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg, clarified their joint ESDP proposals (FA/DIE report, 31 
October 2000; Commission report, 31 October 2000). This implied that they preferred 
option A with regard to the Treaty change, PSC and NATO issues. As the ESDP dossier 
was still not part of the IGC agenda, the other actors primarily took a position regarding 
the Treaty change issue. Greece and the European Parliament indicated that they could 
agree with the proposals (A). Austria was positive about the proposals and wanted to look 
at them again (A/C). Portugal showed sympathy for the proposals and was of the opinion 
that they should be discussed in the IGC (A/C). Sweden had doubts about Treaty change, 
but did not want to close the discussion (A/C). Finland took the advice of the Legal Service 
as a starting point, but was open (C>A). Germany had no problems with the proposals 
with regard to content, but did not believe that Treaty change should take place at that 
time. If it was feasible, then Germany would be in favour of this, but it would support the 
Presidency to find a feasible solution in Nice (B/C>A). Similarly, Spain expressed that it 
was in favour of A/B-C. The European Commission stated that it agreed with the advice of 
the Legal Service (C>A), but that it understood the positions held by Italy and the Benelux 
countries. Denmark, France, Ireland and the Council Secretariat were in favour of C. The 
French Presidency concluded that there was no consensus as yet, so the issue was not part 
of the agenda for the moment.
On 31 October 2000, a lengthy discussion about the Treaty change issue initiated by the 
Dutch cabinet took place during a PoCo meeting (FA/DIE report, 1 November 2000). 
The Dutch cabinet, supported by Italy and Austria, supported option A. Finland, Greece, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom were in favour of C. This also applied to Sweden, but it 
called the Italy and Benelux proposals ‘elegant and understandable’. Germany and Spain 
stated that Treaty change should take place once in the future (B). Belgium wanted to 
discuss the Treaty change issue at the time, but stated that it would not be feasible to expect 
agreement in Nice. Instead, a Declaration on future Treaty change should be adopted (B). 
Germany and Spain had sympathy for this solution. The French Chairman of the meeting 
exploited the divisions within the Benelux camp by encouraging the Belgian approach for 
everyone. However, the Dutch cabinet indicated that it was not willing to talk about texts 
for Declarations; the dossier had to be discussed in the IGC. Yet the Chairman concluded 
that it was not a decided upon matter that the ESDP proposals would be put on the agenda 
of the IGC. According to him, there was no consensus on this. Although none of the actors 
completely excluded the possibility of Treaty change, a large majority was of the opinion 
that it was not the right moment for it. The Declaration was a good solution. The already 
heavy agenda of the IGC did not need to be further loaded up.
On 8 November 2000, an iPSC meeting took place concerning the PSC text for Nice 
(FA/DIE report, 10 November 2000). The Dutch cabinet, supported by Luxembourg, 
Italy, Austria and to a considerably lesser degree Belgium, again expressed the reserva-
tion that this would be without prejudice to Treaty change. This can again be interpreted 
as support for option A with regard to the Treaty change issue. The French Presidency, 
supported by the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and Ireland, did not want this 
reservation within the text itself. This can be interpreted as a preference for B/C. Belgium 
explicitly expressed that it was in favour of B/C. In the end, the Chairman concluded 
that the reservation would be put in the ‘relevé de conclusions’, which the Dutch cabinet, 
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Luxembourg and Italy agreed to. By now, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom could 
agree with the position that delegating authority to the PSC required Treaty change.
On 14 November 2000, a PoCo meeting about the PSC text for Nice was held (FA/DIE 
report, 16 November 2000). The Dutch cabinet, supported by Luxembourg, again asked 
for a general reservation in the ‘relevé de conclusions’ (option A with regard to the Treaty 
change issue). Belgium did not express any preference. Italy stated that it supported the 
Dutch cabinet with regard to content (A), but was of the opinion that the texts did not 
prejudge Treaty change. Spain took a neutral position (A/B-C). Germany referred to the 
Belgian proposal of a Declaration in Nice (B). At first the Presidency did not want to meet 
the Dutch cabinet, but after Dutch insistence and British mediation, a general reservation 
was accepted by the Chairman: political decision-making would take place in Nice on the 
entire package including the Treaty change issue (A/B-C).
The Dutch cabinet probably repeated its request for a general reservation during an extra 
COREPER II meeting on 16 November 2000 (FA/DIE preparatory note, 16 November 
2000). During an iPSC meeting on the same day about the draft Presidency report on the 
ESDP for Nice, the Dutch cabinet did the same and was supported by Austria, Belgium, 
Italy and Luxembourg (FA/DIE report, 16 November 2000).
During the informal Conclave of 19 November 2000, the Dutch cabinet probably 
insisted, possibly with the other three partners in the network, on discussing the Treaty 
change issue (FA/DIE preparatory note, unknown date).
The Dutch cabinet supported option A regarding the Treaty change, PSC and NATO is-
sues during the General Affairs Council of 20 November 2000 (Council report, unknown 
date; FA/DIE report, 21 November 2000). Austria, Italy and Luxembourg supported the 
Dutch cabinet. Belgium did not intervene. Germany and the United Kingdom supported 
the French Presidency’s suggestion of a political Declaration in Nice foreseeing future 
Treaty change (B). Ireland was against any Treaty change at all (C).
During a COREPER meeting on 22 November 2000, the Benelux countries repeated 
their position with regard to the Treaty change issue (A). However, several delegations 
indicated not wanting to take up the issue in this IGC. Following this, one delegation, 
probably Italy (see below), suggested considering the Treaty change issue as a post-Nice 
subject. This boiled down to option B (FA/DIE report, 23 November 2000).
A FA/DIE memorandum of 23 November 2000 stated that it became increasingly clear 
that France already aimed to conclude the discussion regarding content about the ESDP-
related decisions of Nice during the General Affairs Council of 4 December 2000. During 
this meeting, France wanted to have a ‘politically binding’ text about the Treaty change is-
sue, understanding that Treaty change would be necessary (after this IGC), but that would 
allow the ESDP to become operational in the meantime.
During the PoCo meeting of 28 November 2000 (as well as the COREPER of 29 
November 2000; FA/DIE report, 29 November 2000), Italy proposed the inclusion of 
an inventory of the Treaty articles that should be adapted considering the ESDP in the 
mandate of the incoming Presidency (option B). The Dutch cabinet and Luxembourg 
supported this as a second-best option. The French Presidency proposed including the 
issue of Treaty change as part of the broader package on the ESDP to be presented to Nice. 
At the same time, the Presidency tabled a draft text on future Treaty change, to be included 
in the Presidency conclusions of Nice, a separate Declaration or a Declaration attached to 
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the Final Act of the IGC. It asked the delegations for comments on this draft text (Com-
mission report, 30 November 2000; FA/DIE preparatory note for Benelux summit of 1 
December 2000, unknown date).
The Dutch cabinet, supported by Italy, Luxembourg and Austria, supported option A 
regarding the Treaty change, PSC and NATO issues during the General Affairs Council 
of 4 December 2000 (FA/DIE report, 4 December 2000). Most member states, including 
Belgium, Denmark and Germany, were of the opinion success was now required in Nice 
and could live well with the political Declaration proposed by the Presidency (option B 
with regard to the Treaty change issue). Sweden took an open position (A/C), whereas 
Finland and particularly Ireland were very reserved (B/C and C, respectively).
Finally, the Dutch cabinet supported option A with regard to the Treaty change, PSC 
and NATO issues during the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000 (FA/DIE 
preparatory note, unknown date). It was decided during this meeting that the Treaty would 
indeed be changed with regard to the ESDP and that the decisions regarding the substantive 
amendments would be made. It is known from an informal written source that the neutral 
countries Ireland and probably Finland and Sweden were only convinced in Nice, and 
that first Ireland and after that France were the last to agree (FA/DIE preparatory note for 
legislative consultation in Dutch Second Chamber on 12 November 2001 concerning the 
Treaty of Nice, unknown date). According to an interview with State Secretary Benschop, 
a bilateral consultation between the Dutch cabinet and Ireland on 3 December 2000 was 
crucial in this regard.
Table 7.9 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts for the ESDP (see Tables 6a-h in Annex 6 for more 
details)
 Influence attempts
Goal-achievement
Few Considerable Much
0 Military Staff NATO
1 or 2 PSC
3 Treaty change
In sum, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken only a few influence attempts regarding the 
Military Staff issue (three out of 45 occasions), a considerable number on the NATO issue 
(29) and many attempts with regard to the Treaty change (43) and PSC (31) issues. In 
terms of the other participating actors, the other partners of the Italy and Benelux network 
undertook many influence attempts in this dossier, but not as much as the Dutch cabinet. 
To a lesser extent, Austria (proponent) as well as France, Germany, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom (opponents) also undertook influence attempts.
7.6.2 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
The Dutch cabinet undertook only a few influence attempts regarding the Military Staff 
issue and did not achieve its goal on this issue. It initially undertook influence attempts to 
establish the Military Staff in the Treaty. It made a proposal to this end in its position paper 
of 15 November 1999, which was formally presented to the IGC as CONFER 4720/00 
on 6 March 2000. It was also a part – albeit implicitly – of the semi-formal joint written 
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proposal by Italy and the Dutch cabinet from 14 March 2000. In an internal FA/DIE 
position paper of 17 May 2000, however, the Dutch position on the ESDP dossier was 
reconsidered, in the sense that ‘considering the position of other member states, focusing 
on a limited number of Treaty changes will probably be more successful’. Part of this 
reconsideration was that the Military Staff proposal was now only presented as a possibility 
and no longer as a necessity.
The proposal was thus probably dropped after the 17 May 2000 position paper and no 
other influence attempts have been made since then. It was not a part of the coalition con-
sultations between Italy and the Benelux countries, which would result in the main, joint 
influence attempt on the ESDP dossier on 23 October 2000, when these four member 
states presented their substantive proposals to the IGC (CONFER 4788/00). Therefore, 
the Dutch cabinet has not exerted its influence on the Military Staff issue, because it did 
not (continue to) undertake influence attempts. Although the Dutch proposals concerning 
the PSC (delegation of authority) and NATO issues were reconsidered in the same way, the 
Dutch cabinet continued to persist in its influence attempts on these issues.
The lack of influence attempts therefore cannot be attributed to negligence (type 9), as 
after the inclusion in its position paper it was a part of the Dutch stake in this dossier for 
some time according to internal preparatory notes. Also, no evidence has been found that 
the Dutch cabinet was internally divided on this issue (type 11). Yet explicit evidence was 
found that the Dutch cabinet anticipated possible resistance to its proposal from other 
member state actors that were against ESDP Treaty change (anticipation; type 12). As a 
result, the Dutch cabinet adapted its strategy to focus on only a limited number of Treaty 
changes, not including the Military Staff issue. The focus on a limited number of Treaty 
changes also implied that some ESDP issues were more important to the Dutch cabinet 
than others. Therefore, it was at the same time out of non-priority that the Dutch cabinet 
did not continue to undertake influence attempts with regard to the Military Staff issue 
(type 10).
The Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence attempts regarding the Treaty change 
and PSC issues. It has fully achieved its goal on the Treaty change issue and partially on 
the PSC issue. The fact that the Dutch cabinet has achieved its goal on the Treaty change 
and PSC-1 issues may not be attributable to a free ride (type 2). Apart from its network 
partners (Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg) and Austria, the other actors were either against 
ESDP Treaty change, reserved or took an ambivalent position. Within the network, the 
Dutch cabinet was most consistently in favour of Treaty change and took the lead in this 
dossier rather than getting a free ride from its partners. Therefore, it can safely be concluded 
that the many influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet have resulted in explicit influence 
regarding these issues (type 1). This is not to deny that the Dutch network partners Italy, 
Belgium and Luxembourg might also have exerted their influence in particular.
That the Dutch cabinet did not completely achieve its goal on the PSC issue had to do 
with a specific part of its preference – establishing the relationship between the responsibil-
ity of the PSC and that of COREPER and other committees – which was not realised 
(PSC-2). Apart from its position paper, the Dutch cabinet may have neglected this part 
of its preference in the course of the negotiation process (type 9), although no explicit 
evidence of this was found. However, considering the perceived necessity, outlined above, 
to focus on a limited number of Treaty changes, it is more likely that the Dutch cabinet 
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anticipated possible resistance from other actors (anticipation; type 12) and/or this part of 
the PSC issue was less important than the other parts and issues (non-priority; type 10).
Although the Dutch cabinet did undertake a considerable number of influence attempts 
with regard to the NATO issue, it did not achieve its goal on this issue. Apart from the gen-
eral issue of whether or not to change the Treaty with regard to the ESDP, the NATO issue 
was perhaps the most controversial of all the ESDP issues. The proponents and opponents 
of Treaty change in general had rather pronounced preferences on this. The proponents, 
i.e. Italy and the Benelux countries, discussed the matter rather fiercely amongst themselves 
and the issue was (probably) also sharply debated between the proponents and opponents, 
particularly France and (most of ) the neutral countries during the end game in Nice. The 
absence of goal-achievement on the part of the Dutch cabinet was therefore not a matter of 
bad luck (type 7), nor a case of bad influence attempts (type 6). Given the sensitivity of the 
issue and the insistence of the Dutch cabinet, the absence of goal-achievement might have 
been the result of negative influence (type 8), but no explicit evidence for this mechanism 
was found. It makes the most sense to conclude that the absence of goal-achievement 
was the result of unsuccessful influence attempts by the Dutch cabinet (failure; type 5), 
or – from the perspective of the opponents – the successful influence attempts of the 
opponents.
Although evidence has mainly been found on influence attempts aimed at blocking 
ESDP Treaty change in general, they were also – and probably particularly – aimed at 
blocking the establishment of the relationship and cooperation with NATO. Only ‘indi-
rect’ informal sources – i.e. other actors reporting the preference – have been found that 
report a preference for B of France and the ‘neutral countries’ (FA/DIE report of meeting 
between Italy and the Benelux countries, 30 June 2000). Several sources indicate, however, 
that France has used its (future) position as Presidency during the second half of 2000 to 
promote its own preference as a member state in this dossier.
According to three sources from March 2000, France was halting the discussion on rela-
tions between the EU and NATO and relations with the so-called third countries (non-EU 
European NATO members) in the context of the development of the ESDP in general, 
for tactical reasons. France wanted to maintain control over these vital dossiers during its 
own Presidency. It thought that it could force its position regarding these dossiers by con-
sistently saying no to Treaty change in general and thus also to establishing the relationship 
and cooperation with NATO in the Treaty in particular (FA/DIE DVB memorandum, 
16 March 2000; FA/DIE Berlin embassy note, 22 March 2000; FA/DIE Madrid embassy 
note, 29 March 2000). In keeping with this, France as the Presidency sent out a paper with 
a draft Declaration for Nice on future Treaty change on 14 September 2000 (FA/DIE note, 
14 September 2000). It tabled a draft text on future Treaty change during the PoCo meet-
ing of 28 November 2000, which was also discussed during the General Affairs Council of 
4 December 2000 and probably the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000.
The FA/DIE report of the meeting between Italy and the Benelux countries (30 June 
2000) refers to the ‘neutral countries’ in general (being in favour of option B with regard to 
the NATO issue), without specifying the (intensity of the) preferences of each individual 
actor – Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Austria was in favour of Treaty change in 
general. The multilateral meeting between the Dutch cabinet, Austria and Sweden about the 
ESDP proposals on 23 October 2000 does suggest, however, that Austria and Sweden had 
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to be convinced of option A with regard to the NATO issue and that they were originally 
not in favour of A but rather, of B. Finland and Sweden were probably only convinced of 
ESDP Treaty change in Nice, while Ireland and France were the last to agree to it.
In addition, France, as the Presidency, was supported by Germany and the United King-
dom, that all formed a network in opposition to the Italy and Benelux network (see Section 
7.7.1, Networks). Finally, the opponents were also enabled by domestic actors and factors 
in their attempts to block ESDP Treaty change in general and the inclusion of NATO in 
the Treaty in particular (see Section 7.7.3).
In addition, but subordinate to the failure mechanism, the Dutch cabinet’s lack of goal-
achievement with regard to the NATO issue might be attributed to the internal divisive-
ness of the Italy and Benelux network regarding this issue (type 11). Due to this internal 
divisiveness, less, or at least less coherent, influence attempts were undertaken in keeping 
with the Dutch preference on this issue (see Section 7.7.1, Internal coherence).
7.7 ESDP: explaining the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.7.1 Influence resources
Policy positions 
 -  The more advantageous policy positions the Dutch cabinet holds, the more influence it 
will exert.
Table 7.10 ESDP: policy positions (see Table 5 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Policy positions
Influence
No Yes
No PSC-2
NATO
Military Staff
Yes Treaty change
PSC-1
The Dutch cabinet did not have a ‘pivotal’ position concerning the ESDP issues, as it was 
in favour of (the ‘extreme’) option A for all the issues. It also did not hold a ‘majority’ 
position, because there was no majority of (member state) actors in favour of A for any of 
the ESDP issues.
The expectation receives only mixed support. Networks and influence attempts can ex-
plain why the Dutch cabinet still exerted influence regarding the Treaty change and PSC-1 
issues, which do not meet the expectation (see Networks and Section 7.7.2).
Networks
 -  The more a part of a network the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
According to the FA/DIE archive, there have been two Benelux summits during which the 
ESDP dossier was discussed (30 May 2000 and 1 December 2000). It is not completely 
clear which particular issues were discussed on these occasions. The Treaty change and 
PSC-1 issues were probably discussed on 30 May 2000 and the Treaty change, PSC-1 and 
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NATO issues were probably discussed on 1 December 2000. In addition, there has been 
some kind of contact two, possibly three times, between the Benelux countries about the 
Treaty change, PSC-1 and NATO issues in the context of and considering the second 
Benelux memorandum in which all three issues were explicitly or implicitly included 
(CONFER 4787/00, 19 October 2000; see Section 7.6.1). Thus, there have been at least 
four contacts between the Benelux countries concerning the Treaty change and PSC-1 
issues in total, and three with regard to the NATO issue.
Another network was formed between Italy and the Benelux countries that resulted 
in joint Treaty text proposals on the ESDP (CONFER 4788/00, 23 October 2000; see 
Section 7.6.1). On 31 May 2000, Italy sent draft proposals to the Dutch cabinet on the 
PSC issue, among others. These proposals were (probably) also sent to the other partners 
in the network, Belgium and Luxembourg, considering the meeting of the network in 
Rome on 30 June 2000. Italy sent an invitation to this meeting to the other partners on 
22 June 2000. The Dutch cabinet reacted to this invitation on 23 June 2000, confirming 
its attendance. During the meeting on 30 June 2000, Italy and the Benelux countries 
consulted on the PSC and NATO issues, among others, on the basis of a draft text Italy 
had distributed before the meeting and a short paper distributed by Belgium. Based on 
this meeting, Italy drew up new draft text proposals on the PSC issue, among others, and 
distributed them to the other partners. The Dutch cabinet reacted to Italy with a letter on 
21 July 2000, in which it pleaded for the inclusion of the NATO issue (option A). There 
had already been contact about this between Italy and the Dutch cabinet in the margins of 
the Preparatory Group of 14 July 2000.
A second consultation between Italy and the Benelux countries on joint text proposals 
took place in The Hague on 28 August 2000 (PSC and NATO issues). On that same day, 
the Dutch cabinet sent a letter to its partners thanking them for attending the meeting, 
with the agreements that had been made. These agreements did not include the NATO 
issue (A) due to resistance from Belgium in particular, but also Italy and Luxembourg. On 
12 September 2000, a bilateral meeting between Italy and the Dutch cabinet was held on 
the ESDP dossier, where it became obvious that Italy had doubts about whether it could 
agree with submitting the joint proposals due to the NATO issue. On (or somewhat after) 
14 September 2000, the Dutch cabinet sent a letter to its partners, in which it indicated 
that the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs did not agree with the text of the last meeting 
in The Hague as it did not include the NATO issue (A). In the letter, the Dutch cabinet 
proposed text on this. Following this, Italy consulted with the Benelux countries about 
their proposals (PSC and NATO issues) in the margins of the General Affairs Council of 9 
October 2000 and the Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000 before officially 
presenting them to the IGC on 23 October 2000. In addition, there was contact about the 
Italy and Benelux proposals between the Dutch cabinet (Kok) and Belgium (Verhofstadt) 
on 16 November 2000 and possibly also during the Belgian-Dutch conference that took 
place around 20 November 2000 (FA/DIE preparatory note, 20 November 2000). More-
over, the Dutch cabinet contacted Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy about the proposals 
shortly before 23 November 2000 (FA/DIE memorandum, 231100).
All in all, nine contacts have been found in the data between Italy and the Benelux 
countries and, within this network, five contacts between Italy and the Dutch cabinet, at 
least two between Belgium and the Dutch cabinet and one between Luxembourg and the 
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Dutch cabinet. It is not completely clear which ESDP issues were discussed during these 
contacts, but obviously the Treaty change issue and probably the PSC-1 issue were part of 
them. This probably does not apply to the PSC-2 issue, which was not a part of the Dutch 
cabinet’s stake during the negotiation process, except for its position paper (see Section 
7.6.2).
However, it has become clear that the network was internally divided with regard to the 
NATO issue. The other partners of the network were, to a greater or lesser extent, not in 
favour of establishing relations and cooperation with NATO in the Treaty. This means 
that although there have been contacts on this issue between the Benelux countries and 
between Italy and the Benelux countries, they did not have common preferences, so the 
network actually did not exist for this issue. The Military Staff issue was (probably) also 
not a part of the networks mentioned, because the Dutch cabinet had already dropped its 
proposal on this in May 2000 (see Section 7.6.2).
Table 7.11 ESDP: networks (see Table 5 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Networks
Influence
Hardly or not at all Considerable Much
No PSC-2
NATO
Military Staff
Yes Treaty change
PSC-1
This expectation receives full support. The Dutch cabinet’s influence on the Treaty change 
and PSC-1 issues can at least partly be explained by its networks. The fact that the Dutch 
cabinet was not a part of a network regarding the PSC-2, NATO and Military Staff issues 
at least partially explains why it did not exert influence on these issues. In addition, and 
related, to not being part of a network, a lack of influence attempts on the part of the 
Dutch cabinet also offers an explanation for the absence of influence with regard to the 
PSC-2 and Military Staff issues (see Section 7.7.2).
In terms of the other actors, a network existed between France and the United Kingdom 
and between France and Germany. In the course of the negotiation process, France and 
the United Kingdom agreed that a political Declaration would be the desirable outcome 
of the Treaty change issue in Nice (option B), after which some Treaty changes could 
still be made in 2001 during the ratification of the Nice Treaty or otherwise in a new 
IGC (FA/DIE London embassy note, 15 May 2000). The note calls this a ‘tough coali-
tion’. This agreement is confirmed by another FA/DIE note of 16 November 2000. In 
addition, according to a FA/DIE preparatory note for the Nice European Council, the 
United Kingdom and Germany had promised to support the Presidency with regard to 
(its resistance to) ESDP Treaty changes, although they had few problems with the content 
of the Italy and Benelux proposals. Germany’s support is confirmed by a FA/DIE Berlin 
embassy note of 20 September 2000 and the FA/DIE report of the Preparatory Group of 
30 October 2000, during which it explicitly stated that it would support the Presidency 
to reach a feasible solution in Nice. Assuming that these instances were based on contacts 
between the actors, the United Kingdom and France as well as Germany and France have 
had contact at least three times.
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Internal coherence
 -  The more internally coherent the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
Table 7.12 ESDP: internal coherence (see Table 5 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Internal coherence
Influence
No: divided with regard to 
preferences and/or actions
Yes
No PSC-2 NATO
Military Staff
Yes PSC-1 Treaty change
According to the data, the Dutch cabinet was internally coherent with regard to the Treaty 
change, NATO and Military Staff issues. According to a FA/DIE note of 17 May 2000, 
however, there was internal divisiveness regarding the PSC issue between the director of 
DVB, who was in favour of option A, and the director of DIE, who was in favour of B. No 
additional evidence has been found that the Dutch cabinet was (structurally) divided on 
this. Moreover, based on the sources consulted, the different preferences have not resulted 
in different actions at the EU level. The Dutch cabinet has consistently pleaded for option 
A during the negotiation process (see Section 7.6.1).
The expectation receives mixed support. That the Dutch cabinet still exerted influence 
regarding the PSC-1 issue might be explained by the fact that internal divisiveness on 
preferences did not result in divergent actions, i.e. influence attempts at the EU level. The 
fact that the Dutch cabinet was not part of a network regarding the NATO and Military 
Staff issues can (partly) explain why it did not exert its influence regarding the NATO 
issue (see Networks). A lack of influence attempts on the part of the Dutch cabinet offers a 
complementary explanation for the absence of influence with regard to the Military Staff 
issue (see Section 7.7.2).
According to an informal written source, Germany was internally divided on the Treaty 
change issue (FA/DIE Berlin embassy note, 16 May 2000). The German ‘DGES’ was in 
favour of A, whereas the German ‘DGPZ’ was in favour of C. A FA/DIE Berlin embassy 
note from 30 May 2000 mentions that the internal divisiveness was settled on a preference 
for B. Internal divisiveness within the Greek government became clear during the Prepara-
tory Group of 30 October 2000, where the representative backed option A regarding the 
Treaty change issue, whereas the political director stated that it was in favour of C during 
a PoCo meeting the next day (FA/DIE reports, 31 October 2000 and 1 November 2000, 
respectively).
7.7.2 Influence attempts
 -  The more influence attempts the Dutch cabinet undertakes, the more influence it will 
exert.
As became clear in Section 7.6.1, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken only a few influ-
ence attempts regarding the Military Staff issue (three out of 45 occasions), a considerable 
number on the NATO issue (29) and many attempts with regard to the Treaty change (43) 
and PSC-1 (31) issues. As pointed out in Section 7.6.2, apart from its position paper, the 
Dutch cabinet probably did not undertake any influence attempts on the PSC-2 issue.
The process analysis 217
Table 7.13 ESDP: influence attempts (see Tables 6a-h in Annex 6 for more details)
 Influence attempts
Influence
Few Considerable Much
No PSC-2
Military Staff
NATO
Yes Treaty change
PSC-1
All in all, the expectation receives considerable support. In addition and related to not 
being part of a network (see Section 7.7.1), a lack of influence attempts on the part of 
the Dutch cabinet can indeed offer an explanation for the absence of influence in the case 
of the PSC-2 and Military Staff issues. The variable influence attempts can also explain 
that the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence with regard to the Treaty change and PSC-1 
issues. The Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence attempts both individually and 
in the context of the Italy and Benelux network to put the ESDP dossier on the agenda 
and to realise its substantive preference with regard to the PSC-1 issue in the Treaty text. 
Although the Dutch cabinet also undertook a considerable number of influence attempts 
with regard to the NATO issue, it did not exert its influence on this issue. This can partly 
be explained by the absence of the Italy and Benelux network for this issue as a result of 
internal divisiveness (see Section 7.7.1).
7.7.3 Domestic actors and factors11
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by domestic actors (parliament, 
constitutional court) and factors (referendum, public opinion, elections, events and 
political conflicts), the more (less) influence it will exert.
Table 7.14 ESDP: domestic actors and factors (see Table 7 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Domestic actors and
factors
Influence
Constrained Enabled
No PSC-2
NATO
Yes Treaty change
PSC-1
According to the data, the Dutch cabinet referred at least twice during meetings to (pos-
sible) ratification problems by its parliament in the case of no ESDP Treaty changes. In 
doing so, it was enabled by its parliament to realise option A regarding the Treaty change, 
PSC and NATO issues.
The expectation receives mixed support. The fact that the Dutch cabinet did not exert 
its influence with regard to the NATO issue, although it was enabled by domestic actors 
and factors, can be (partly) explained by the internal divisiveness of the Italy and Benelux 
network on this issue (see Section 7.7.1). In the case of the PSC-2 issue, this had to do with 
11. This variable does not apply to the Military Staff issue, because it was not a part of the Dutch influence 
attempts when it referred to its parliament.
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a lack of networks and influence attempts (see Sections 7.7.1 and 7.7.2). It is difficult to 
assess the contribution of this variable to the explanation of the Dutch influence regarding 
the Treaty change and PSC-1 issues. It seems at the most complementary to the explana-
tion offered earlier, by networks and influence attempts.
The following opponents of Treaty change in general (and the inclusion of NATO in 
the Treaty in particular) were enabled by their parliaments: Ireland (twice), Sweden (1), 
Finland (1), Denmark (1), France (1) and the United Kingdom (3). France was enabled 
once by its constitutional court. Ireland (twice), Denmark (1) and Finland (1) were en-
abled by a (possible) referendum. The following actors were enabled by their parliaments 
and/or a (possible) referendum (‘ratification’): Sweden (six times), Ireland (6), Finland (5) 
and Denmark (5). Sweden (once), Ireland (3), Finland (1), Denmark (1) and the United 
Kingdom (2) were enabled by public opinion. Upcoming elections in spring 2002 enabled 
France. A domestic event (a no-vote during the referendum on the possible introduction 
of the euro on 28 September 2000) enabled Denmark and at the same time constrained 
the proponents of Treaty change, which included the Dutch cabinet (see Section 7.7.6). 
Austria held an ambivalent position in the sense that it was in favour of ESDP Treaty 
change in general, but probably not of the inclusion of NATO in the Treaty in particular 
(see Section 7.6.2). It was enabled once by its parliament and twice by its parliament and/
or a (possible) referendum (‘ratification’).
7.7.4 Negotiation level12
 -  The lower the level at which an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet 
will exert.
Table 7.15 ESDP: negotiation level (see Table 8 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation level
Influence
High Moderate Low
No PSC-2
NATO
Yes Treaty change
PSC-1
Although the Presidency only put the ESDP dossier on the agenda in its report on the 
ESDP of 30 November 2000 (see Section 5.4), practically the Treaty change issue has been 
discussed once at the formal level 3 (Preparatory Group of 30 October 2000), twice at the 
formal level 2 (General Affairs Councils of 20 November 2000 and 4 December 2000), 
once and possibly twice at the informal level 2 (Conclave of 6-7 May 2000 and possibly 
Conclave of 19 November 2000), once at the informal level 1 (Biarritz European Council 
of 13-14 October 2000) and once at the formal level 1 (Nice European Council of 7-11 
December 2000). The median is 2.
Although it is not clear whether and to what extent the other participating actors discussed 
the PSC and NATO issues specifically during these meetings, the Dutch cabinet at least 
12. This variable does not apply to the Military Staff issue, because it was not put on the agenda, let alone 
discussed and decided upon (non-decision).
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mentioned them on all these occasions, which is considered as constituting a discussion in 
this study. The median for these issues is therefore also 2.
The expectation receives mixed support. As pointed out earlier, internal divisiveness 
within the Italy and Benelux network offers an (partial) explanation for the fact that the 
Dutch cabinet did not exert its influence on the NATO issue (see Section 7.7.1). In terms 
of the Treaty change and PSC-1 issues, which do not completely meet the expectation, 
networks and influence attempts may explain why the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence 
(see Sections 7.7.1 and 7.7.2).
7.7.5 Negotiation timing13
 -  The earlier an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet will exert.
Table 7.16 ESDP: negotiation timing (see Table 8 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation timing
Influence
Late Moderate Early
No PSC-2
NATO
Yes Treaty change
PSC-1
The Treaty change, PSC and NATO issues were discussed on 6-7 May 2000 (IGC week 
number 12), 13-14 October 2000 (35), 30 October 2000 (38), possibly 19 November 
2000 (40), 20 November 2000 (41), 4 December 2000 (43) and 7-11 December 2000 
(43), resulting in an average of 35.3 (-36).
The expectation receives mixed support. As pointed out earlier, internal divisiveness 
within the Italy and Benelux network offers an (partial) explanation for the fact that the 
Dutch cabinet did not exert its influence on the NATO issue (see Section 7.7.1). In terms 
of the Treaty change and PSC-1 issues, networks and influence attempts may explain why 
the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence (see Section 7.7.1 and 7.7.2).
7.7.6 External events and developments
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by external events and develop-
ments, the more (less) influence it will exert.
Table 7.17 ESDP: external events and developments (see Table 8 in Annex 6 for more details)
 External events and developments
Influence
Constrained Enabled
No PSC-2
NATO
Military Staff
Yes Treaty change
PSC-1
13. This variable does not apply to the Military Staff issue, because it was not put on the agenda, let alone 
discussed and decided upon (non-decision).
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The development of the ESDP in general, which began at the Cologne European Coun-
cil of June 1999, was an external development that enabled the Dutch cabinet, because 
objectively there was a good chance that this would result in a need for Treaty changes 
(particularly regarding the PSC issue).
In addition, the Kosovo war in 1999 was an external event that enabled the Dutch cabi-
net, because it provided an impetus for the development of the ESDP in general (which 
might result in a need for Treaty changes). More specifically, the Danish referendum on 
the possible introduction of the euro on 28 September 2000 was an external event that 
potentially constrained the Dutch cabinet and its coalition partners Italy, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, particularly the timing of their joint proposals. They discussed this timing 
during their meeting in The Hague on 28 August 2000. Italy was of the opinion that 
the proposals could be presented soon, but Belgium felt that it should not occur before 
the Danish referendum. The Dutch cabinet in turn stated that the proposals should not 
be presented too late either, because otherwise it would no longer be possible to discuss 
them. They came to an agreement that the proper moment would be some weeks before 
the Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October and right after the Danish referendum 
(FA/DIE report, unknown date). In addition, from a FA/DIE Berlin embassy note of 
18 October 2000, it is clear that Germany expected the Dutch cabinet to withdraw its 
proposals after the Danish ‘no’ against the euro rather than presenting them at the Biarritz 
European Council.
It is concluded that the Dutch cabinet was more enabled than constrained by external events 
and developments in this dossier. The potentially constraining Danish referendum eventually 
appeared not to be harmful to the proper timing of the Italy and Benelux proposals.
The expectation receives mixed support. As mentioned earlier, internal divisiveness 
within the Italy and Benelux network offers an (partial) explanation for the fact that the 
Dutch cabinet did not exert its influence on the NATO issue (see Section 7.7.1). A lack of 
networks and influence attempts can explain the Dutch cabinet’s absence of influence with 
regard to the PSC-2 and Military Staff issues (see Sections 7.7.1 and 7.7.2).
7.8 ESDP: conclusions and reflections
The Dutch cabinet has undertaken only a few influence attempts regarding the PSC-2 and 
Military Staff issues, a considerable number on the NATO issue and many attempts with 
regard to the Treaty change and PSC-1 issues.
The Dutch cabinet exerted explicit influence with regard to the Treaty change and 
PSC-1 issues, but not the PSC-2 (non-priority and/or anticipation) and Military Staff 
issues (non-priority in combination with anticipation), as well as the NATO issue (failure; 
subordinately internal divisiveness Italy and Benelux network).
The variable influence attempts offer an explanation for the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s 
influence with regard to the Treaty change, PSC and Military Staff issues. A lack of influ-
ence attempts on the part of the Dutch cabinet partly explains the absence of influence on 
the PSC-2 and Military Staff issues.
On the other hand, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence attempts regarding 
the Treaty change and PSC-1 issues, which explains its exertion of influence with regard to 
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these issues. These influence attempts were often undertaken in the context of the Benelux 
network and, particularly, the Italy and Benelux network. Thus, the network variable also 
explains the Dutch cabinet’s influence on the Treaty change and PSC-1 issues. With regard 
to the PSC-2, NATO and Military Staff issues, the fact that the Dutch cabinet was not part 
of a network regarding these issues partly explains why it did not exert its influence. With 
regard to the NATO issue, this was due to internal divisiveness within the network.
This combination of variables still does not seem to be able to fully explain the extent of 
the Dutch cabinet’s influence in this dossier. In particular, the Dutch cabinet’s absence of 
influence on the NATO issue cannot completely be explained by the internal divisiveness 
of the Italy and Benelux network concerning this issue or the fact that it undertook less 
influence attempts than in the case of the Treaty change and PSC-1 issues. Therefore other 
variables should be considered.
First, contrary to the Court of Auditor’s case, the Dutch cabinet was timely in forming a 
network with like-minded member states and undertaking influence attempts to realise its 
preferences in the ESDP dossier.
Second, explicit and implicit evidence has been found that suggests that the proponents 
and opponents of ESDP Treaty change have exchanged issues among one another. This 
was not only the case regarding issues and not-issues that were actually put on the agenda 
(Treaty change and PSC vs. NATO), but also non-issues that were not (Military Staff).
Third and in the context of this exchange taking place, anticipation by the Dutch cabinet 
of (possible) resistance from other actors might also have played a role in this dossier. The 
remainder of this section elaborates on the second and third points.
For the greater part of the negotiations, the ESDP was an agenda-setting issue, i.e. the 
issue of whether or not Treaty change should take place with regard to (parts of ) the ESDP. 
Only during the Nice European Council, when the ESDP was a part of the agenda for the 
first time, did decision-making take place on the substance of these Treaty changes (WEU, 
PSC, NATO, Military Committee). However, the strict distinction between agenda-setting 
and decision-making cannot be maintained in this case (nor in the case of the Nice Treaty 
negotiation process in general; see Sections 2.4.3 and 8.5.1). The issue of possible Treaty 
change and the substance of the ESDP in general and of the Treaty changes in particular 
were not completely separated during the agenda-setting process. From the reconstruction, 
it appears that not only did actors have a preference in favour or against Treaty change, 
they also had a preference on which – substantive (with regard to content) – changes should 
(not) be made. On the one hand, the proponents of Treaty change used substance as an 
argument to persuade opponents of the necessity of Treaty change. Proponents argued that 
if the opponents agreed on the necessity of a certain substantive part of the ESDP, then this 
would also necessitate changing the Treaty.
A good example of this is the issue of the Council delegating (part of its) decision-
making authority to the PSC during a crisis management operation. Several opponents of 
Treaty change were in favour of this substantive point, as it would increase the efficiency of 
decision-making prior to and during an operation. Realising this, however, required Treaty 
change.
On the other hand, substance played a role in the acceptability of Treaty change to 
various actors that were principally not in favour of it. As a result, actors in favour of 
Treaty change such as the Dutch cabinet lowered their ambitions and demands with regard 
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to substance in the course of the negotiation process, in order to keep the issue on the 
agenda and attempt to make Treaty change sufficiently acceptable to opponents. Although 
the preference for Treaty change was realised in the end, the preferences on the substance 
of Treaty change were not completed realised. The resulting decision in favour of Treaty 
change was ultimately a compromise (in addition to the issue of how the ESDP Treaty 
change decision fits into the Nice compromise as a whole). Thus, although the opponents 
had to accept in the end that the Treaty would indeed be changed regarding the ESDP, 
they did manage to keep some substantive issues from the agenda that some proponents of 
Treaty change wanted to establish in the Treaty, which thus resulted in non-decisions from 
the perspective of these proponents.
Two examples of this were already discussed in Section 7.6.2. The Dutch cabinet probably 
withdrew its proposal on the Military Staff issue in anticipation of the (possible) resistance 
of the opponents of ESDP Treaty change. With regard to the PSC issue, the Dutch stake was 
originally broader than establishing the PSC and possibly delegating authority to the PSC 
in the Treaty (i.e. PSC-1). According to its position paper, the Dutch cabinet also wanted 
to establish the relationship between the responsibility of the PSC and that of COREPER 
and other committees (i.e. PSC-2). The latter was not realised in the Treaty, so the Dutch 
cabinet only partially (2) achieved its goal (see Section 5.4.3). Based on the data, however, 
this part of the Dutch stake in the ESDP dossier was not included in the (other) influence 
attempts during the negotiation process. The actual withdrawal of this part of the PSC issue 
may also have been the result of the anticipation of (possible) resistance, or of non-priority 
of this part of the issue (although no explicit evidence has been found for this).
The exchange of substantive points between proponents and opponents of Treaty change 
continued during the decision-making on the possible ESDP Treaty changes in Nice itself. 
The result was that although the opponents – and even some proponents! – of Treaty change 
had to ‘accept’ that some substantive ESDP issues were a part of the agenda in Nice, they 
still managed to prevent a decision from being made on these issues that would be in keep-
ing with the preference of some proponents of Treaty change, which thus resulted in not-
decisions from the perspective of these proponents. An example of this was the NATO issue 
(also, the Military Committee issue, discussed in Section 5.4.5). It is very likely that the 
opponents, particularly France and (most of ) the neutral countries, only agreed to Treaty 
change in general in exchange for the non-inclusion of a reference to NATO in the Treaty.
7.9 Closer cooperation: assessing the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.9.1 The extent of influence attempts
Formal individual written proposals
The Dutch cabinet undertook an influence attempt in its position paper for all three issues 
(see Section 5.5). Finland, Greece, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Commission and the 
Parliament expressed their preferences in position papers with regard to the Minimum 
requirement and Veto possibility issues. Germany did the same, but only regarding the 
Veto possibility issue. The other actors did not express themselves on the Differentiated 
membership issue (see Section 6.5).
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Belgium initially did not table a position paper, but later during the negotiation process 
it issued a formal contribution expressing a preference for A and possibly B regarding the 
Minimum requirement issue and a preference for A regarding the Veto possibility issue 
(CONFER 4765/00, 28 August 2000).
Formal joint written proposals
The Benelux countries expressed a preference for A with regard to the Minimum require-
ment and Veto possibility issues in both of the Benelux memoranda (see Sections 5.5 and 
6.5). Germany and Italy issued a joint proposal indicating a preference for A and possibly 
B regarding the Minimum requirement issue and a preference for A regarding the Veto 
possibility issue (CONFER 4783/00, 4 October 2000).
Semi-formal individual and joint written proposals
The Presidency asked the participating actors to deliver written comments on its note of 18 
October 2000 (CONFER 4786/00), to be discussed during the Preparatory Groups of 23 
October 2000 and 30 October 2000. However, it is unclear whether this actually happened 
during the Preparatory Group of 23 October 2000. Some delegations only submitted their 
comments after the Preparatory Group of 30 October 2000.
Finland indicated in its comments that it accepted that option A was the majority view 
regarding the Minimum requirement issue, but repeated its preference for C. Concern-
ing the Veto possibility issue, Finland welcomed B instead of C, but asked whether the 
statement (reference possibility) had legal value. In its comments, Austria stated that it 
was in favour of C concerning the Minimum requirement issue in principle, and was 
only willing to talk about option A if an agreement on which areas may (not) be subject 
to closer cooperation could be reached. The Dutch cabinet indicated its agreement with 
A with regard to the Minimum requirement issue, but had fundamental problems with B 
regarding the Veto possibility issue (thus indicating a preference for A). Greece stated that 
option B of the Veto possibility issue should be deleted (thus expressing a preference for 
A). Sweden pointed out that it was still too early to discuss a specific formula regarding 
the ‘critical mass’ (Minimum requirement issue), which should be considered in light of 
other proposed solutions. Regarding the Veto possibility issue, Sweden backed a solution 
that was more in line with C (rather than B). The European Parliament supported option 
B instead of A regarding the Minimum requirement issue and A (including the right of 
approval for the European Parliament) regarding the Veto possibility issue. Ireland stated 
in its comments that it preferred C in principle regarding the Minimum requirement issue, 
but that it was prepared to consider A/B if this was the general desire. Ireland agreed with 
option B instead of C concerning the Veto possibility issue, but asked some specific ques-
tions about the decision-making procedure in case of a reference to the European Council. 
The Commission, the United Kingdom and Portugal also delivered comments, but did not 
make any proposals regarding the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues. No 
written comments on these issues were found for the other actors, but it is unclear whether 
this is because they actually did not submit them.
No evidence on semi-formal joint written proposals with regard to the Closer coopera-
tion dossier was found.
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Informal bilateral and multilateral contacts
During the negotiation process, there was contact between the Dutch cabinet and Spain 
on 6 September 2000 and with Sweden on 13 September 2000 concerning closer coopera-
tion in general and (probably) the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues in 
particular. On 14 November 2000, contact was made between the Dutch cabinet and 
Finland about (option A of ) the Minimum requirement issue.
Prime Minister Kok had a conversation with President Chirac probably in early De-
cember 2000 about several IGC dossiers (FA/DIE/Weighting of votes preparatory note, 
unknown date). Kok (probably) indicated his approval of A with regard to the Minimum 
requirement issue. However, he was unhappy with the reference possibility to the European 
Council (option B with regard to the Veto possibility issue), which looked like a ceiled 
veto. A closer reading of this text would be required in the form of a firm Declaration. 
During the Nice European Council, the Dutch cabinet contacted the Council Secretariat 
regarding the Veto possibility issue (see Formal and informal IGC meetings).
No evidence has been found in the data on multilateral contacts between the participat-
ing actors regarding the Closer cooperation dossier.
Formal and informal IGC meetings
During the formal Preparatory Group of 25 February 2000, the Dutch cabinet (probably) 
pleaded for option A with regard to the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues, 
and the Commission (probably) supported B regarding the Minimum requirement issue 
and A regarding the Veto possibility issue (FA/DIE/Court of Auditors preparatory note, 
unknown date; Commission preparatory note, 24 February 2000).
During the informal Preparatory Group in Sintra of 14 April 2000, the following actors 
expressed a preference for option A (and/or B; this is not clear for all actors) regarding 
the Minimum requirement issue: the Dutch cabinet, Belgium, France, Germany (prob-
ably), Italy, Luxembourg and the Commission (B; probably). Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom stated that they were in favour 
of C. Sweden was also in favour of C in principle, but was somewhat open to A/B. The 
Dutch cabinet, Belgium, France, Germany (probably), Italy, Luxembourg and (probably) 
the Commission supported option A on the Veto possibility issue. Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom supported option C. Austria, Denmark, Finland and 
Ireland were also in favour of C in principle, but were somewhat open to A as well. The 
European Parliament pleaded for the right of approval instead of the current right of con-
sultation (FA/DIE report, 17 April 2000; Commission report, 17 April 2000).
During a dinner of the General Affairs Council on 12 June 2000, the Foreign Affairs 
Ministers discussed whether or not closer cooperation should be included on the IGC 
agenda. The Dutch cabinet, Belgium (probably), Italy, France, Germany and Luxembourg 
were in favour of including closer cooperation on the agenda in general and of option 
A (and/or B) regarding the Minimum requirement issue and option A regarding Veto 
possibility issue in particular. Greece also stated that it was in favour of A on both issues. 
Portugal indicated that ‘we need to revise what was agreed in Amsterdam, especially the 
veto’ (Commission report, 13 June 2000). This can be interpreted as support for A and/
or B regarding the Minimum requirement issue (implicitly) and A regarding the Veto 
possibility issue (explicitly). Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Spain 
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were in favour of discussing closer cooperation in the IGC, but took a reserved position 
on relaxing the (two) conditions. According to the FA/DIE report of the meeting, Sweden, 
Denmark and Ireland were the least positive. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom explicitly or implicitly expressed that they were in favour 
of C with regard to the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues (FA/DIE report, 
14 June 2000; Commission report, 13 June 2000). The Commission (probably) expressed 
itself to be in favour of B with regard to the Minimum requirement issue and A with regard 
to the Veto possibility issue (Commission preparatory note, unknown date).
During the Feira European Council of 19-20 June 2000, the Commission (probably) 
backed option B regarding the Minimum requirement issue and A regarding the Veto pos-
sibility issue (Commission preparatory note for Feira European Council, unknown date). 
No reports of this meeting have been found, so there are no data on the influence attempts 
of the other actors.
During a General Affairs Council dinner on 10 July 2000, the Commission and the 
European Parliament pleaded for option B of the Minimum requirement issue and option 
A of the Veto possibility issue. Greece and Italy were open to discussing (making more 
flexible) closer cooperation. This can be interpreted as support for A (and/or B) regard-
ing the Minimum requirement issue and A regarding the Veto possibility issue. Sweden, 
Spain and Denmark, on the other hand, took a prudent position on closer cooperation, 
which can be considered as support for option C of the Minimum requirement and Veto 
possibility issues. Austria stated that it was in favour of A regarding the Veto possibility 
issue and Finland indicated that it favoured C regarding the Minimum requirement issue 
(Commission report, 11 July 2000).
On 14 July 2000, there was a formal Preparatory Group lunch meeting to discuss closer 
cooperation. The Dutch cabinet, Germany, Italy (implicitly) and Luxembourg (implicitly) 
stated that they were in favour of A and/or B with regard to the Minimum requirement 
issue. Belgium and (probably) the Commission backed option B. Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal were open to A/B. Denmark and Sweden favoured C. The Dutch cabinet, Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy (implicitly), Luxembourg (implicitly) and the Commis-
sion (probably) were in favour of A with regard to the Veto possibility issue. Greece and 
Portugal were open to A. Ireland was possibly in favour of A, but would be in favour of 
C if the minimum requirement was reduced (A/B of the Minimum requirement issue). 
Denmark, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom remained more or less in favour of 
option C with regard to the Veto possibility issue. The European Parliament wanted to 
replace the veto with a right of approval for the European Parliament (Commission report, 
14 July 2000; FA/DIE report, 14 July 2000; Commission preparatory note, unknown 
date).
According to the Commission report of the informal Conclave of 24 July 2000, 12 
delegations, coinciding with the Euro 12 group, showed themselves to be open to op-
tion A regarding the Veto possibility issue. This group consisted of all 15 member states, 
except for Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, that probably preferred C. Six 
delegations accepted the Commission proposal regarding the majority requirement (B), 
while the other six preferred C or a variable system (C combined with an even more strict 
system). The report does not specify the actors within these ‘delegations’, but the six delega-
tions accepting B probably coincided more or less with the six founding member states, 
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while most other member states probably preferred C or a variable system. The European 
Parliament proposed compensating for the abolition of the veto possibility with the right 
of approval for the Parliament. The Commission (probably) pleaded for option B of the 
Minimum requirement issue and A of the Veto possibility issue (Commission preparatory 
note, unknown date).
During the formal Preparatory Group of 4 September 2000, the Dutch cabinet, Ger-
many and Italy supported option A/B regarding the Minimum requirement issue. Austria, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal expressed a preference for C, while the other member states 
actors did not indicate any preference. With regard to the Veto possibility issue, there was a 
clear majority in favour of scratching the veto possibility. Sweden and the United Kingdom 
were, however, in favour of C, while Spain and Denmark did not express themselves on this 
yet. Only Germany and the Dutch cabinet chose option one of the Presidency document 
(CONFER 4766/00, 30 August 2000), which was A. This implies that the other actors 
favouring abolishing the veto possibility – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal were in favour of option two of the Presidency 
document, which was a combination of options A and B (FA/DIE report, 5 September 
2000; Commission report, 5 September 2000). The Commission (probably) supported 
B concerning the Minimum requirement issue and A regarding the Veto possibility issue 
(Commission preparatory note, unknown date).
On 8 October 2000, there was an informal Conclave on closer cooperation. With regard 
to the Minimum requirement issue, the Dutch cabinet and Luxembourg were in favour of 
A, Belgium of A/B, Germany, Italy and the Commission of A and possibly B, while France 
favoured B. Austria (in principle C), Greece, Ireland (in principle C) and Portugal made 
their support for A/B regarding the Minimum requirement issue dependent on heavier 
decision-making (i.e. at least option C with regard to the Veto possibility issue). Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom were in favour of C. Concerning the Veto 
possibility issue, the Dutch cabinet, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Commission were in favour of A. Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom favoured C in principle. However, Spain and the United Kingdom 
(probably) could agree to abolishing the veto possibility (A) on the condition that a so-
called ‘negative list’ (excluding specific policy areas from closer cooperation) would be in-
troduced. Greece could agree to scratching the veto possibility (A) on the condition that it 
would still be possible to postpone the decision on closer cooperation for a year. The Dutch 
cabinet, Austria, Belgium and Germany were, on the other hand, against this possibility for 
postponement. It is not completely clear whether and how the postponement possibility is 
different from option B, particularly whether it also implied that the matter was referred to 
the European Council. In any case, the postponement possibility lies somewhere between 
the extreme options A and C (FA/DIE report, 10 October 2000; Commission report, 9 
October 2000; FA/DIE preparatory note for Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 
2000, unknown date).
During the Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000, the Dutch cabinet 
(probably) backed A (rather than B) regarding the Minimum requirement issue and A 
(and no postponement period instead of C) regarding the Veto possibility issue (FA/DIE 
preparatory note for Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000, unknown date). 
No data on the other participating actors were found.
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The Presidency had asked for written comments on its note of 18 October 2000 (CON-
FER 4786/00), to be discussed during the formal Preparatory Groups of 23 and 30 October 
2000 (see Semi-formal individual written proposals). However, it is unclear whether or not 
this discussion actually took place during the meeting of 23 October 2000.
During the meeting of 30 October 2000, Greece and Portugal indicated that they were 
in favour of A regarding the Minimum requirement issue. Denmark and Finland expressed 
that they were in favour of C. Belgium stated that the existing conditions could be better 
taken as a starting point, but it is not clear what this implies in terms of the options 
Belgium was in favour of. Luxembourg said that it was not in favour of drastically changing 
the conditions, but it is unclear which options it preferred. Germany and Italy (implicitly) 
backed A regarding the Veto possibility issue. Ireland stated that it could now agree to 
scratching the veto possibility, but it is unclear whether this implies that Ireland preferred 
A or, more probable, B, which was included in the Presidency document for this meeting 
(CONFER 4786/00, 18 October 2000).
On 4 November 2000, an informal Preparatory Group took place in Paris on the basis of 
the first progress report of the French Presidency (CONFER 4790/00, 3 November 2000) 
and an additional, specific note (SN 506/00, 3 November 2000). Most actors, except for 
Denmark (C), agreed with option A regarding the Minimum requirement issue included 
in the progress report. Many member states, including the Dutch cabinet, considered 
the reference possibility to the European Council regarding the Veto possibility issue (B), 
included in the report, as a ‘veto in disguise’ (C) and therefore rejected it. On the insistence 
of the United Kingdom and Denmark, however, the French Presidency concluded that the 
text would not be altered.
During the formal Preparatory Group of 13 November 2000, there was support every-
where for option A, which was included in the Presidency document (CONFER 4798/00, 
9 November 2000) with regard to the Minimum requirement issue, although the European 
Parliament repeated its preference for B. The Dutch cabinet, Belgium, Germany, Italy and 
the Commission were not happy with the reference possibility to the European Council 
concerning the Veto possibility issue (B) as laid out in the Presidency document. This can 
be interpreted as these actors favouring option A (FA/DIE report, 15 November 2000; 
Commission report, 15 November 2000). The European Parliament also wanted more 
clarity on the appeal possibility to the European Council and was in favour of including 
its approval in the provision. According to the FA/DIE report of this meeting, the French 
Presidency gave the impression that the text on the Veto possibility issue could not be 
debated. According to the French Presidency, what may precisely occur in the European 
Council should not be spelt out. Something (a necessary minimum) should be formulated 
on this point. The proposal would not include a veto or emergency brake.
The Closer cooperation dossier would be discussed during the Conclave of 19 November 
2000, but there was no time left. The General Affairs Council the following day discussed 
closer cooperation in relation to the ESDP, but no evidence has been found that the Mini-
mum requirement and Veto possibility issues were raised (in relation to the first pillar).
On 25 November 2000, an informal Preparatory Group meeting took place about closer 
cooperation on the basis of the revised progress report of 23 November 2000 (CONFER 
4810/00). The Presidency proposals on the Minimum requirement issue (A) and the Veto 
possibility issue (B) were generally accepted. Sweden indicated that an appeal possibility 
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to the European Council was essential (B). Greece, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Dutch 
cabinet and the Commission wanted the approval of the European Parliament to be in-
cluded in the decision-making on closer cooperation (Veto possibility issue). The French 
Presidency subsequently concluded accordingly.
As part of the ‘speaking points’ for the informal Conclave of 3 December 2000, it is stated 
that the Dutch cabinet kept having doubts about the vague text on the reference possibility 
to the European Council (option B), which may not be a ceiled veto. It is also stated that 
the Dutch cabinet wanted the IGC to accept a Declaration explaining the proper reading 
of this provision. It is unclear whether the Dutch cabinet actually expressed these points 
and insisted – along with like-minded countries, as the note suggests – on a Declaration. 
It is concluded that the Dutch cabinet probably undertook an influence attempt regarding 
the Veto possibility issue, and in any case expressed its doubts about option B. Denmark 
expressed a preference for C with regard to the Minimum requirement issue (FA/DIE 
preparatory note for Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000, unknown date).
According to the ‘speaking points’ in the FA/DIE preparatory note for the Nice Euro-
pean Council of 7-11 December 2000, the Dutch cabinet expressed that it was a great 
gain that from now on, closer cooperation would be possible with eight member states 
(option A of the Minimum requirement issue), but that the reference possibility to the 
European Council (option B of the Veto possibility issue) might not be a ceiled veto. 
Regarding the latter, a possible speaking point was included proposing that a Declaration 
be adopted by the IGC containing the proper reading of this provision. This Declaration 
would state that the reference possibility to the European Council was without prejudice 
to the normal decision-making process of the Council (with QMV). The note further 
indicates that the Dutch cabinet could propose this Declaration together with Belgium 
and Luxembourg. Again, it is unclear whether or not the Dutch cabinet actually expressed 
these points and proposed the Declaration, with or without Belgium and Luxembourg. It 
is again concluded that the Dutch cabinet probably and in any case expressed its objections 
to option B regarding the Veto possibility issue. Its approval of option A with regard to the 
Minimum requirement issue is not counted as an influence attempt.
Up until the draft Treaty text of 6 December 2000 (CONFER 4816/00) was presented 
to the Nice European Council, option B of the Veto possibility issue was formulated as 
follows (see Section 5.5.2):
‘A member of the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European 
Council before the Council takes a decision [by QMV]’.
In the course of the Nice European Council itself, however, the provision was changed to 
the following final outcome, which was a compromise between B and C (SN 533/00, 12 
December 2000):
‘A member of the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European 
Council. After that referral, the Council may take a decision in accordance with the 
provisions of the first subparagraph [i.e. by QMV]’ (emphasis added, SL).
Thus, the way in which the outcome was ultimately formulated left open whether the 
Council would actually make a decision (by QMV).
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A FA/DIE memorandum of 22 December 2000 makes it clear that the Dutch cabinet 
placed a ‘reservation’ on the words ‘may take a decision’ during the COREPER meetings 
of 20 and 21 December 2000. The Dutch cabinet wanted to replace this formulation with 
‘takes a decision’, but was the only actor who wanted to do so. From the memorandum 
it appears that the Dutch cabinet made this reservation in light of an agreement with 
the acting Secretary-General of the Council Secretariat, made during the Nice European 
Council, that ‘may take decision’ should be replaced with ‘takes a decision’.
The French Presidency (Vimont) reacted by confirming the agreement with the Council 
Secretariat. In keeping with this, the Presidency had proposed the Dutch amendment in 
the Nice European Council. The United Kingdom had subsequently made an objection 
against it in the European Council. After this, the Presidency (Chirac) had proposed main-
taining the old text (‘may take a decision’) and had asked if anyone objected to this. None 
of the actors, not even the Dutch cabinet, had reacted, so the Presidency concluded accord-
ingly. The French Presidency (Vimont) reported that he listened with three persons to the 
recording of the European Council meeting; this was how it had evolved and therefore the 
Presidency had no room to meet the Dutch reservation.
During the discussions in COREPER on 20 and 21 December 2000, the Dutch Perma-
nent Representative indicated several times that the Dutch cabinet had not explicitly agreed 
with the change at the request of the United Kingdom. In light of the French Presidency’s 
reaction, however, the Permanent Representative advised lifting the reservation. There was 
no outlook for the Dutch demand to be met and maintaining the reservation meant that, 
if the compromise on the weighting of votes was accepted, the Dutch reservation was 
the only remaining blockade to the Treaty. The memorandum indicates that this advice 
should be taken and the Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister was asked to agree with lifting the 
reservation during the next COREPER meeting on 22 December 2000 accordingly.
Although the COREPER meetings took place after and outside the IGC that was 
concluded during the Nice European Council, by way of exception the Dutch influence 
attempt to replace ‘may take a decision’ with ‘takes a decision’ during the COREPER 
meetings of 20 and 21 December 2000 is still included.
Table 7.18 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts for Closer cooperation (see Tables 10a-g in Annex 6 for 
more details)
 Influence attempts
Goal-achievement
Few Considerable Much
0 Differentiated 
membership
1 or 2 Veto possibility
3 Minimum requirement
To sum up, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken only a few influence attempts with regard 
to the Differentiated membership issue (1 out of 25 occasions) and many attempts with 
regard to the Minimum requirement (19 out of 25 occasions) and Veto possibility (22 out 
of 27 occasions) issues. In terms of the other participating actors, no data on influence 
attempts regarding the Differentiated membership issue were found. With regard to the 
Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues, the other actors have also undertaken a 
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substantial number of influence attempts. It is striking that the proponents of relaxing the 
two conditions were mainly the six founding member states plus the Commission, while 
the opponents roughly consisted of the other member states.
7.9.2 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
The Dutch cabinet undertook only a few influence attempts regarding the Differentiated 
membership issue and did not achieve its goal on this. The reason why it did not undertake 
(further) influence attempts might have been that this issue was less important to it than 
the other issues (of the dossier) (non-priority; type 10). The Dutch cabinet had, after all, 
included its preference on this issue in its position paper only as a possibility. The lack of 
influence attempts was not the result of neglect (type 9), as the issue was initially explicitly 
discussed within the Dutch cabinet, according to informal notes. One note drawn up 
by the Dutch Permanent Representation points to the possibility that the Dutch cabinet 
was internally divided on this issue (type 11) (FA/DIE PR note, unknown date, probably 
between 31 January 2000 and 30 March 2000; see Section 7.10.1, Internal coherence). 
However, no evidence has been found for this in notes drawn up by FA/DIE. In one of 
these notes, in which it is discussed how closer cooperation would become negotiable, it is 
indicated that closer cooperation should not be applied in the framework of the enlarge-
ment process (option B). Many member states would consider this to be premature and the 
Second Chamber had, in a motion, also expressed that it was against partial accession (FA/
DIE note, unknown date, probably between 20 December 1999 and 31 January 2000). 
Therefore, resistance from other member states and the Second Chamber are mentioned 
as reasons for abandoning the original Dutch proposal (option A). The Dutch cabinet 
therefore seems to have anticipated (possible) resistance from other member states with 
regard to the Differentiated membership issue (anticipation; type 12).
The Dutch cabinet undertook many influence attempts with regard to the Minimum 
requirement and Veto possibility issues and completely achieved its goal regarding the 
former issue, but only partially for the latter. The influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet 
were initially aimed at putting the dossier on the agenda to begin with and after that, at 
realising its substantive preferences on the two issues. The Dutch cabinet was certainly a 
pioneering proponent in this respect, but from the beginning was, to a greater or lesser 
degree, supported by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg – i.e. the other 
five founding member states – plus the Commission. The opponents consisted of the 
Scandinavian member states, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain. Initially, there was 
a lot of resistance to including these issues in the IGC. In the course of the negotiation 
process, however, there was growing support, which resulted in their official inclusion 
on the agenda during the Feira European Council of June 2000. After that, the support 
for lowering the minimum requirement (option A or B instead of C) gradually grew, but 
the opponents continued to resist the abolition of the veto possibility (A). As a result, a 
compromise outcome took shape in the last few months of the negotiation process in the 
form of formally abolishing the veto possibility, but maintaining the possibility of referring 
the matter to the European Council (option B).
In light of the contentiousness of the matter, it is not plausible to conclude that the 
inclusion of the issues on the agenda and the (partial) realisation of the Dutch preferences 
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in the Treaty text involved sheer luck (type 4). Nor do the (imperfect) data point to the 
anticipation of the Dutch cabinet’s behaviour by other actors (type 3). It seems plausible, 
also considering its pioneering role, that the Dutch cabinet has exerted explicit influence 
(type 1) with regard to the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility-1 issues.
As mentioned earlier, the Dutch cabinet was supported by the other five founding 
member states – including three (of the five) big member states. It may therefore have 
profited from the support of these, particularly the big, founding member states. Data 
have been found indicating that some actors did refer to the support of the six founding 
member states. Moreover, the big member states of Germany and Italy formed a network 
with regard to the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues (see Section 7.10.1, 
Networks). Therefore, it seems likely that the Dutch cabinet, in addition to exerting explicit 
influence itself, got a free ride (type 2) from the other (big) member states that exerted 
explicit influence with regard to the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility-1 issues.
The fact that the Dutch cabinet did not achieve its goal on the Veto possibility-2 issue 
seems to be a good example of a failure (type 5). Although the Dutch cabinet under-
took many influence attempts, it still only partially achieved its goal due to resistance, 
i.e. influence attempts from opponents of relaxing the two conditions in general and the 
veto possibility condition in particular. Moreover, evidence has been found that the op-
ponents Sweden, the United Kingdom and Ireland were enabled by domestic actors and 
factors in their resistance (see Section 7.10.3). The objection of the United Kingdom to 
the Dutch amendment during the Nice European Council resulted in an extent of Dutch 
goal-achievement of 1 instead of 2, the latter corresponding with the outcome until the 
Nice European Council. As the final outcome had already been established before the clash 
between the Dutch cabinet and the United Kingdom, it is not likely that the Dutch cabinet 
exerted negative influence (type 8) (during this part of the negotiations). According to the 
data, the Dutch cabinet and French Presidency disagreed on the course of things during 
the Nice European Council. This disagreement gives rise to two other, albeit subordinate, 
mechanisms that may have been at work. From the French view, the Dutch cabinet might 
have played it badly during the endgame in Nice (unforced error, type 6); from the Dutch 
view this might also have been a matter of bad luck (type 7).
7.10 Closer cooperation: explaining the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s 
influence
7.10.1 Influence resources
Policy positions 
 -  The more advantageous policy positions the Dutch cabinet holds, the more influence it 
will exert.
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Table 7.19 Closer cooperation: policy positions (see Table 9 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Policy positions
Influence
No Yes
No Differentiated membership
Veto possibility-2
Yes Minimum requirement
Veto possibility-1
The Dutch cabinet did not hold a ‘pivotal’ position on the Closer cooperation issues, as for 
all the issues it was in favour of (the ‘extreme’) option A. It also did not hold a ‘majority’ 
position, because there was no majority of (member state) actors in favour of option A for 
all of these issues.
The expectation receives mixed support. Influence attempts can explain why the Dutch 
cabinet still exerted influence regarding the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility-1 
issues (see Section 7.10.2).
Networks
 -  The more a part of a network the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
Table 7.20 Closer cooperation: networks (see Table 9 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Networks
Influence
Hardly or not at all Considerable Much
No Differentiated membership
Veto possibility-2
Yes Minimum requirement
Veto possibility-1
During the meeting between Italy and the Benelux countries on 30 June 2000 in Rome on 
possible ESDP Treaty changes, these actors also talked about closer cooperation. In opposi-
tion to the idea recently expressed by France to make closer cooperation possible outside 
the Treaty framework (see Section 7.10.6), Italy and the Benelux countries were of the 
opinion that closer cooperation should take place within the Treaty framework. Although 
there is no explicit evidence that they actually discussed the Minimum requirement and 
Veto possibility issues, this contact is related to these issues, as these were the main issues 
in this dossier and for both issues they were all in favour of option A.
On 12 September 2000, a meeting was held between the Dutch cabinet and Italy about 
closer cooperation, among other things. The Dutch cabinet and Germany held a meet-
ing about closer cooperation on 19 October 2000. Although it is unclear whether the 
actors actually discussed the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues during 
these meetings, as they shared the same preferences on these issues, these contacts come 
under networks (at least closer cooperation in general) and not under influence attempts 
(informal bilateral contacts).
On 1 December 2000, Benelux consultations took place in The Hague about, among 
other matters, closer cooperation. According to a FA/DIE preparatory note for this meet-
ing, the Presidency texts would no longer be altered with regard to the first and third pillars. 
This implied that option A would be included in the Treaty with regard to the Minimum 
requirement issue, in accordance with the preference of the Benelux countries, but that 
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option B would be taken along regarding the Veto possibility issue. The Dutch cabinet was 
afraid that B actually boiled down to a veto possibility, because of the reference possibility 
to the European Council. Therefore, the Dutch cabinet wanted to adopt a Declaration 
explaining this provision. The Benelux countries (probably) discussed this during their 
meeting. The contact is thus only related to the Veto possibility issue.
All in all, the expectation receives mixed support. A lack of networks does not seem 
to offer an explanation for the Dutch cabinet’s absence of influence with regard to the 
Differentiated membership and Veto possibility-2 issues, as it was not part of a network 
regarding the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility-1 issues either. Influence at-
tempts can explain why the Dutch cabinet still exerted influence regarding the latter two 
issues (see Section 7.10.2).
In terms of the other participating actors, at least Germany and Italy formed a network, 
as they presented joint proposals on the Closer cooperation dossier in general and the 
Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues in particular (CONFER 4783/00, 4 
October 2000; see Section 7.9.1, Formal joint written proposals). It is assumed that these 
joint written proposals were based on previous contact(s) between the two countries.
Internal coherence
 -  The more internally coherent the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
Table 7.21 Closer cooperation: internal coherence (see Table 9 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Internal coherence
Influence
No: divided with regard to 
preferences and/or actions
Yes
No Differentiated membership Veto possibility-2
Yes Minimum requirement
Veto possibility-1
Based on the data, the Dutch cabinet was internally coherent regarding the Minimum 
requirement and Veto possibility issues. With regard to the Differentiated membership 
issue, the Dutch cabinet may have been internally divided between the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry in The Hague on the one hand and the Permanent Representation in Brussels 
on the other. From a note of the Permanent Representation, it appears that it had criti-
cisms about the Differentiated membership proposal included in the position paper of 15 
November 1999 (FA/DIE PR note, unknown date, probably between 31 January 2000 
and 30 March 2000).
All in all, the expectation is amply supported by the data. Regarding the Differentiated 
membership issue, informal documents drawn up by FA/DIE do not refer to any possible 
internal divisiveness on this issue (see Section 7.9.2). From one of these documents it 
appears that it is because of other member states and a motion of the Second Chamber 
rather than due to internal divisiveness that the original proposal was abandoned and 
no (further) actions, i.e. influence attempts, were taken (FA/DIE note, unknown date, 
probably between 20 December 1999 and 31 January 2000). It is therefore more probable 
that the absence of influence attempts and subsequently of influence regarding the Dif-
ferentiated membership issue is (partly) the result of resistance from the Second Chamber 
(see Section 7.10.3). Concerning the Veto possibility-2 issue, which does not meet the 
expectation, the Dutch cabinet’s absence of influence cannot be explained by the number 
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of influence attempts or by the other variables of the conceptual model. Still other variables 
should be considered in this case (see Section 7.11).
In terms of the other actors, the United Kingdom was internally divided to a certain 
extent as to whether or not the Closer cooperation dossier should be dealt with in the IGC 
in general and if the conditions should be relaxed in particular. According to a FA/DIE 
report of a meeting between the Dutch cabinet and the United Kingdom on 20 December 
1999, the Foreign Cabinet Office was prudently favourable in this respect, but the Cabinet 
Office was much more dismissive, referring to the ‘domestic political context’ (see Section 
7.10.3). France was similarly internally divided on this (FA/DIE/Weighting of votes Paris 
embassy report, 16 December 1999). Some in France were of the opinion that the condi-
tions should be relaxed, whereas others wanted to lessen the load on the IGC agenda as 
far as possible and felt that if need be, closer cooperation might also be regulated outside 
the Treaty. For both France and the United Kingdom, no evidence was found that their 
internal divisiveness as to preferences resulted in divergent actions, i.e. influence attempts, 
during the negotiation process.
7.10.2 Influence attempts
 -  The more influence attempts the Dutch cabinet undertakes, the more influence it will 
exert.
Table 7.22 Closer cooperation: influence attempts (see Tables 10a-g in Annex 6 for more details)
 Influence attempts
Influence
Few Considerable Much
No Differentiated 
membership
Veto possibility-2
Yes Minimum requirement
Veto possibility-1
As was made clear in Section 7.9.1, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken only a few influence 
attempts with regard to the Differentiated membership issue (1 out of 25 occasions) and 
many attempts with regard to the Minimum requirement (19 out 25 occasions) and Veto 
possibility (22 out of 27 occasions) issues.
All in all, the expectation receives ample support. The Dutch cabinet’s lack of influence 
on the Differentiated membership issue can be explained by the fact that it undertook only 
a few influence attempts on this issue, which in turn was (partly) the result of resistance 
from the Dutch parliament (see Section 7.10.3). The influence attempts of the Dutch 
cabinet offer an explanation for its influence regarding the Minimum requirement and 
Veto possibility-1 issues. However, they cannot explain why the Dutch cabinet did not 
exert influence with regard to the Veto possibility-2 issue. Other variables, not included in 
the conceptual model, should also be considered (see Section 7.11).
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7.10.3 Domestic actors and factors
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by domestic actors (parliament, 
constitutional court) and factors (referendum, public opinion, elections, events and 
political conflicts), the more (less) influence it will exert.
Table 7.23 Closer cooperation: domestic actors and factors (see Table 11 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Domestic actors and factors
Influence
Constrained Enabled
No Differentiated membership
Yes
The Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament adopted a motion on 14 December 1999, 
in which it called upon the Dutch cabinet to clearly express itself against option A – and 
thus in favour of B – regarding the Differentiated membership issue (Tweede Kamer, ver-
gaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 800 V, nr. 36). In this way, the Dutch cabinet was constrained by 
its parliament in realising its (original) preference for A on this issue. According to the data, 
there were no domestic actors or factors enabling or constraining the Dutch cabinet with 
regard to the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues. Therefore, the variable 
does not apply to these two issues and the expectation cannot be tested.
As far as the expectation can be tested, it is fully supported by the data. The resistance 
from the Dutch parliament as expressed in the motion mentioned above, in addition to 
the resulting lack of influence attempts (see Section 7.10.2), offer an (partial) explanation 
for the fact that the Dutch cabinet did not exert its influence regarding the Differentiated 
membership issue.
In terms of the other actors, the United Kingdom was enabled by several actors (parlia-
ment) and factors (future referendum on the possible introduction of the euro, future 
elections and public opinion) in its resistance to putting the Closer cooperation dossier 
on the IGC agenda in general and relaxing the Minimum requirement and Veto pos-
sibility issues in particular (FA/DIE London embassy note, 31 January 2000). Sweden 
was similarly enabled by its ‘sceptical parliament’, which could cause ratification problems 
(FA/DIE/ESDP report of meeting with Sweden on 13 September 2000, unknown date; 
Commission report of General Affairs Council of 12 June 2000, 13 June 2000). Ireland 
was enabled by the possibility of a future referendum on the Nice Treaty, which would 
become more likely as the IGC agenda would be loaded with more dossiers, such as closer 
cooperation (Commission note, 12 April 2000).
7.10.4 Negotiation level14
 -  The lower the level at which an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet 
will exert.
14. This variable does not apply to the Differentiated membership issue, because it was not put on the agenda, 
let alone discussed and decided upon (non-decision).
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Table 7.24 Closer cooperation: negotiation level (see Table 12 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation level
Influence
High Moderate Low
No Veto possibility-2
Yes Minimum requirement
Veto possibility-1
During the negotiation process, the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues 
were discussed five, possibly six, times at the formal level 3 (Preparatory Groups of 25 
February 2000, 14 July 2000, 4 September 2000, 23 October 2000 (possibly), 30 October 
2000 and 13 November 2000), three times at the informal level 3 (Preparatory Groups of 
14 April 2000, 4 November 2000 and 25 November 2000), two and possibly three times 
at the formal level 2 (General Affairs Councils of 12 June 2000, 10 July 2000 and possibly 
20 November 2000), three times at the informal level 2 (Conclaves of 24 July 2000, 8 
October 2000 and 3 December 2000), twice at the formal level 1 (European Councils of 
19-20 June 2000 (Feira) and 7-11 December 2000 (Nice)) and once at the informal level 1 
(Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000). This results in a median of 2.5.
The expectation receives only mixed support. The issues do not completely meet the 
expectation. Influence attempts on the part of the Dutch cabinet offer an explanation 
for its influence on the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility-1 issues (see Section 
7.10.2). As indicated before, the Dutch cabinet’s lack of influence with regard to the Veto 
possibility-2 issue cannot be explained by the conceptual model (see Section 7.11 for 
further discussion).
7.10.5 Negotiation timing15
 -  The earlier an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet will exert.
Table 7.25 Closer cooperation: negotiation timing (see Table 12 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation timing
Influence
Late Moderate Early
No Veto possibility-2
Yes Minimum requirement
Veto possibility-1
The Minimum requirement and Veto possibility issues were discussed on 25 February 
2000 (IGC week number 2), 14 April 2000 (9), 12 June 2000 (18), 19 June 2000 (19), 10 
July 2000 (22), 14 July 2000 (22), 24 July 2000 (24), 4 September 2000 (30), 8 October 
2000 (34), 13-14 October 2000 (35), possibly 23 October 2000 (37), 30 October 2000 
(38), 4 November 2000 (38), 13 November 2000 (40), possibly 20 November 2000 (41), 
25 November 2000 (41), 3 December 2000 (42) and 7-11 December 2000 (43). This 
results in an average week number of 28.6 (-29.7).
The expectation receives only mixed support. The issues do not completely meet the 
expectation. Influence attempts on the part of the Dutch cabinet can explain its influence 
15. This variable does not apply to the Differentiated membership issue, because it was not put on the agenda, 
let alone discussed and decided upon (non-decision).
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regarding the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility-1 issues (see Section 7.10.2). As 
mentioned, the Dutch cabinet’s lack of influence with regard to the Veto possibility-2 issue 
cannot be explained by the conceptual model (see Section 7.11 for further discussion).
7.10.6 External events and developments
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by external events and develop-
ments, the more (less) influence it will exert.
Table 7.26 Closer cooperation: external events and developments (see Table 12 in Annex 6 for more details)
 External events and 
developments
Influence
Constrained Enabled
No Veto possibility-2
Differentiated membership
Yes Minimum requirement
Veto possibility-1
The impending enlargement was an external development that enabled the Dutch cabinet 
to realise its preference for option A with regard to the Minimum requirement and Veto 
possibility issues. Without relaxing these two conditions, the formation of closer coopera-
tion would be more difficult in an enlarged Union, which at the same time would be more 
diverse, and in turn increase the chances that the closer cooperation provisions would 
actually be called upon in the future. The impending enlargement also enabled the Dutch 
cabinet to realise its preference for option A regarding the Differentiated membership is-
sue. After all, realising this option in the Treaty increased the chances of the enlargement 
(with a large and diverse number of member states) actually taking place.
In addition, the German Foreign Affairs Minister Fischer and the French President Chirac 
delivered speeches on 12 May and 27 June 2000, respectively, pointing to the possibility 
of further integration by a limited number of member states outside the Treaty framework. 
These external events were on the one hand a constraint for the Dutch cabinet, because 
further integration outside the Treaty framework could reduce the necessity of relaxing the 
two conditions within the Treaty, as the Dutch cabinet wanted. On the other hand, they 
enabled the Dutch cabinet, because opponents of closer cooperation in general probably 
preferred the relaxation of the two conditions within the Treaty above further integration by 
a limited number of member states outside the Treaty framework. As for the opponents of 
closer cooperation in general the Dutch proposals to relax the two conditions lay between 
not relaxing them at all and going outside the Treaty framework, it is concluded that these 
external events were more enabling than constraining for the Dutch cabinet.
The expectation receives mixed support. The lack of influence attempts on the part of 
the Dutch cabinet, in turn (partly) the result of being constrained by its parliament, can 
explain why the Dutch cabinet did not exert its influence regarding the Differentiated 
membership issue (see Sections 7.10.2 and 7.10.3). The conceptual model cannot explain 
why the Dutch cabinet did not exert its influence on the Veto possibility-2 issue (see 
Section 7.11).
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7.11 Closer cooperation: conclusions and reflections
The Dutch cabinet has undertaken only a few influence attempts with regard to the Differ-
entiated membership issue and many attempts with regard to the Minimum requirement 
and Veto possibility issues.
It has exerted explicit influence with regard to the Minimum requirement and Veto 
possibility-1 issues. In addition, it received a free ride from the five other founding member 
states on this. The lack of goal-achievement on the Veto possibility-2 issue reflects a failure, 
possibly combined with the subordinate mechanisms of bad luck or unforced error. With 
regard to the Differentiated membership issue, for which it did not achieve its goal either, 
the Dutch cabinet anticipated (possible) resistance from other member states and the is-
sue was a non-priority. As a result, the Dutch cabinet undertook only a few influence 
attempts.
The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts can explain the extent of its influence 
on the Minimum requirement, Veto possibility-1 and Differentiated membership issues. 
Whereas the Dutch cabinet undertook many influence attempts in the case of the first two 
issues, it undertook only a few influence attempts regarding the latter. With regard to the 
Differentiated membership issue, the lack of influence attempts was in turn (partly) the 
result of the fact that the Dutch cabinet was constrained by its parliament on this issue.
The variables of the conceptual model are unable to offer a sufficient explanation for the 
extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence in this dossier. The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s 
influence attempts cannot explain why the Dutch cabinet did not exert influence regarding 
the Veto possibility-2 issue. Three other variables may have played a role here.
First, as the Minimum requirement and Veto possibility conditions were treated in con-
nection with each other, at least practically a kind of exchange seems to have taken place 
between the two issues and between the proponents and opponents of relaxing the closer co-
operation conditions: one of the conditions could be relaxed, but only if the other remained 
stringent. This mechanism and the level of resistance became painfully clear for the Dutch 
cabinet during the endgame in Nice, when the outcome regarding the Veto possibility issue 
became even worse for the Dutch cabinet (option B, but closer to C than before).
Second, the salience of the two issues differed. The Veto possibility issue was more salient 
than the Minimum requirement one. As a result, it seems to have been more difficult for 
the Dutch cabinet to exert its influence on the former issue than on the latter.
Third, the Dutch cabinet did not just undertake only a few influence attempts regarding 
the Differentiated membership issue due to a constraining parliament, but also because it 
anticipated (possible) resistance from other actors to its proposal.
7.12 Commission size: assessing the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.12.1 The extent of influence attempts
Formal individual written proposals
The Dutch cabinet undertook an influence attempt regarding the Commission size is-
sue in its position paper (see Section 5.6). Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
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Italy, the United Kingdom, the Commission and the Parliament also undertook influence 
attempts by presenting their preferences in position papers (see Section 6.6). In an ad-
ditional contribution to the IGC, Italy expressed a preference for D (20 Commissioners), 
in combination with an equal rotation system (CONFER 4746/00, 26 May 2000).
Formal joint written proposals
The Benelux countries stated that they were in favour of B in both the Benelux memo-
randa.
Semi-formal individual and joint written proposals
The Commission developed a theoretical rotation model for the composition of the 
Commission assuming a Union of 28 member states and a Commission of 20 members 
(Commission note, 30 May 2000). It distributed the note during the Preparatory Group of 
30 May 2000. According to this note, its objective was not to propose a concrete rotation, 
but to illustrate the feasibility of an equal rotation. In doing so, the Commission can 
be said to have implicitly promoted option D. Commission President Prodi presented a 
letter to the Heads of State or Government on 10 October 2000 on the eve of the Biarritz 
European Council of 13-14 October 2000, in which he pleaded for C in combination with 
an equal rotation system (Commission letter, 10 October 2000). Luxembourg presented 
a memorandum to the IGC on 19 October 2000. In it, Luxembourg pleaded for option 
B regarding the Commission issue. Italy drew up a document on the Commission, ‘Le 
nombre des Commissaires’, which was distributed to the six founding member states and 
related to a system of rotations regarding the different EU institutions (FA/DIE memoran-
dum, 21 November 2000). It is not clear whether Italy proposed a specific option in this 
document.
No evidence has been found in the data on semi-formal joint written proposals with 
regard to the Commission size issue.
Informal bilateral and multilateral contacts
According to the data, bilateral meetings have been held between the Dutch cabinet and 
Italy (three times, one of which was a written fax), Germany (two times), the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission (several meetings on the same day). It is unclear whether 
the Dutch cabinet actually mobilised support for its own preference during these meetings, 
but these meetings are considered as ‘informal bilateral contacts’, because the respective 
actors had different preferences on the size of the Commission.
A bilateral meeting between the Commission and Ireland was held on 10 March 2000. 
Germany (Schröder) met bilaterally with Denmark on 17 November 2000, Luxembourg 
on 20 November 2000, Austria on 21 November 2000 and Belgium on 21 November 
2000. The French Presidency held a series of bilateral meetings with several small member 
states, starting with Belgium on 24 October 2000 (Commission telexpress, 23 October 
2000). It is not entirely clear which small member states were involved, evidence has been 
found of meetings with Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, Denmark and Sweden. The 
French Presidency charged the Finnish Prime Minister Lipponen in November 2000 with 
collecting the positions of all the small member states considering the Nice European 
Council in December 2000 and in particular regarding the French proposal to fix the 
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Commission later at 20 Commissioners in combination with a rotation system (option C; 
Commission telexpress, 6 November 2000). Although Finland, as a small member state, 
had the same preference on the Commission issue as the other small member states, these 
bilateral contacts are not considered as ‘networks’, because Finland was charged by the 
French Presidency with a clear assignment: to collect the positions of the small member 
states on the French proposal for a ceiling, which was contrary to the (original) preferences 
of the small member states.
A French-German summit was held in Vittel (probably) on 14 November 2000 during 
which the size of the Commission was (also) discussed. The German Chancellor appeared 
to very firmly call for an immediate ceiling for the Commission (option D) (Commission 
political flash report, 14 November 2000).
Prime Minister Kok had a conversation with President Chirac probably in early De-
cember 2000 about several IGC dossiers (FA/DIE/Weighting of votes preparatory note, 
unknown date). With regard to the Commission size, Kok (probably) pleaded for option 
C (20 Commissioners as of 2010) in combination with an equal rotation system. He felt 
that this system should be decided on right away rather than later on.
No evidence has been found in the data on multilateral contacts between the participat-
ing actors regarding the Commission size issue.
Formal and informal IGC meetings
After a COREPER II meeting on 14 July 1999, the first technical meeting preparing the 
IGC took place on the first leftover – the size and composition of the Commission (on 
the basis of SN 506/99, 9 July 1999).16 None of the member state actors were willing 
to abandon the principle of one Commissioner per member state (option B). The small 
member states wanted equality, while the big member states were prepared to give up their 
second Commissioner, but wanted to be compensated in the Council (weighting of votes) 
(FA/DIE PR report, 16 July 1999).
During lunch at the formal Preparatory Group on 7 March 2000, an open discussion 
(not based on a Presidency document) took place on the Commission issue in preparation 
for the next ministerial meeting on 20 March 2000 (Commission/Organisation note, 3 
March 2000). No evidence on influence attempts was found in the data.
This ministerial meeting occurred in the margins of the General Affairs Council of 20 
March 2000 on the basis of a (semi-formal) letter from the Portuguese Presidency (Minister 
Gama). The Commission (probably) expressed a preference for D/B during this meeting 
(two Commission preparatory notes, unknown dates). No evidence was found in the data 
on influence attempts by the other actors.
On 28 March 2000, a formal Preparatory Group took place on the size and composition 
of the Commission on the basis of a Presidency note (CONFER 4727/00, 24 March 
2000). The five big member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United King-
dom) expressed a preference for around 20 Commissioners (D), whereas the other, small 
member states preferred a Commission with one Commissioner per member state (B) 
(Commission report, 28 March 2000). In a FA/DIE preparatory note for this meeting, 
16. Although this preparatory meeting took place before and thus outside the IGC, it is included here as an 
exception.
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it is stated that option B was the Dutch point of departure and that D would only be 
imaginable in combination with an equal rotation system. However, it is unclear whether 
the Dutch cabinet also expressed the latter preference during the meeting.
On the basis of CONFER 4744/00 of 24 May 2000, the next formal Preparatory Group 
was held on 30 May 2000. In the document, the Presidency presented as three possible 
scenarios the options B, D and – for the first time – C (although it was left open whether 
a ceiling would indeed be established after introducing one Commissioner per member 
state for the time being). The five big member states indicated that they were in favour of 
D, whereas the small member states expressed a preference for B. Most big member states, 
except for Germany and Spain, stated that they were in favour of an equal rotation system 
in this respect. The FA/DIE report indicates that it appeared from the interventions by 
the big member states that they also expected that B would be the outcome in Nice, but 
they stressed that this would only be accepted if sufficient compensation in other dossiers 
was offered (read: more votes in the Council). The report also notes that other than Spain’s 
desire not to remove C from the table, there was hardly any support for this option. Most 
member states in fact considered this option – which would become the final outcome! – as 
a postponement (FA/DIE report, 31 May 2000). The Commission (probably) indicated 
that C was not acceptable and expressed a preference for B/D (Commission preparatory 
note, unknown date).
It is likely that the Commission size issue, as part of the Presidency report of 14 June 
2000 (CONFER 4750/00), was discussed during the Feira European Council of 19-20 
June 2000, but no data on influence attempts have been found in this regard.
There was a ministerial dinner on 10 July 2000 about, among other matters, the size and 
composition of the Commission (Commission report, 11 July 2000). Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden indicated that they were in 
favour of B. Austria was also in favour of B, but in combination with a hierarchy within the 
Commission. Germany and the United Kingdom stated that they favoured D. Spain ex-
pressed a preference for D, or otherwise B, but combined with distinguishing two categories 
of Commissioners (hierarchy). The Commission and the European Parliament indicated 
their preference for D (20)/B. The Dutch cabinet and Italy did not express a preference, 
according to the report. The French Presidency (Minister Moscovici) did not hide its major 
doubts on the possibility of maintaining a collective functioning in case of an enlarged Com-
mission. In doing so, France (as a member state) implicitly expressed its preference for D.
In CONFER 4757/00 of 11 July 2000, preparing the Preparatory Group of 14 July 
2000, the Presidency indicated that it deemed it not worthwhile to resume the discussion 
on the size of the Commission at that stage and therefore proposed coming back to it later. 
Instead, the Presidency asked for attention to be paid to the internal organisation of the 
Commission. The FA/DIE report of the meeting, however, indicates that many delegations 
still related to the size of the Commission. Commission representative Barnier stressed 
that the question of size should also be seriously studied until the end of the IGC. The 
French Presidency (Vimont) joined in by stating that reforming the Commission might 
be useful if a smaller Commission was chosen, but would be an absolute necessity if one 
Commissioner per member state was chosen (FA/DIE report, 18 July 2000).
During the informal Conclave on 24 July 2000, which was also about the internal 
organisation of the Commission, certain delegations according to the Commission report 
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repeated their interpretation of the Amsterdam Protocol on the institutions with the pros-
pect of enlargement: one Commissioner per member state (B) would be ‘acquis’.
During the formal Preparatory Group of 11 September 2000, the 10 small member states 
clearly confirmed their preference for B (Commission reports, 12 and 13 September 2000; 
FA/DIE report, 12 September 2000). According to the Commission report of this meeting, 
the Dutch cabinet stated: ‘three things are certain: death, taxation, one Commissioner per 
member state’. The European Parliament also pleaded for B. The five big member states, 
on the other hand, confirmed their preference for D, in the case of France even below 20 
Commissioners. They stated that the system of one Commissioner per member state would 
inevitably result in the entrenchment of a hierarchy. France and Germany asked why they 
would give up their second Commissioner if the Commission would not have a fixed size. 
Although Luxembourg explicitly asked which mode of composition would apply for such 
a fixed-size Commission, only Italy indicated that it was in favour of an equal rotation 
system in this regard. According to the FA/DIE report, Presidency Vimont concluded that 
the formula of one per member state would probably be the outcome of Nice, but that this 
highly political matter would have to be left to the European Council itself.
The Ministers discussed the Commission size issue during a restricted session at the 
end of the General Affairs Council of 18 September 2000 (two Commission reports, 19 
September 2000). The Presidency outlined two options during the meeting: one Commis-
sioner per member state with a hierarchy or a fixed number of Commissioners based on an 
equal rotation system. According to the report, the French Presidency openly supported 
an equal rotation system for the first time. The small member states again pleaded for one 
Commissioner per member state (B) but without a hierarchy, whereas the big member 
states were in favour of a ceiling (D). Germany indicated that there should be a hierarchy 
in the case of one Commissioner per member state, while Spain also touched upon the 
hierarchy issue in the context of the status quo option in which the big member states have 
two Commissioners (A). Italy, which was in favour of fixing the size of the Commission at 
20, pleaded for an equal rotation system. Germany and Spain, on the other hand, rejected 
the Presidency proposal on equal rotation. The United Kingdom did not comment on the 
type of system. The Commission initially presented options D and B in a seemingly equal 
manner, but it later stated, rather threatened, that three member states had stated that 
they would keep their second Commissioner if no ceiling was agreed upon. The European 
Parliament was no participant in this restricted session. The small member states stated that 
the Presidency should accept the majority view of one Commissioner per member state 
and use the final weeks of the negotiation process to focus on the powers of the President 
and the weighting of votes in Council. Towards the end of the meeting, the Presidency 
stated that it could not see itself accepting a large Commission with no hierarchy and at the 
very end, it stated that the risk of no progress would be the status quo (A).
During the Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000, the well-known division 
between the big (D) and small (B) member states came to the forefront. Option C was 
also introduced on this occasion. At least the Dutch cabinet and Belgium, in addition 
to their basic preference for B, showed themselves to be willing to consider C, under the 
condition of an equal rotation system (FA/DIE preparatory note for bilateral meetings 
on 19 and 23 October 2000, unknown date). The Commission (probably) pleaded for 
D/C (Commission preparatory note, unknown date). According to a Commission report 
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of the Preparatory Group of 30 October 2000, Prime Minister Kok had asked in Biarritz 
whether all big member states agreed to an equal rotation system. President Chirac had 
subsequently asked this question of the five Heads of State or Government, which all 
reacted positively.
A lunch meeting was held to deal with the size of the Commission during the Prepara-
tory Group of 23 October 2000. According to the Commission report of 25 October 
2000, most actors were not very specific in terms of their preferred options. Italy stated that 
‘one Commissioner per member state’ should not be established in the Treaty, as it would 
be irreversible. Germany pointed out that it should be possible to find a solution with 
an equal rotation system. Greece stated that a fixed-size Commission would be a weaker 
Commission and this would not be acceptable to the Greek parliament.
On 30 October 2000, a Preparatory Group lunch meeting was held on the size of the 
Commission (FA/DIE report, 31 October 2000; Commission report, 30 October 2000). 
In principle, the respective positions of the big and small member states had not changed. 
However, some small member states (the Dutch cabinet, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Finland) were willing to consider C, but only under the condition of an equal rotation 
system. The Dutch cabinet indicated that after having reached 27 Commissioners, the 
Commission could be reduced to, for example, 20 Commissioners and that a decision on 
the rotation should already be made (in a Protocol, or at least the principle in the Treaty). 
Italy (favouring an equal rotation system), France (as Presidency) and, with some hesita-
tion, Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain were also willing to consider C. Germany 
still indicated that a decision should be made right then (on the precise number of Com-
missioners). The United Kingdom wanted the Commission to increase to 25 rather than 
27 or 28 Commissioners, after which it should decrease. According to the FA/DIE report 
of the meeting, there was an impression that only Spain was not yet completely convinced 
of the correctness of an equal rotation system, although the Spanish representative had to 
admit that Prime Minister Aznar had agreed to this principle in Biarritz. Greece, Austria, 
Portugal, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden continued to stick to their preference for B. Sev-
eral delegations had doubts about the possibility of ‘selling’ to public opinion the solution 
of a ceiling in the long run. Thus, Luxembourg indicated that if C was the outcome, the 
principle of one per member state should be maintained in the Treaty. According to the 
two reports of the meeting, the Commission and the European Parliament did not express 
a preference for any option. The French Presidency concluded that the rotation system 
could only be based on equality. It asked the question of whether C was okay and whether 
a fixed-size Commission should apply from a specific Commission term of office or from a 
specific number of member states.
Another Preparatory Group lunch meeting was held on the size of the Commission on 
13 November 2000. The FA/DIE report of this meeting indicates that although the small 
member states continued to stick to the principle of one Commissioner per member state 
and the big member states to the idea of a smaller Commission, it was gradually becoming 
clear that the ‘Biarritz model’ (option C) was considered by everyone to be a possible com-
promise. The Commission report makes it clear that the delegations agreed that C should 
be coupled with a date (Commission term of office) and not the number of member states. 
Belgium and the United Kingdom mentioned 2010 in this regard. According to the FA/
DIE report, the Dutch cabinet was still of the opinion that B would be the proper formula, 
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but expressed a willingness to take C into consideration, under the condition of an equal 
rotation system. The Dutch representative asked the Presidency whether he had already 
developed further ideas about such a system. This appeared not to be the case. The French 
Presidency thought that such a system could not be worked out anymore before Nice. 
It would be better to include a clause in the Treaty, specifying that the Council would 
arrange a rotation system later through unanimity and that until then, the principle of 
one Commissioner per member state would apply. The Commission report indicates that 
several representatives agreed with the Presidency, stating that it would suffice to inscribe 
in the Treaty the conditions and modalities, leaving a concrete rotation schedule to a later 
decision. The Commission (probably) pleaded for C in combination with an equal rota-
tion system and coupled with a specific date from which the fixed-size Commission would 
apply (Commission preparatory note, unknown date).
On 19 November 2000, there was a Conclave about the size of the Commission (Com-
mission report, 19 November 2000). During this meeting, the well-known positions of 
principle of the big and small member states were again raised. Several delegations rejected 
the remark made in the Presidency preparatory document for the meeting (CONFER 
4802/00, 16 November 2000) that ‘the majority of delegations are prepared to consider 
the possibility of an upper limit on the number of Commission members’. The Presi-
dency still concluded during the meeting that a majority of the delegations were willing 
to explore the ‘third way’ (C). The most cited scenario was a Commission composed of 
one Commissioner per member state from 2005 and a fixed-size Commission from 2010 
(Italy, Belgium, the Dutch cabinet, Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Spain and 
France), with a possible transgression to add new member states (point particularly made 
by the Dutch cabinet, Germany, Denmark and Finland). Those that expressed themselves 
on the starting point for the ceiling preferred the start of a Commission term of office and 
not a specific number of member states. Yet others only wanted to consider this issue when 
it was at hand, with the adaptation of the number during a next Commission (Sweden, 
Austria, Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland and Greece). It is not completely clear whether and 
to what extent these countries as well as Ireland actually expressed that they were willing to 
consider option C in addition to their basic preference for B. With regard to the number of 
Commissioners, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and France preferred a maximum of 
20 while Belgium and the Dutch cabinet wanted more than 20. An equal rotation system, 
insisted upon by the small member states, was generally accepted; however, the United 
Kingdom proposed a system of free choice for the President of the Commission between 
the candidates proposed by the member states. According to a FA/DIE preparatory note 
for the meeting, the Dutch cabinet (probably) stressed that it would only accept a ceiling 
if the conditions for an equal rotation system were very clearly established in the Treaty. In 
the words of Prime Minister Kok, the conditions should be ‘written in stone’. Therefore, 
the Dutch cabinet did not want to leave the conditions for a rotation system to a future 
unanimous decision by the Council. This would also be of great importance to political 
feasibility. The Commission (probably) indicated that for C, the ceiling should apply from 
a certain date, the number of Commissioners should be fixed at 20 and the principle of 
equal rotation should be established in the Treaty, while leaving the establishment of the 
concrete list to a future decision by the Council (Commission preparatory note, unknown 
date).
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On 24 November 2000, an informal Preparatory Group dinner meeting was held to 
discuss the size of the Commission. The FA/DIE report of the meeting states that there still 
appeared to be three schools, one that assumed a ceiling that would start from when the 
EU had 27/28 members without mentioning a specific date, one that assumed a fixed date 
of 2010 and one that did not accept a ceiling at all. Only three member states, Sweden, 
Greece and Denmark, tended towards this last solution (B). The other small member states 
could see that further resistance was in vain and that they would have to accept a fixed-size 
Commission in due course (C). Opinion was still divided as to the number of Commis-
sioners (varying from 20 to 27).
Another Conclave was held on the size and composition of the Commission on 3 De-
cember 2000. A FA/DIE preparatory note for this meeting indicates that the Dutch cabinet 
wanted a ceiling of 20 Commissioners from 2010, but at the same time (the guarantees 
for) an equal rotation system should be established in the Treaty (C). The criteria that the 
Presidency proposed in this regard for the meeting in CONFER 4813/00 of 1 December 
2000 would not be sufficiently tough. Among other matters, they would not guarantee 
that each member state over a certain period of time could nominate a Commissioner. It 
is unclear whether and to what extent the Dutch cabinet actually expressed these points 
during the meeting, but it probably did.
The negotiations on the size and composition of the Commission were concluded during 
the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000. According to a FA/DIE preparatory 
note for this meeting, the Dutch cabinet (probably) pleaded for C (for example, 20 Com-
missioners from a certain date, such as 2010), but on the condition of an equal rotation 
system, the conditions of which would be established precisely in the Treaty. It is again 
concluded that the Dutch cabinet probably undertook an influence attempt.
Table 7.27 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts for the Commission (see Tables 14a-c in Annex 6 for 
more details)
 Influence attempts
Goal-achievement
Few Considerable Much
0
1 or 2 Size
3
All in all, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence attempts regarding the Com-
mission size issue (26 out of 32 occasions). In terms of the other participating actors, the 
other member state actors (and the Commission) have undertaken roughly as many influ-
ence attempts as the Dutch cabinet during the IGC meetings. Moreover, for the greater 
part of the negotiation process, the member states were clearly divided based on their size 
between the ‘block’ of small member states (favouring option B) and the ‘block’ of big 
member states (favouring option D).
7.12.2 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
The Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence attempts with regard to the Commis-
sion size issue and has partially achieved its goal (2). There is a positive correlation between 
the influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet and its extent of goal-achievement, but it is 
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difficult to assess whether this is also a matter of causation in terms of influence. This is 
particularly so, because all the participating actors have achieved their goals to a greater 
or lesser extent and all (member state) actors have undertaken many influence attempts. 
Moreover, for a long time, there was little movement of the relative positions of the actors 
during the negotiation process, with the small member states in favour of B and the big 
member states preferring D. It must be recognised that the Dutch cabinet was one of the 
few small member states that first indicated during the negotiation process that it was 
willing to consider C as a compromise under the condition of an equal rotation system. 
This may have been a strategic move, in the sense that a fixed-size Commission in the 
longer run (C) and in combination with an equal rotation system was more preferable for 
the Dutch cabinet than a fixed-size Commission right away (D) without equal rotation. 
Yet, it should be noted that the Dutch cabinet preferably wanted to establish in the Treaty 
not only the conditions for an equal rotation system – as was the final outcome – but also 
the system itself. All in all, it still seems plausible to conclude that the Dutch cabinet has 
exerted explicit influence in this regard (type 1).
However, explicit influence seems not to be the only mechanism and not necessarily the 
most important one. In any case, the Dutch cabinet clearly had a good starting point in the 
sense that its most preferred option, introducing one Commissioner per member state (B), 
was shared by all the small member states. In total, there was a clear majority of 10 member 
states in favour of this option. In addition, the Dutch cabinet’s preference also left room 
for D (under the condition of an equal rotation system), so that its ‘overall’ preference on 
this issue lay in between the two main and extreme options of B and D. Put differently, its 
preference was less extreme than for many of the other Nice Treaty issues. Thus, the Dutch 
cabinet had a higher chance of achieving its goal on this issue. In addition to exerting 
explicit influence on the basis of undertaking influence attempts itself, the Dutch cabinet 
has therefore also profited from the fact that a majority of actors shared its basic preference 
and that its ‘overall’ preference was an intermediate one (free ride, type 2). It is precisely 
because the Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence attempts itself, however, that it 
cannot be concluded that its goal-achievement was (also) a matter of sheer luck (type 4).
7.13 Commission size: explaining the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.13.1 Influence resources
Policy positions
 -  The more advantageous policy positions the Dutch cabinet holds, the more influence it 
will exert.
Table 7.28 Commission: policy positions (see Table 13 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Policy positions
Influence
No Yes
No
Yes Size (‘pivotal’ and ‘majority’ position)
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The only real ‘pivotal’ position is option C (fixed-size Commission later). B also lies between 
other options, but is in fact a rather ‘extreme’ one (one Commissioner per member state), as 
with A (status quo) and D (fixed-size Commission now). Therefore, strictly speaking, only 
the United Kingdom, which preferred D/C, (partially) had a pivotal position during the 
negotiation process on the Commission issue. The Dutch cabinet preferred B in principle, 
but was willing to accept D on the condition that it was combined with an equal rotation 
system. In doing so, the Dutch cabinet also held a kind of pivotal position. The Dutch 
cabinet held a ‘majority’ position, because in total 10 (small) member states were more or 
less in favour of B (with two in favour of B>D).
The expectation is fully supported by the data. However, just the possession of policy 
positions (pivotal and majority) cannot explain why the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence 
in this case. Rather, its influence was the result of the strategic use of its pivotal position in 
particular, via influence attempts (see Section 7.13.2).
Networks
 -  The more a part of a network the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
Table 7.29 Commission: networks (see Table 13 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Networks
Influence
Hardly or not at all Considerable Much
No
Yes Size
A bilateral meeting on the Commission issue was held between the Dutch cabinet and 
Denmark on 23 October 2000 and with Finland on 14 November 2000. Although it is 
unclear what was discussed during these meetings, these contacts are considered as ‘net-
works’ because the respective actors had the same preferences concerning this issue.
Consultations between the Benelux countries were held on the Commission issue on 
1 December 2000 in The Hague. A FA/DIE preparatory note stated that the Presidency 
was willing to establish the principle of an equal rotation system in the Treaty, but not 
the details of the arrangement, which would now be too complex. However, a ceiling was 
unacceptable to the Dutch cabinet without a written arrangement. The Dutch cabinet 
wanted a precise arrangement to now be established. The note also indicated that the 
Dutch cabinet rejected the Belgian idea to couple things in (the IGC of ) 2004 to further 
competences for the Commission. This would not be a good idea: a good ‘deal’ could never 
be obtained in due time as was now the case. Although the Benelux countries had the same 
preferences on the size of the Commission and probably consulted with one another in 
order to realise these preferences, the note also makes clear that opinion was divided at least 
between the Dutch cabinet and Belgium. It is not clear whether Belgium and Luxembourg 
were also of the opinion that a precise arrangement on the equal rotation system should 
be established.
All in all, the Dutch cabinet was hardly a part of a network with regard to the Commis-
sion size issue. The expectation is therefore not supported. The fact that the Dutch cabinet 
undertook many, particularly strategic, influence attempts can explain why it still exerted 
its influence (see Section 7.13.2).
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A bilateral meeting between the Commission (Prodi) and Germany (Schröder) was held 
on 24 September 2000 on the Commission issue. Another meeting between the two took 
place on 22 November 2000. Germany (Schröder) met bilaterally with the United King-
dom on 16 November 2000. A multilateral meeting of the Nordic Council (Denmark, 
Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden) took place on 6 November 2000 (Commission 
telexpress, 6 November 2000). It is not clear whether and to what extent these countries 
consulted on the IGC in general and the Commission issue in particular, but it is rather 
likely. In any case, these contacts are considered as networks, because the actors shared the 
same preferences on the issue.
Internal coherence
 -  The more internally coherent the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
Table 7.30 Commission: internal coherence (see Table 13 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Internal coherence
Influence
No: divided with regard to 
preferences and/or actions
Yes
No
Yes Size
Based on the data, the Dutch cabinet was internally coherent with regard to the Commis-
sion issue. The expectation is therefore fully supported.
Some evidence on the internal divisiveness of the Commission on preferences has been 
found. In a German newspaper on 20 October 2000 that is included in the Commis-
sion archive, it is stated that the German Commissioner was in favour of B (whereas the 
actual preference of the Commission was D, certainly at the time of the negotiations). 
According to a FA/DIE report of several bilateral contacts of the Dutch cabinet with the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat on 8 November 2000, all Commissioners had 
blamed the Commission representative to the IGC, Barnier, that he stood too much in the 
publicity behind the French position in favour of C. In reaction the College would now 
almost unanimously have chosen option B, which was also the reason why President Prodi 
expressed this to the press. At the request of the College, a document was now drafted that 
should prove that a big Commission might function very well with internal organisational 
reforms. According to the data, however, this internal divisiveness on preferences has not 
resulted in divergent actions, i.e. influence attempts during IGC meetings.
7.13.2 Influence attempts
 -  The more influence attempts the Dutch cabinet undertakes, the more influence it will 
exert.
Table 7.31 Commission: influence attempts (see Tables 14a-c in Annex 6 for more details)
 Influence attempts
Influence
Few Considerable Much
No
Yes Size
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As indicated in Section 7.12.1, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence at-
tempts concerning the Commission size issue (26 out of 32 occasions). The expectation is 
therefore fully supported by the data. The many influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet, 
particularly its strategic move towards the end of the negotiation process – its willingness 
to consider option C as a compromise under the condition of an equal rotation system (see 
Section 7.12.2) – contribute to the explanation of its influence.
7.13.3 Domestic actors and factors
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by domestic actors (parliament, 
constitutional court) and factors (referendum, public opinion, elections, events and 
political conflicts), the more (less) influence it will exert.
Table 7.32 Commission: domestic actors and factors (see Table 15 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Domestic actors
and factors
Influence
Constrained Enabled
No
Yes Size
During the Preparatory Group of 23 October 2000, Greece stated that a fixed-size Com-
mission (option D) was not acceptable to its parliament. Greece was thus enabled by its 
parliament to realise its preference for B. On 25 October 2000, the Danish parliament 
declared that it was against the French proposal for a fixed-size Commission (C), demand-
ing that each member state should have a Commissioner (B) (Commission telexpress, 
25 October 2000). In doing so, the Danish parliament enabled its government to realise 
option B. During the Preparatory Group of 30 October 2000, the Dutch cabinet and 
Portugal (implicitly) negatively referred to their parliaments in connection with C. The 
Dutch cabinet wondered how this option could be sold to the national parliaments (FA/
DIE report, 31 October 2000). Portugal indicated that it had major doubts about this 
option because of the difficult ‘political situation’ in Portugal (Commission report, 30 
October 2000). This enabled them to realise their preferences for B.
In a FA/DIE preparatory note for the Nice European Council, it is stated that Sweden, 
Portugal, Denmark, Finland and Ireland kept resisting a maximum number of Commis-
sioners (C), which would be partly domestically politically motivated (ratification, refer-
enda). Their parliaments and/or a possible referendum enabled these countries to realise 
their preference for B.
During the General Affairs Council of 18 September 2000, Ireland referred to public 
opinion while pleading for B (Commission report, 19 September 2000). During the Biar-
ritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000, the Dutch cabinet (probably) referred to 
its citizens while pleading for B. A FA/DIE preparatory note for bilateral meetings on 
19 and 23 October 2000 refers to ‘a recognisable face in Brussels for the citizens’ (public 
opinion in general) as an argument used by the small member states in favour of B. During 
the Preparatory Group of 30 October 2000, Portugal, Germany and Ireland questioned 
whether C could be sold to public opinion (Commission report, 30 October 2000). The 
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Dutch cabinet did the same (FA/DIE report, 30 October 2000). During the Preparatory 
Group of 13 November 2000, Germany stated that, in any case, a final decision should be 
made in Nice on the size of the Commission, referring to the effect on public opinion if 
there would be leftovers from Nice (Commission report, 14 November 2000). The Dutch 
cabinet (probably) did the same during the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 
2000 (FA/DIE preparatory note, unknown date). In all these instances, the respective actors 
were enabled by public opinion in general or in particular in realising their preferences.
The Dutch cabinet was enabled by domestic actors and factors regarding the Commission 
size issue and exerted its influence. The expectation is therefore fully supported. However, 
as it was only modestly enabled and this structural variable is theoretically subordinate to 
the agency variables of the conceptual model, its explanatory value is concluded to be at 
most complementary to the influence attempts explanation (see Section 7.13.2).
7.13.4 Negotiation level
 -  The lower the level at which an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet 
will exert.
Table 7.33 Commission: negotiation level (see Table 16 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation level
Influence
High Moderate Low
No
Yes Size
The Commission issue was discussed eight times at the formal level 3 (Preparatory Groups 
of 7 March 2000, 28 March 2000, 30 May 2000, 14 July 2000, 11 September 2000, 23 
October 2000, 30 October 2000 and 13 November 2000) and once at the informal level 3 
(Preparatory Group of 24 November 2000). It was discussed three times at the formal level 
2 (General Affairs Councils of 20 March 2000, 10 July 2000 and 18 September 2000) and 
three times at the informal level 2 (Conclaves of 24 July 2000, 19 November 2000 and 
3 December 2000). In addition, the issue was discussed once at the formal level 1 (Nice 
European Council of 7-11 December 2000) and once at the informal level 1 (Biarritz 
European Council of 13-14 October 2000). The median is 3.
The expectation is fully supported by the data. It is difficult to assess the contribution 
of this variable to the Dutch cabinet’s extent of influence. It was during the highest level 
of the Biarritz European Council that the Dutch cabinet indicated that it was willing 
to consider C with the condition of an equal rotation system. It was during the Nice 
European Council that the outcome was finally agreed upon. Between these two meetings 
at the highest level, however, several meetings of the Preparatory Group were held, during 
which the final outcome took shape. The fact that these were low-level meetings might 
have contributed to the consolidation of this outcome and thus to the Dutch cabinet’s 
influence. Yet this explanation seems subordinate to the influence attempts explanation 
discussed earlier (Section 7.13.2).
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7.13.5 Negotiation timing
 -  The earlier an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet will exert.
Table 7.34 Commission: negotiation timing (see Table 16 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation timing
Influence
Late Moderate Early
No
Yes Size
The Commission issue was discussed on 7 March 2000 (IGC week 4), 20 March (6), 28 
March (7), 30 May (16), 10 July (22), 14 July (22), 24 July (24), 11 September (31), 18 
September (32), 13-14 October (35), 23 October (37), 30 October (38), 13 November 
(40), 19 November (40), 24 November (41), 3 December (42) and 7-11 December (43). 
This results in an average IGC week number of 25.9.
The expectation is fully supported by the data. It must, however, be recognised that 
the final outcome on the Commission size issue took shape only towards the end of the 
negotiation process. Until then, the issue had been negotiated for a long time, with little 
movement of the relative positions of the actors. It is therefore not plausible to conclude 
that this variable can explain the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence.
7.13.6 External events and developments
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by external events and develop-
ments, the more (less) influence it will exert.
Table 7.35 Commission: external events and developments (see Table 16 in Annex 6 for more details)
 External events and
developments
Influence
Constrained Enabled
No
Yes Size
The impending enlargement was an external development constraining the Dutch cabinet, 
as it formed an external pressure to reduce the size of the Commission (option D), whereas 
the Dutch cabinet was in principle in favour of one Commissioner per member state 
(option B).
The expectation is therefore not supported by the data. As mentioned in Section 7.13.2, 
(strategic) influence attempts can explain why the Dutch cabinet exerted influence with 
regard to the Commission size issue.
7.14 Commission size: conclusions and reflections
The Dutch cabinet has undertaken many influence attempts with regard to the Commis-
sion size issue.
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It has exerted explicit influence, but has also profited from the fact that a majority of the 
member states shared its basic preference and that its ‘overall’ preference lay in between two 
extreme preferences (free ride).
The influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet, particularly its strategic move towards 
the end of the negotiation process – its willingness to consider option C as a compromise 
under the condition of an equal rotation system – can explain why the Dutch cabinet 
exerted its influence regarding the Commission size issue.
However, the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence cannot be completely explained 
by the conceptual model. The exchange variable, which already appeared to play a role in 
previous dossiers, was probably most important regarding the Commission and Weighting 
of votes dossiers. The outcome for the Commission size issue was the result of a complex 
package deal, which also included the Court of Auditor’s size, the weighting of votes in 
the Council and the allocation of seats in the European Parliament. The exchange among 
the actors concerning these interrelated dossiers and issues seems to have contributed to 
the final outcomes. In particular, the fact that the Court of Auditor’s size was not reduced 
created room for a reduction – albeit in the longer term – of the Commission’s size.
7.15 Weighting of votes: assessing the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.15.1 The extent of influence attempts
Formal individual written proposals
The Dutch cabinet has undertaken an influence attempt regarding all three issues in its po-
sition paper (see Section 5.7). Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom 
undertook an influence attempt with regard to the Type of system and General weighting 
issues. Finland, Greece, the Commission and the Parliament did so only regarding the 
Type of system issue (see Section 6.7). In an additional contribution to the IGC on this 
dossier (CONFER 4751/00, 16 June 2000), Italy supported option E with regard to the 
Type of system issue, A with regard to the General weighting issue and B with regard to 
the Individual weighting issue (it proposed giving the four biggest member states the same 
number of votes (33)).
Formal joint written proposals
In the first Benelux memorandum, the Benelux countries stated that they were open to 
discuss both a re-weighting of votes and a dual majority system, and expressed a preference 
for A/B with regard to the General and Individual weighting issues (CONFER 4721/00, 7 
March 2000). These preferences represent compromise positions as a result of the opposing 
preferences of the Dutch cabinet on the one hand and Belgium (and Luxembourg) on the 
other (see Sections 5.7 and 6.7). In the second Benelux memorandum, the same positions 
on the three issues were included, using somewhat different formulations (CONFER 
4787/00, 19 October 2000).
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Semi-formal individual and joint written proposals
According to the FA/DIE archive, many actors drafted all kinds of weighting of votes pro-
posals during the negotiation process, which were to a greater or lesser extent distributed 
and discussed among (particular) actors. Based on the data, however, it is hardly or not at 
all possible to examine the precise number and nature of these proposals for each of the 
actors.
Informal bilateral and multilateral contacts
On 1 December 1999, the Benelux countries consulted on their first Benelux memoran-
dum (FA/DIE memorandum, 1 December 1999), which resulted in a new draft that was 
distributed among the three by fax. The most amount of time was spent on the section 
about the weighting of votes (all three issues), particularly the three factors that should 
be taken into account in the new weighting (see Section 5.7.3). The Benelux countries 
had common preferences concerning several IGC dossiers, but with regard to the weight-
ing of votes in fact had divergent preferences regarding the Type of system issue and, as 
far as the Dutch cabinet and Belgium were concerned, the Individual weighting issue. 
Even regarding the General weighting issue, the Dutch cabinet held an ambivalent posi-
tion – different from its partners – in that it wanted both to maintain the global balance 
between big and small member states and weighting the population size of a member state 
heavier. Therefore, when drafting the Benelux memorandum, the Benelux countries both 
tried to lay down common preferences and undertook influence attempts to realise their 
individual preferences. On 6 December 1999, a Benelux summit took place during which 
they probably discussed at least the Type of system and Individual weighting issues (FA/
DIE preparatory note, unknown date).
On 31 January 2000, a lunch meeting was held between the Dutch and Belgian Foreign 
Affairs Ministers in Brussels, which probably also dealt with the Weighting of votes dossier, 
particularly the Type of system and Individual weighting issues (FA/DIE memorandum, 
27 January 2000).
Benelux consultations were held in The Hague on 1 December 2000 (FA/DIE prepara-
tory note, unknown date). The note indicates that the Italian model (3-33, without dif-
ferentiation) was not acceptable to the Dutch cabinet, because the big member states were 
running out too much and three of them could block a decision, and the Dutch weight 
was not being differentiated from the countries with 10 million inhabitants. Belgium 
wanted to introduce four new clusters: 24-10-7-4. Verhofstadt had supposedly stated that 
the variant with a small differentiation would also be possible (so Germany 26, France 24, 
the Netherlands 11 and Belgium 10 votes). These proposals were probably acceptable to 
Luxembourg. The Dutch cabinet saw nothing in new clusters. Belgium and Luxembourg 
maintained their preference for a dual majority system. Belgium maintained its bottom 
line that in the case of re-weighting, no differentiation between the Dutch cabinet and 
Belgium should take place. Luxembourg wanted a high minimum number of votes per 
member state (three, if possible four votes) in a re-weighting.
On 28 and 29 February 2000, President Chirac and Prime Minister Kok met and agreed 
to conduct bilateral consultations on the IGC and particularly concerning the weighting 
of votes (FA/DIE Paris embassy note, 18 April 2000). On 17 April 2000, a Dutch official 
held separate conversations with three French colleagues at least about the Type of system 
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and Individual weighting issues, which was the first follow-up of this agreement (FA/DIE 
Paris embassy note, 18 April 2000). The Dutch official indicated that it was in favour of 
a re-weighing of votes. However, one French official stated that this should not result in a 
relatively higher number of votes for Germany. A greater voting weight for Germany could 
be achieved through a double majority system. Another French official stated that France 
was strongly in favour of a re-weighting and saw Germany as an attractive ally in this 
respect. After all, a double majority system was much more favourable for Germany than 
a couple of votes more. Germany would not yet have approached France with its desire 
for differentiation vis-à-vis France. Neither Schröder nor Fischer had raised this point to 
Chirac and Védrine, respectively. An authoritative French reasoning was therefore that the 
Germans would not raise this subject themselves. Germany would rather fence with the 
double majority that would solve the German problem seemingly less directly. The French 
official agreed with the Dutch official that France would do well to anticipate a more direct 
German request. The French official also indicated wanting to make an appointment in the 
margins of the ‘Six seminar’ of 28 and 29 April 2000 for a conversation between the Dutch 
cabinet, Germany and France in May 2000.
In keeping with this, Dutch, French and German officials met about the weighting of 
votes in Paris on 5 May 2000 (FA/DIE memorandum, 8 May 2000). The memorandum, 
which includes a report of the meeting, makes it clear that it was particularly about the 
Type of system and Individual weighting issues. The positions of Germany and France 
were clearly adapted, but in opposite ways. Unlike earlier conversations, the German of-
ficial completely supported the Dutch desire for a greater voting weight at that moment. 
Formally, he continued to state that Berlin’s first preference was the double key (including 
a light re-weighting to the advantage of the big member states). Germany, however, realised 
that this was not acceptable to France. The German official now openly put on the table the 
demand of more votes for Germany and a disconnection vis-à-vis the other big member 
states. The official added that the wishes of the Foreign Affairs Ministry were still modest. 
The Chancellor would want to go much further. He put several models on the table, 
including an Italian idea in which both Germany and the Netherlands were disconnected 
from their groups. The Italian model had a greater range than the others: Germany 33, 
Luxembourg three votes. The French official was also clear: Paris rejected both a German 
and a Dutch disconnection. The French Presidency would not put any proposals or models 
on the table that contained a ‘décrochage’ of Germany and/or the Netherlands. In reaction 
to the objection that Chirac had provided an opening to both Kok and Schröder, the 
official eventually hinted that some movement at the highest political level might not be 
completely excluded. It was first necessary for the Chancellor to make his wishes unam-
biguously clear. Concerning the Netherlands, the French official allowed no doubt that 
The Hague should itself convince Belgium. During bilateral conversations, the Belgians 
had given no opening at all to the French. The official clearly showed that Paris wanted to 
avoid every direct conflict with Belgium. France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium 
were against the Dutch cabinet. The French official indicated that the meeting had been 
useful and proposed that the Ministers continue the discussion. The report concludes that 
it was clear that the French did not want to commit themselves to anything and wanted to 
test how powerful the political level would carry the positions taken. Paris realised that it 
was in a very difficult position: eventually it would have to choose between two evils: either 
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the double key or re-weighting with a German disconnection. The aversion to the double 
key was strong because then the German weight really counted.
A summit was held between France and Germany in Mainz, at some point during the 
first half of the IGC, during which they probably talked about the weighting of votes (FA/
DIE memorandum, 12 September 2000).
The Dutch and Italian State Secretaries met in Rome on 14 March 2000, where the 
Dutch State Secretary indicated that the Dutch cabinet held a tough position concerning 
the weighting of votes and closer cooperation/QMV, but was willing to be more flexible 
on other subjects, such as the ESDP and the necessity of Treaty change (FA/DIE/ESDP 
memorandum, 15 March 2000).
Prime Ministers Blair and Kok met on 15 March 2000 (probably also) about the Weight-
ing of votes dossier (FA/DIE London embassy note, 11 May 2000). The next day, Blair 
called Chirac to secure French support on no differentiation between the Dutch cabinet 
and Belgium, so that there would also be no differentiation between Germany and France. 
Chirac would have promised this support.
On 10 April 2000, a meeting was held between Dutch and British officials about (prob-
ably all three) Weighting of votes issues (FA/DIE memorandum, 12 April 2000). During 
this meeting, the British official put two re-weighting proposals on the table. The United 
Kingdom had already consulted about these models with Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain. According to the official, they had been received well by these countries. One day 
after this meeting, the British official sent a fax to his Dutch colleague containing the two 
British weighting proposals (FA/DIE fax, 11 April 2000).
A Dutch and a British official had a conversation in London in May (precise date 
unknown) at least about the General and Individual weighting issues (FA/DIE London 
embassy note, 11 May 2000).
A Dutch official and an Italian official made contact about the Weighting of votes dos-
sier after a general briefing of the latter about the Feira European Council (precise date 
unknown; FA/DIE Rome embassy fax, 16 June 2000). On this occasion, Italy also passed 
a proposal, which would be presented to the IGC on 16 June 2000 (see Formal individual 
written proposals).
E-mail contact between Dutch officials in The Hague and the Athens embassy makes it 
clear that there have been several contacts between Dutch and Greek officials (probably) 
in Athens probably about the Type of system and Individual weighting issues (FA/DIE 
e-mail, June 2000).
 Dutch and Italian officials had a conversation around 12 September 2000 about, among 
other matters, the Weighting of votes dossier. The Italian official understood that The Hague 
was disappointed with the Italian model, but thought that it was able to offer perspective 
on this point. He did not think that Schröder would present the desire for differentiation 
(between Germany and Italy) during the bilateral summit with Amato the following week. 
However, differentiation was not non-negotiable for Rome. In that case, the Dutch cabinet 
could also look for differentiation (with Belgium) (FA/DIE/ESDP Rome embassy report, 
12 September 2000).
In the margins of the Preparatory Group of probably 23 October 2000, there was contact 
between a Dutch official and his French and British colleagues about the weighting of 
votes. The French and British officials confirmed the strategy of the French Presidency 
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not to come too early with texts about the Commission and the weighting of votes. This 
strategy was fine-tuned with the big member states. The progress report of 3 November 
2000 therefore would not include texts on these two dossiers. The British official stated 
that if the weighting of votes proposal was put forward too early, the (small) member states 
would dig themselves in and nothing would result in Nice. Only in Nice should the text be 
put on the table. The British official stated that the Netherlands came out well regarding 
the weighting of votes. His Dutch colleague replied that it could be even better and that in 
particular, the gap vis-à-vis Romania was a problem in The Hague. The British stated that 
the Dutch cabinet should not complain as long as it was over-represented. According to 
the Dutch official, it also had to do with the degree of over-representation of other member 
states (Romania, Spain and Poland). The British official admitted that a certain choice had 
been made on this (FA/DIE e-mail, unknown date).
The Dutch State Secretary visited Copenhagen on 26 October 2000 and the Weighting 
of votes dossier was (probably) discussed during this meeting (FA/DIE preparatory note, 
unknown date).
A FA/DIE memorandum of 2 November 2000 makes it clear that there would be an ‘old 
six’ meeting in Berlin probably in November 2000, during which the weighting of votes 
would probably be discussed.
France visited Portugal in Lisbon on 2 November 2000. It is not clear which subjects 
were discussed during this meeting, but the Weighting of votes dossier was likely one 
of them (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 7829, 26 October 2000; included in Commission 
archive).
There was a French-German summit in Vittel (probably) on 14 November 2000 during 
which the Type of system and Individual weighting issues were (also) discussed. According 
to a Commission report, the German Chancellor, while favouring a dual majority system, 
showed himself to be willing to support the Presidency. If a global agreement on the IGC was 
in sight in Nice, the Chancellor would not endanger it by asking for a differentiation vis-à-
vis France (Commission political flash report, 14 November 2000). In light of this summit, 
the German Foreign Affairs Ministry was concerned about the ‘firmness’ of the position of 
the Chancellor concerning differentiation vis-à-vis France. The German official was under 
the impression that for the sake of French-German relations, the Chancellor would give in 
on this point. ‘Massive pressure’ would have been exerted on him in Vittel. Another German 
official made a connection with the Dutch position: ‘if you don’t stick to your position, we 
can forget the décrochage’ (FA/DIE Berlin embassy note, 15 November 2000).
A FA/DIE memorandum of 20 November 2000 states that a ‘recent meeting’ between 
the Dutch and Belgian Prime Ministers Kok and Verhofstadt was held and that there had 
been a ‘possible meeting’ between the Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister Van Aartsen and 
Verhofstadt. The memorandum deals with all three Weighting of votes issues, which were 
therefore probably discussed during these meetings.
After the Preparatory Group of 24 November 2000, the Dutch Permanent Representa-
tive spoke with Chairman Vimont, who said that the Presidency planned to present an 
‘alternative proposal’ (probably similar to the Italian model) as the best solution (FA/DIE/
Commission report, 27 November 2000; see Formal and informal IGC meetings). This 
proposal would particularly take account of the Dutch desire for differentiation (option A 
regarding the Individual weighting issue).
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Prime Minister Kok had a conversation with President Chirac probably in early Decem-
ber 2000 about several IGC dossiers (FA/DIE preparatory note, unknown date). With 
regard to the Weighting of votes dossier, the Dutch Prime Minister (probably) pleaded 
for a re-weighting of votes (E), but was open to a dual majority system (A or B). In ad-
dition, he backed option A/B regarding the General weighting issue and A regarding the 
Individual weighting issue.
A FA/DIE report of the Paris embassy of 1 December 2000 reports conversations Dutch 
officials had with four French colleagues. In Nice and not earlier, a compromise proposal 
would be put on the table with a simple weighting, in which the voting weight of each 
member state would be established in a ‘fork’. The point of departure would be something 
‘in between Italy and the other proposals’. The intention was that negotiations about the 
precise number of votes would be done within the margins presented. One of the French 
officials noted that ‘bigger margins between big and small member states increase the 
possibility to realise the special desires of certain countries’, referring explicitly to Spain 
and the Netherlands. The small member states were met by building in a ‘safety net’, so a 
member state might request that a decision was also carried by a majority of the member 
states. Concerning the blocking minority, it was known that France had a preference for 
three big member states, but this did not seem to be a crucial point for France. Regarding 
the voting difference with Germany, the French Matignon official still trusted the often 
repeated statement ‘that this subject may not result in a problem between both countries’. 
In other words, France did not give in and if it would, this would be in exchange for what 
was in the eyes of France a very good arrangement.
The commentary included in the report states that the French insistence on equality with 
Germany became increasingly strong. Chirac probably publicly confirmed in Madrid (as 
part of his ‘tour des capitales’) that France could not accept a differentiation. The big ques-
tion was what the prize (for Germany or France) would be to give in on this point. One 
of the French officials had mentioned as an element of a ‘good enough agreement’, among 
other things a Commission arrangement along the lines of the original French proposal (a 
ceiling right away at less than 20 Commissioners). According to the Dutch commentator 
of the report, it seemed improbable that this was really the most essential for France (FA/
DIE Paris embassy report, 1 December 2000).
Formal and informal IGC meetings
On 15 September 1999, the second technical meeting preparing the IGC took place about 
the weighting of votes after a COREPER II meeting (FA/DIE PR report, 16 September 
1999).17 Almost all Permanent Representatives did not have definite instructions, so that 
it was not accidental that most of them were in line with their governments at the end 
of the Amsterdam IGC. There appeared to be hardly any support for double majorities, 
even from the United Kingdom. France was open to Germany getting more votes (option 
A regarding the Individual weighting issue). The big member states accepted the over-
representation of small member states, but wanted a balance (option A with regard to the 
General weighting issue). Spain indicated that it wanted to have as many votes as the other 
17. Although this preparatory meeting took place before and thus outside the IGC, it is included here by way 
of exception.
258 Chapter 7
big member states (option A of the Individual weighting issue). The Council Secretariat 
(De Boissieu) indicated that it was no longer taboo to give Germany more votes than 
France, if revision was also applied to the countries that followed below (mentioning the 
Netherlands as an example). In addition, the Council Secretariat was in favour of D as 
far as the QMV threshold was concerned. The Dutch Permanent Representative was in 
principle not against this option. Spain, on the other hand, wanted to increase the QMV 
threshold (F), while others, including the United Kingdom, tended towards maintaining 
the current threshold (E).
During lunch at the formal Preparatory Group on 7 March 2000, an open discussion 
(not based on a Presidency document) took place on the Weighting of votes dossier in 
preparation for the next ministerial meeting on 20 March 2000 (Commission/Organisa-
tion note, 3 March 2000). No evidence of influence attempts was found in the data.
This ministerial meeting occurred in the margins of the General Affairs Council of 20 
March 2000 on the basis of a (semi-formal) letter from the Portuguese Presidency (Minister 
Gama). The Commission (probably) expressed a preference for A with regard to the Type 
of system issue during this meeting (two Commission preparatory notes). In terms of the 
other actors, no specific evidence was found in the data on influence attempts. However, 
the Commission report of the following Preparatory Group on 4 April 2000 indicates that 
the positions of the delegations on the Type of system issue had not changed from the 
General Affairs Council of 20 March 2000 (Commission report, 4 April 2000). Therefore, 
it is concluded that the evidence on influence attempts found for the Preparatory Group 
of 4 April 2000, which is presented below, also applies to the General Affairs Council of 
20 March 2000.
On 4 April 2000, the first Preparatory Group on the Weighting of votes dossier took 
place, as there was no time left for the subject during the previous Preparatory Group of 
28 March 2000 (Commission report, 4 April 2000; FA/DIE report, 5 April 2000). The 
Dutch cabinet, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom expressed 
themselves to be in favour of a re-weighting of votes with a QMV threshold around the 
current level (E). Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Luxembourg were in favour of a dual majority system. None of these countries were in 
favour of A in this regard. The FA/DIE report of this meeting indicates that most of these 
countries preferred a simple majority of the member states and 60% of the population (B). 
This is confirmed by the Commission report, which indicates that Denmark was in favour 
of a dual majority system in accordance with the ‘Amsterdam formula’. This boils down 
to option C. Spain indicated that in the case of a dual majority system, the population 
percentage should be 70%. The Commission and the European Parliament preferred A. 
The only contradiction between the two reports concerns the position of Ireland. The 
FA/DIE report states that Ireland was in favour of a dual majority system, whereas the 
Commission report indicates that it was in favour of a re-weighting. Therefore, it is not 
known what kind of influence attempt Ireland has undertaken, but it is concluded that it 
has in any case undertaken one.
The divide between the big and small member states with regard to the General weight-
ing issue was also put forward clearly during the meeting. The small member states did not 
want to give much more weight to population size and wanted to maintain the balance 
between big and small member states (B), whereas the big member states preferred to give 
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much more weight to population size in light of previous and future enlargements involv-
ing mainly small member states, and/or wanted to be compensated for giving up their 
second Commissioner (A). It is unclear whether the Dutch cabinet, as with the other small 
member states, pleaded for B, or whether it took a more ambivalent position in keeping 
with its original preference (A/B). The Commission (probably) supported A.
Regarding the Individual weighting issue, the Dutch cabinet probably pleaded for A 
(FA/DIE preparatory note, unknown date). Belgium indicated that the population ele-
ment could weigh heavier via differentiation if applied to all groups, which boils down to 
option B. Germany stated that the existing clusters were not a satisfying form of voting 
distribution and pleaded for differentiation on the basis of population size. In doing so, 
Germany (implicitly) pleaded for option A. Sweden thought that the member states were 
currently not placed well in the clusters, thus implicitly pleading for A.
On 30 May 2000, a formal Preparatory Group took place on the weighting of votes 
on the basis of a Presidency note, CONFER 4745/00 of 24 May 2000 (FA/DIE report, 
31 May 2000). The Dutch cabinet, France, Italy and Sweden expressed that they were in 
favour of E regarding the type of system. Spain was in favour of F. Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Greece, Ireland and the Commission were in favour of a dual majority system. Of these 
actors, the Commission preferred A. Belgium and Ireland (Germany also mentioned this 
option) pleaded for extrapolation, possibly combined with a correcting population test of 
60% (C). Luxembourg also found such a combined model to be interesting. It is assumed 
that Greece preferred B, which was probably also the point of departure for Germany and 
Luxembourg.
Regarding the General weighting issue, Germany and France stated that they were in 
favour of A. They wanted the big member states to receive extra votes both for the loss of 
their second Commissioner and their population size. In particular Sweden, the Dutch 
cabinet and Germany had criticisms on the annexes of the Presidency document, which 
contained several weighting tables. As all three countries remained in their respective clus-
ters with the same number of votes, it is concluded from this that they were not happy with 
the number of their votes, (implicitly) pleading for A concerning the Individual weighting 
issue. At least as far as the Dutch cabinet is concerned, this interpretation is confirmed by 
the FA/DIE preparatory instructional note for the meeting.
The round table was not completed during this meeting and was therefore continued 
during the Preparatory Group of 6 June 2000 (Commission report, 6 June 2000; FA/DIE 
report, 7 June 2000). Finland and the United Kingdom were in favour of option E with 
regard to the type of system. The United Kingdom was in favour of giving the big member 
states more votes as compensation for the loss of their second Commissioner and their dete-
riorated position resulting from previous enlargements (option A of the General weighting 
issue). Denmark had a first preference for a double weighting (B), but expressed itself also, 
as with Portugal and Austria, to be in favour of the Amsterdam model of maintaining more 
or less the current weighting of votes in combination with a population test of 60% (C).
A formal Preparatory Group was held on the weighting of votes on 6 July 2000 (FA/
DIE report, 7 July 2000). Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg 
expressed themselves to be for a dual majority system (probably B or C). Greece indicated 
that it was also willing to consider a re-weighting of votes. Finland, Italy, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom were in favour of E. Spain stated that if a dual majority system was 
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chosen, a decision should be supported by 70% of the population. According to the report, 
Germany did not express a preference for a re-weighting or dual majority system. Yet, it 
stated that if there was a dual majority system, a decision should be supported by at least 
60% of the population. The report does not indicate a preference regarding the type of 
system for the Dutch cabinet, Austria, France and Spain, but states at the beginning that 
‘all member states stuck to their original positions’. It is derived from this that the Dutch 
cabinet and France preferred E, Spain F and Austria B or C. The Commission (probably) 
pleaded for option A (Commission preparatory note, unknown date). As to the General 
weighting issue, the following actors more or less explicitly expressed a preference: the 
Dutch cabinet (A/B), Austria, Belgium, Finland and Sweden (B), and the United Kingdom 
(A). The Dutch cabinet and Sweden indicated that they were in favour of A concerning the 
Individual weighting issue, Belgium preferred B and Germany and Spain more implicitly 
expressed a preference for A. The United Kingdom stated that it had no position on dif-
ferentiation; this would emerge later on in the negotiations.
On 25 September 2000, a formal Preparatory Group took place on the weighting of 
votes. The Commission and FA/DIE reports (both from 26 September 2000) note that 
the positions of the delegations had not changed. The Commission report indicates that 
Belgium, Greece and Sweden pleaded for a dual majority system (probably B). Denmark 
and Ireland were in favour of the Amsterdam model (C). The Commission preferred A. 
Spain was in favour of a re-weighting (probably F). The positions of the other actors can 
be derived from their positions expressed during the previous Preparatory Group of 6 
July 2000. With regard to the General weighting issue, the Commission report makes 
it clear that there was again a discussion as to whether the big member states should 
only be compensated for the loss of their second Commissioner, as argued by the small 
member states, or also considering their deteriorated position in an enlarged Union if 
nothing changed. This discussion boiled down to the question of whether Article 1 of the 
Amsterdam Protocol applied, Article 2 or something in between (as the French Presidency 
defended). The FA/DIE report indicates that the Dutch cabinet again took an ambivalent 
position (A/B). The Commission report specifically notes that Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, but also the French Presidency (implicit), were in favour of A. Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland (implicit), Greece, Portugal, Sweden and Luxembourg pleaded for B. 
Spain implicitly pleaded for A regarding the Individual weighting issue.
On 8 October 2000, there was an informal Conclave about the weighting of votes (Com-
mission report, 9 October 2000; FA/DIE report, 10 October 2000). The Dutch cabinet 
was in favour of option D with regard to the type of system. France (3-33 votes), Italy (3-
33), Sweden and the United Kingdom preferred E. Spain supported F. Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg were in favour of 
a dual majority system (‘according to different models’). The Commission report indicates 
that several countries in this group, particularly Finland and Germany, were willing to 
consider a re-weighting of votes. This resulted in the Presidency’s conclusion that there was 
movement in the direction of a re-weighting. The FA/DIE report notes that Ireland was 
also willing to accept a re-weighting and Portugal was willing to discuss a re-weighting on 
the basis of concrete numbers. The Commission (probably) supported A (Commission 
preparatory note, unknown date). Regarding the General weighting issue, the well-known 
positions on whether or not the big member states should be ‘doubly’ compensated were 
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again put forward (with the big member states preferring A and the small member states 
B). The Dutch cabinet again backed A and B at the same time. It pleaded for A concerning 
the Individual weighting issue according to the FA/DIE report.
The informal Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000 subsequently discussed 
the Weighting of votes dossier. According to a FA/DIE preparatory note for this meeting, 
the Dutch cabinet pleaded for E with regard to the Type of system issue and A regarding 
the Individual weighting issue. Concerning the General weighting issue, the Dutch cabinet 
stated rather unambiguously that the big member states should get more votes and that 
their population weight should be taken into account (A). No report of this meeting was 
found in the data. Therefore, it is unknown which (other) actors have undertaken which 
influence attempts during this meeting.
During lunch at the Preparatory Group on 23 October 2000, the delegations reacted 
to the Biarritz European Council with regard to the size of the Commission and the 
weighting of votes in the Council (Commission/Commission report, 25 October 2000). 
Regarding the Type of system issue, Finland indicated that it was flexible on the formula, 
but stated that in principle at least 50% of the population and the member states should be 
represented. Luxembourg made it clear that it was against the Italian model (E). Germany 
was in favour of a dual majority system. The European Parliament and Greece supported 
A. Denmark stated that there were various possibilities, but that one should always reckon 
with a second parameter (either population or number of member states). Sweden implic-
itly indicated that it was in favour of a re-weighting. The report does not contain evidence 
on influence attempts by the other actors.
During their informal meeting in Paris on 4 November 2000, the Preparatory Group 
also talked about the weighting of votes. The short FA/DIE report of 9 November 2000 
only states that ‘there seemed to emerge a growing consensus about the Finnish proposal 
[of the Preparatory Group of 23 October 2000] that a decision made by QMV should 
always represent the majority of the member states and of the population, whether one 
would choose for a dual majority system or not’. According to a Commission preparatory 
note, the Commission (probably) pleaded for option A with regard to the type of system.
The next formal Preparatory Group on the weighting of votes occurred on 13 November 
2000 (FA/DIE report, 14 November 2000). It was made clear during the lunch meeting, 
as in Paris, that all delegations stuck to the principles of a majority of member states 
and a majority of population in a new weighting formula. According to the report, this 
meant progress in so far as one was no longer sticking to either a dual majority system or 
a re-weighting of votes; a single formula containing both principles might suffice. A clear 
division appeared from the discussion between the big and small member states concerning 
the blocking minority. The big member states claimed that, as was the case now, three 
big member states should be able to block a decision. Spain wanted the same number of 
votes as the other big member states (option A of the Individual weighting issue). The 
report notes that much would depend on the question of whether France was willing to 
differentiate vis-à-vis, for example, Germany. If it was, then Spain would possibly also be 
willing to step back.
A majority of the small member states, on the other hand, appeared to be willing to aban-
don a dual majority system if the blocking minority was formed by at least four member 
states and the population percentage was not too high. Some were indifferent to the even-
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tual formula chosen if the basic principles were ensured, others expressed themselves to be 
clearly for the Swedish model (E) if it could be explained with examples. However, Greece 
and Luxembourg remained proponents of a dual majority system, as did Portugal and the 
Commission. The report states that it was clear that the Commission would change its 
opinion in due time if there were to be an acceptable compromise formula. Germany was 
willing to abandon the claim of a dual majority system and revert to a re-weighting formula 
under the condition that the ‘demographic factor’ would continue to play an important 
role (option A of the General weighting issue). France was in favour of E with regard to the 
Type of system issue and A with regard to the General weighting issue. Sweden defended its 
‘square root population model’ (E) and was willing to consider variants of this model.
The Dutch cabinet indicated that the current QMV threshold and the practical popula-
tion threshold of 58% should be maintained. The report does not make clear which options 
the Dutch cabinet supported during the meeting. In an instructional preparatory note for 
the meeting, it is stated that the Dutch cabinet maintained a preference for a ‘general 
re-weighting’, for example along the lines of the Swedish model. This did not imply that 
the Dutch cabinet excluded a dual majority system. Irrespective of the system chosen, the 
two thresholds mentioned should not increase. The instruction note also includes prefer-
ences for option A/B with regard to the General weighting issue and A with regard to the 
Individual weighting issue. It is thus not clear whether the Dutch cabinet actually expressed 
these preferences during the meeting, but it probably did. Although the specific contents of 
the influence attempts of the other actors are not known, the above makes it clear that they 
have undertaken influence attempts with regard to the Type of system issue.
During the Conclave of 19 November 2000, Ministers discussed the Weighting of votes 
dossier on the basis of a Presidency note containing three models (CONFER 4801/00, 
16 November 2000): a weak re-weighting coupled with a ‘population safety net’ ensuring 
that a qualified majority would be supported by at least 58% of the EU population (Feira 
model); a moderate re-weighting (Swedish model); and a substantial re-weighting (Italian 
model). The Commission/Commission report of 19 November 2000 indicates that several 
delegations (Germany, Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) regretted that the Presi-
dency had abandoned the dual majority system. A large majority, except for France and the 
United Kingdom, was of the opinion that a qualified majority should always be supported 
by a majority of the member states. These actors were therefore against the Italian model, of 
which most big member states were in favour (Italy, Spain, United Kingdom and France). 
Germany continued to take an open position, as long as the demographic factor was taken 
into account. Regarding the clusters, Denmark and Italy wanted to maintain the current 
situation, Germany opposed this, Spain was flexible depending on the re-weighting and 
Belgium wanted the same principles to be applied to all clusters. In terms of options with 
regard to the Individual weighting issue, this implies that Italy was in favour of B, Spain 
(implicitly) preferred A, Germany also preferred A and Belgium was in favour of B. Accord-
ing to a FA/DIE preparatory note for this meeting, the Dutch cabinet (probably) pleaded 
for A. In addition, it (probably) supported E with regard to the Type of system issue and 
A/B regarding the General weighting issue. The Commission (probably) stated that it still 
preferred A, but that it was open to other models under the condition that a majority of 
the population and of the member states were represented and the decision-making process 
would not become more difficult (Commission preparatory note, unknown date).
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On 24 November 2000, a dinner meeting of the Preparatory Group was held about the 
weighting of votes (FA/DIE/Commission report, 27 November 2000). As there were criti-
cisms of the different options on the table, Chairman Vimont had an alternative proposal. 
This was a re-weighting of votes (probably similar to the Italian model) with, in case a 
member state could not agree with the decision, as a ‘safety net’ the additional request of 
a majority of member states. In case there was no majority of member states, the decision 
was not made. This would enable the small member states to still agree to a re-weighting 
formula. The other re-weighting models, such as the Swedish model, did not (always) 
guarantee a majority of member states. As nobody possessed the alternative proposal, the 
delegations reacted prudently to it. The United Kingdom was very explicit in stating that 
it would boycott every solution in Nice that would not envision the possibility for three 
big member states to block a decision. If this was not realised, the United Kingdom would 
not collaborate on the solutions proposed for any of the other subjects. In this respect, only 
the Italian model (E) was acceptable. This resulted in some small member states stating 
that they would then fall back on the Commission’s dual majority system (A). This again 
suggests that all the actors have probably expressed a preference with regard to the Type of 
system issue, although no specific data on this have been found.
The Weighting of votes dossier was the most difficult one during the Nice European 
Council of 7-11 December 2000. In a FA/DIE preparatory note for this meeting, it is 
indicated that the Dutch cabinet preferred a re-weighting of votes (probably E) and op-
tion A regarding the Individual weighting issue. It can be readily assumed that the Dutch 
cabinet actually expressed these preferences, but no data have been found on this. The 
preparatory note does not indicate a preference on the General weighting issue. It is likely 
that the Dutch cabinet stopped expressing its ambivalent position (A/B) in order to fully 
put its cards on the table, realising a re-weighting of votes with more votes than Belgium (A 
of the Individual weighting issue). According to the preparatory note, Belgium and France 
were in favour of B concerning the Individual weighting issue, and Germany, Spain and 
Sweden preferred A. The note is, however, only an indirect source.
As already outlined in Section 5.7.1, the weighting of votes outcome agreed upon 
during the Nice European Council had to be revised, because Declarations 20 and 21 
contained conflicting numbers and percentages. This occurred during COREPER meet-
ings on 20-22 December 2000. It is not exactly clear which actors undertook which 
influence attempts during these occasions. In a FA/DIE memorandum preparing the 
COREPER meeting of 22 December 2000, the Dutch Permanent Representative was 
instructed to agree with the eventual compromise – described in Section 5.7.1 – if all 
other member states were to do the same. If there was no consensus, the Permanent 
Representative would have to stick to the position it took earlier during the COREPER 
Table 7.36 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts for the Weighting of votes (see Tables 18a-g in Annex 6 
for more details)
 Influence attempts
Goal-achievement
Few Considerable Much
0
1 or 2 General weighting Type of system
3 Individual weighting
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meetings. As mentioned, this position is not entirely clear. What is known is that the 
compromise was indeed agreed upon.
In sum, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken a considerable number of influence attempts 
with regard to the General weighting issue (30 out of 49 occasions) and many concerning 
the Type of system (42) and Individual weighting (40) issues. In terms of the other member 
state actors (and the Commission), they have undertaken roughly as many influence at-
tempts as the Dutch cabinet during the IGC meetings regarding the Type of system issue. 
The situation is less clear with regard to the General and Individual weighting issues, but 
this probably has to do with the insufficiency of the data and the eventually arbitrary 
distinction between three otherwise closely interconnected issues.
7.15.2 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
The Dutch cabinet undertook a considerable number of influence attempts regarding the 
General weighting issue and many regarding the Type of system and Individual weighting 
issues. The Dutch cabinet fully achieved its goal on the Individual weighting issue and par-
tially on the Type of system and General weighting issues. As with the Commission dossier, 
it is very difficult to assess whether the Dutch cabinet has exerted influence, particularly 
with regard to the Type of system and General weighting issues. All (member state) actors 
have undertaken many influence attempts regarding the Type of system issue and all have 
achieved their goals to a greater or lesser extent. It is hardly or not at all possible to deter-
mine whether the Dutch cabinet has exerted explicit influence regarding this issue (type 
1), as the outcome for this issue – and this dossier in general – was, more than any other 
outcome, a complex compromise and the result of a package deal between the participating 
actors. The actors tried fiercely to exert influence on one another and eventually all went 
home with a result that was at least partially in keeping with their desires. Therefore, it is 
concluded that it is simply not known whether the Dutch cabinet has exerted influence in 
this case (see Section 7.17 for further discussion).
For the General weighting issue, the Dutch cabinet – as in the case of the Commission 
size issue – profited from its intermediate preference, being in favour of weighting popula-
tion size more heavily in the voting distribution, but not too much (A/B). As such, the 
Dutch cabinet got a free ride (type 2) from the other actors that were in favour of either 
A (the small member states) or B (the big member states). However, it should also be 
noted that the Dutch cabinet has strategically used its intermediate position – maintaining 
contact with and undertaking influence attempts vis-à-vis both ‘camps’ – to realise its 
preference (see Sections 7.16.1, Networks and 7.16.2). In doing so, it also exerted explicit 
influence (type 1).
The Individual weighting issue was primarily a matter between the Dutch cabinet and 
Belgium, with the former completely achieving its goal and the latter not. In this specific 
case involving two actors in particular, the correlation between the Dutch cabinet’s influ-
ence attempts and goal-achievement can credibly be equated with causation. The Dutch 
cabinet has thus exerted explicit influence in this regard (type 1). This is not to deny that the 
Dutch cabinet has given in (vis-à-vis Belgium) in other dossiers in exchange (see Section 
7.17).
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7.16 Weighting of votes: explaining the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
7.16.1 Influence resources
Policy positions
 -  The more advantageous policy positions the Dutch cabinet holds, the more influence it 
will exert.
Table 7.37 Weighting of votes: policy positions (see Table 17 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Policy positions
Influence
No Yes
No Type of system?
Yes Type of system?
Individual weighting
General weighting (‘pivotal’ 
position)
Regarding the Type of system issue, the ‘pivotal’ position is option C, which is in fact a 
combination of a re-weighting of votes and a dual majority system. The Dutch cabinet 
held no pivotal position, as it preferred E(/D). Denmark did prefer C and therefore held a 
pivotal position. Germany also (partially) held a pivotal position, because it was in favour 
of C/B. As for the General weighting issue, the Dutch cabinet could be said to have had a 
pivotal position, as it was in favour both of taking further account of population size and 
maintaining the balance between big and small member states (A/B). This can be explained 
by the fact that the Dutch cabinet had a double interest here: on the one hand, it was in 
favour of weighting population size heavier so that it could itself get a greater weight than 
Belgium, but on the other hand it did not want the big member states to be able to run out 
too much vis-à-vis the small member states (which included the Netherlands; see Section 
5.7.2). The Dutch cabinet did not hold a pivotal position with regard to the Individual 
weighting issue, since it was in favour of (the ‘extreme’) option A.
The Dutch cabinet did not hold a ‘majority’ position concerning any of the Weighting 
of votes issues (this is actually unknown for the Individual weighting issue). As for the 
Type of system issue, there was a small majority of eight member states and, including the 
Commission and the Parliament, 10 actors in total who were in favour of a kind of dual 
majority system (A, B or C). In addition, there was a majority of nine (small) member 
states in favour of B with regard to the General weighting issue.
The expectation receives mixed support. Just the possession of a pivotal position, how-
ever, cannot explain why the Dutch cabinet exerted influence with regard to the General 
weighting issue. The Dutch cabinet’s influence was instead the result of the strategic use 
of this position by networking with and undertaking influence attempts vis-à-vis both 
the camp of the small member states and that of the big member states (see Networks and 
Section 7.16.2). Influence attempts and networks can also explain why the Dutch cabinet 
still exerted influence with regard to the Individual weighting issue.
Networks
 -  The more a part of a network the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
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Table 7.38 Weighting of votes: networks (see Table 17 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Networks
Influence
Hardly or not at all Considerable Much
No Type of system?
Yes Type of system?
General weighting
Individual weighting
The Benelux countries had common preferences concerning several IGC dossiers, but with 
regard to the weighting of votes, they had divergent preferences regarding the Type of 
system issue and, as far as the Dutch cabinet and Belgium were concerned, the Individual 
weighting issue. Therefore, their contacts are discussed under the heading of ‘informal 
bilateral and multilateral contacts’ (Section 7.15.1).
Sweden sent a fax to the Dutch cabinet containing the Swedish square root model on 29 
February 2000 and 13 April 2000. On 1 March 2000, a meeting was held between Dutch 
and Swedish officials (probably) in The Hague (FA/DIE fax, 29 February 2000).
On 10 March 2000, the Dutch cabinet and Germany agreed in Berlin to collaborate on 
the Individual weighting issue (FA/DIE memorandum, 12 September 2000). The memo-
randum instructs the Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister to remind his German colleague 
about this agreement. The memorandum indicates that the intent was also to involve 
France, but now that France held the Presidency, this was a bit difficult. This did not 
exclude the possibility that Germany and the Dutch cabinet could together fiercely plead 
for differentiation at the Presidency.
Telephonic contact was made between Dutch and German officials on 20 September 
2000 about the weighting of votes, particularly about the Individual weighting issue and a 
new German weighting proposal about which informal agreement would have been reached 
with Spain. In this model, the Netherlands would have 12 votes, while Belgium and the 
other members of this cluster would have 10. Spain supposedly agreed with this formula 
under the condition that a blocking minority with three big member states was possible. 
Spain would be considered as a big member state, which would imply a blocking minority 
of 87 votes. Italy and the United Kingdom supposedly found the proposal interesting, but 
France remained against it. However, it was interesting for Paris as the Presidency, because 
it solved the Spanish problem. The report of this telephone call indicates that the Ger-
man proposal was ‘very interesting’ for the Dutch cabinet (because of the differentiation 
with Belgium). The German official had again confirmed that Berlin supported the Dutch 
cabinet (FA/DIE memo, 20 September 2000). Subsequently there were several contacts 
between the Dutch cabinet and Germany about the German proposal. Dutch officials 
from both the Foreign Affairs and General Affairs Ministries probably discussed the model 
with their German colleagues. These conversations were in turn preparations for meetings 
between Dutch and German Foreign Affairs Ministers and Heads of Government shortly 
before the Biarritz European Council (FA/DIE memorandum, 28 September 2000). The 
model was probably also discussed during the Dutch State Secretary’s visit to Berlin on 19 
October 2000 (FA/DIE note, 9 October 2000).
In the margins of the Preparatory Group of 23 October 2000, a lunch meeting was held 
between the Dutch cabinet, Austria and Sweden about the weighting of votes (and ESDP) 
(FA/DIE/ESDP report, 24 October 2000). Austria foresaw that the big five member states 
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were in agreement about a simple weighting of votes that would leave the other 10 member 
states far behind. The French ideas about a far-reaching reduction of the Commission 
were an attempt to intimidate the smaller member states and realise a big re-weighting of 
votes. In that light, the 10 other member states could try to unite for an alternative that 
compensates the big member states for the second Commissioner, but does no more than 
that. Portugal, Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg had already been contacted, now so 
were Sweden and the Dutch cabinet. Austria wondered whether the Dutch cabinet was 
open to consulting with these 10 or it guessed that it reached an agreement with the five 
(related to its ambivalent position with regard to the General weighting issue). Sweden 
stated that the Austrian model needed to be studied, but at first did not offer it much. 
Luxembourg later stated that it expected that it would support this model. The Dutch 
official outlined the Dutch goals (accepting some compensation in conformance with the 
Amsterdam Protocol, but differentiation within the groups in order to account for popula-
tion weight). The Dutch official promised to come back to these issues after consultation 
with the Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister.
The Austrian paper assumed a population test, besides a re-weighting. According to the 
report, it was positive that the big member states were running out less vis-à-vis the smaller 
member states and the three biggest member states less vis-à-vis the smaller member states, 
and that they could not form a blocking minority. The commentary included in the report 
states that the Dutch involvement in the camp against the five while at the same time being 
a conversation partner of the five, should be maintained. Considering the Dutch double 
interest making its position special, the Dutch cabinet should keep both channels open 
for as long as possible. According to the commentary, that meant that a reserved positive 
reaction to the Austrian paper was useful.
On 31 October 2000, Sweden sent an e-mail to the Dutch cabinet, Denmark and Finland, 
containing three weighting proposals, two of which were based on the square root. On 2 
November 2000, a Swedish official called his Dutch colleague to sound out a reaction. 
The latter gave an initial, prudently positive reaction and suggested that the Dutch DGES 
and Permanent Representative could possibly exchange ideas with their Swedish colleagues 
about the drafts that coming weekend (FA/DIE memorandum, 2 November 2000). A 
Finnish official reacted to the Swedish proposals in an e-mail on 3 November 2000 to the 
Dutch cabinet, Denmark and Sweden.
A Dutch official received a Finnish proposal on the weighting of votes in Brussels, which 
Prime Minister Lipponen would probably present to Kok in The Hague on 14 November 
2000. In the proposal, the big member states were running out somewhat vis-à-vis the 
small ones and the current voting groups were differentiated. Thus, the Netherlands got 
12 votes, whereas Belgium, Greece and Portugal got 10. Yet the Netherlands was placed 
below Romania (14 votes) in the model (FA/DIE memorandum, 14 November 2000). 
In another FA/DIE preparatory note, it is stated that in a system with maximally 33 and 
minimally three votes, the Netherlands should have at least 14 votes. It could not accept 
the situation in which Romania received much more votes than the Netherlands.
Germany consulted with the Dutch cabinet, Spain and the United Kingdom about three 
German proposals of 23 November 2000 (FA/DIE note, ‘Rules of thumb for the new 
weighting of votes in the Council. December 2000’).
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All in all, the Dutch cabinet was to a high degree a part of a network for all the Weight-
ing of votes issues. The expectation is therefore fully supported. In addition to influence 
attempts (see Section 7.16.2), the Dutch cabinet’s networks – particularly with Germany – 
can offer an explanation for its influence with regard to the Individual weighting issue. This 
also applies to the General weighting issue on which the Dutch cabinet had an ambivalent 
preference and as such remained in contact with both the big and small member states to 
realise its preference.
Internal coherence
 -  The more internally coherent the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
Table 7.39 Weighting of votes: internal coherence (see Table 17 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Internal coherence
Influence
No: divided with regard to 
preferences and/or actions
Yes
No Type of system?
Yes Type of system?
General weighting
Individual weighting
According to the data, the Dutch cabinet was internally coherent with regard to all the 
Weighting of votes issues. The expectation is therefore fully supported.
According to a FA/DIE memorandum of 20 September 2000, reporting a telephonic 
contact between the Dutch cabinet and Germany, both France and Germany were in-
ternally divided on their preferences regarding the Individual weighting issue. There was 
still no final agreement between France and Germany about this. President Chirac was 
supposedly willing to give Germany more votes than the other big member states (A), 
but Prime Minister Jospin and Minister Védrine were against this (B). Minister Moscovici 
had assumedly argued for it: though Germany had more inhabitants, France was a nuclear 
power and a permanent member of the Security Council. These elements should also 
count. As for Germany, the Foreign Affairs Ministry was striving to disconnect Germany 
(A), but the Chancellor still did not express himself clearly. This did not necessarily imply 
that the Chancellor was in favour of B, but that there was at least some division or tension 
visible within this actor.
7.16.2 Influence attempts
 -  The more influence attempts the Dutch cabinet undertakes, the more influence it will 
exert.
Table 7.40 Weighting of votes: influence attempts (see Tables 18a-g in Annex 6 for more details)
 Influence attempts
Influence
Few Considerable Much
No Type of system?
Yes General weighting Type of system?
Individual weighting
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As outlined in Section 7.15.1, the Dutch cabinet has undertaken a considerable number of 
influence attempts with regard to the General weighting issue (30 out of 49 occasions) and 
many concerning the Individual weighting (40) issue (and Type of system issue (42)).
The expectation receives mixed support. Influence attempts, in addition to networks, can 
(partly) explain why the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence with regard to the Individual 
weighting issue. The Dutch cabinet’s influence on the General weighting issue can be ex-
plained by its strategic use of its pivotal position to network with and undertake influence 
attempts vis-à-vis both the camp of the small member states and that of the big member 
states (for networks, see Section 7.16.1).
7.16.3 Domestic actors and factors
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by domestic actors (parliament, 
constitutional court) and factors (referendum, public opinion, elections, events and 
political conflicts), the more (less) influence it will exert.
No evidence was found in the data that the Dutch cabinet was enabled or constrained by 
domestic actors or factors regarding the Weighting of votes dossier. The variable therefore 
cannot be tested in this case.
The Commission was enabled by public opinion when (probably) stating during the 
General Affairs Council of 20 March 2000 that its preferred option (A) could be explained 
to public opinion during the ratification of the Treaty (Commission preparatory note, 
unknown date). This also applies to the Preparatory Groups of 4 April 2000, 30 May 
2000 (also referring to parliaments), 6 July 2000 and 4 November 2000 (Commission 
preparatory notes, unknown dates).
During the Preparatory Group of 4 April 2000, several delegations underlined that a 
change in the number of votes should be ‘explainable’ to the population of their country 
(Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Spain, France, Ireland) (Commission report, 4 April 2000). 
According to the FA/DIE report of this meeting, in addition to Denmark and Ireland, 
Greece and Luxembourg pointed to public opinion, i.e. that the public should understand 
and accept future results (also considering the possibility of a referendum). In doing so, 
they were enabled by their specific public opinions to realise their preferences with regard 
to the General and Individual weighting issues.
France was enabled by its public opinion and parliament to realise option B regarding 
the Individual weighting issue when it stated during a bilateral meeting between a Dutch 
and French official that it could not explain to the parliament and the public that Germany 
would receive a greater voting weight than France (FA/DIE Paris embassy report, 18 April 
2000). According to the same report, France was constrained by ‘electoral obstacles’ (in 2002) 
in formulating and expressing its position on the Weighting of votes dossier. However, this 
could at the same time be considered and used as an enabling factor vis-à-vis other actors.
During the Preparatory Group of 30 May 2000, President Vimont was of the opinion 
that the under-representation of the big member states was increasingly difficult to explain 
to their populations (FA/DIE report, 31 May 2000). The big member states were enabled 
by their public opinions to realise option A with regard to the General weighting issue.
During the Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000, several member states (United 
Kingdom, Portugal, Ireland) indicated that they should be able to sell the result of the 
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Weighting of votes dossier to public opinion and/or parliament (Commission report, 26 
September 2000).
A FA/DIE preparatory note for the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000 
stated that, according to several actors, the Swedish square root model would not be 
explainable to the broader public and press. This implies that Sweden was constrained 
in realising its preferences with regard to the Weighting of votes dossier (see Table 19 in 
Annex 6 for more details).
7.16.4 Negotiation level
 -  The lower the level at which an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet 
will exert.
Table 7.41 Weighting of votes: negotiation level (see Table 20 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation level
Influence
High Moderate Low
No Type of system?
Yes Type of system?
General weighting
Individual weighting
The Type of system issue was discussed eight times at the formal level 3 (Preparatory Groups 
of 7 March 2000 (probably), 4 April 2000, 30 May 2000, 6 June 2000, 6 July 2000, 25 
September 2000, 23 October 2000 and 13 November 2000). It was discussed twice at the 
informal level 3 (Preparatory Groups of 4 November 2000 and 24 November 2000). The 
issue was discussed once at the formal level 2 (General Affairs Council of 20 March 2000) 
and twice at the informal level 2 (Conclaves of 8 October 2000 and 19 November 2000). It 
was discussed once at the formal level 1 (Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000) 
and once at the informal level 1 (Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000). This 
results in a median of 3.
The General weighting issue was negotiated six times at the formal level 3 (Preparatory 
Groups of 4 April 2000, 30 May 2000, 6 June 2000, 6 July 2000, 25 September 2000 and 
13 November 2000) and possibly also during the formal Preparatory Groups of 7 March 
2000 and 23 October 2000. It was possibly discussed during the informal Preparatory 
Groups of 4 November 2000 and 24 November 2000. In addition, the issue was possibly 
discussed at the formal level 2 once (General Affairs Council of 20 March 2000) and twice 
at the informal level 2 (Conclaves of 8 October 2000 and 19 November 2000). It was 
discussed once at the formal level 1 (Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000) 
and once at the informal level 1 (Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000). This 
results in a median of 3.
The Individual weighting issue was discussed five times at the formal level 3 (Preparatory 
Groups of 4 April 2000, 30 May 2000, 6 July 2000, 25 September 2000 and 13 November 
2000) and possibly also during the formal Preparatory Groups of 7 March 2000, 6 June 
2000 and 23 October 2000. It was possibly discussed during the informal Preparatory 
Groups of 4 November 2000 and 24 November 2000. In addition, the issue was possibly 
discussed at the formal level 2 once (General Affairs Council of 20 March 2000) and twice 
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at the informal level 2 (Conclaves of 8 October 2000 and 19 November 2000). It was 
discussed once at the formal level 1 (Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000) 
and once at the informal level 1 (Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000). This 
results in a median of 3.
The expectation is fully supported by the data. It must, however, be recognised that the 
final outcome of the Weighting of votes dossier was mainly agreed upon at the highest 
political level of the Nice European Council. Before that time, the dossier had been negoti-
ated on a relatively low level for a long time, but without the participating actors making 
much progress. It is therefore not plausible to conclude that this variable can explain the 
extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence.
7.16.5 Negotiation timing
 -  The earlier an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet will exert.
Table 7.42 Weighting of votes: negotiation timing (see Table 20 in Annex 6 for more details)
 Negotiation timing
Influence
Late Moderate Early
No Type of system?
Yes General weighting
Individual weighting
Type of system?
The Type of system issue was discussed on 7 March 2000 (IGC week 4; probably), 20 
March 2000 (6), 4 April 2000 (8), 30 May 2000 (16), 6 June 2000 (17), 6 July 2000 (21), 
25 September 2000 (33), 8 October 2000 (34), 13-14 October 2000 (35), 23 October 
2000 (37), 4 November 2000 (38), 13 November 2000 (40), 19 November 2000 (40), 24 
November 2000 (41) and 7-11 December 2000 (43). This results in an average IGC week 
number of 27.5.
The General weighting issue was discussed on 7 March 2000 (IGC week 4; possibly), 20 
March 2000 (6; possibly), 4 April 2000 (8), 30 May 2000 (16), 6 June 2000 (17), 6 July 
2000 (21), 25 September 2000 (33), 8 October 2000 (34), 13-14 October 2000 (35), 23 
October 2000 (37; possibly), 4 November 2000 (38; possibly), 13 November 2000 (40), 
19 November 2000 (40), 24 November 2000 (41; possibly) and 7-11 December 2000 
(43). This results in an average IGC week number of 28.7 (-27.5).
The individual weighting issue was discussed on 7 March 2000 (IGC week 4; possibly), 
20 March 2000 (6; possibly), 4 April 2000 (8), 30 May 2000 (16), 6 June 2000 (17; 
possibly), 6 July 2000 (21), 25 September 2000 (33), 8 October 2000 (34), 13-14 October 
2000 (35), 23 October 2000 (37; possibly), 4 November 2000 (38; possibly), 13 No-
vember 2000 (40), 19 November 2000 (40), 24 November 2000 (41; possibly) and 7-11 
December 2000 (43). This results in an average IGC week number of 30 (-27.5).
The expectation receives mixed support in the data. It must be recognised that the final 
outcome of the Weighting of votes dossier was mainly agreed upon during the Nice Eu-
ropean Council at the end of the negotiation process. Until then, the dossier had been 
negotiated for a long time, but without the participating actors making much progress. It 
is therefore not plausible to conclude that this variable can explain the extent of the Dutch 
cabinet’s influence.
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7.16.6 External events and developments
 -  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by external events and develop-
ments, the more (less) influence it will exert.
Table 7.43 Weighting of votes: external events and developments (see Table 20 in Annex 6 for more details)
 External events and
developments
Influence
Constrained Enabled
No
Yes General weighting
Individual weighting
The impending enlargement was a constraining external development for the Dutch cabi-
net. This development cannot really be related to the Type of system issue – the choice for a 
re-weighting of votes or a dual majority system – but it constrained the Dutch cabinet with 
regard to the General and Individual weighting issues. In light of previous enlargements 
and the next one approaching soon, there was pressure to give the big member states 
relatively more weight than the small ones in order to maintain and restore the balance 
between them. This would be to the detriment of the small member states in general 
(General weighting issue) and the Netherlands in particular (Individual weighting issue).
The expectation receives no support. The influence of the Dutch cabinet with regard 
to the General weighting issue has to do with the fact that it strategically used its pivotal 
position via influence attempts and networks to realise its preference (see Sections 7.16.1 
and 7.16.2). The Dutch cabinet’s influence on the Individual weighting issue can also be 
explained by influence attempts and networks.
7.17 Weighting of votes: conclusions and reflections
The Dutch cabinet has undertaken a considerable number of influence attempts with regard 
to the General weighting issue and many concerning the Type of system and Individual 
weighting issues.
While it is clear that the Dutch cabinet has exerted explicit influence with regard to 
the Individual weighting issue, this is very difficult to assess with regard to the Type of 
system issue. Therefore, it is concluded that it is simply not known whether the Dutch 
cabinet has exerted its influence in this case. (The feasibility of ) measuring influence in 
complex negotiation processes on closely interlinked issues will be returned to in Sections 
8.5.1 and 8.5.2. With regard to the General weighting issue, the Dutch cabinet not only 
profited from the fact that its preference lay in between the two main and extreme options 
(pivotal position), getting a free ride from the other participating actors. It also actively and 
strategically used this position to realise its preference. In doing so, it also exerted explicit 
influence.
The way the Dutch cabinet used its pivotal position with regard to the General weighting 
issue by networking with and undertaking influence attempts vis-à-vis both the camp of 
the small member states and that of the big ones can explain its influence in this regard. 
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The Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts and networks can also explain why it exerted influ-
ence on the Individual weighting issue.
However, it is important to note that the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence cannot 
completely be explained by the conceptual model. As was already indicated in Section 
7.14, the exchange variable was probably the most important regarding the Commission 
and Weighting of votes dossiers. The outcome of the Weighting of votes dossier, which 
consisted of three interlinked issues that were only separated from one another in this 
study for analytical purposes, was linked to the Commission size and the allocation of 
seats in the European Parliament. The big member states’ loss of a second Commissioner 
– and perhaps also the fact that the principle of one Commissioner per member state was 
introduced for the next Commission’s term of office – was compensated with relatively 
more weight in the Council. The Dutch cabinet won the battle with Belgium about the 
individual weighting, but lost with regard to the allocation of seats in the European Parlia-
ment. Unlike the Netherlands, which went from 31 to 25 seats, Belgium lost two seats less 
than originally planned (as did Greece and Portugal). Besides that, it was arranged for the 
total number of votes of the Benelux countries (12 + 13 + 4 = 29) to be the same as that of 
a big member state – to the benefit of them all, and Brussels was established as the venue 
for official European Council meetings (Galloway, 2001:82-83). The latter point may also 
be considered to be a specific gain for Belgium.
7.18 Conclusion
In this chapter, a process analysis has been carried out assessing the extent to which the 
Dutch cabinet has exerted its influence with regard to those issues of the sample selection 
on which it has partially or fully achieved its goal (first step) and how this can be explained 
(second and third steps).
For the assessment, it can be concluded from the first step that the Dutch cabinet has 
exerted influence regarding 9 of the 20 Nice Treaty issues of the sample selection (SOA-1, 
Contact Committee-1, Treaty change, PSC-1, Minimum requirement, Veto possibility-1, 
Commission size, General weighting and Individual weighting).
For the explanation, on the basis of the second, deductive step, it can be concluded that 
the extent to which the Dutch cabinet was a part of a network, was internally coherent, 
undertook influence attempts and was enabled or constrained by domestic actors and fac-
tors can, to a certain degree, explain its extent of influence.
However, the conceptual model does not offer a complete explanation. On the basis of 
the third, inductive step, it can be concluded that the exchange of dossiers and issues among 
the participating actors, the timeliness of influence attempts and networks, anticipation of 
(possible) resistance from other participating actors and the saliency of an issue also seem 
to contribute to the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence.
This chapter has thus answered the research question of this study. The next and final 
chapter presents this answer in more detail and further elaborates and reflects on it.
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Conclusions and reflections
8.1 Introduction
This study has adopted a relational influence perspective to analyse the Nice Treaty negotia-
tion process and explain its outcome, focusing on the influence of the Dutch cabinet in the 
context of the other participating actors. The study has attempted to answer the following 
research question:
To what extent has the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence during the negotiation process that 
resulted in the Treaty of Nice, and how can this influence be explained?
In order to answer this research question, the empirical analysis began with a before-after 
analysis for the Dutch cabinet (Chapter 5) and the other participating actors (Chapter 
6). This analysis involved assessing the extent to which the Dutch cabinet and the other 
participating actors achieved their goals on the Nice Treaty issues selected for this study. 
The descriptive before-after analysis was subsequently complemented with an explanatory 
process analysis (Chapter 7). The process analysis was divided into three steps, based on 
as accurate a reconstruction of the negotiation process as possible and addressing all 18 
participating actors. The first step aimed at assessing whether the Dutch cabinet actually 
exerted its influence regarding the issues on which it partially or fully achieved its goals. 
In doing this, the focus was on the relationship between influence attempts and goal-
achievement, examining whether mechanisms other than explicit influence might account 
for the relationship between the two variables. The second step aimed at explaining the 
extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence thus found. This deductive step consisted of testing 
the expectations of the agency and structural variables of the conceptual model. The third, 
inductive step considered whether yet other variables – not included in the conceptual 
model – might explain the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. The before-after analysis 
and three-step process analysis should result in a plausible answer to the research question, 
which is presented in this chapter.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 first summarises the line of reasoning of 
this study, developed in Chapters 2-4. The empirical results are then presented in Section 
8.3. In Section 8.3.1, the results of the before-after analyses are laid out and in Sections 
8.3.2-8.3.4, the results of the three steps of the process analysis are presented. Based on 
this, Section 8.4 presents the answer to the research question. The presentation of the 
empirical results organically leads to some reflections on this study in Section 8.5. Sections 
8.5.1 and 8.5.2 reflect on the theory and methodology adopted by the study, respectively, 
and offer some suggestions for future research. Finally, practical lessons for the Dutch 
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cabinet’s influence during EU Treaty negotiations are drawn out based on this study in 
Section 8.5.3.
8.2 Recapitulation of the argument
The aim of this study was to explain the outcome of the Nice Treaty negotiation process. 
Among EU studies, only a few scholars have examined the process of EU Treaty negotia-
tions in order to explain its outcome (e.g. Smith, 2002; Beach, 2005). The literature on EU 
Treaty negotiations draws our attention to several agency and structural variables affecting 
the negotiation process and thus co-determining its outcome (see Chapter 2).
An EU Treaty negotiation process in general and the Nice Treaty negotiation process in 
particular can be characterised as an increasingly structured process, in which the participat-
ing actors negotiate with one another about many issues at several levels and during different 
phases. In terms of the participating actors, in addition to the formal participants of EU 
Treaty negotiations – the 15 member states of the EU, three EU level actors sat at the table 
of the Nice Treaty negotiation process. These were the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council Secretariat (e.g. Christiansen, 2002; Beach, 2005). In view of 
its aim to assess the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence, this study has addressed all these 
actors. However, as the participating actors cannot be considered to be unitary, this study 
also paid attention to possible internal divisiveness within an actor, in the form of divergent 
preferences and/or actions. Moreover, when negotiating an EU Treaty, the participating ac-
tors operate in a structured environment at both the national and EU levels that may either 
enable or constrain them in realising their preferences in the outcomes of the negotiation 
process. In this study, several domestic actors and factors have therefore been taken into 
account. These include the parliament, constitutional court, a potential referendum, the 
prevailing public opinion, elections that may be held and events and political conflicts that 
occur. In addition, events and developments at the European and global level external to the 
negotiation process may affect the agenda-setting and decision-making processes.
The structural context at the EU level is also formed by different negotiation levels and 
phases, particularly timing. Regarding negotiation levels, the Nice Treaty negotiation 
process, specifically the Nice IGC, took place at three levels: the Heads of State or Govern-
ment during formal and informal European Councils, the Foreign Affairs Ministers during 
formal and informal (Conclaves) meetings in the margins of monthly General Affairs 
Councils and the Personal Representatives of the governments during regular formal and 
informal meetings of the Preparatory Group. A fourth level may be distinguished, the 
Friends of the Presidency Group, which dealt with the reforms of the European Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance.
Concerning negotiation phases, making a distinction between agenda-setting and 
decision-making, with both taking place at the EU level, enables us to distinguish three 
types of outcomes depending on the course of an issue through the two phases: issues 
that go through both phases (decisions), issues that go through the first phase but not 
the second (not-decisions) and issues that do not even enter the first phase to begin with 
(non-decisions). In addition, different issues appear to have different time courses through 
the agenda-setting and decision-making phases. Some issues were put on the agenda and 
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discussed early, whereas others were only added to the agenda and discussed later during 
the negotiation process. The specific time course of an issue has been called the ‘negotiation 
timing’ of an issue in this study. In Chapter 2, the sub-question of what the negotiation 
process resulting in the Treaty of Nice looked like, what its outcomes were and how it can 
be characterised was thus answered.
In our view, however, the agency and structural variables from the EU literature insuf-
ficiently touch on the core of an EU Treaty negotiation process: the mutual exertion of 
influence by the participating actors. For this, the Political Science and IR literature was 
approached in Chapter 3. Here, the debate on the concepts of power and influence was 
entered by discussing three important distinctions of this debate and indicating the choices 
this study made in light of the research question.
With regard to the first distinction between resources and relation (Lasswell & Kaplan, 
1950:75; Van Doorn, 1962/63; Baldwin, 2002), the study primarily adopted a relational 
approach by taking actual, exerted influence as the dependent variable and resources (power) 
as the independent variable. With regard to the second distinction between explicit and 
implicit (anticipated) influence (Dahl, 1970), this study has conceptually accounted for 
both, but empirically mainly focused on explicit influence operating through the influence 
attempt mechanism. It is during this conversion mechanism, or process, that an actor has 
to successfully employ its influence resources before there is any actual influence. The third 
distinction concerned the existence of three faces of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; 
Lukes, 1974; Dahl, [1961] 2005) and, related to this, the ‘agency-structure dilemma’ (e.g. 
Giddens, 1984; Clegg, 1989). As with the other two distinctions, this study has made its 
own choices, but at the same time aimed at integrating the distinction. Thus, the study has 
primarily been actor-oriented and focused on the first face of power of decision-making, 
but also analysed the agenda-setting process taking partial account of the second face of 
non-decision-making and, between the first and second face, of not-decision-making. 
Lukes’ third face is considered to be too deterministic, but a middle road has been chosen 
of structure co-determining the behaviour of actors by providing opportunities and con-
straints. Overlapping with the agency and structural variables found in the EU literature, 
this study has, in addition to agency variables, derived several structural variables from 
empirical studies dealing with the agency-structure dilemma from the perspective of power 
and influence (e.g. Huberts, 1988; Arts, 1998). Thus, Chapter 3 answered the sub-question 
of how the process of EU Treaty negotiations can be analysed.
Combining the – partly overlapping – variables that have been put forward in the EU 
literature on the one hand (Chapter 2) and the Political Science and IR literature on the 
other (Chapter 3) resulted in the building blocks for the conceptual model of this study 
(see Figure 8.1). This model was further specified and presented in Chapter 4. The depen-
dent variable is the extent of influence of actor A (the Dutch cabinet) on actor B (the other 
17 actors) in making a decision on a specific Nice Treaty issue. The influence resources of 
actor A make up the independent variable. The crucial intervening variable is formed by 
the influence attempt mechanism of explicit influence, which has been deductively and 
inductively specified by all kinds of influence attempts that the Dutch cabinet as actor A, 
but also the other participating actors, undertook during the negotiation process. Finally, 
this conversion process is in turn affected by several structural, contextual variables, which 
enable or constrain the extent to which the influence resources of actor A are converted 
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into actual influence through influence attempts. These are domestic structure (actors and 
factors), negotiation structure (levels and phases, particularly timing) and external events 
and developments at the European level. Chapter 4 thus answered the sub-question of 
which variables can explain the process of EU Treaty negotiations.
The next sub-question asked what kinds of expectations can be identified for each of the 
variables of the conceptual model. The first, general expectation was of the causal relation 
between the independent and dependent variables:
 1. The more influence resources the Dutch cabinet has, the more influence it will exert.
The following influence resources have been selected for this study: policy positions, net-
works and internal cohesion. The specific expectations for these influence resources were 
as follows:
 2.  The more advantageous policy positions the Dutch cabinet holds, the more influence it 
will exert.
 3.  The more a part of a network the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
 4.  The more internally coherent the Dutch cabinet is, the more influence it will exert.
The following expectation focused on the conversion mechanism:
 5.  The more influence attempts the Dutch cabinet undertakes, the more influence it will 
exert.
The last series of expectations concerned the relationship between the contextual variables 
and the dependent variable:
 6.  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by domestic actors (parliament, 
constitutional court) and factors (referendum, public opinion, elections, events and 
political conflicts), the more (less) influence it will exert.
 7.  The lower the level at which an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet 
will exert.
 8.  The earlier an issue is negotiated, the more influence the Dutch cabinet will exert.
 9.  The more the Dutch cabinet is enabled (constrained) by external events and develop-
ments, the more (less) influence it will exert.
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8.3 Empirical results
8.3.1 The before-after analysis: assessing the extent of goal-achievement
As the research question of this study focuses on the exertion of actual influence during 
a negotiation process, a method was required that studies influence as a relation between 
actors and as an effect brought about during a process. Being a process-oriented method, 
Dahl’s decision method – making a comparison between the influence attempts of the 
participating actors and the ultimate decisions – formed the starting point of the influence 
analysis. In our view, however, such an analysis should begin with establishing the original 
preferences of the participating actors on specific Nice Treaty issues and examining the 
extent to which they have realised these preferences in the outcomes of the negotiation 
process. In other words, the extent of goal-achievement of the participating actors should 
be assessed on the basis of a before-after analysis.
In Chapter 5, the before-after analysis was executed, establishing the extent of goal-
achievement of the Dutch cabinet for all 24 selected issues within the five selected dossiers 
of the Nice Treaty negotiation process (Court of Auditors, ESDP, Closer cooperation, 
Commission and Weighting of votes). To what extent has the Dutch cabinet achieved its 
goal? The Dutch cabinet fully achieved its goals regarding six of the 24 issues and partially 
regarding seven of the 24 issues. In total, the Dutch cabinet therefore achieved its goals 
to a greater or lesser extent on 13 of the 24 issues (see Table 8.1). In general, the Dutch 
cabinet partially or fully achieved its goal for nine of the 20 issues of the Court of Auditors, 
ESDP and Closer cooperation dossiers and for all four issues of the Commission size and 
Weighting of votes dossiers.
In total, the Dutch cabinet has not achieved its goals on 11 of the 24 issues. This was 
not due to the fact that the outcomes for these issues were decision options the Dutch 
cabinet did not prefer, but because these issues either did not reach the agenda-setting and 
decision-making phases, resulting in non-decisions (five issues) from the perspective of the 
Dutch cabinet, or did reach these phases but were ultimately not decided upon, resulting 
in not-decisions (six issues). In other words, as far as issues were put on the agenda and de-
cided upon, the Dutch cabinet partially or fully achieved its goals for all of these 13 issues. 
Yet merely focusing on decisions as outcomes of the negotiation process would conceal the 
fact that the Dutch cabinet did not achieve its goal for roughly the same number of issues 
(11 issues), because they resulted in not-decisions or non-decisions from its perspective.
The goal of the before-after analysis for the Dutch cabinet was to establish for which 
and how many issues the Dutch cabinet could be considered as a potentially necessary 
condition for the outcomes and thus a potentially influential actor. It can be concluded 
that this is the case for the 13 (out of 24) issues on which the Dutch cabinet has partially 
or fully achieved its goal.
In Chapter 6, the before-after analysis was carried out for the other participating actors, 
assessing the extent to which they achieved their goals concerning the ‘sample selection’ of 
16 issues of the five dossiers. In general, with regard to the issues (resulting in decisions) 
on which the Dutch cabinet partially or fully achieved its goals, a considerable number of 
other actors also partially or fully achieved their goals (this is unclear only for the SOA and 
Contact Committee issues of the Court of Auditors dossier). Concerning some dossiers 
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and issues – Closer cooperation (Veto possibility), Commission size and Weighting of 
votes (Type of system and General weighting), all the actors even achieved their goals to a 
greater or lesser degree. This makes it clear that even if a correlation between preference and 
outcome (decision) is considered as causation in terms of influence, it would still not be 
known which of the actors to which this correlation applies actually exerted their influence. 
In addition, other actors also achieved their goals on the issues (resulting in not-decisions 
or non-decisions) on which the Dutch cabinet has not achieved its goals. This applies most 
clearly to the NATO and Military Staff issues of the ESDP dossier, but probably also to one 
or more of the issues for which the extent of goal-achievement of the other actors is unclear 
or unknown: Appeal ECJ and Instruction (Court of Auditors dossier) and Differentiated 
membership (Closer cooperation dossier).
The goal of the before-after analysis for the other participating actors was to establish 
which of them could be considered as potentially necessary conditions for the respective 
Table 8.1 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement
Dossier
Issue
Extent of goal-achievement
Court of Auditors
Size Full (3)
Internal chambers Full (3)
SOA Partial (2)
Contact Committee Partial (1)
Appeal ECJ Zero (0b – not-decision)
Same powers Zero (0b – not-decision)
Financial management Zero (0b – not-decision)
OLAF Zero (0b – not-decision)
Instruction Zero (0a – non-decision)
ESDP
Treaty change Full (3)
WEU Full (3)
PSC Partial (2)
NATO Zero (0b – not-decision)
Military Committee Zero (0b – not-decision)
Military Staff Zero (0a – non-decision)
Financial articles Zero (0a – non-decision)
Closer cooperation
Minimum requirement Full (3)
Veto possibility Partial (1)
Differentiated membership Zero (0a – non-decision)
Treaty division Zero (0a – non-decision)
Commission
Size and composition Partial (2)
Weighting of votes
Type of system Partial (2)
General weighting Partial (2)
Individual weighting Full (3)
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outcomes, i.e. potentially influential. Although this study did not aim to assess the extent 
of influence of each of the participating actors, the assessment of their goal-achievement 
was necessary in order to be able to assess and explain the Dutch cabinet’s influence in the 
context of the other participating actors (see Section 1.3.4).
8.3.2 The process analysis: assessing the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
The goal of the three-step process analysis, carried out in Chapter 7, was to assess (first step) 
and explain (second and third steps) the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence with regard 
to the 16 issues of the sample selection.
With regard to the first step, how do we know whether the Dutch cabinet caused its goal-
achievement by itself, i.e. whether it actually exerted its influence? To answer this question, 
the descriptive before-after analysis should be complemented with an explanatory process 
analysis. It is precisely this process, or mechanism of causation, that should be studied in 
order to examine whether a correlation between an actor’s preference and a decision – an 
actor’s goal-achievement – is also a matter of causation by the actor itself. Thus, the second 
part of Chapter 3 answered the sub-question of what kinds of methods are available to 
measure influence and which is the most suitable for this research.
This study has focused primarily on influence attempts as the mechanism through which 
the exertion of influence takes place. Therefore, in uncovering whether the Dutch cabinet 
has actually exerted its influence regarding the issues on which it has partially or fully 
achieved its goals, the influence attempts undertaken by the Dutch cabinet as well as the 
other participating actors were particularly important. The first step of the process analysis 
therefore began with an examination of the influence attempts undertaken by the Dutch 
cabinet and the other participating actors regarding the 16 issues of the sample selection. 
The results for the Dutch cabinet are summarised in Table 8.2.
Based on this, the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence was assessed by examining 
rival mechanisms – mechanisms other than explicit influence – to which specific combina-
tions of (lack of ) influence attempts and goal-achievement might be attributed. These 
mechanisms were already suggested by the typology of possible combinations of influence 
attempts and goal-achievement, which was presented in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1). In doing 
so, it was considered which mechanisms plausibly applied (verification) and which did not 
(falsification) for each of the issues of the sample selection.
For a proper attribution of influence, four issues resulting in decisions had to be split 
up into two issues each (SOA-1 and 2, Contact Committee-1 and 2, PSC-1 and 2, and 
Veto possibility-1 and 2), so that the total number of issues of the sample selection is 20. 
Compared to the original sample selection, the Dutch cabinet has not achieved its goal 
regarding the four extra issues (SOA-2, Contact Committee-2, PSC-2, and Veto possibil-
ity-2).
The results can now be summarised in a new typology, in which the mechanisms are 
matched with the issues (see Table 8.3).
The Dutch cabinet exerted explicit influence with regard to the following Nice Treaty issues 
in the sample selection: SOA-1, Contact Committee-1, Treaty change, PSC-1, Minimum 
requirement, Veto possibility-1, Commission size, General weighting and Individual 
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weighting. In addition to exerting explicit influence, the Dutch cabinet got a free ride in 
the case of the Minimum requirement, Veto possibility-1, Commission size and General 
weighting issues.
With regard to the other issues in the sample selection, the Dutch cabinet did not exert its 
explicit influence. In one case, the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement was a matter of sheer 
luck (Court of Auditors size issue). In another case, the Dutch cabinet’s lack of goal-achieve-
ment was related to its internal divisiveness (Instruction issue). This mechanism played a 
subordinate role in the case of the NATO issue, on which the Italy and Benelux network 
was internally divided. In five cases, the Dutch cabinet’s absence of goal-achievement had to 
do with failure (SOA-2, Contact Committee-2, Appeal ECJ, NATO and Veto possibility-2 
issues). The unforced error mechanism possibly played a subordinate role with regard to 
the SOA-2, Contact Committee-2, Appeal ECJ and Veto possibility-2 issues. The bad luck 
mechanism possibly played a subordinate role regarding the Veto possibility-2 issue. In 
three cases, the Dutch cabinet’s lack of goal-achievement had to do with the issues being a 
non-priority and/or with anticipation (Military Staff, Differentiated membership and PSC-
2 issues). In addition, the anticipation mechanism possibly played a subordinate role with 
regard to the SOA-2, Contact Committee-2 and Appeal ECJ issues. Regarding the Type of 
system issue, it is not known whether or not the Dutch cabinet exerted explicit influence.
As becomes clear from Table 8.3, for several mechanisms that were identified beforehand, 
no empirical evidence was found in the data. Possible reasons for this will be reflected on 
in Section 8.5.2.
Table 8.2 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts
Dossier
Issue
Extent of influence attempts
Court of Auditors
Size Few
SOA Considerable
Contact Committee Much
Appeal ECJ Considerable
Instruction Few
ESDP
Treaty change Much
PSC Much
NATO Considerable
Military Staff Few
Closer cooperation
Minimum requirement Much
Veto possibility Much
Differentiated membership Few
Commission
Size and composition Much
Weighting of votes
Type of system Much
General weighting Considerable
Individual weighting Much
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The empirical results make it clear that ‘goal-achievement’ cannot always be equated 
with ‘influence’ (see Section 3.6). Five of the 20 issues presented in Table 8.3 show that the 
conceptual distinction also applies in practice. In the case of the Court of Auditor’s size, 
the Dutch cabinet fully achieved its goal, but did not exert its influence at all (sheer luck). 
Table 8.3 Evidence found for the relationship between the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts and the 
extent of its goal-achievement
Goal-achievement
Yes
Issues Goal-achievement
No
Issues
Influence 
attempts
Yes
1. Explicit influence SOA-1; Contact Committee-1; 
Treaty change; PSC-1; Minimum 
requirement, Veto possibility-1, 
Commission size and General 
weighting (all in combination with 
2.); Individual weighting
5. Failure SOA-2; Contact Committee-2; Appeal ECJ; 
NATO; Veto possibility-2
6. Unforced error SOA-2, Contact Committee-2, Appeal ECJ and 
Veto possibility-2 (all possibly, and subordinate 
to 5.)
2. Free ride Minimum requirement, Veto 
possibility-1, Commission size 
and General weighting (all in 
combination with 1.)
7. Bad luck Veto possibility-2 (possibly, and subordinate 
to 5.)
8. Negative 
influence
No evidence found in the data
Influence 
attempts
No
3. Implicit, 
anticipated 
influence
No evidence found in the data 9. Justified loss No evidence found in the data
4. Sheer luck Court of Auditors size 10. Non-priority Military Staff and Differentiated membership 
(both in combination with 12.); PSC-2 (and/
or 12.)
11. Internal 
divisiveness
Instruction; NATO (subordinate to 5.)
12. Anticipation SOA-2, Contact Committee-2 and Appeal ECJ 
(all possibly, and subordinate to 5.); Military 
Staff and Differentiated membership (both in 
combination with 10.); PSC-2 (and/or 10.)
1.  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with influence attempts in the sense of the active use of 
influence resources.
2.  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with profiting from influence resources (notably advantageous 
policy positions) or other actors’ influence attempts, while undertaking influence attempts itself.
3.  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with simply possessing the influence resource ‘reputation for 
influence’, while not undertaking influence attempts.
4.  Goal-achievement that is positively associated with luck, while not undertaking influence attempts.
5.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with unsuccessful influence attempts.
6.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with bad influence attempts.
7.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with bad luck, while undertaking influence attempts.
8.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with just the influence attempts themselves.
9.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with neglect resulting in not undertaking influence 
attempts.
10.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with non-priority resulting in not undertaking influence 
attempts.
11.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with internal divisiveness resulting in not undertaking 
influence attempts.
12.  No goal-achievement that is positively associated with anticipation resulting in not undertaking influence 
attempts.
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In the case of the Minimum requirement, Veto possibility-1, Commission size and General 
weighting issues, the Dutch cabinet did exert its influence, but also got a free ride. The 
process analysis thus provides a more adequate and nuanced view of what really happened 
in these situations.
At a more general level, the typology can be subdivided into four categories: ‘success’ (1), 
‘profit’ (2-4), ‘fiasco’ (5-8), and ‘blame’ (9-12). It is interesting to see that an actor may not 
only achieve its goal by undertaking influence attempts (‘success’), but also without doing 
anything or that much (‘profit’). This might even be a part of an actor’s strategy during 
the negotiations. While for some issues it deliberately undertakes influence attempts, for 
others it may attempt to get a free ride, trust its reputation for influence or hope for a lucky 
deal. It can, of course, be questioned to what extent an actor, particularly a small member 
state such as the Netherlands, is able to achieve its goals in this way. In this study, this 
was the case for the Dutch cabinet for only five of the 20 issues, and for four of them this 
was combined with the ‘hard’ way (‘success’). With regard to the other two categories, an 
actor does well to draw lessons from its own behaviour during the negotiations. What was 
the reason that influence attempts were not successful (‘fiasco’) or were not undertaken to 
begin with (‘blame’)? Is it possible and desirable to operate differently next time and, if so, 
how (see Section 8.5.3 for further discussion)?
8.3.3 The process analysis: explaining the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence (deduction)
The next question is: how can the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence that was pre-
sented in the previous section be explained? To answer this question, the second step of 
the process analysis in Chapter 7 worked to examine the explanatory value of the variables 
in the conceptual model. To what extent are the expectations formulated for each of these 
variables supported by empirical evidence? The degree of support for the expectations, 
answering the following sub-question of this study, is summarised in Table 8.4.
Table 8.4 Degree of support for the expectations of the conceptual model
Variable Degree of support for expectation
Policy positions Mixed
Negotiation level Mixed
Negotiation timing Mixed
External events and developments Mixed
Networks Ample
Internal coherence Ample
Influence attempts Ample
Domestic actors and factors Full (insofar testable)
The extent to which the Dutch cabinet was a part of a network, was internally coherent and 
undertook influence attempts can explain the extent of its influence to a certain extent. In 
addition, insofar as the structural variable domestic actors and factors could be tested, they 
received full support in this study. The other variables got only mixed support.
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8.3.4 The process analysis: explaining the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence (induction)
Considering the limited explanatory value of the conceptual model, the third and final 
step of the process analysis aimed to consider whether still other variables could offer an 
explanation for the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. The empirical evidence, which 
was also presented in Chapter 7, suggests the following four variables.
First and probably most important is the exchange of dossiers and issues taking place 
among the participating actors. Exchange occurred both within and between Nice Treaty 
dossiers and both implicitly and explicitly. Implicitly, exchange took place between differ-
ent issues within the Court of Auditors, ESDP and Closer cooperation dossiers. In terms 
of the Court of Auditors dossier, while the Dutch cabinet (partly) realised its preferences 
on the SOA and Contact Committee issues, it had to accept that other proposals, such 
as the one on the Appeal ECJ issue, did not make it into the final Treaty text. Regarding 
ESDP, the exchange was related to issues as well as not-issues that were put on the agenda 
(Treaty change and PSC vs. NATO) and to non-issues that did not make it into the agenda 
(Military Staff). For the issues and not-issues, in exchange for the support of the opponents 
of ESDP Treaty change, among other issues regarding the PSC, the proponents had to give 
in on the NATO issue. For the non-issues, in exchange for making ESDP Treaty change 
sufficiently acceptable to the opponents during the agenda-setting phase, the Dutch cabinet 
lowered its ambitions with regard to substance withdrawing its proposal on the Military 
Staff issue (although this might also be considered as anticipation, a variable discussed 
in a moment). Regarding the Closer cooperation dossier, one condition – the Minimum 
requirement – was relaxed, but this occurred also or perhaps only because another condi-
tion – the Veto possibility – practically remained intact.
More explicitly, the participating actors exchanged the Court of Auditor’s size with the 
Commission’s size, and the Commission’s size, weighting of votes and allocation of seats 
in the European Parliament (although the latter dossier was not part of this study). The 
fact that the Court of Auditor’s size was not reduced created room for a reduction – albeit 
in the longer term – in the Commission’s size. The big member states’ loss of a second 
Commissioner – and perhaps also the fact that the principle of one Commissioner per 
member state was introduced for the next Commission’s term of office – was compensated 
with relatively more weight allocated to them in the Council. The Dutch cabinet won 
the battle with Belgium on individual weighting, but lost on the allocation of seats in the 
European Parliament. Unlike the Netherlands, which went from 31 to 25 seats, Belgium 
lost two seats less than originally planned (as did Greece and Portugal). In addition, Brus-
sels was established as the venue for official European Council meetings, which may also 
be considered as a specific gain for Belgium.
Second, in addition to the sheer number of influence attempts and networks, their 
timeliness seems to be at least just as important. Although the Dutch cabinet realised the 
importance of gathering support for its reform proposals on the Court of Auditors in a 
timely manner – already in February 2000, they were eventually only submitted on 20 
September 2000, right before the crucial Preparatory Group of 25 September 2000. It was 
during this meeting that the main decisions on the Court of Auditors – those related to 
its size and composition – seem to have been agreed upon. The timing of the main Dutch 
influence attempt, 20 September 2000, might have been too late to (completely) realise the 
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controversial Dutch reform proposals (SOA, Contact Committee and Appeal ECJ issues). 
Unlike the case of the Court of Auditors, the Dutch cabinet was timely in undertaking 
influence attempts to realise its preferences in the ESDP dossier. At least for the Treaty 
change and PSC-1 issues, this resulted in the exertion of influence. These timely influence 
attempts were undertaken in the context of a network that was formed with like-minded 
member states in a timely manner (Italy and Benelux).
Third, the anticipation by the Dutch cabinet of (possible) resistance from other partici-
pating actors also seems to offer an explanation for the extent of its influence. In the case 
of the Court of Auditors dossier, for example, the Dutch cabinet weakened its original 
proposals on the SOA and Contact Committee issues, and eventually dropped its Appeal 
ECJ proposal. It similarly abandoned its proposals on the Military Staff and (possibly) 
PSC-2 issues (ESDP dossier) and on the Differentiated membership issue (Closer coop-
eration dossier). By anticipating (possible) resistance, the Dutch cabinet may have itself 
contributed to the fact that it only partially achieved its goal (SOA, Contact Committee 
and PSC issues) or to the fact that issues resulted in not-decisions (Appeal ECJ issue) or 
non-decisions (Military Staff and Differentiated membership issues) from its perspective. 
This is not to say that the Dutch cabinet had another choice in all these cases. Whether 
its anticipation was justified or not, it is clear that other actors have exerted anticipated 
influence in these cases. Although the anticipation mechanism of implicit influence was not 
included in the conceptual model for empirical testing (see Section 3.3.3), the empirical 
evidence already presented in Section 8.3.2 for the anticipation mechanism as part of the 
typology is suggestive evidence for this type of influence. This issue is revisited in Section 
8.5.1.
Fourth, the saliency of an issue seems to have mattered to the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s 
influence. A distinction could be drawn between the collective and individual saliency of 
an issue. With regard to the saliency of an issue for the participating actors collectively, that 
the Dutch cabinet did not achieve its goal and did not exert its influence on the Appeal 
ECJ, NATO and Veto possibility-2 issues seems at least partly to have been due to the 
fact that these issues were more salient than the issues of the respective dossiers on which 
it did achieve its goals and exert its influence. To the extent that an issue is more salient 
for more and particularly for powerful actors, it may simply be more difficult for a small 
member state, such as the Netherlands, to get its way. In terms of the saliency of an issue 
for the Dutch cabinet individually, the more important a dossier or issue is to the Dutch 
cabinet, the more intense seems to be its preference and the more insistent its influence 
attempts. This can be seen, for example, from a comparison between the Court of Auditors 
and ESDP dossiers, the latter of which was more important to the Dutch cabinet than the 
former (which, for that matter, also appeared from the different quantity and quality of the 
two dossiers in the archive of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry). However, the empiri-
cal evidence does not suggest that there is also a positive correlation between individual 
saliency and the extent of influence. The individual saliency of an issue still seems to be 
a relevant variable, because an actor, at least theoretically, has more chances to exert its 
influence regarding those issues on which its preferences are more intense and its influence 
attempts more insistent.
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8.4 Answering the research question
To what extent has the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence during the negotiation process 
that resulted in the Treaty of Nice, and how can this influence be explained?
It can be concluded that the Dutch cabinet has exerted explicit influence regarding nine 
of the 20 Nice Treaty issues from the sample selection (see Table 8.5). This was the case 
regarding the SOA-1 and Contact Committee-1 issues (Court of Auditors dossier), Treaty 
change and PSC-1 issues (ESDP dossier), Minimum requirement and Veto possibility-1 
issues (Closer cooperation dossier), Commission size issue (Commission dossier) and Gen-
eral weighting and Individual weighting issues (Weighting of votes dossier). The Dutch 
cabinet has not exerted explicit influence regarding 10 of the 20 issues from the sample 
selection. This applies to the Size, SOA-2, Contact Committee-2, Appeal ECJ and Instruc-
tion issues (Court of Auditors dossier), PSC-2, NATO and Military Staff issues (ESDP 
dossier) and Veto possibility-2 and Differentiated membership issues (Closer cooperation 
Table 8.5 The extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence
Dossier
Issue
Influence
Court of Auditors
Size No
SOA Yes: SOA-1
No: SOA-2
Contact Committee Yes: Contact Committee-1
No: Contact Committee-2
Appeal ECJ No
Instruction No
ESDP
Treaty change Yes
PSC Yes: PSC-1
No: PSC-2
NATO No
Military Staff No
Closer cooperation
Minimum requirement Yes
Veto possibility Yes: Veto possibility-1
No: Veto possibility-2
Differentiated membership No
Commission
Size and composition Yes
Weighting of votes
Type of system Unknown
General weighting Yes
Individual weighting Yes
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dossier). For one issue, the Type of system issue (Weighting of votes dossier), it remains 
unknown whether or not the Dutch cabinet has exerted explicit influence.
When comparing Tables 8.1 and 8.5, it can moreover be concluded that the Dutch 
cabinet has exerted influence regarding an ample majority (nine) of the 15 – including the 
four extra issues – decisions of the sample selection. The Dutch cabinet has not exerted its 
influence regarding five decisions, but to a considerable degree the non-decisions and not-
decisions (also five issues) account for its lack of influence during the negotiation process 
resulting in the Treaty of Nice. Focusing only on the decisions that have been made during 
the Nice Treaty negotiation process and the influence the Dutch cabinet has exerted would 
thus disregard the lack of influence of the Dutch cabinet – and the influence that other 
participating actors have exerted – with regard to the decisions that have not been made. 
For a proper assessment of an actor’s influence, it is therefore important to include not only 
decisions, but also non-decisions and not-decisions in the analysis.
For an explanation of the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence, the deductive and 
inductive steps result in the following conclusions.
On the basis of the deductive testing of the expectations of the conceptual model, it 
can be concluded that the extent to which the Dutch cabinet was a part of a network, was 
internally coherent, undertook influence attempts and was enabled or constrained by do-
mestic actors and factors can, to a certain degree, explain the extent of its influence. In the 
nine cases where the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence, it was often a part of a network, 
internally coherent, undertook many influence attempts and was enabled by domestic 
actors and factors. In the 10 cases where the Dutch cabinet did not exert its influence, 
on the other hand, it was often a part of a divided network or of no network at all, was 
internally divided, undertook hardly any or few influence attempts and was constrained by 
domestic actors and factors.
Box 8.1 Main conclusions of this study
1.  The Dutch cabinet has achieved its goal for roughly half of all Nice Treaty issues selected for this study, which 
resulted in decisions.
2.  The Dutch cabinet has not achieved its goal for roughly half of all Nice Treaty issues selected for this study, 
which resulted in non-decisions or not-decisions.
3.  The Dutch cabinet was therefore better at decision-making than at agenda-setting during the Nice Treaty 
negotiations.
4.  The Dutch cabinet has exerted its influence with regard to roughly half of the sample selection of Nice Treaty 
issues, which resulted in decisions.
5.  To a considerable degree, non-decisions and not-decisions account for the lack of the Dutch cabinet’s influ-
ence during the Nice Treaty negotiations.
6.  Partial or full goal-achievement by the Dutch cabinet cannot be equated with influence during the Nice 
Treaty negotiations.
7.  The extent to which the Dutch cabinet was a part of a network, was internally coherent, undertook influence 
attempts and was enabled or constrained by domestic actors and factors can, to a certain degree, explain the 
extent of its influence.
8.  The exchange of dossiers and issues among the participating actors, the timeliness of influence attempts 
and networks, anticipation of (possible) resistance and the saliency of an issue also seem to contribute to the 
extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence.
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Yet these variables cannot fully explain the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. On 
the basis of induction, it can be concluded that the exchange of dossiers and issues among 
the participating actors, the timeliness of influence attempts and networks, anticipation 
of (possible) resistance from other participating actors and the collective and individual 
saliency of an issue also seem to contribute to the explanation.
The main conclusions of this study are presented in Box 8.1.
8.5 Looking to the future of EU Treaty negotiations
The presentation of the empirical results and the answer to the research question lead 
quite naturally to some reflections on the theory, methodology and practice of influence. 
These reflections or recommendations have to do with the last sub-question of this study. 
Beginning with some reflections on the theory and methodology of influence in Sections 
8.5.1 and 8.5.2, the study also presents some suggestions for future research. The study is 
then closed with some recommendations for the practice of influence in Section 8.5.3.
8.5.1 Theory: reflections and further research
The reflections on theory are begun with a new proposal for a conceptual model for the 
analysis of EU (Treaty) negotiations (see Figure 8.2). This new conceptual model is, on 
the one hand, composed of those variables of this study’s conceptual model that received 
sufficient support in the data (deduction). On the other hand, it is also composed of the 
variables that seemed to be important in this study, but were not included in the model 
(induction). The results of the deductive step of the process analysis show that internal 
coherence, the number of networks, the number of influence attempts and domestic actors 
and factors – on the condition that sufficient data are available – can, to a certain degree, 
explain the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence during the Nice Treaty negotiation 
process. From the inductive step of the process analysis, it seems that the exchange of inter-
linked dossiers and issues, an early timing of influence attempts and networks, anticipation 
of (possible) resistance and the collective and individual saliency of an issue also contribute 
to the explanation of the Dutch cabinet’s influence.
As with the conceptual model of this study presented in Section 4.5 (Figure 4.1), the 
central relationship in the revised model is still the conversion of influence resources 
(independent variable) into influence (dependent variable) via influence attempts (inter-
vening variable). With regard to influence attempts, not just their number but also their 
timeliness seems to be important. With regard to influence resources, internal coherence 
and the number and – plausibly – timeliness of networks are particularly relevant. As for 
the anticipation of (possible) resistance, it was already pointed out in Section 4.2.2 that 
an actor’s reputation for influence can also be an important resource for the exertion of 
influence. Inadequate data were collected in this study to test this variable for the Dutch 
cabinet, but its value was discovered indirectly – via the other participating actors – in the 
sense that the Dutch cabinet seems to have anticipated the reputation of these actors in 
several instances. As a result, these actors seem to have exerted anticipated influence in this 
regard. In addition to the influence attempt mechanism of explicit influence, it is therefore 
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proposed to include the anticipation mechanism of implicit influence, which is backed up 
by reputation for influence as an influence resource. In this mechanism, which was already 
theoretically discussed in Section 3.3.3, only the presence of actor A and its influence 
resource reputation for influence suffices for the conversion of this influence resource into 
actual influence.
The crucial conversion process is in turn affected by several contextual variables: domes-
tic structure, collective and individual saliency and the exchange of dossiers and issues. 
Domestic actors and factors enable or constrain an actor in its attempts to convert its 
influence resources into influence. The other two contextual variables are less structural 
in nature. In addition, it is less clear how they affect the central relationship between 
influence resources and influence via influence attempts. A new study may investigate this 
by putting the revised model to the empirical test.
How might such a study look like? To test the revised model, the research question of 
assessing and explaining an actor’s influence is maintained. The number of actors and EU 
Treaty negotiation processes – or international negotiation processes more generally (see 
below) – for which the research question will be answered may be varied (however, see Sec-
tion 8.5.2 with regard to feasibility). After having assessed the extent of one or more actors’ 
influence, the variables of the revised model aim to offer an explanation for the influence 
thus found. The operationalisations proposed in this study for the influence resources of 
internal coherence and networks, as well as for influence attempts, could again be used 
to measure these variables. Whether and to what extent networks and influence attempts 
have been undertaken in a timely manner may, for example, be examined by making a 
distinction between an early, median and late phase of the negotiation process.
In terms of the anticipation mechanism, the empirical results suggest that the Dutch 
cabinet anticipated the reactions, i.e. the possible resistance of other participating actors, 
in several cases and adapted its behaviour accordingly. The Dutch cabinet did not at all 
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or only partially achieve its goals on these issues and this was seemingly caused by the 
anticipated influence of other actors. A general indicator of anticipated influence based on 
a reputation for influence of an actor that emerges from this study is that other actors – in 
this case the Dutch cabinet – refer to this actor as influential, important or to be reckoned 
with in – most likely, informal – written sources or during interviews. A second, more 
specific, indicator is when an actor lowers its ambitions, i.e. undertakes influence attempts 
for weakened proposals or stops undertaking influence attempts by abandoning proposals, 
without other actors doing anything to let this actor do so. The latter is, of course, rather 
difficult to establish, but several instances have been traced in which the Dutch cabinet, 
seemingly unasked, weakened (SOA and Contact Committee issues) or abandoned (Ap-
peal ECJ, Military Staff and Differentiated membership issues) its proposals.
What about the contextual variables of the revised model? This study’s operationalisa-
tions of domestic structure could again be used, but ideally more data should be collected 
than have been for this study to adequately test this variable. The collective and individual 
saliency of an issue could be measured by asking the actors participating in a specific 
negotiation process orally or in written form to rank the different negotiation issues in 
terms of their saliency. In order to examine the effect of the exchange variable on the 
relationship between the central variables, it is necessary to make a comparison in time 
and/or place between two or more negotiation processes that differ in terms of the extent 
of exchange taking place.
What about the applicability of the model? Although the object of study, the Nice Treaty 
negotiation process, was in a sense unique, this model may be applied to other EU Treaty 
negotiations as well. The Amsterdam Treaty, Nice Treaty, Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon 
Treaty negotiations are comparable in the sense that they all aimed for institutional reforms 
to prepare the Union for or to catch up with enlargements. In addition, it would be inter-
esting to find out the extent to which the model is also applicable to international political 
negotiations more generally. Negotiation processes may be thought of in the context of the 
United Nations or the World Trade Organisation.
The proposal for a revised model raises the question of how the relevant literature, dis-
cussed in Chapters 2 and 3, on which the original model was based, can be evaluated. First, 
the study confirms the relevance of moving beyond the unitary actor assumption to look 
at the degree of an actor’s internal coherence, of being part of networks and undertaking 
influence attempts during the negotiation process, and the enabling or constraining effect 
on an actor of actors and factors at the home front. Second, it must be recognised that the 
variables that inductively seemed to have been relevant in this study have, to a greater or 
lesser extent, already been suggested by the literature. As far as the Political Science literature 
is concerned, this applies to the anticipation mechanism of implicit influence, as discussed 
in Section 3.3. Previous studies on EU Treaty negotiations have shown the relevance of 
the saliency of an issue (e.g. Schneider, 2005). Previous empirical analyses of international 
decision-making processes in general and of EU Treaty negotiations in particular have 
also pointed to the phenomenon of ‘issue-linkage’ (Cox & Jacobson, 1973; Moravcsik, 
1998; Stubb, 2002; Dür & Mateo, 2004, 2006). In this way, the study thus also confirms 
the relevance of these variables. Third, considering the specific and limited context of this 
study about the Nice Treaty negotiation process, it is at the same time not trivial that the 
value of the revised model can be generalised to other EU or international negotiations. In 
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other negotiation contexts, the timeliness of networks and influence attempts might, for 
example, be less important, while the negotiation structure might be relevant after all.
With regard to the concepts of power and influence, how valuable and fruitful were the 
three distinctions and the choices made in this regard? In terms of the distinction between 
resources and relation, this study shows that a relational influence perspective enables one 
to assess the actual, exerted influence of the participating actors, in this case of the Dutch 
cabinet. Instead of deriving an actor’s influence a priori from the resources it has at its 
disposal, it is more adequate and also feasible to establish the extent to which an actor has 
actually exerted its influence vis-à-vis and in the context of the other participating actors. 
Although this study has focused more on influence attempts than on influence resources, 
the evidence found on resources, particularly internal coherence and networks, suggests 
that they are indeed important and form a basis for the exertion of influence.
The exertion of influence by an actor, however, takes place during a process, in which it 
undertakes influence attempts and – as was also, albeit indirectly, discovered – other actors 
anticipate this actor’s reactions. This touches on the second distinction between explicit 
and implicit, anticipated influence. It is remarkable that although the primary focus was on 
the influence attempt mechanism in this study, it was still discovered that the anticipation 
mechanism was plausibly also at work in several cases. This confirms the initial expectation 
that both are important to the analysis of influence (see Section 3.3).
In terms of the third distinction between three faces of power, this study confirms that 
power – in this study’s terminology, influence – is exerted during the process of decision-
making. This is in keeping with previous (relational) influence studies, most of which 
focused on the local level of decision-making. The added value of the study is its applica-
tion to the realm of IR and EU level decision-making, particularly EU Treaty negotiations. 
In addition, as was already pointed out in Section 8.4, this study shows that for a proper 
assessment of an actor’s influence it is necessary to also consider which of its preferences 
were not realised because no decisions were made on the respective issues, because they 
resulted in non-decisions or not-decisions from its perspective. In connection with this, the 
study has further enriched and specified the distinction between different faces of power 
by discerning not-decisions as a category between decisions and non-decisions. In our view, 
a proper influence analysis does not only take account of the first face of power (decision-
making), but also of the second face (non-decision-making) and – between these two 
faces – of not-decision-making. The study has moreover shown that it is also empirically 
feasible – at least from the perspective of one actor – to study non-decision-making and 
not-decision-making.
The distinction made in this study between agenda-setting and decision-making is thus 
useful to take account of decisions, not-decisions and non-decisions as different types of 
outcomes of a negotiation process. At the same time, the study underlines the point that 
this conceptual distinction is empirically not tenable at a general level; in practice, the two 
phases overlap, with each issue having its own time course through the two phases. Some 
Nice Treaty issues, such as the three leftovers from Amsterdam, became a part of the agenda 
relatively early, whereas others, such as ESDP Treaty change, were only put on the agenda 
at the end of the negotiation process. In addition, the agenda-setting and decision-making 
of subsequent rounds of EU Treaty reform overlap with one another. The three leftovers 
were, on the one hand, in fact already put on the agenda at the end of the Amsterdam IGC. 
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Several issues that still resulted in non-decisions or not-decisions during the Nice IGC, on 
the other hand, popped up again during the negotiations resulting in the Constitutional 
Treaty. This applies most clearly and generally to the Treaty division issue, which lay at 
the basis of the drawing up of a ‘European Constitution’, but also to, for example, the 
Commission proposal to introduce a European Public Prosecutor (which however was not 
a part of this study).
This makes it all the more clear that EU Treaty reform is not static, but rather, a dynamic 
and ongoing process. It is suggested that future research be theoretically aware of the over-
lapping character of agenda-setting and decision-making both within and between EU 
Treaty negotiations and for the focus to be empirically on specific negotiation issues over 
time. The focus on issues enables one to both discern different types of outcomes of a single 
EU Treaty negotiation process as well as to study several EU Treaty negotiation processes 
in order to cover (a greater part of ) the course of an issue through the agenda-setting and 
decision-making phases.
In terms of the third face of power and the related distinction between agency and struc-
ture, general conclusions cannot be drawn about the relative value of these concepts for the 
measurement and explanation of influence. After all, this study was clearly actor-oriented 
and only treated structure as a contextual and subordinate concept. Considering this, it 
is remarkable that the results of this study point to the explanatory value of one of the 
structural variables of the conceptual model: domestic actors and factors. An objection 
may be raised that these variables are not really structural in nature. This is true to a certain 
extent and has to do with the fact that structure has been conceived of in this study in a 
contextual way – contextual to actors. Yet this is, in our view, at the same time its strength, 
as a more ‘hard’ conception of structure runs the risk of becoming too abstract and, as a 
result of this, immeasurable.
In general, the concepts of power and influence and the distinctions made in this regard 
were thus useful for analysing the object of study, the Nice Treaty negotiation process. 
This is not to say that the other theoretical perspectives, discussed in Section 1.4, are not 
valuable for the study of EU Treaty negotiations. The study’s findings on the importance 
of exchange are, for example, in keeping with the perspective of EU Treaty negotiations 
as incremental learning processes with their own negotiation dynamics. Getting tired and 
under intense time pressure to successfully conclude the negotiations during the end sum-
mit, Heads of State or Government might behave irrationally, resulting in all kinds of 
exchanges and unpredictable outcomes. Rather than abandoning the perspectives, it is 
suggested that they are applied, particularly intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, 
by making use of a relational influence perspective both theoretically and empirically. In this 
way, the relative explanatory value of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism may be 
found out by actually measuring the influence of member state actors on the one hand and 
supranational actors on the other. In this sense, a relational influence perspective on EU 
Treaty negotiations is complementary to the other perspectives discussed.
Above all, it is important that the theoretical perspectives are applied in the context 
of a process perspective on EU Treaties. As discussed in Section 1.2.1, there are several 
valuable perspectives on EU Treaties. Yet if and when one aims to analyse the extent to and 
ways in which actors succeed in getting their way with regard to the content of EU Trea-
ties, a process perspective is indispensable. This is the case when applying a supranational 
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or intergovernmental perspective and all the more when adopting a relational influence 
perspective.
The plausibly predominant role of exchange of dossiers and issues among the participat-
ing actors in this study seems to challenge the value of the relational influence concept 
and perspective. It is almost impossible to grasp this complex exchange and to pinpoint 
who controlled all this, i.e. who has exerted influence to what degree. It might even be 
questioned whether actors were in control at all. The outcome seems rather to have been 
the result of all the actors attempting to exert their influence and finally – and miraculously 
– ending up with a perfectly balanced compromise that they could all be satisfied with. 
In fact, considering that exchange has probably played a role in all the dossiers selected 
for this study, the outcome of the Nice Treaty as a whole might be considered as one, big 
package deal between closely interlinked dossiers and issues. This raises several questions. 
What is the exact relationship between the exertion of influence and exchange? Is exchange 
a part of the exertion of influence between actors or is the influence concept rather sub-
ordinate to the exchange concept? Is it possible to analyse EU Treaty negotiations from a 
relational influence perspective when exchange plays such an important role? In particular, 
the question of whether it is in fact feasible to measure influence in complex negotiation 
processes about closely interlinked issues can be raised. This latter issue is revisited in the 
next subsection.
8.5.2 Methodology: reflections and further research
Regarding the method of influence measurement selected for this study, the study has 
proposed modesty in that the extent of an actor’s goal-achievement should first be assessed 
before assessing and explaining the extent of its influence. How can this two-part method 
be evaluated? The first, descriptive part (before-after analysis) consisted of establishing 
the extent of an actor’s goal-achievement by comparing its preference with the outcome 
of an issue. This already appeared to be a major undertaking. It was rather laborious to 
determine the precise outcome and, particularly, the ‘original’ preference of an actor. Yet 
in most cases the study managed to do this rather well, on the basis of formal written 
sources, complemented – in the case of the measurement of an actor’s preference – with 
informal written sources. Taking preferences rather than decisions as the starting point 
has several advantages. First, it results in a reliable assessment of what an actor really and 
originally wanted with regard to a specific issue. Second, it enables us to consider whether 
and to what extent an actor did not realise specific preferences because issues resulted in 
non-decisions or not-decisions from its perspective. If decisions were taken as the starting 
point, these other types of outcomes could not have been detected. As already pointed out, 
this is problematic when the aim is to measure the extent of an actor’s influence during a 
negotiation process.
Taking the preference concept as the starting point had its own disadvantages. These 
disadvantages are tied up with the aim of establishing the original preference of an actor. 
For several reasons, this appeared to not always be possible or, at least, to be difficult. 
First, one disadvantage of taking the preferences on specific issues of one actor, the Dutch 
cabinet, as the starting point is that the other participating actors do not always have 
(clear) preferences on these issues. This might have to do with the fact that some of these 
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issues are ‘hobbyhorses’ of this actor and (therefore) less important in the eyes of the other 
actors. Second, although the assessments have been based on both formal and informal 
written sources, the possibility that in some cases the ‘bargaining’ preference of an actor 
has been assessed rather than its ‘real’ preference cannot be excluded. In our view, however, 
the advantages for a proper influence analysis of being able to assess what an actor really 
and originally wanted and of including non-issues and not-issues weigh heavier than the 
disadvantages mentioned.
The second, explanatory part (process analysis) first involved assessing the extent of the 
Dutch cabinet’s influence. The study aimed to establish whether the Dutch cabinet had 
actually exerted its influence in the cases where it had partially or fully achieved its goal. 
The causality issue was approached by considering whether mechanisms other than explicit 
influence might account for the relationship found between influence attempts and goal-
achievement. This appeared to be a fruitful approach, in the sense that empirical evidence 
was indeed found not only for the explicit influence mechanism, but also for most of the 
other mechanisms that were theoretically devised.
The two-part method thus enabled us to empirically show that ‘goal-achievement’ can-
not be equated with ‘influence’ per se. This touches on the question of how the way in 
which the study dealt with the causality issue, in particular the three problems discussed in 
Section 4.3.1, can be evaluated. In general, it must be stressed that the issue was restricted 
beforehand by limiting this study’s research question to the assessment and explanation of 
the influence of the Dutch cabinet only. Considering that answering this limited research 
question was already a major undertaking, it is questionable whether it is feasible at all 
to assess and explain the influence of all actors participating in an EU Treaty negotiation 
process.
With regard to the first causality problem in particular, the co-variation between the 
influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet and the decision made by all member state actors 
together could rather easily be established. Asymmetry could be established insofar as there 
was generally a period of time between the Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts and the 
decision made. Asymmetry could, however, not be proven insofar as the other participating 
actors might also have exerted their influence on the Dutch cabinet in the cases where it 
exerted explicit influence itself. With regard to the SOA issue, for example, the Dutch 
cabinet has undertaken influence attempts resulting in explicit influence on the SOA-1 
issue, but other actors seem at the same time to have exerted implicit, anticipated influence 
on the Dutch cabinet with the result that it undertook influence attempts for a weakened 
proposal. In general, the study aimed to establish whether or not the Dutch cabinet exerted 
its influence in a specific instance; the aim was not to prove whether other actors (also) 
exerted their influence, which can – and need – not be excluded. With regard to the 
third problem, the study fruitfully dealt with spuriousness insofar as evidence was indeed 
found of several cases in which the Dutch cabinet achieved its goal, but did not exert its 
influence. This conclusion could be drawn, because all participating actors, particularly 
their influence attempts, were addressed in the analysis. In this way, it was discovered for 
example that the Dutch cabinet, in addition to exerting explicit influence, got a free ride 
from other participating actors in the case of the Commission size issue. On the other 
hand, the possible influence of other third, non-participating actors was not established. 
In terms of possible relevant third variables, several contextual, structural variables were 
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included in the model, but apart from domestic actors and factors they appeared to have 
no explanatory value.
All in all, the two-part method has been fruitful to approach the causality issue with and 
has resulted in a plausible answer to the research question. Yet it is clear not only that it is 
impossible to prove causality, but also that it is very difficult to end up with plausibility. In 
the end, it remains very difficult to establish that there was no other, third actor’s behaviour 
or variable being a necessary condition for the decision made. The matter is particularly 
complicated due to the exchange of dossiers and issues taking place among the participat-
ing actors. As a result, the feasibility of measuring influence in such negotiation processes 
is questionable. For this reason, no conclusions were drawn about the extent of the Dutch 
cabinet’s influence regarding the Type of system issue of the Weighting of votes dossier. 
Although the study managed to open up the black box of the Nice Treaty negotiations a 
little in answering the research question, it is clear that it remains closed to a considerable 
extent.
Rather than abandoning the influence concept and not engaging in a measurement of 
influence at all – and thus allowing the black box to remain closed – a modest approach to 
this matter is suggested in keeping with this study. First, a causal process analysis should 
only be carried out after a precise before-after analysis. Second, the process analysis should 
only be applied to a limited research question, i.e. a limited number of actors and issues/
negotiation processes, because of the importance of a detailed reconstruction. In addition, 
the assessment of influence can be made more plausible by applying a strategy of verifica-
tion and falsification, while the explanation of influence should be based on a conceptual 
model that is tailored to the specific context of the study.
How can the lack of empirical evidence for some mechanisms – the blank cells of Table 
8.3 – of the study’s typology be explained? The mechanism of justified loss may overlap with 
the non-priority mechanism for which evidence was found. When an issue is of subordi-
nate importance to an actor, this might result in negligence of the issue in the course of the 
negotiation process. With regard to the mechanisms of implicit, anticipated influence and 
negative influence, an important reason why no evidence was found for these mechanisms 
might be that they required an assessment of the ‘motives’ behind the behaviour of actors. In 
order to attribute anticipated influence to the Dutch cabinet, it should be established that 
one or more other actors anticipated its reactions. In order to attribute negative influence 
to the Dutch cabinet, it should be established that one or more other actors consciously 
allowed its influence attempts to bounce back on it. This is very difficult to assess and these 
kinds of data on the part of the other participating actors were not collected. As discussed 
in the previous subsection, to a certain extent these data on the part of the Dutch cabinet 
were collected as far as the anticipation mechanism is concerned.
With regard to the evaluation of the operationalisations and measurements more gener-
ally, the main challenge was to collect sufficient and proper data to answer the research 
question. In particular, these data for the Dutch cabinet were satisfactorily collected from 
the archive of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry. As the study aimed to assess and explain 
the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence in the context of the other participating actors, it 
was important to also collect these data for the other actors as much as possible. This was 
achieved by complementing the Dutch archive with the perhaps relatively objective archive 
of the European Commission. Yet ideally, one would have to visit all the capital cities 
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of the member states and study their archives in order to answer the research question, 
let alone answer this question for all the participating actors. Apart from possible access 
problems, it was clear from the outset that this was just not feasible in the context of this 
study. This resulted in the modest approach to carry out a precise before-after analysis for 
all participating actors and only after that to engage in a process analysis focusing on the 
Dutch cabinet.
As mentioned earlier, the before-after analysis was rather laborious just because it was so 
precise, but the fruits of this were adequate measurements. The process analysis focused 
mainly on the influence attempts of the Dutch cabinet, but also of the other participating 
actors, particularly the preferences expressed by them all during the IGC meetings. This 
was based on – and related to – the opportunity to study the two archives resulting in a 
detailed reconstruction of the negotiation process, particularly the preferences expressed 
during the meetings. With regard to the other variables of the process analysis, particularly 
influence resources and domestic structure, it was clear that the ideal condition of sufficient 
and proper data collection could not be met. The data that were found on the basis of the 
sources consulted for this study were simply collected and presented. In the case of the 
domestic structure variable, for example, this resulted to a large extent in a measurement 
of the (strategic) use of actors and factors on the home front by the participating actors 
during the negotiation process rather than of the actual existence and role of these actors 
and factors. Although this was not originally intended, it produced interesting side results 
in this study.
8.5.3 Practice: lessons for the Dutch cabinet
Regarding the practice of influence, what can be recommended to the Dutch cabinet to 
allow it to exert more influence during EU (Treaty) negotiations in the future? The follow-
ing recommendations are based on the main conclusions of this study presented above, 
particularly with regard to the variables that deductively or plausibly inductively appeared 
to be relevant.
First and generally speaking, in order to exert influence it pays off to invest greatly in 
agenda-setting and decision-making. To a considerable extent, the Dutch cabinet’s lack of 
influence during the Nice Treaty negotiation process had to do with the fact that issues 
resulted in non-decisions or not-decisions from its perspective. On the other hand, it 
often exerted its influence regarding issues that were put on the agenda and resulted in 
decisions. In other words, the Dutch cabinet has an interest in ensuring that issues are 
actually decided upon. In order to further this interest, it is first of all important that 
issues are actually made a part of the agenda. In several instances, the Dutch cabinet did 
not undertake influence attempts due to its internal divisiveness (Instruction issue) or 
the fact that an issue was a non-priority (Military Staff and Differentiated membership 
issues). Internal coherence and having clear preferences and priorities, followed by insistent 
influence attempts, can prevent issues from not being put on the agenda to begin with and 
therefore not being decided on. The Dutch cabinet may have less control over whether an 
agenda issue is eventually decided on or not. Yet, for example, in the case of the Appeal ECJ 
issue, it was partly due to the late timing of its influence attempts that the Dutch cabinet 
did not realise its preference.
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Second, it must of course be recognised that the Dutch cabinet must weigh its priori-
ties. It cannot realise all its preferences by just including them in its position paper and 
undertaking insistent influence attempts. As a specification of the first point, it is therefore 
recommendable to include a limited number of clear and prioritised preferences in its position 
paper and influence attempts rather than to include a lot of preferences, some of which 
are unclear and/or of minor importance. The Dutch cabinet has, at least on paper, more 
chances of exerting its influence when its preferences are intense and its influence attempts 
insistent. Establishing which issues are salient for the Dutch cabinet individually should 
be weighted against which issues are salient for the participating actors collectively. In this 
regard, the Dutch cabinet should consider that it is more difficult to exert its influence with 
regard to collectively salient issues.
Third, and as was already pointed out in the first point, being internally coherent con-
tributes to the exertion of influence. Due to its internal divisiveness, the Dutch cabinet 
hardly undertook any influence attempts to put the Instruction issue on the agenda and 
realise its preference in the Treaty text. The Dutch cabinet undertook divergent influence 
attempts with regard to the Court of Auditor’s size and it was only through sheer luck that 
it still achieved its goal on this issue. Although the Dutch cabinet was less in control, the 
internal divisiveness of the Italy and Benelux network with regard to the NATO issue can 
also partly explain its absence of influence.
Fourth, being part of a network matters to the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. 
The Dutch cabinet formed a network with Italy and the Benelux countries in the case of 
the ESDP Treaty change and PSC-1 issues, with both the camp of the big and that of the 
small member states in the case of the General weighting issue and particularly with Ger-
many with regard to the Individual weighting issue. In all these cases, this resulted in the 
exertion of influence. In an increasingly expanded and differentiated Union, it is of course 
important to network with all kinds of member states, but the Dutch cabinet should not 
underestimate the value of old networks, such as the Benelux cooperation. Moreover, in all 
the cases mentioned, the timeliness of networking might have been at least as important for 
the exertion of influence.
Fifth, this study shows that influence attempts make a difference to the exertion of influ-
ence. A lack of influence attempts on the part of the Dutch cabinet resulted in a lack of 
influence regarding the Instruction, Military Staff and Differentiated membership issues. 
The many influence attempts on, for example, the ESDP Treaty change, Minimum require-
ment, Commission size and General and Individual weighting issues have contributed to 
the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence in these cases. As was put forward in the second 
point, this is related to the fact that these involved prioritised issues that in turn resulted in 
insistent influence attempts. As with the network variable, the timeliness of the influence 
attempts seems to also have played an important role.
Sixth, although the anticipation mechanism was not included in the conceptual model, 
it is questionable whether the Dutch cabinet, as a small member state, has a reputation 
for influence in the EU that might result in exerting anticipated influence. This should all 
the more allow the Dutch cabinet to concentrate on influence attempts as the way to exert 
its influence. With regard to the Dutch cabinet’s anticipation of the possible reactions, 
i.e. resistance from other participating actors, it would do well to regularly evaluate its 
estimation of their reputation for influence. This is particularly important in view of the 
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fact that the actual influence of (member state) actors might be changing in an enlarging 
Union.
Seventh, the Dutch cabinet has modestly experienced – in the Commission and Weight-
ing of votes dossiers – that strategically making use of and referring to domestic actors 
and factors, such as the parliament and public opinion, may contribute to the exertion of 
influence. Though the conceptual model was not thoroughly tested on the other participat-
ing actors on this point, empirical evidence suggests that the opponents of ESDP Treaty 
change partly managed to get what they wanted – particularly with regard to the NATO 
issue – by referring – whether as a reflection of reality or rhetorically – to actors and factors 
in their member states. The Dutch cabinet would do well if it adopted this influence 
strategy more actively during EU (Treaty) negotiations. It might very well be the case that 
the Dutch cabinet managed to realise a considerable number of its preferences during the 
Lisbon Treaty negotiation process, because it relatively actively utilised this strategy against 
the backdrop of the no-vote of its population in 2005.
Eighth, the Dutch cabinet might examine in advance which dossiers and issues are inter-
linked and will thus probably be exchanged during the negotiation process, and proactively 
consider what linkages it prefers (to construct) itself in order to realise more of its prefer-
ences.
The limited explanatory value of the original conceptual model suggests that the exertion 
of influence by the Dutch cabinet is very much contingent on the specific issue and situa-
tion concerned. In conclusion and perhaps most importantly, the matter of contingency 
should be addressed when recommendations are suggested.
If so much depends on the specific issue and specific situation when negotiating an EU 
Treaty, it is first of all important for the Dutch cabinet to invest heavily in preparatory home-
work (cf. Van Schendelen, 2005). This homework could successively consist of mapping 
the negotiation environment, prioritising the issues and one’s preferences, and developing 
negotiation scenarios for these issues. The first step, mapping the negotiation environment, 
has to do with examining which issues will or should be at stake during the negotiations, 
which (participating) actors are involved with respect to these issues and which preferences 
and underlying interests these actors have with regard to these issues. The second step, 
prioritising the issues and one’s preferences on these issues, involves ranking the present and 
absent, but desirable, issues in terms of their individual saliency and accordingly determine 
the intensity of one’s preferences for each of these issues. The third and final step, developing 
negotiation scenarios, involves examining for each of the issues – classified in terms of their 
individual saliency and preference intensity, and in consideration of their specific negotia-
tion environment – how many and what kind of networks and influence attempts will be 
undertaken with how much insistence and at which moments.
The recommendations presented above are thus acted upon within this contingency 
framework based on thorough preparatory homework. Considering that EU Treaty reform 
is an ongoing but contingent process and that the Dutch cabinet has major interests in 
this regard, it is recommendable to set up a semi-permanent, high-level Taskforce at the 
European Integration Department (DIE) of the Foreign Affairs Ministry to do this prepa-
ratory homework. By way of conclusion, the preparatory homework of such a Taskforce 
is illustrated with two issues in the context of the Lisbon Treaty re-negotiations, assuming 
that the Treaty would have been re-negotiated after the Irish no-vote of June 2008.
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With regard to the first step of the preparatory homework, the negotiation environment 
is generally characterised by the need felt by European leaders to allay the worries of the 
Irish and presumably many other European citizens that the European integration process 
is going too fast and that the EU level is increasingly superseding the level of the member 
states. Therefore, issues that are considered to represent the increasing speed of the integra-
tion process and importance of the EU level are likely to pop up during the negotiations. 
For the member state governments, such as the Dutch cabinet, the re-negotiations at the 
same time offer opportunities to realise old or new preferences.
The Dutch cabinet decides that the Commission size issue and the European Council 
Presidency issue should again be put on the agenda of the Lisbon Treaty re-negotiations. 
In hindsight, the Dutch cabinet is not happy with the fact – as it sees it – that the then 
Prime Minister Kok gave up during the Nice Treaty negotiations the principle of one 
Commissioner per member state for the longer term, although it has to admit that he 
skilfully guaranteed that the fixed-size Commission would be based on a strictly equal 
rotation system. However, it is precisely this rotation system that will have to be decided 
upon unanimously, which offers member states that do not want to give up their own 
Commissioner the opportunity to block the reduction of the Commission after all. It is 
not just small member states, such as Ireland, that seem to have problems with giving up 
their Commissioner, but the French President Sarkozy has, for example, also voiced this 
concern. The Dutch cabinet considers this situation to be a ‘window of opportunity’. The 
perceived success of the Dutch Commissioner Kroes provided an impetus to the conviction 
that it is important to have one’s own Commissioner, particularly from a legitimacy point 
of view. Guaranteeing one’s own Commissioner can be presented as a real, substantive gain 
to the parliament and citizens, whereas the differences in form between the Lisbon Treaty 
and the Constitutional Treaty were rather cosmetic, as was also admitted to be the case 
within the Dutch cabinet.
Regarding the European Council Presidency issue, the Dutch cabinet was originally – 
before the start of the Constitutional Treaty negotiations – not in favour of a President for 
the European Council. In the course of the negotiation process, however, it changed its 
mind or, perhaps to be put in a better way, realised that opposition would be in vain. Yet 
the situation has now changed. A European President is considered to be one of the main 
indicators of an allegedly approaching European ‘superstate’. In addition, the Dutch cabinet 
again realises that a strengthening of the supranational institutions, such as the Commis-
sion (including its President), is more in keeping with its interests as a small member state 
than a strengthening of the intergovernmental institutions, such as the European Council. 
Many small member states share the Dutch preference on this, but this probably does not 
apply to the big member states. The Dutch cabinet is, however, conscious of the fact that 
the European Council President was to a great extent a personal project of the former 
French President and President of the European Convention preparing the Constitutional 
Treaty negotiations, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.
With regard to the second step of the preparatory homework, the Dutch cabinet realises 
that it should prioritise both issues, because it will be difficult to realise both preferences, 
not the least considering that both issues are, or can easily be, interlinked. The Dutch 
cabinet considers the Commission size issue to be more important than the European 
Council Presidency issue. This is also related to its estimation that it has a higher chance of 
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realising its preference on the Commission size issue and that this will be considered to be 
a greater gain by the parliament and citizens.
With regard to the third step, the Dutch cabinet realises that it is of utmost importance 
that the representatives of the Dutch cabinet in The Hague, Brussels (Permanent Repre-
sentation) as well as in the different capital cities (Dutch embassies) are internally coherent 
with regard to both preferences and actions. At the moment, there seems to be no division 
of opinion with regard to preferences. The Taskforce has been instructed to maintain close 
contact with the representatives mentioned, particularly the General Affairs Ministry and 
the Permanent Representation. It should also deliver clear and uniform instructions to the 
Dutch cabinet’s representatives during the negotiation process at the EU level. In keeping 
with its priorities, the Dutch cabinet decides that it will primarily put its cards on realising 
the Commission size preference. It will undertake many and insistent influence attempts in 
a timely manner. This will be done in the context of networks formed in a timely manner 
with relevant, like-minded (member state) actors.
At the same time, the European Council Presidency issue should not be neglected; in 
fact, to the contrary. The Dutch cabinet considers that the best way to realise both its 
preferences is to also form networks and undertake influence attempts in a timely manner 
on the European Council Presidency issue and, if appropriate, construct a linkage between 
the two issues. First the Dutch cabinet will attempt to find out whether there is sufficient 
support for both of its preferences separately. When this appears not to be the case and/or 
both issues are considered to be linked to each other, the Dutch cabinet will try to realise 
the following second-best preferences on one of both issues. When particularly the big 
member states want to maintain the European Council President in combination with or 
in exchange for maintaining one Commissioner per member state, the Dutch cabinet can 
agree with this, but only under the condition that a political text is agreed upon in the 
form of, for example, a Declaration that the European Council President will only be of 
a ‘technical’ nature. In the less preferred and rather unlikely case that both the European 
Council President and the principle of one Commissioner per member state are planned to 
be abolished, the Dutch cabinet can attempt to introduce a kind of hierarchy in the Com-
mission instead. A distinction could, for example, be made between Commissioners with 
and without voting rights. The Dutch cabinet considers that it is better to have a Commis-
sioner without a voting right for some time than to have no Commissioner at all.
In the search for like-minded actors on both issues, the Dutch cabinet will try to form 
networks with the many other small member states, particularly the Benelux partners, 
and with the Commission, but also with France. The Dutch cabinet hopes that a kind 
of solidarity will emerge between Ireland, France and the Netherlands, as they have all 
been confronted with a no-vote of their citizens. The Dutch cabinet’s influence attempts 
to gather support for its preferences will primarily be aimed at the big member states. 
Several big member states, such as the United Kingdom, Poland and also Germany, might 
be sensitive to the Dutch arguments because of their critical home fronts. In the United 
Kingdom, Prime Minister Brown has a weak position and faces a very critical parliament 
and public all the more since the Constitutional Treaty has been passed without holding a 
referendum. In Poland, there are worries both at the elite and mass levels about the speed of 
the integration process and the erosion of the national level. In Germany, the citizens might 
not really be critically involved, but the government is alarmed by the legal proceedings on 
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the constitutional character of the Lisbon Treaty that have been instituted at the Federal 
Court. In its contacts with these member states both at the political and official levels, the 
Dutch cabinet will not refrain from referring to these critical home fronts in order to gather 
support for its preferences.
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Informal documents (archives)
FA/DIE archive
The following files from the FA/DIE archive (Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry, European Integration Department) have been 
used in this study:
- Preparation (‘Voorbereiding’; ISN=659617)
- Court of Auditors (‘Europese Rekenkamer’; ISN=661908)
- ESDP (‘EVDB’; ISN=678632 and ISN=709017)
- Closer cooperation (‘Flexibiliteit (nauwere samenwerking)’; ISN=678660 and ISN=709016)
- Size and composition of the Commission (‘Omvang en samenstelling van de Commissie’; ISN=661787)
- Weighting of votes in the Council (‘Stemmenweging in de Raad’; ISN=661809 and ISN=709018)
Except for the first file, these files correspond to the five Nice Treaty dossiers that were selected for this study.
In this study, reference is made to the FA/DIE archive in the following way:
FA/DIE [type of document], [date]
For example:
FA/DIE report, 23 May 2000
Unless otherwise indicated, a reference concerns the file that corresponds with the respective dossier that is under consid-
eration. Thus, when the Court of Auditors dossier is under consideration, a reference to the FA/DIE archive concerns the 
Court of Auditors file of this archive. When this is – exceptionally – not the case, the respective file is explicitly mentioned. 
For example:
FA/DIE/Closer cooperation note, 7 September 2000
In this example, the reference to the FA/DIE archive concerns the Closer cooperation files, while a dossier other than the 
Closer cooperation dossier is under consideration.
Commission archive
The following files from the Commission archive (Secretariat-General, Taskforce Future of the Union and institutional 
matters) have been used in this study:
- Organisation of work (‘Organisation des traveaux’; 26)
- Court of Auditors (‘Court des comptes’; 171)
- ESDP (‘PESC/PESD’; 460 and 461)
- Closer cooperation (‘Flexibilité/coopérations renforcées’; 258, 259, 260, 271 and 272)
- Size and composition of the Commission (‘Commission-composition de la Commission’; 80 and 81)
- Weighting of votes in the Council (‘Conseil-pondération des voix’; 127 and 128)
Except for the first file, these files again correspond to the five Nice Treaty dossiers selected for this study.
In this study, reference is made to the Commission archive in the same way as for the FA/DIE archive (see above).
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The research process
The research for this study began in March 2002. In order to prepare the empirical research, 
several informal contacts were made with (former) officials from the Dutch Foreign Affairs 
Ministry and the European Commission. These contacts were also made in view of the 
aim to gain access to the archives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, European Integration 
Department (FA/DIE) and the Commission’s Secretariat-General, Taskforce Future of the 
Union and institutional matters.
With regard to the FA/DIE archive, an initial formal request on the basis of the Freedom 
of Information Act (‘WOB’) was submitted to the Legal Affairs Department in July 2003. 
However, it became clear that the application of this Act would result in a refusal of access 
to most, primarily informal documents of the archive. Therefore, it was decided not to treat 
the request under this Act, but to provide the author with (practically) unrestricted access 
under a number of specified conditions. The author was one of the first to gain such special 
access to this archive. The request was submitted by the European Integration Department 
via the Director-General for European Cooperation to the Secretary-General, who granted 
access in December 2003. In addition, the request was submitted to the Dutch General 
Affairs Ministry, which also agreed to it.
One of the conditions was that access would only be allowed to the Commission and 
Weighting of Votes dossiers in 2005 (which had to do with the sensitivity of these dossiers 
related to the then ongoing Constitutional Treaty negotiations). Another was that copies 
were not allowed to be made. FA/DIE would also have to agree to the final manuscript 
before publication.
The archive was consulted in 2004 and the first half of 2005. As copies were not allowed 
to be made, all the documents deemed useful (which were a lot) had to be handwrit-
ten. These notes formed the basis of the detailed reconstructions made of the negotiation 
process for all five dossiers selected for this study. These reconstructions, or case reports, in 
turn formed the basis of the influence analysis, a before-after analysis complemented with 
a process analysis.
Similarly, the author gained special access to the archive of the Commission’s Secretariat-
General, Taskforce Future of the Union and institutional matters. The similarities with the 
FA/DIE procedure are striking. A conversation with and subsequent action by the former 
Head of this Taskforce during the time of the Nice Treaty negotiations was rather decisive 
in gaining access. Following this conversation and without even writing a letter, the author 
received a letter from the Director of the Taskforce granting access in September 2004. As 
the request would not fit Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parlia-
ment, Council and Commission documents (a kind of European ‘Freedom of Information 
Act’), (practically) unrestricted access was again received to the archive – including many 
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informal documents – subject to specified conditions. These conditions were considerably 
less stringent than in the case of the FA/DIE archive. Significantly, this time copies of the 
documents were allowed to be made.
The author visited and consulted the Commission archive a couple of times in the first 
half of 2005. The documents were a good complement to the FA/DIE documents in mak-
ing the reconstructions that formed the basis of the influence analysis.
Encouraged by these good experiences, the author subsequently attempted to gain spe-
cial access to the archive of the Council Secretariat. Unfortunately, this appeared not to 
be possible; only ‘normal’ access was provided to primarily formal documents on the basis 
of Regulation 1049/2001. This confirms the image of the Council as the least transparent 
institution of the EU. Remarkably, it was stated that there would be no so-called ‘neutral’ 
reports, i.e. minutes, of the IGC meetings made by Council Secretariat officials.
To fill some gaps that remained in the study, some concluding conversations were held 
with a FA/DIE and Commission official in July 2008.
The final manuscript was submitted to and assessed by FA/DIE during the summer 
of 2008. Following the same route as in the case of the access procedure (DIE, DGES, 
Secretary-General and General Affairs Ministry), FA/DIE eventually agreed to publication 
– without any changes worth mentioning – in November 2008.
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List of respondents18
Dick Benschop, 10 December 2002
State Secretary for European Affairs, Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry
Aldrik Gierveld, 12 April 2005 and 16 July 2008
Head of IGC Taskforce, Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry, European Integration Depart-
ment
Carmen Gonsalves, 12 May 2003
Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry, European Integration Department
Pieter van Nuffel, 7 July 2004 and 15 July 2008
Head of Unit Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reforms, European Commis-
sion, Secretariat-General
Jaap de Zwaan, 13 March 2003
Professor Law of the European Union, Erasmus University Rotterdam
18. The job description of the respondents is that during the time of the Nice Treaty negotiation process 
(2000).
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Justification of measuring support 
for expectations
Depending on the number of sample selection issues of the respective Nice Treaty dossier, 
the support for the expectations of the conceptual model in Chapter 7 was measured as 
follows.
One issue:
1-0 full support
0-1 no support
Two issues:
2-0 full support
1-1 mixed support
0-2 no support
Three issues:
3-0 full support
2-1 ample support
1-2 little support
0-3 no support
Four issues:
4-0 full support
3-1 ample support
2-2 mixed support
1-3 little support
0-4 no support
Five issues:
5-0 full support
4-1 considerable support
3-2 mixed support
2-3 mixed support
1-4 very little support
0-5 no support
318 Annex 3
Six issues:
6-0 full support
5-1 considerable support
4-2 ample support
3-3 mixed support
2-4 little support
1-5 very little support
0-6 no support
Seven issues:
7-0 full support
6-1 considerable support
5-2 ample support
4-3 mixed support
3-4 mixed support
2-5 little support
1-6 very little support
0-7 no support
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Detailed tables before-after analysis 
(Dutch cabinet)
The detailed tables should be read in connection with the text and summary tables in 
Chapter 5 and the operationalisations of the variables preference, outcome and extent of 
goal-achievement presented in Section 4.9.1. The numbering refers to these operation-
alisations. A description of the decision options – A, B etc. – for each issue is found in 
Chapter 5.
Legend:
 060300  = 6 March 2000
 0300   = March 2000
 A(/B)   = A, possibly B
 A/B   = ‘A and B equally’ or ‘A and/or B’ (depending on the situation)
 A>B   = A more than B
 A, B   = A or B
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annex 5
Detailed tables before-after analysis 
(other actors)
The detailed tables should be read in connection with the text and summary tables in 
Chapter 6 and the operationalisations of the variables preference, outcome and extent of 
goal-achievement presented in Section 4.9.1. The numbering – 1), 2) etc. – refers to these 
operationalisations. A description of the decision options – A, B etc. – for each issue can 
be found in Chapter 6. A legend can be found in Annex 4.
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n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 2
80
30
0,
 2
80
30
0:
 B
C
1
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Si
ze
 a
nd
 co
m
po
sit
io
n
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
Ou
tc
om
e
Go
al
-a
ch
ie
ve
m
en
t
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
D/
C 
(c
om
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 e
qu
al
 ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
1)
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
18
/0
0,
 0
30
30
0:
 D
/C
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
/P
re
pa
ra
tio
n 
PR
 re
po
rt 
of
 1
st
 te
ch
ni
ca
l m
ee
tin
g 
of
 1
40
79
9,
 1
60
79
9:
 B
- F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 1
50
20
0:
 D
 (c
om
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 e
qu
al
 ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 2
80
30
0,
 2
80
30
0:
 D
C
3
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
D 
(2
0)
>B
1)
 - 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n,
 1
99
9:
 D
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
01
/0
0,
 0
10
20
0:
 D
 (2
0)
/B
2)
 - 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
br
ie
fin
g 
no
te
, 1
20
10
0:
 D
(/B
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 1
00
30
0:
 D
/B
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
sp
ea
ki
ng
 n
ot
e 
fo
r G
AC
 o
f 2
00
30
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: D
/B
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 0
60
40
0:
 D
/B
C
2
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
D 
(2
0)
/B
1)
 - 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t, 
19
99
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
36
/0
0,
 0
30
50
0:
 D
 (2
0)
/B
C
2
Ta
bl
e 
14
 A
ss
es
si
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 o
th
er
 a
ct
or
s’ 
go
al
-a
ch
ie
ve
m
en
t f
or
 th
e 
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 v
ot
es
 (T
yp
e 
of
 sy
st
em
) (
se
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
6)
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 (a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
Ou
tc
om
e
Go
al
-
ac
hi
ev
em
en
t
Au
st
ria
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
1)
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
12
/0
0,
 1
50
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 o
n 
ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
; Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 ri
se
 (E
/D
)
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r G
AC
 o
f 2
00
30
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: o
pe
n 
to
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 3
10
30
0:
 o
pe
n 
to
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 cu
rre
nt
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 o
pe
n 
to
 d
isc
us
s d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 B
 (n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
; m
os
t m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s f
av
ou
rin
g 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 +
 6
0%
); i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 
on
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
1
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Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 (a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
Ou
tc
om
e
Go
al
-
ac
hi
ev
em
en
t
Be
lg
iu
m
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
1)
 - 
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
)
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r B
en
el
ux
 su
m
m
it 
of
 0
61
29
9,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r b
ila
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 B
el
gi
um
 o
f 3
10
10
0,
 2
70
10
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r G
AC
 o
f 2
00
30
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o 
op
en
 to
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
an
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 o
r a
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 
bo
th
 sy
st
em
s; 
in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: A
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 3
10
30
0:
 o
pe
n 
to
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 B
 (n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
; m
os
t m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s f
av
ou
rin
g 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 +
 6
0%
); ‘
w
illi
ng
 to
 ta
lk 
ab
ou
t b
ot
h 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
an
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
’; i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
1
De
nm
ar
k
C 1)
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
22
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 C
 (Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
ar
ou
nd
 cu
rre
nt
 le
ve
l +
 at
 le
as
t 5
0%
 p
op
ul
at
io
n)
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 3
10
30
0:
 ag
ai
ns
t l
ow
er
in
g 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
(E
/F
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 C
 (d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 ‘A
m
st
er
da
m
 fo
rm
ul
a’)
; in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
2
Fin
la
nd
E 1)
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
23
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 E
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g;
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g;
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
2
Fr
an
ce
E/
D
1)
 N
o 
fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
16
12
99
: r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
)
- F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r G
AC
 o
f 2
00
30
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 3
10
30
0:
 D
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g;
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g;
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
2
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Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 (a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
Ou
tc
om
e
Go
al
-
ac
hi
ev
em
en
t
Ge
rm
an
y
C/
B
1)
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
33
/0
0,
 2
10
30
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (C
, w
ith
 e.
g.
 6
0%
 o
f p
op
ul
at
io
n)
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r G
AC
 o
f 2
00
30
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: B
 (5
0%
 +
 6
0%
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 3
10
30
0:
 B
 (5
0%
 +
 6
0%
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 B
 (n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
; m
os
t m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s f
av
ou
rin
g 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 +
 6
0%
); i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 
on
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
2
Gr
ee
ce
B 1)
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
19
/0
0,
 0
30
30
0:
 ‘if
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 w
er
e 
to
 b
e 
ch
an
ge
d’ 
B 
(6
0%
 +
 6
0%
)
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 o
pe
n 
to
 d
isc
us
s d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 B
 (n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
; m
os
t m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s f
av
ou
rin
g 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 +
 6
0%
); i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 
on
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
1
Ire
la
nd
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
1)
 N
o 
fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 3
10
30
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
); i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 B
 (n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
; m
os
t m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s f
av
ou
rin
g 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 +
 6
0%
); i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 
on
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
1
Ita
ly
E 1)
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
17
/0
0,
 0
30
30
0:
 E
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g;
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g;
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
2
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
1)
 - 
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
)
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r G
AC
 o
f 2
00
30
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o 
op
en
 to
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
an
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 o
r a
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 
bo
th
 sy
st
em
s
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 3
10
30
0:
 o
pe
n 
to
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 B
 (n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
; m
os
t m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s f
av
ou
rin
g 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 +
 6
0%
); i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 
on
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
D/
E/
F 
(m
os
tly
)-
A/
B/
C
1
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Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 (a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
Ou
tc
om
e
Go
al
-
ac
hi
ev
em
en
t
Po
rtu
ga
l
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
1)
 N
o 
fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
2)
 - 
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
20
30
0:
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
 o
pe
n 
to
 d
isc
us
s d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
50
40
0:
 B
 (n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
; m
os
t m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s f
av
ou
rin
g 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 +
 6
0%
); i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 
on
 Q
M
V 
th
re
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annex 6
Detailed tables process analysis 
(all actors)
The detailed tables should be read in connection with the text and summary tables in 
Chapter 7 and the operationalisations presented in Section 4.9.2 of the variables influ-
ence resources, influence attempts and domestic structure (actors and factors), and the 
contextual variables negotiation structure (level and timing) and external events and devel-
opments. The numbering refers to these operationalisations. A description of the decision 
options – A, B etc. – for each issue is found in Chapters 5 and 6. A legend can be found 
in Annex 4.
356 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
1 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 C
ou
rt
 o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 (i
nfl
ue
nc
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.2
-7
.4
)
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 fo
r a
ll i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- N
o:
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s, 
no
 m
aj
or
ity
 (c
le
ar
ly)
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
- Y
es
: o
n 
SO
A,
 C
on
ta
ct
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 an
d 
Ap
pe
al
 EC
J i
ss
ue
s
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
):
2)
 - 
On
 Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
di
ffe
re
nt
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 in
 d
iff
er
en
t p
ar
ts
 (F
A/
DI
E: 
A 
an
d 
Fin
an
ce
: B
) (
FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
05
04
00
)
- O
n 
In
st
ru
ct
io
n 
iss
ue
, d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 in
 d
iff
er
en
t p
ar
ts
 (F
A/
DI
E: 
A 
an
d 
Fin
an
ce
 (a
nd
 D
ut
ch
 C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
): B
) (
FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
05
04
00
)
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t a
ct
io
ns
):
2)
 O
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
di
ffe
re
nt
 ac
tio
ns
, i.
e. 
in
flu
en
ce
 at
te
m
pt
s d
ur
in
g 
di
ffe
re
nt
 
m
ee
tin
gs
 at
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
 le
ve
l 3
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t o
f P
G 
25
02
00
, 2
80
20
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
of
 P
G 
25
02
00
, 1
40
30
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
of
 P
G 
16
05
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t o
f P
G 
25
09
00
, 2
80
90
0)
Au
st
ria
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
 in
 th
e 
da
ta
Be
lg
iu
m
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
 
De
nm
ar
k
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Fin
la
nd
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Fr
an
ce
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ge
rm
an
y
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Gr
ee
ce
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ire
la
nd
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ita
ly
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
-B
/C
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- N
o:
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
no
 m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
-B
/C
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Po
rtu
ga
l
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Sp
ai
n
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
/C
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- N
o:
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
no
 m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
/C
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 357
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Sw
ed
en
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- Y
es
: o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
11
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
/C
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- N
o:
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
no
 m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
/C
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- N
o:
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
no
 m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
(/C
) o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- N
o:
 o
n 
Si
ze
 is
su
e, 
no
 m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
(/C
)
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ta
bl
e 
2 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 C
ou
rt
 o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 (i
nfl
ue
nc
e 
at
te
m
pt
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.1
 a
nd
 7
.5
)
Ta
bl
e 
2a
 S
iz
e
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Siz
e
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
16
05
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 
an
d 
19
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0 
an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
25
09
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
11
00
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
20
/0
0,
 0
60
30
0:
 
A 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 
20
09
00
: B
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
 an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
C 
(1
2)
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, d
at
e 
un
kn
ow
n:
 B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, d
at
e 
un
kn
ow
n:
 
B,
 b
ut
 ca
n 
ag
re
e 
w
ith
 A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 
15
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
 an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
B
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
: A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
358 Annex 6
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Siz
e
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
16
05
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 
an
d 
19
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0 
an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
25
09
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
11
00
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 
07
03
00
: A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
 an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 
07
03
00
: A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
 an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
B/
C-
A
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
33
/0
0,
 3
00
30
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
- C
ON
FE
R 
48
17
/0
0,
 0
51
20
0:
 
B/
C
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
: 
‘de
riv
at
io
n 
of
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
siz
e 
iss
ue
’
C 
(1
2)
B/
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
 an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 
03
03
00
: A
 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
: ‘c
ou
ld
 
ag
re
e 
w
ith
 B
/C
’
B
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
 an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 359
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Siz
e
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
16
05
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 
an
d 
19
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0 
an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
25
09
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
11
00
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
: 
‘de
riv
at
io
n 
of
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
siz
e 
iss
ue
’
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 
B/
C 
is 
‘ac
ce
pt
ab
le
’
B/
C-
A
B/
C-
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
 an
d 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 A
A
A 
(b
ut
 sy
m
pa
th
y f
or
 B
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
: ‘c
ou
ld
 
ag
re
e 
w
ith
 B
/C
’
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 
B/
C 
is 
‘ac
ce
pt
ab
le
’
C 
(‘p
er
ha
ps
 1
2’
)
B/
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 
01
02
00
: C
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 C
C
C
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
da
te
 u
nk
no
w
n:
 B
/C
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 
03
05
00
: B
(/C
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
B/
C
B/
C
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
8/
00
, 
02
05
00
: A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
360 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
2b
 S
O
A
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
SO
A
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 ‘g
re
at
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s: 
di
sc
us
sio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
lim
ite
d 
to
 
siz
e 
an
d 
co
m
po
sit
io
n’
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
: ‘m
uc
h 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
 th
at
 co
op
er
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l a
ud
it 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 
be
 im
pr
ov
ed
, in
te
rn
al
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n 
of
 C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
 an
d 
its
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
re
fin
ed
’
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
09
00
: ‘G
en
er
al
ly 
w
el
co
m
ed
 b
y n
um
be
r o
f 
de
le
ga
tio
ns
, C
om
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
Pa
rli
am
en
t, 
bu
t m
os
t d
el
eg
at
io
ns
 
fir
st
 w
an
te
d 
to
 st
ud
y p
ro
po
sa
ls 
m
or
e 
clo
se
ly
’
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0:
 ‘k
ep
t 
un
de
r e
xa
m
in
at
io
n’
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
20
/0
0,
 
06
03
00
: A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 2
00
90
0:
 
A/
B
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 ‘c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l a
ud
it 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
, in
te
rn
al
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
of
 C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
 
an
d 
its
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 re
fin
ed
’
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 A
/B
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
da
te
 u
nk
no
w
n:
 
‘gl
ad
 w
ith
 A
/B
’ 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
da
te
 u
nk
no
w
n:
 
‘A
/B
 is
 p
os
iti
ve
’ 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 
15
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 
vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 361
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
SO
A
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Ge
rm
an
y
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
33
/0
0,
 3
00
30
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
- C
ON
FE
R 
48
17
/0
0,
 
05
12
00
: B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 
vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
of
 in
flu
en
ce
 at
te
m
pt
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 
vi
ew
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 ‘C
om
pl
ex
 
id
ea
s, 
fir
st
 d
isc
us
sio
n 
by
 Fr
ie
nd
s 
Gr
ou
p’
; s
ee
 al
so
 ‘o
th
er
 ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 
vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 
01
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 ‘G
en
er
al
ly 
w
el
co
m
ed
’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
362 Annex 6
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
SO
A
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 
03
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 ‘G
en
er
al
ly 
w
el
co
m
ed
’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
8/
00
, 
02
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Ta
bl
e 
2c
 C
on
ta
ct
 C
om
m
itt
ee
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Co
nt
ac
t 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
60
50
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 ‘g
re
at
 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s: 
di
sc
us
sio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
lim
ite
d 
to
 si
ze
 an
d 
co
m
po
sit
io
n’
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
: ‘m
uc
h 
su
pp
or
t 
fo
r D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
 th
at
 co
op
er
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l a
ud
it 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
, in
te
rn
al
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n 
of
 
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
 an
d 
its
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 re
fin
ed
’
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
09
00
: ‘G
en
er
al
ly 
w
el
co
m
ed
 b
y n
um
be
r o
f 
de
le
ga
tio
ns
, C
om
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
Pa
rli
am
en
t, 
bu
t m
os
t d
el
eg
at
io
ns
 
fir
st
 w
an
te
d 
to
 st
ud
y p
ro
po
sa
ls 
m
or
e 
clo
se
ly
’
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0:
 ‘k
ep
t 
un
de
r e
xa
m
in
at
io
n’
No
t 
ap
pl
ica
bl
e
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
20
/0
0,
 
06
03
00
: A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 
20
09
00
: A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 ‘c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l a
ud
it 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
, in
te
rn
al
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n 
of
 
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
 an
d 
its
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 re
fin
ed
’
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: 
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 A
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, d
at
e 
un
kn
ow
n:
 B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
da
te
 u
nk
no
w
n:
 B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 
47
12
/0
0,
 
15
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 363
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Co
nt
ac
t 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
60
50
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 
47
22
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 
47
23
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
33
/0
0,
 
30
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- C
ON
FE
R 
48
17
/0
0,
 
05
12
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 
47
19
/0
0,
 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
364 Annex 6
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Co
nt
ac
t 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
60
50
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 
47
17
/0
0,
 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 ‘C
om
pl
ex
 
id
ea
s, 
fir
st
 d
isc
us
sio
n 
by
 Fr
ie
nd
s 
Gr
ou
p’
; s
ee
 al
so
 ‘o
th
er
 ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 
47
18
/0
0,
 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 
se
e ‘
ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 
47
01
/0
0,
 
01
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 ‘G
en
er
al
ly 
w
el
co
m
ed
’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 
47
36
/0
0,
 
03
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: 
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 ‘G
en
er
al
ly 
w
el
co
m
ed
’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 365
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Co
nt
ac
t 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
60
50
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
CO
NF
ER
 
47
38
/0
0,
 
02
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Ta
bl
e 
2d
 A
pp
ea
l E
CJ
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Ap
pe
al
 EC
J
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 ‘g
re
at
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s: 
di
sc
us
sio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
lim
ite
d 
to
 
siz
e 
an
d 
co
m
po
sit
io
n’
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
: ‘m
uc
h 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 
Du
tc
h 
vi
ew
 th
at
 co
op
er
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l a
ud
it 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 
be
 im
pr
ov
ed
, in
te
rn
al
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n 
of
 C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
 an
d 
its
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
re
fin
ed
’
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
09
00
: ‘G
en
er
al
ly 
w
el
co
m
ed
 b
y n
um
be
r o
f d
el
eg
at
io
ns
, 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
Pa
rli
am
en
t, 
bu
t m
os
t 
de
le
ga
tio
ns
 fi
rs
t w
an
te
d 
to
 st
ud
y 
pr
op
os
al
s m
or
e 
clo
se
ly
’
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0:
 ‘k
ep
t 
un
de
r e
xa
m
in
at
io
n’
/ ‘v
er
y w
ea
k s
up
po
rt’
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
20
/0
0,
 0
60
30
0:
 
A - C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 2
00
90
0:
 
A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 ‘c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l a
ud
it 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
, in
te
rn
al
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n 
of
 C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
 an
d 
its
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 re
fin
ed
’
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 A
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, d
at
e 
un
kn
ow
n:
 A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
of
 
in
flu
en
ce
 
at
te
m
pt
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 
15
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
366 Annex 6
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Ap
pe
al
 EC
J
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 
vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
33
/0
0,
 3
00
30
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
- C
ON
FE
R 
48
17
/0
0,
 0
51
20
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 
vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 367
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Ap
pe
al
 EC
J
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
an
d 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
90
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
03
12
00
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 
vi
ew
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 ‘C
om
pl
ex
 id
ea
s, 
fir
st
 d
isc
us
sio
n 
by
 Fr
ie
nd
s G
ro
up
’; s
ee
 
al
so
 ‘o
th
er
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 
po
sit
io
n 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 
vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
No
 sp
ec
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d,
 b
ut
 se
e 
‘ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 
01
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 
03
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0:
 ‘G
en
er
al
ly 
w
el
co
m
ed
’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
8/
00
, 
02
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
368 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
2e
 In
st
ru
ct
io
n
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
In
str
uc
tio
n
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Ot
he
r a
ct
or
s i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0:
 ‘g
re
at
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s: 
di
sc
us
sio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
lim
ite
d 
to
 
siz
e 
an
d 
co
m
po
sit
io
n’
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
: ‘m
uc
h 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
 th
at
 co
op
er
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l a
ud
it 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
, in
te
rn
al
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n 
of
 C
ou
rt 
of
 
Au
di
to
rs
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
 an
d 
its
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 re
fin
ed
’
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
20
/0
0,
 
06
03
00
: A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 
20
09
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 ‘c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l a
ud
it 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
, in
te
rn
al
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n 
of
 C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
 an
d 
its
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
re
fin
ed
’
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 
15
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 
07
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Ge
rm
an
y
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
33
/0
0,
 
30
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- C
ON
FE
R 
48
17
/0
0,
 
05
12
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 369
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
In
str
uc
tio
n
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
50
20
0
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 
pa
pe
r
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 n
o 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 
03
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 
01
02
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 
03
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0:
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 D
ut
ch
 vi
ew
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
8/
00
, 
02
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Ta
bl
e 
3 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 C
ou
rt
 o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 (d
om
es
tic
 a
ct
or
s a
nd
 fa
ct
or
s)
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
Au
st
ria
Be
lg
iu
m
De
nm
ar
k
Fin
la
nd
Fr
an
ce
Ge
rm
an
y
Gr
ee
ce
370 Annex 6
Co
ur
t o
f A
ud
ito
rs
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
Ita
ly
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
Ta
bl
e 
4 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 C
ou
rt
 o
f A
ud
ito
rs
 (c
on
te
xt
ua
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
) (
se
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.6
-7
.8
)
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Si
ze
SO
A
Co
nt
ac
t C
om
m
itt
ee
Ap
pe
al
 EC
J
In
st
ru
ct
io
n
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
le
ve
l
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 
24
02
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0)
- P
G,
 1
60
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
41
/0
0,
 
11
05
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 
an
d 
19
05
00
)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 
20
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
09
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0)
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 
03
11
00
 an
d 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
0/
00
, 2
31
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, 1
41
10
0 
an
d 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 2
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 1
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
M
ed
ia
n:
 3
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 2
40
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0)
 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 2
00
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
09
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0)
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 0
31
10
0 
an
d 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
0/
00
, 
23
11
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 2
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 1
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
6/
00
, 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
M
ed
ia
n:
 2
.5
 (-
3)
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 
24
02
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 1
60
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
41
/0
0,
 
11
05
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
) 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 
20
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
09
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0)
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 
03
11
00
 an
d 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
0/
00
, 2
31
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, 1
41
10
0 
an
d 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
Le
ve
l 2
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 1
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
M
ed
ia
n:
 2
.5
 (-
3)
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 2
40
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 2
00
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0)
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 
03
11
00
 an
d 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
0/
00
, 2
31
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, 1
41
10
0 
an
d 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
Le
ve
l 2
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
Le
ve
l 1
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
M
ed
ia
n:
 2
.5
 (-
3)
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
 (n
on
-
de
cis
io
n)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 371
Co
ur
t o
f 
Au
di
to
rs
Si
ze
SO
A
Co
nt
ac
t C
om
m
itt
ee
Ap
pe
al
 EC
J
In
st
ru
ct
io
n
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
tim
in
g
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 
24
02
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
- P
G,
 1
60
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
41
/0
0,
 
11
05
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 
an
d 
19
05
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 1
4
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 
20
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
09
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
3
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 
03
11
00
 an
d 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
0/
00
, 2
31
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, 1
41
10
0 
an
d 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
1
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
2
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
29
.2
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 2
40
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
02
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0)
: 
IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 2
00
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
28
09
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0)
: 
IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
3
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 0
31
10
0 
an
d 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
0/
00
, 
23
11
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
1
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
2
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
6/
00
, 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 
w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
39
.8
 (-
32
.2
)
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 
24
02
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
02
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 1
60
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
41
/0
0,
 
11
05
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 
an
d 
19
05
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 1
4 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 
20
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
28
09
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
3
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 
03
11
00
 an
d 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
0/
00
, 2
31
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): 
IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
1 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
2
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
33
 (-
29
.2
)
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 2
40
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
20
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
30
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 
2 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
73
/0
0,
 2
00
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
80
90
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
50
90
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
3
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 
03
11
00
 an
d 
CO
NF
ER
 4
81
0/
00
, 2
31
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, 1
41
10
0 
an
d 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
1 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
2 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3 
(p
os
sib
ly)
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
37
.5
 (-
32
.2
)
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
 (n
on
-
de
cis
io
n)
Ex
te
rn
al
 
ev
en
ts
 an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
1)
 Im
pe
nd
in
g 
en
la
rg
em
en
t: 
co
ns
tra
in
in
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
1)
 St
ep
pi
ng
 d
ow
n 
Sa
nt
er
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
(0
39
9)
: e
na
bl
in
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
3)
 FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
17
06
99
: ‘m
om
en
tu
m
 
fo
r r
ef
or
m
s’
1)
 St
ep
pi
ng
 d
ow
n 
Sa
nt
er
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
(0
39
9)
: 
en
ab
lin
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
3)
 FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
17
06
99
: ‘m
om
en
tu
m
 fo
r 
re
fo
rm
s’
1)
 St
ep
pi
ng
 d
ow
n 
Sa
nt
er
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
(0
39
9)
: e
na
bl
in
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
3)
 FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
17
06
99
: ‘m
om
en
tu
m
 fo
r 
re
fo
rm
s’
1)
 St
ep
pi
ng
 d
ow
n 
Sa
nt
er
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
(0
39
9)
: 
en
ab
lin
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
3)
 FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
17
06
99
: 
‘m
om
en
tu
m
 fo
r r
ef
or
m
s’
Ta
bl
e 
5 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 E
SD
P 
(in
flu
en
ce
 re
so
ur
ce
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.1
0-
7.
12
)
ES
DP
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 fo
r a
ll i
ss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 fo
r a
ll 
iss
ue
s
Be
ne
lu
x
- B
en
el
ux
 su
m
m
it,
 3
00
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- D
ra
ft 
2n
d  B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (i
de
m
)
- B
en
el
ux
 co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
n 
2n
d  B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o,
 2
30
60
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l, 
22
06
00
)
- B
en
el
ux
 co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
n 
2n
d  B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o,
 0
30
70
0 
(p
os
sib
ly)
 (i
de
m
)
- B
en
el
ux
 su
m
m
it,
 0
11
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- Y
es
: o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
, N
AT
O 
an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
):
2)
 O
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
, d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 w
ith
in
 sa
m
e 
pa
rt 
(D
VB
 d
ire
ct
or
: A
 an
d 
DI
E d
ire
ct
or
: B
) (
FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
17
05
00
)
372 Annex 6
ES
DP
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Ita
ly 
+ 
Be
ne
lu
x
- L
et
te
r I
ta
ly 
w
ith
 d
ra
ft 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
31
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E, 
31
05
00
)
- I
nv
ita
tio
n 
Ita
ly 
fo
r m
ee
tin
g 
in
 R
om
e 
on
 3
00
60
0,
 2
20
60
0 
(FA
/D
IE
, 
22
06
00
)
- L
et
te
r (
re
ac
tio
n)
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t t
o 
Ita
ly,
 2
30
60
0 
(FA
/D
IE
, 2
30
60
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
in
 R
om
e, 
30
06
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
04
07
00
)
- D
ra
ft 
pr
op
os
al
s I
ta
ly,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E n
ot
e, 
13
07
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 It
al
y i
n 
m
ar
gi
ns
 P
G 
of
 1
40
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
, 
21
07
00
)
- L
et
te
r (
re
ac
tio
n)
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t t
o 
Ita
ly,
 2
10
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
, 2
10
70
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
in
 Th
e 
Ha
gu
e, 
28
08
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- L
et
te
r D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
28
08
00
 (F
A/
DI
E, 
28
08
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 It
al
y, 
12
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
12
09
00
)
- D
ra
ft 
le
tte
r D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E, 
14
09
00
)
- M
ee
tin
gs
 in
 m
ar
gi
ns
 G
AC
 o
f 0
91
00
0 
an
d 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 1
3 
or
 1
41
00
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 B
el
gi
um
, 1
61
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r B
el
gi
an
-
Du
tc
h 
co
nf
er
en
ce
), 2
01
10
0
- B
el
gi
an
-D
ut
ch
 co
nf
er
en
ce
, 2
01
10
0 
(p
os
sib
ly)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
20
11
00
)
- C
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 It
al
y, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 2
31
10
0)
- C
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 B
el
gi
um
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 2
31
10
0)
- C
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 2
31
10
0)
Au
st
ria
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
>C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
>C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Be
lg
iu
m
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
De
nm
ar
k
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Fin
la
nd
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
>A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
NA
TO
 an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
>A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e, 
of
 A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
 
an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
NA
TO
 an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 373
ES
DP
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Fr
an
ce
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
- A
gr
ee
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
UK
 an
d 
Fr
an
ce
 o
n 
po
lit
ica
l D
ec
la
ra
tio
n 
(o
pt
io
n 
B 
of
 Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e)
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
05
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t o
f m
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 U
K,
 
16
11
00
)
- G
er
m
an
y a
nd
 U
K 
pr
om
ise
 su
pp
or
t t
o 
Fr
en
ch
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 o
n 
ES
DP
 
do
ss
ie
r, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t P
G 
of
 3
01
00
0,
 3
11
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 7
-1
11
20
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ge
rm
an
y
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
Se
e 
Fr
an
ce
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
):
2)
 O
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e, 
di
ffe
re
nt
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 w
ith
in
 
sa
m
e 
pa
rt 
(‘D
GE
S’:
 A
 an
d ‘
DG
PZ
’: C
) (
FA
/D
IE
 B
er
lin
 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
16
05
00
 an
d 
30
05
00
)
- N
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
Gr
ee
ce
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
, 
PS
C 
an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
NA
TO
 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
, P
SC
 an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
NA
TO
 is
su
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t a
ct
io
ns
):
2)
 O
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e, 
di
ffe
re
nt
 ac
tio
ns
 d
ur
in
g 
di
ffe
re
nt
 (I
GC
) m
ee
tin
gs
 (P
G,
 3
01
00
0:
 A
 an
d 
Po
Co
, 
31
10
00
: C
) (
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rts
, 3
11
00
0 
an
d 
01
11
00
, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y)
- N
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
Ire
la
nd
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ita
ly
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
an
d 
PS
C 
iss
ue
s
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 an
d 
PS
C 
iss
ue
s
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Po
rtu
ga
l
Un
kn
ow
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
al
l is
su
es
Un
kn
ow
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
al
l is
su
es
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Sp
ai
n
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Sw
ed
en
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
374 Annex 6
ES
DP
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
iss
ue
, o
f A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
NA
TO
 an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e, 
of
 A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 
on
 N
AT
O 
an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
Se
e 
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
/B
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/C
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
/B
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Co
un
cil
 
Se
cr
et
ar
ia
t
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
>A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
su
e
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
NA
TO
 an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
>A
 o
n 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 is
su
e, 
of
 A
 o
n 
PS
C 
iss
ue
 
an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
NA
TO
 an
d 
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff 
iss
ue
s
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ta
bl
e 
6 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 E
SD
P 
(in
flu
en
ce
 a
tt
em
pt
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.9
 a
nd
 7
.1
3)
Ta
bl
e 
6a
 T
re
at
y 
ch
an
ge
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
/C
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
Jo
in
t t
ex
t o
f I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
03
00
: A
 (F
A/
DI
E 
Ro
m
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
No
 ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d 
in
 th
e d
at
a
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 U
K,
 1
40
40
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
40
40
0)
- T
el
ep
ho
ni
c c
on
ta
ct
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Ko
k a
nd
 C
hi
ra
c (
Fr
an
ce
), u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
24
04
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fr
an
ce
, 2
80
40
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 U
K,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
17
05
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 C
ou
nc
il S
ec
re
ta
ria
t (
So
la
na
), 0
50
60
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fr
an
ce
, 2
80
80
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sp
ai
n,
 0
60
90
0 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E/
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fr
an
ce
, 1
10
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 It
al
y, 
12
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
12
09
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sw
ed
en
, 1
30
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y, 
19
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
20
10
00
)
- T
el
ep
ho
ni
c c
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l, 1
91
00
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 D
en
m
ar
k, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E C
op
en
ha
ge
n 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
20
10
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 A
us
tri
a a
nd
 Sw
ed
en
 in
 m
ar
gi
ns
 P
G 
of
 2
31
00
0:
 A
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
24
10
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fi
nl
an
d,
 1
41
10
0 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 375
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 U
K,
 1
61
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fr
an
ce
, 2
31
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 2
31
10
0)
- C
on
ve
rs
at
io
n 
Ko
k-
Ch
ira
c (
Fr
an
ce
), u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y 1
20
0)
 (F
A/
DI
E/
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Ir
el
an
d,
 0
31
20
0 
(In
te
rv
ie
w
 w
ith
 fo
rm
er
 St
at
e 
Se
cr
et
ar
y B
en
sc
ho
p,
 1
01
20
2)
Au
st
ria
 
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 
A>
C
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
/C
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 
C>
A 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
 
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 
C>
A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
- D
ra
ft 
De
cla
ra
tio
n 
fo
r N
ice
 o
n 
fu
tu
re
 Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
, 1
40
90
0:
 
B 
(FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
14
09
00
)
- D
ra
ft 
te
xt
 o
n 
fu
tu
re
 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
, 3
01
10
0:
 B
 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
10
0)
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 A
/C
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
Jo
in
t t
ex
t o
f I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
03
00
: A
 (F
A/
DI
E 
Ro
m
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
376 Annex 6
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
/C
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 A
/C
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 A
/C
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
un
cil
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t
No
 fo
rm
al
 o
pi
ni
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
- A
dv
ice
 o
n 
ne
ce
ss
ity
 o
f T
re
at
y 
ch
an
ge
, 0
80
50
0:
 C
>A
- P
ap
er
 ‘S
ug
ge
st
io
ns
 fo
r 
EU
 cr
isi
s m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
’, 1
00
0:
 C
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Ta
bl
e 
6b
 T
re
at
y 
ch
an
ge
 (f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 (I
G
C)
 m
ee
tin
gs
)
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
iP
SC
, 1
00
30
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
6-
07
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
09
05
00
)
Po
Co
, 
11
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
12
05
00
)
Po
Co
, 
05
06
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
iP
SC
, 2
80
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
29
09
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
13
10
00
 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
fa
x, 
16
10
00
))
iP
SC
, 2
71
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
30
10
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 30
10
00
 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
)
Po
Co
, 3
11
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
iP
SC
, 
08
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
10
11
00
)
Po
Co
, 1
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
16
11
00
)
CO
RE
PE
R 
II, 
16
11
00
iP
SC
, 1
61
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
16
11
00
)
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 0
90
30
0:
 
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A
A
A
A
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 1
61
10
0:
 
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 377
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
iP
SC
, 1
00
30
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
6-
07
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
09
05
00
)
Po
Co
, 
11
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
12
05
00
)
Po
Co
, 
05
06
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
iP
SC
, 2
80
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
29
09
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
13
10
00
 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
fa
x, 
16
10
00
))
iP
SC
, 2
71
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
30
10
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 30
10
00
 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
)
Po
Co
, 3
11
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
iP
SC
, 
08
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
10
11
00
)
Po
Co
, 1
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
16
11
00
)
CO
RE
PE
R 
II, 
16
11
00
iP
SC
, 1
61
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
16
11
00
)
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
C
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B
A
A/
C
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n)
B/
C
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B/
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C>
A
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C/
B
C
C 
(‘T
re
at
y 
ch
an
ge
 
di
sc
us
sio
n 
ou
t o
f o
rd
er
, 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
be
lo
ng
s 
to
 IG
C’
; 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n;
 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
)
B/
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A/
B-
C 
(P
re
sid
en
cy
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
C
C/
B
C
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B/
C>
A
B 
(sy
m
pa
th
y f
or
 
De
cla
ra
tio
n)
B/
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C/
B
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
B/
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C/
B
A
A
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
378 Annex 6
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
iP
SC
, 1
00
30
0
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
6-
07
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
09
05
00
)
Po
Co
, 
11
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
12
05
00
)
Po
Co
, 
05
06
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
iP
SC
, 2
80
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
29
09
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
13
10
00
 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
fa
x, 
16
10
00
))
iP
SC
, 2
71
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
30
10
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 30
10
00
 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
)
Po
Co
, 3
11
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
iP
SC
, 
08
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
10
11
00
)
Po
Co
, 1
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
16
11
00
)
CO
RE
PE
R 
II, 
16
11
00
iP
SC
, 1
61
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
16
11
00
)
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
C 
(P
re
sid
en
cy
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘Is
su
e 
of
 
po
ss
ib
le
 
Tr
ea
ty
 
ch
an
ge
 is
 
sit
ua
te
d 
in
 
IG
C’
A/
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B-
C
B 
(sy
m
pa
th
y f
or
 
De
cla
ra
tio
n)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B-
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
C
C 
(b
ut
 p
ro
po
sa
ls 
ar
e ‘
el
eg
an
t a
nd
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
ab
le
’)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
C
C
C
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
B/
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C>
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
A
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
Co
un
cil
 
Se
cr
et
ar
ia
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C>
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
6c
 T
re
at
y 
ch
an
ge
 (f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 (I
G
C)
 m
ee
tin
gs
 c
on
tin
ue
d)
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 
19
11
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 C
ou
nc
il, 
20
11
00
(C
ou
nc
il r
ep
or
t, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
21
11
00
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
21
10
0 
(FA
/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
23
11
00
)
Po
Co
, 2
81
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
30
11
00
; F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r 
Be
ne
lu
x s
um
m
it 
of
 0
11
20
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
91
10
0
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
41
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
04
12
00
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A
A
A 
(B
 as
 se
co
nd
-b
es
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
A 
(p
os
sib
ly)
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 379
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 
19
11
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 C
ou
nc
il, 
20
11
00
(C
ou
nc
il r
ep
or
t, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
21
11
00
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
21
10
0 
(FA
/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
23
11
00
)
Po
Co
, 2
81
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
30
11
00
; F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r 
Be
ne
lu
x s
um
m
it 
of
 0
11
20
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
91
10
0
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
41
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
04
12
00
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B/
C
Gi
ve
s u
p 
(p
ro
ba
bl
e)
 
re
sis
ta
nc
e 
to
 A
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n;
 P
re
sid
en
cy
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Pr
op
os
es
 in
clu
di
ng
 Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
 
iss
ue
 as
 p
ar
t o
f b
ro
ad
er
 ES
DP
 
pa
ck
ag
e 
to
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
to
 N
ice
 
EC
 (A
/C
), b
ut
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
fo
r B
 
(P
re
sid
en
cy
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gi
ve
s u
p 
re
sis
ta
nc
e 
to
 A
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
Gi
ve
s u
p 
re
sis
ta
nc
e 
to
 A
Ita
ly
A 
(p
os
sib
ly)
A
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
B
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
91
10
0:
 B
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
A 
(p
os
sib
ly)
A
A
A 
(B
 as
 se
co
nd
-b
es
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
C
Gi
ve
s u
p 
(p
ro
ba
bl
e)
 
re
sis
ta
nc
e 
to
 A
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(D
ec
la
ra
tio
n)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Co
un
cil
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
6d
 P
SC
ES
DP
PS
C
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
Jo
in
t t
ex
t o
f I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
03
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 
Ro
m
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
380 Annex 6
ES
DP
PS
C
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (p
os
sib
ly)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 A
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Jo
in
t t
ex
t o
f I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
03
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 
Ro
m
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 Ta
bl
e 
6a
 (T
re
at
y 
ch
an
ge
)
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 A
/B
 (i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
un
cil
 
Se
cr
et
ar
ia
t
No
 fo
rm
al
 o
pi
ni
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
- A
dv
ice
 o
n 
ne
ce
ss
ity
 o
f T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e, 
08
05
00
: A
- P
ap
er
 ‘S
ug
ge
st
io
ns
 fo
r E
U 
cr
isi
s m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s’, 
10
00
: B
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 381
Ta
bl
e 
6e
 P
SC
 (f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 (I
G
C)
 m
ee
tin
gs
)
ES
DP
PS
C
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
6-
07
05
00
Po
Co
, 0
50
60
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
06
00
)
iP
SC
, 2
80
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
29
09
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(It
al
y a
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
13
10
00
 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
fa
x, 
16
10
00
))
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
;
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
)
iP
SC
, 0
81
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
10
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 2
01
10
0
(C
ou
nc
il r
ep
or
t, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
21
11
00
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
41
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
04
12
00
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
05
00
: A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
A
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘P
SC
 m
an
da
te
 re
qu
ire
s 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
’
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘P
SC
 m
an
da
te
 re
qu
ire
s 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘P
SC
 m
an
da
te
 re
qu
ire
s 
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
’
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
382 Annex 6
ES
DP
PS
C
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
6-
07
05
00
Po
Co
, 0
50
60
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
06
00
)
iP
SC
, 2
80
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
29
09
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(It
al
y a
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
13
10
00
 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
fa
x, 
16
10
00
))
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
;
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
)
iP
SC
, 0
81
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
10
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 2
01
10
0
(C
ou
nc
il r
ep
or
t, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
21
11
00
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
41
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
04
12
00
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Co
un
cil
 
Se
cr
et
ar
ia
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
6f
 N
AT
O
ES
DP
NA
TO
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
Jo
in
t t
ex
t o
f I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(FA
/D
IE
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Au
st
ria
 
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 Sw
ed
en
 in
 m
ar
gi
ns
 P
G 
of
 2
31
00
0:
 ‘A
 is
 ap
pe
al
in
g 
el
em
en
t o
f p
ro
po
sa
ls’
 (F
A/
DI
E 
re
po
rt,
 2
41
00
0)
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 383
ES
DP
NA
TO
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
Jo
in
t t
ex
t o
f I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
03
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
(FA
/D
IE
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 A
us
tri
a i
n 
m
ar
gi
ns
 P
G 
of
 2
31
00
0:
 ‘A
 is
 ap
pe
al
in
g 
el
em
en
t o
f p
ro
po
sa
ls’
 (F
A/
DI
E 
re
po
rt,
 2
41
00
0)
- B
ila
te
ra
l c
on
ta
ct
s:
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
un
cil
 
Se
cr
et
ar
ia
t
No
 fo
rm
al
 o
pi
ni
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
- A
dv
ice
 o
n 
ne
ce
ss
ity
 o
f T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e, 
08
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- P
ap
er
 ‘S
ug
ge
st
io
ns
 fo
r E
U 
cr
isi
s m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s’, 
10
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e T
ab
le
 6
a (
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
)
384 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
6g
 N
AT
O
 (f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 (I
G
C)
 m
ee
tin
gs
)
ES
DP
NA
TO
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 0
6-
07
05
00
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(It
al
y a
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 p
ro
po
sa
ls,
 
13
10
00
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
fa
x, 
16
10
00
))
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 C
ou
nc
il, 
20
11
00
(C
ou
nc
il r
ep
or
t, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
11
10
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 C
ou
nc
il, 
04
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
41
20
0)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
90
50
0:
 A
A
A
A
A
A
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Co
un
cil
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
6h
 M
ili
ta
ry
 S
ta
ff
ES
DP
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Fo
rm
al
 an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 (I
GC
) 
m
ee
tin
gs
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
Jo
in
t t
ex
t o
f I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
03
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 385
ES
DP
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Fo
rm
al
 an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 (I
GC
) 
m
ee
tin
gs
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 A
 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
Jo
in
t t
ex
t o
f I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
14
03
00
: A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (i
m
pl
ici
t) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
386 Annex 6
ES
DP
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Fo
rm
al
 an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 (I
GC
) 
m
ee
tin
gs
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
un
cil
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t
No
 fo
rm
al
 o
pi
ni
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
- A
dv
ice
 o
n 
ne
ce
ss
ity
 o
f T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e, 
08
05
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- P
ap
er
 ‘S
ug
ge
st
io
ns
 fo
r E
U 
cr
isi
s m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s’, 
10
00
: n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
7 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 E
SD
P 
(d
om
es
tic
 a
ct
or
s a
nd
 fa
ct
or
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
e 
7.
14
)
ES
DP
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 - 
Po
Co
, 3
11
00
0:
 ‘T
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t c
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
a p
ro
bl
em
 w
ith
 ra
tifi
ca
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f n
o 
ES
DP
 Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
s’ 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
11
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fi
nl
an
d,
 1
41
10
0:
 ‘It
 w
ill 
be
 ve
ry
 h
ar
d 
to
 co
nv
in
ce
 o
ur
 p
ar
lia
m
en
t…
’ (‘
sp
ea
ki
ng
 p
oi
nt
’) (
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- P
os
sib
le
 b
ila
te
ra
l c
on
ve
rs
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 D
en
m
ar
k a
nd
 Ir
el
an
d 
at
 th
e 
Ba
lk
an
 su
m
m
it,
 2
41
10
0:
 D
ut
ch
 p
os
iti
on
 is
, ju
st
 lik
e 
th
ei
rs
, r
el
at
ed
 to
 o
pe
n 
co
nc
er
ns
 o
f t
he
 n
at
io
na
l p
ar
lia
m
en
t (
in
st
ru
ct
io
n/
‘sp
ea
ki
ng
 p
oi
nt
’) (
FA
/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 m
em
o,
 2
31
10
0)
Au
st
ria
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 ‘N
eu
tra
l c
ou
nt
rie
s a
re
 af
ra
id
 o
f p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 d
isc
us
sio
n’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 Fr
an
ce
) (
FA
/D
IE
 P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
01
09
00
)
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
 (‘r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n’
)
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) -
 ‘F
ea
re
d 
th
at
 (n
eu
tra
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 ag
re
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
Ni
ce
 re
su
lt 
as
 a 
w
ho
le
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f E
SD
P T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
20
10
00
)
- ‘T
he
 co
nt
en
t o
f t
he
 [I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x]
 p
ro
po
sa
ls 
is 
ok
ay
, b
ut
 th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 is
 th
e 
ne
ut
ra
l c
ou
nt
rie
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l, 1
91
00
0)
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
De
nm
ar
k
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 ‘P
os
iti
on
 is
 re
la
te
d 
to
 o
pe
n 
co
nc
er
ns
 o
f t
he
 n
at
io
na
l p
ar
lia
m
en
t’ (
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 2
31
10
0)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 387
ES
DP
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
 (‘r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n’
)
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) -
 ‘W
el
l-k
no
w
n 
se
ns
iti
vi
tie
s’ 
(FA
/D
IE
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- ‘A
fra
id
 o
f i
m
pl
ica
tio
ns
 o
f T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e 
fo
r t
he
 ra
tifi
ca
tio
n 
pr
oc
es
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
18
10
00
)
- ‘E
SD
P T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e 
m
ay
 re
su
lt 
in
 ra
tifi
ca
tio
n 
pr
ob
le
m
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 U
K)
 (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
20
10
00
)
3)
 an
d/
or
 2
) -
 ‘W
or
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
- ‘A
gr
ee
in
g 
in
 N
ice
 o
n 
ES
DP
 w
ill 
en
su
re
 an
 in
st
an
t r
es
ul
t, 
w
hi
ch
 (…
) m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
be
tte
r c
ha
nc
es
 to
 b
e 
pa
ss
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
so
m
e 
of
 o
ur
 n
at
io
na
l p
ro
ce
du
re
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 m
em
o 
fo
r 
Ba
lk
an
 su
m
m
it 
of
 2
41
10
0,
 2
31
10
0)
Re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 ‘R
ea
l c
ha
nc
e 
of
 a 
re
fe
re
nd
um
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
en
m
ar
k)
 (F
A/
DI
E C
op
en
ha
ge
n 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
20
10
00
)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 ‘W
or
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
Ev
en
ts
 an
d 
po
lit
ica
l c
on
fli
ct
s
En
ab
le
d:
1)
 D
an
ish
 ‘n
o’ 
du
rin
g 
re
fe
re
nd
um
 o
n 
po
ss
ib
le
 in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
eu
ro
, 2
80
90
0
Fin
la
nd
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 ‘N
eu
tra
l c
ou
nt
rie
s a
re
 af
ra
id
 o
f p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 d
isc
us
sio
n’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 Fr
an
ce
) (
FA
/D
IE
 P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
01
09
00
)
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
 (‘r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n’
)
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) -
 ‘W
el
l-k
no
w
n 
se
ns
iti
vi
tie
s’ 
(FA
/D
IE
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- ‘F
ea
re
d 
th
at
 (n
eu
tra
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 ag
re
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
Ni
ce
 re
su
lt 
as
 a 
w
ho
le
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f E
SD
P T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
20
10
00
)
- ‘T
he
 co
nt
en
t o
f t
he
 [I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x]
 p
ro
po
sa
ls 
is 
ok
ay
, b
ut
 th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 is
 th
e 
ne
ut
ra
l c
ou
nt
rie
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l, 1
91
00
0)
3)
 an
d/
or
 2
) -
 ‘W
or
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
- ‘A
gr
ee
in
g 
in
 N
ice
 o
n 
ES
DP
 w
ill 
en
su
re
 an
 in
st
an
t r
es
ul
t, 
w
hi
ch
 (…
) m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
be
tte
r c
ha
nc
es
 to
 b
e 
pa
ss
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
so
m
e 
of
 o
ur
 n
at
io
na
l p
ro
ce
du
re
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 m
em
o 
fo
r 
Ba
lk
an
 su
m
m
it 
of
 2
41
10
0,
 2
31
10
0)
Re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 ‘A
nx
io
us
 ab
ou
t t
he
 o
ut
co
m
e 
of
 an
y r
ef
er
en
du
m
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r m
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fi
nl
an
d 
on
 1
41
10
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 ‘W
or
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
388 Annex 6
ES
DP
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Fr
an
ce
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 ‘G
ov
er
nm
en
t (
po
ss
ib
ly)
 w
an
ts
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a 
de
ba
te
 o
n 
de
fe
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
pa
rli
am
en
t’ (
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 B
ru
ss
el
s e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
26
10
00
)
Co
ns
tit
ut
io
na
l c
ou
rt
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 ‘E
SD
P 
ch
an
ge
s m
ay
 co
m
e 
ac
ro
ss
 o
bj
ec
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 co
ns
tit
ut
io
na
l c
ou
rt’
 (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 0
7-
11
12
00
)
El
ec
tio
ns
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 ‘G
ov
er
nm
en
t (
po
ss
ib
ly)
 w
an
ts
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a 
de
ba
te
 o
n 
de
fe
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
pa
rli
am
en
t, 
al
so
 in
 co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
el
ec
tio
ns
 o
f s
pr
in
g 
20
02
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 B
ru
ss
el
s e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
26
10
00
)
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 - ‘
Ne
ut
ra
l c
ou
nt
rie
s a
re
 af
ra
id
 o
f p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 d
isc
us
sio
n’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 Fr
an
ce
) (
FA
/D
IE
 P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
01
09
00
)
- ‘P
os
iti
on
 is
 re
la
te
d 
to
 o
pe
n 
co
nc
er
ns
 o
f t
he
 n
at
io
na
l p
ar
lia
m
en
t’ (
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 m
em
o 
fo
r B
al
ka
n 
su
m
m
it 
of
 2
41
10
0,
 2
31
10
0)
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
 (‘r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n’
)
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) -
 ‘W
el
l-k
no
w
n 
se
ns
iti
vi
tie
s’ 
(FA
/D
IE
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- ‘F
ea
re
d 
th
at
 (n
eu
tra
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 ag
re
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
Ni
ce
 re
su
lt 
as
 a 
w
ho
le
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f E
SD
P T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
20
10
00
)
- ‘T
he
 co
nt
en
t o
f t
he
 [I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x]
 p
ro
po
sa
ls 
is 
ok
ay
, b
ut
 th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 is
 th
e 
ne
ut
ra
l c
ou
nt
rie
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l, 1
91
00
0)
- ‘E
SD
P T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e 
m
ay
 re
su
lt 
in
 ra
tifi
ca
tio
n 
pr
ob
le
m
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 U
K)
 (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
20
10
00
)
3)
 an
d/
or
 2
) -
 ‘W
or
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
- ‘K
ee
ps
 fe
ar
in
g 
co
m
pl
ica
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n’ 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt 
GA
C 
of
 0
41
20
0,
 0
41
20
0)
Re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 ‘T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e 
re
qu
ire
s a
 re
fe
re
nd
um
 fo
r w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 ar
e 
ve
ry
 af
ra
id
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 Ir
el
an
d)
 (F
A/
DI
E D
ub
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
27
10
00
)
3)
 ‘P
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly 
af
ra
id
 o
f a
 n
eg
at
ive
 o
ut
co
m
e 
of
 a 
re
fe
re
nd
um
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 0
7-
11
12
00
)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 - ‘
W
or
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
- ‘I
t i
s n
ot
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t, 
bu
t t
he
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
th
at
 is
 n
ot
 co
nv
in
ce
d 
[o
f E
SD
P T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e]
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 Ir
el
an
d)
 (F
A/
DI
E D
ub
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
27
10
00
)
3)
 ‘T
hi
s i
s n
ot
 ab
ou
t c
re
at
in
g 
an
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 ar
m
y’ 
(T
he
 Ex
am
in
er
, 1
30
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
fa
x, 
14
07
00
))
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 389
ES
DP
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 ‘N
eu
tra
l c
ou
nt
rie
s a
re
 af
ra
id
 o
f p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 d
isc
us
sio
n’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 Fr
an
ce
) (
FA
/D
IE
 P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
01
09
00
)
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
 (‘r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n’
)
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) -
 ‘W
el
l-k
no
w
n 
se
ns
iti
vi
tie
s’ 
(FA
/D
IE
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
03
00
)
- ‘F
ea
re
d 
th
at
 (n
eu
tra
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 ag
re
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
Ni
ce
 re
su
lt 
as
 a 
w
ho
le
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f E
SD
P T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
20
10
00
)
- ‘T
he
 co
nt
en
t o
f t
he
 [I
ta
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x]
 p
ro
po
sa
ls 
is 
ok
ay
, b
ut
 th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 is
 th
e 
ne
ut
ra
l c
ou
nt
rie
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 G
er
m
an
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l, 1
91
00
0)
- ‘E
SD
P T
re
at
y c
ha
ng
e 
m
ay
 re
su
lt 
in
 ra
tifi
ca
tio
n 
pr
ob
le
m
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 U
K)
 (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
20
10
00
)
3)
 an
d/
or
 2
) -
 ‘W
or
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
- ‘A
gr
ee
in
g 
in
 N
ice
 o
n 
ES
DP
 w
ill 
en
su
re
 an
 in
st
an
t r
es
ul
t, 
w
hi
ch
 (…
) m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
be
tte
r c
ha
nc
es
 to
 b
e 
pa
ss
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
so
m
e 
of
 o
ur
 n
at
io
na
l p
ro
ce
du
re
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 m
em
o 
fo
r 
Ba
lk
an
 su
m
m
it 
of
 2
41
10
0,
 2
31
10
0)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 ‘W
or
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
07
06
00
)
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 ‘P
re
ss
ur
e 
fro
m
 th
e 
op
po
sit
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
s’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 U
K)
 (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
20
10
00
)
4)
 - ‘
Re
ce
nt
 cr
iti
cis
m
 o
f t
he
 To
rie
s (
…
) a
ga
in
st
 th
e “
EU
 ar
m
y”
 p
la
ns
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 0
7-
11
12
00
)
- ‘ “
Eu
ro
pe
an
 ar
m
y”
 e
ffe
ct
ive
 (…
) t
he
m
e 
[fo
r C
on
se
rv
at
ive
s] 
to
 e
xp
lo
it 
pu
bl
ic 
un
ce
rta
in
ty
 o
ve
r E
ur
op
ea
n 
po
lic
y’ 
(a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 C
om
m
iss
io
n)
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
po
lit
ica
l fl
as
h 
re
po
rt,
 2
21
10
0)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n 
(p
re
ss
)
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 - ‘
Re
ce
nt
 cr
iti
cis
m
 o
f (
…
) t
he
 p
op
ul
ar
 B
rit
ish
 p
re
ss
 ag
ai
ns
t t
he
 “E
U 
ar
m
y”
 p
la
ns
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t) 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 0
7-
11
12
00
)
- ‘P
re
ss
ur
e 
fro
m
 th
e 
eu
ro
sc
ep
tic
 p
re
ss
’ (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 C
om
m
iss
io
n)
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
po
lit
ica
l fl
as
h 
re
po
rt,
 2
21
10
0)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
/n
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
/n
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d
390 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
8 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 E
SD
P 
(c
on
te
xt
ua
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
) (
se
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.1
5-
7.
17
)
ES
DP
Tr
ea
ty
 ch
an
ge
PS
C
NA
TO
M
ilit
ar
y S
ta
ff
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
le
ve
l
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 3
01
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0)
Le
ve
l 2
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
6-
07
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
09
05
00
)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
- G
AC
, 2
01
10
0 
(C
ou
nc
il r
ep
or
t, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
21
11
00
)
- G
AC
, 0
41
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ou
nc
il o
f t
he
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
, 2
00
0c
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
04
12
00
)
Le
ve
l 1
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 1
3 
or
 1
41
00
0)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ou
nc
il o
f t
he
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
, 2
00
0c
M
ed
ia
n:
 2
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
 (n
on
-d
ec
isi
on
)
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
tim
in
g
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
6-
07
05
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
09
05
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 1
2
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 1
3 
or
 1
41
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
5
- P
G,
 3
01
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
88
/0
0,
 2
31
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
8
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
0 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- G
AC
, 2
01
10
0 
(C
ou
nc
il r
ep
or
t, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
21
11
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
1
- G
AC
, 0
41
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ou
nc
il o
f t
he
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
, 2
00
0c
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
04
12
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ou
nc
il o
f t
he
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
, 2
00
0c
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
35
.3
 (-
36
)
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
 (n
on
-d
ec
isi
on
)
Ex
te
rn
al
 e
ve
nt
s a
nd
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
1)
 - 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f E
SD
P 
in
 g
en
er
al
: e
na
bl
in
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- K
os
ov
o 
w
ar
 (1
99
9)
: e
na
bl
in
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
1)
/2
) D
an
ish
 re
fe
re
nd
um
 o
n 
po
ss
ib
le
 in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
eu
ro
 (2
80
90
0)
: c
on
st
ra
in
in
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t (
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt 
Ita
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x m
ee
tin
g 
of
 2
80
80
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
18
10
00
)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 391
Ta
bl
e 
9 
Ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r C
lo
se
r c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
(in
flu
en
ce
 re
so
ur
ce
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.1
9-
7.
21
)
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f (
‘ex
tre
m
e’)
 
de
cis
io
n 
op
tio
n 
A 
on
 al
l is
su
es
- N
o:
 3
-6
 (u
nc
le
ar
) m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 6
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
A 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 (c
le
ar
ly)
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 
on
 D
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t  
an
d 
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s:
- M
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Ita
ly 
an
d 
Be
ne
lu
x i
n 
Ro
m
e, 
30
06
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
04
07
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 It
al
y, 
12
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E/
ES
DP
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y 
re
po
rt,
 1
20
90
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y, 
12
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E/
ES
DP
 B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
20
10
00
)
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
:
- B
en
el
ux
 su
m
m
it,
 0
11
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- Y
es
: o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
): 
2)
 O
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
 d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
di
ffe
re
nt
 p
ar
ts
 (F
A/
DI
E: 
A 
an
d 
PR
: B
) (
FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
, 
pr
ob
ab
ly 
be
tw
ee
n 
31
 Ja
nu
ar
y 2
00
0 
an
d 
30
 M
ar
ch
 2
00
0)
Au
st
ria
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
 in
 th
e 
da
ta
Be
lg
iu
m
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
De
nm
ar
k
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Fin
la
nd
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
392 Annex 6
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Fr
an
ce
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
 an
d 
of
 A
 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
):
2)
 O
n 
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n 
do
ss
ie
r i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l a
nd
 re
la
xin
g 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s i
n 
pa
rti
cu
la
r d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 w
ith
in
 an
d/
or
 b
et
w
ee
n 
di
ffe
re
nt
 p
ar
ts
 (s
om
e:
 ‘c
on
di
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
la
xe
d’ 
an
d 
ot
he
rs
: 
‘ag
en
da
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
lo
ad
ed
 as
 le
ss
 as
 p
os
sib
le
’)
- N
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
Ge
rm
an
y
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
 an
d 
of
 A
 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s:
- C
on
ta
ct
(s)
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Ge
rm
an
y a
nd
 It
al
y, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
(s)
 
(a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 co
m
m
on
 su
bm
iss
io
n 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
83
/0
0,
 0
41
00
0)
- S
ee
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Gr
ee
ce
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ire
la
nd
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ita
ly
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
 an
d 
of
 A
 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 G
er
m
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 393
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Po
rtu
ga
l
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Sp
ai
n
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Sw
ed
en
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
C 
on
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
):
2)
 O
n 
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n 
do
ss
ie
r i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l a
nd
 re
la
xin
g 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s i
n 
pa
rti
cu
la
r d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 w
ith
in
 an
d/
or
 b
et
w
ee
n 
di
ffe
re
nt
 p
ar
ts
 (F
or
ei
gn
 C
ab
in
et
 O
ffi
ce
: ‘p
ru
de
nt
ly 
po
sit
ive
’ a
nd
 C
ab
in
et
 
Offi
ce
: ‘m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
di
sm
iss
ive
’) (
FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l r
ep
or
t o
f m
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 U
K 
on
 2
01
29
9,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- N
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
 an
d 
of
 A
 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ve
to
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
ss
ue
 an
d 
of
 A
 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
394 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
10
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r C
lo
se
r c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
(in
flu
en
ce
 a
tt
em
pt
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.1
8 
an
d 
7.
22
)
Ta
bl
e 
10
a 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
n 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
 n
ot
e 
of
 1
81
00
0 
(C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0)
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
/B
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
‘A
gr
ee
s w
ith
 A
’
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sp
ai
n,
 0
60
90
0 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sw
ed
en
, 1
30
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/E
SD
P 
re
po
rt,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fi
nl
an
d,
 1
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- C
on
ve
rs
at
io
n 
Ko
k-
Ch
ira
c (
Fr
an
ce
), u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y 
12
00
) (
FA
/D
IE
/W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
C 
(o
nl
y c
on
di
tio
na
lly
 w
illi
ng
 to
 ta
lk 
ab
ou
t A
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
Be
lg
iu
m
- N
o 
fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
65
/0
0,
 2
80
80
0:
 A
(/B
)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 C
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
C 
(b
ut
 ac
ce
pt
ed
 th
at
 A
 w
as
 m
aj
or
ity
 vi
ew
)
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
78
3/
00
, 0
41
00
0:
 A
(/B
)
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 C
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
C 
(b
ut
, if
 g
en
er
al
 d
es
ire
, p
re
pa
re
d 
to
 co
ns
id
er
 A
/B
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 A
/B
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
CO
NF
ER
 4
78
3/
00
, 0
41
00
0:
 A
(/B
)
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
‘St
ill 
to
o 
ea
rly
 to
 d
isc
us
s a
 sp
ec
ifi
c f
or
m
ul
a’
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 C
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 395
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
n 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
 n
ot
e 
of
 1
81
00
0 
(C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0)
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
10
b 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t (
fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
)
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
02
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
40
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
70
40
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
20
60
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
06
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
30
60
0)
Fe
ira
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
9-
20
06
00
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
10
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
10
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
07
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
24
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
09
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
 fo
r 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 
13
-1
41
00
0,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
- 6
 d
el
eg
at
io
ns
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y 
fo
un
di
ng
 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s):
 B
- 6
 d
el
eg
at
io
ns
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y m
os
t 
ot
he
r m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
): a
t l
ea
st
 C
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
A
A 
(ra
th
er
 th
an
 
B)
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
396 Annex 6
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
02
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
40
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
70
40
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
20
60
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
06
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
30
60
0)
Fe
ira
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
9-
20
06
00
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
10
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
10
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
07
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
24
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
09
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
 fo
r 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 
13
-1
41
00
0,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
C
C 
(su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
/B
 
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
he
av
ie
r d
ec
isi
on
-
m
ak
in
g 
(i.
e. 
at
 le
as
t 
C 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
) 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
A/
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘Ex
ist
in
g 
co
nd
iti
on
s c
ou
ld
 
be
 b
et
te
r t
ak
en
 
as
 st
ar
tin
g 
po
in
t’
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
) 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
A(
/B
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
/B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
C
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
/B
 
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
he
av
ie
r d
ec
isi
on
-
m
ak
in
g 
(i.
e. 
at
 le
as
t 
C 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 397
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
02
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
40
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
70
40
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
20
60
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
06
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
30
60
0)
Fe
ira
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
9-
20
06
00
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
10
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
10
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
07
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
24
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
09
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
 fo
r 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 
13
-1
41
00
0,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
/B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
C
C 
(su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
/B
 
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
he
av
ie
r d
ec
isi
on
-
m
ak
in
g 
(i.
e. 
at
 le
as
t 
C 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
A/
B 
(im
pl
ici
t)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
A(
/B
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
A/
B 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B 
(im
pl
ici
t)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘N
ot
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 
of
 d
ra
st
ica
lly
 
ch
an
gi
ng
 
co
nd
iti
on
s’
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
A/
B 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
/B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
C
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
/B
 
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
he
av
ie
r d
ec
isi
on
-
m
ak
in
g 
(i.
e. 
at
 le
as
t 
C 
on
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y 
iss
ue
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C,
 b
ut
 so
m
ew
ha
t 
op
en
 to
 A
/B
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
398 Annex 6
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
02
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
40
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
70
40
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
20
60
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
06
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
30
60
0)
Fe
ira
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
9-
20
06
00
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
10
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
10
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
07
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
24
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
09
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
 fo
r 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 
13
-1
41
00
0,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
24
02
00
: B
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
B
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A(
/B
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
/ 
un
kn
ow
n
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
10
c 
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t (
fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
 c
on
tin
ue
d)
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
51
10
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
51
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
61
10
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 0
31
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
M
os
t m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s c
ou
ld
 ag
re
e 
w
ith
 A
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
A 
‘ge
ne
ra
lly
 ac
ce
pt
ed
’
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
is 
‘gr
ea
t g
ai
n’
Au
st
ria
 
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
C
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 0
7-
11
12
00
: C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 399
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
51
10
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
51
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
61
10
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 0
31
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
B
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Ta
bl
e 
10
d 
Ve
to
 p
os
si
bi
lit
y
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
n 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
 n
ot
e 
of
 1
81
00
0 
(C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0)
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
A
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sp
ai
n,
 0
60
90
0 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sw
ed
en
, 1
30
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/E
SD
P 
re
po
rt,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- C
on
ve
rs
at
io
n 
Ko
k-
Ch
ira
c (
Fr
an
ce
), u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y 1
20
0)
 (F
A/
DI
E/
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 C
ou
nc
il S
ec
re
ta
ria
t, 
in
 m
ar
gi
ns
 N
ice
 EC
 o
f 
7-
11
12
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 2
21
20
0)
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
- N
o 
fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
65
/0
0,
 2
80
80
0:
 A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 C
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
‘W
el
co
m
es
 B
’ (i
ns
te
ad
 o
f C
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 A
CO
NF
ER
 4
78
3/
00
, 0
41
00
0:
 A
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 C
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
400 Annex 6
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
n 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
 n
ot
e 
of
 1
81
00
0 
(C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0)
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
‘A
gr
ee
s w
ith
 B
’, b
ut
 so
m
e 
sp
ec
ifi
c q
ue
st
io
ns
 ab
ou
t d
ec
isi
on
-
m
ak
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
in
 ca
se
 o
f r
ef
er
en
ce
 to
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 A
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
CO
NF
ER
 4
78
3/
00
, 0
41
00
0:
 A
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
C 
(ra
th
er
 th
an
 B
)
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 C
 (u
nc
le
ar
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
A 
(in
clu
di
ng
 ri
gh
t o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
un
cil
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t
No
 fo
rm
al
 o
pi
ni
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Ta
bl
e 
10
e 
Ve
to
 p
os
si
bi
lit
y 
(fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
)
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 
25
02
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 
14
04
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
12
06
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
06
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
13
06
00
)
Fe
ira
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
9-
20
06
00
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
10
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
11
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
07
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
24
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
09
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
 fo
r 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 
13
-1
41
00
0,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
11
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
51
10
0)
Ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
t 
ap
pl
ica
bl
e
No
t 
ap
pl
ica
bl
e
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t 
ap
pl
ica
bl
e
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
M
an
y m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 d
ou
bt
 
ab
ou
t u
se
fu
ln
es
s 
B/
co
ns
id
er
 it
 as
 a 
‘ve
to
 in
 d
isg
ui
se
’
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 401
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 
25
02
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 
14
04
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
12
06
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
06
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
13
06
00
)
Fe
ira
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
9-
20
06
00
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
10
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
11
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
07
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
24
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
09
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
 fo
r 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 
13
-1
41
00
0,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
11
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
51
10
0)
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A 
(o
pt
io
n 
1,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
A 
(a
nd
 ag
ai
ns
t 
po
st
po
ne
m
en
t 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y)
A 
(a
nd
 n
o 
po
st
po
ne
m
en
t 
pe
rio
d 
in
st
ea
d 
of
 C
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(B
 is
 ‘v
et
o 
in
 
di
sg
ui
se
’)
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C,
 b
ut
 
so
m
ew
ha
t 
op
en
 to
 A
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
Ag
ai
ns
t 
po
st
po
ne
m
en
t 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y (
th
us
 
pr
ob
ab
ly 
A)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
A 
(a
nd
 ag
ai
ns
t 
po
st
po
ne
m
en
t 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘Ex
ist
in
g 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
co
ul
d 
be
 
be
tte
r t
ak
en
 as
 
st
ar
tin
g 
po
in
t’
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C,
 b
ut
 
so
m
ew
ha
t 
op
en
 to
 A
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
C 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C,
 b
ut
 
so
m
ew
ha
t 
op
en
 to
 A
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘Te
xt
 [=
 B
] w
ill 
no
t b
e 
al
te
re
d’ 
(P
re
sid
en
cy
)
402 Annex 6
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 
25
02
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 
14
04
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
12
06
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
06
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
13
06
00
)
Fe
ira
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
9-
20
06
00
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
10
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
11
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
07
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
24
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
09
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
 fo
r 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 
13
-1
41
00
0,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
11
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
51
10
0)
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A 
(o
pt
io
n 
1,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
A 
(a
ga
in
st
 
po
st
po
ne
m
en
t 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
Co
ul
d 
ag
re
e 
to
 A
 
if 
po
st
po
ne
m
en
t 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y (
= 
so
m
ew
he
re
 
be
tw
ee
n 
A 
an
d 
C)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C,
 b
ut
 
so
m
ew
ha
t 
op
en
 to
 A
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(p
os
sib
ly)
, 
bu
t C
 if
 A
/B
 
on
 M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
iss
ue
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘N
ot
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 
of
 d
ra
st
ica
lly
 
ch
an
gi
ng
 
co
nd
iti
on
s’
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
A/
B 
(o
pt
io
n 
2,
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 
30
08
00
)
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 403
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 
25
02
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 
14
04
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
17
04
00
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
12
06
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
06
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
13
06
00
)
Fe
ira
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
9-
20
06
00
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 
10
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
11
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
07
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
24
07
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
90
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
09
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
 fo
r 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 
13
-1
41
00
0,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
01
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
01
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
11
00
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
51
10
0)
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
‘O
pe
n 
to
’ A
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
C 
(b
ut
 co
ul
d 
ag
re
e 
to
 A
 if
 ‘n
eg
at
ive
 lis
t’)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C
C 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
C
C
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
C
C 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
C
C 
(b
ut
 co
ul
d 
ag
re
e 
to
 A
 if
 ‘n
eg
at
ive
 lis
t’)
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 2
40
20
0:
 
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ri
gh
t o
f 
ap
pr
ov
al
 fo
r 
EP
 in
st
ea
d 
of
 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 
pa
rti
cip
an
t
A
Ri
gh
t o
f a
pp
ro
va
l 
fo
r E
P 
(in
st
ea
d 
of
 C
)
Ri
gh
t o
f a
pp
ro
va
l 
fo
r E
P 
(to
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
e 
fo
r A
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Ta
bl
e 
10
f V
et
o 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 (f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
 c
on
tin
ue
d)
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
51
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
61
10
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 
03
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E 
m
em
o,
 2
21
20
0)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
21
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 2
21
20
0)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
21
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 2
21
20
0)
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
B ‘
ge
ne
ra
lly
 ac
ce
pt
ed
’
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
404 Annex 6
Cl
os
er
 
co
op
er
at
io
n
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
51
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
61
10
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 
03
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; F
A/
DI
E 
m
em
o,
 2
21
20
0)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
21
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 2
21
20
0)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
21
20
0
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 2
21
20
0)
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
A 
(‘n
ot
 h
ap
py
 w
ith
 B
’)
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- R
ig
ht
 o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
- ‘B
 m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
a c
ei
le
d 
ve
to
’ 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
- P
ro
po
sa
l f
or
 D
ec
la
ra
tio
n 
on
 
pr
op
er
 re
ad
in
g 
of
 B
 (a
lo
ng
 
w
ith
 ‘li
ke
-m
in
de
d 
co
un
tri
es
’) 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- ‘B
 m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
a c
ei
le
d 
ve
to
’ (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
- P
ro
po
sa
l f
or
 D
ec
la
ra
tio
n 
on
 p
ro
pe
r r
ea
di
ng
 
of
 B
 (t
og
et
he
r w
ith
 B
el
gi
um
 an
d 
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g)
 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- O
bj
ec
tio
n 
ag
ai
ns
t ‘m
ay
 ta
ke
 a 
de
cis
io
n’ 
(B
/C
; 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t)
Re
se
rv
at
io
n 
on
 ‘m
ay
 ta
ke
 
a d
ec
isi
on
’ (B
/C
), s
ho
ul
d 
be
 re
pl
ac
ed
 w
ith
 ‘ta
ke
s a
 
de
cis
io
n’ 
(B
), b
ut
 D
ut
ch
 
ca
bi
ne
t i
s o
nl
y a
ct
or
 w
ho
 
w
an
ts
 to
 d
o 
so
Lif
tin
g 
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
on
 
‘m
ay
 ta
ke
 a 
de
cis
io
n’ 
(B
/C
) 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- R
ig
ht
 o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
A 
(‘n
ot
 h
ap
py
 w
ith
 B
’)
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- R
ig
ht
 o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
‘G
av
e 
th
e 
im
pr
es
sio
n 
th
at
 th
is 
te
xt
 co
ul
d 
no
t b
e 
de
ba
te
d’
/‘B
 
is 
no
 ve
to
 o
r e
m
er
ge
nc
y b
ra
ke
’ 
(P
re
sid
en
cy
)
‘R
ig
ht
 o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
 w
ill 
be
 ta
ke
n 
al
on
g 
in
 fi
rs
t p
illa
r’ 
(P
re
sid
en
cy
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- N
o 
ob
je
ct
io
n 
of
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t a
ga
in
st
 ‘m
ay
 ta
ke
 
a d
ec
isi
on
’ (B
/C
; a
cc
or
di
ng
 Fr
en
ch
 P
re
sid
en
cy
)
- T
he
re
fo
re
 te
xt
 m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
(B
/C
)
‘P
re
sid
en
cy
 h
as
 n
o 
ro
om
 to
 
m
ee
t D
ut
ch
 re
se
rv
at
io
n’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
A 
(‘n
ot
 h
ap
py
 w
ith
 B
’)
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- R
ig
ht
 o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- R
ig
ht
 o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
A 
(‘n
ot
 h
ap
py
 w
ith
 B
’)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(‘a
pp
ea
l p
os
sib
ilit
y t
o 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il i
s e
ss
en
tia
l’)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ob
je
ct
io
n 
ag
ai
ns
t ‘t
ak
es
 a 
de
cis
io
n’ 
(B
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
A 
(‘n
ot
 h
ap
py
 w
ith
 B
’)
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- R
ig
ht
 o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
Ri
gh
t o
f a
pp
ro
va
l f
or
 EP
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 405
Ta
bl
e 
10
g 
D
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rsh
ip
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
n 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
 n
ot
e 
of
 1
81
00
0 
(C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0)
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Fo
rm
al
 an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
 
(p
os
sib
ilit
y)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
Be
lg
iu
m
- N
o 
fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
65
/0
0,
 2
80
80
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
78
3/
00
, 0
41
00
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
Ita
ly
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
7/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
78
3/
00
, 0
41
00
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (1
st
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 (2
nd
 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (u
ns
ur
e)
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
406 Annex 6
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rsh
ip
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
rit
te
n 
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
n 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
 n
ot
e 
of
 1
81
00
0 
(C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0)
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Fo
rm
al
 an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
Ta
bl
e 
11
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r C
lo
se
r c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
(d
om
es
tic
 a
ct
or
s a
nd
 fa
ct
or
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
e 
7.
23
)
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Pa
rli
am
en
t
Co
ns
tra
in
ed
 w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 D
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
:
1)
 M
ot
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Se
co
nd
 C
ha
m
be
r a
do
pt
ed
 o
n 
14
12
99
 (2
68
00
 V,
 n
o.
36
) c
al
lin
g 
up
on
 th
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t t
o 
cle
ar
ly 
ex
pr
es
s i
ts
el
f a
ga
in
st
 A
 (t
hu
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
 o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
De
nm
ar
k
Fin
la
nd
Fr
an
ce
Ge
rm
an
y
Gr
ee
ce
Ire
la
nd
Re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s:
3)
 ‘T
he
 m
or
e 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 th
e 
IG
C 
w
ill 
be
 w
id
en
ed
, t
he
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y a
 re
fe
re
nd
um
 w
ill 
be
 o
rg
an
ise
d’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
, 1
20
40
0)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 D
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s:
3)
 - 
GA
C,
 1
20
60
0:
 ‘S
w
ed
en
 w
ill 
ha
ve
 p
ro
bl
em
s e
.g
. in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 p
illa
r, w
he
re
 it
 co
ul
d 
ca
us
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s f
or
 ra
tif
yin
g 
th
e 
fu
tu
re
 Tr
ea
ty
’ (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
30
60
0)
- ‘S
ce
pt
ica
l p
ar
lia
m
en
t’ (
FA
/D
IE
/E
SD
P 
re
po
rt 
of
 m
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sw
ed
en
 o
n 
13
09
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 D
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 407
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s:
4)
 ‘G
iv
in
g 
in
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
to
 th
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
Co
ns
er
va
tiv
es
’ (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
31
01
00
)
Re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s:
3)
 R
ef
er
en
du
m
 o
n 
po
ss
ib
le
 in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 e
ur
o 
in
 au
tu
m
n 
20
01
 (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
31
01
00
; F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l r
ep
or
t o
f m
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 U
K 
on
 2
01
29
9,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s:
3)
 ‘B
la
ir 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
as
 p
ro
gr
es
siv
e 
as
 h
e 
w
ou
ld
 lik
e 
to
 b
e, 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
vo
te
rs’
 (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
31
01
00
)
El
ec
tio
ns
En
ab
le
d 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t a
nd
 Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y i
ss
ue
s:
3)
 El
ec
tio
ns
 in
 sp
rin
g 
20
01
 (F
A/
DI
E L
on
do
n 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
31
01
00
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 D
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
iss
ue
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
/n
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
Ta
bl
e 
12
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r C
lo
se
r c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
(c
on
te
xt
ua
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
) (
se
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.2
4-
7.
26
)
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
le
ve
l
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 2
40
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
24
02
00
)
- P
G,
 1
40
40
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 SN
 5
02
/0
0,
 1
10
40
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
70
40
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
70
40
0)
- P
G,
 1
40
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
58
/0
0,
 1
10
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
- P
G,
 0
40
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 3
00
80
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0,
 1
81
00
0 
(p
os
sib
ly)
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
 (n
on
-d
ec
isi
on
)
- P
G,
 3
01
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0,
 1
81
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
11
10
0)
- P
G,
 0
41
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 0
31
10
0 
an
d 
SN
 5
06
/0
0,
 0
31
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
51
10
0)
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
98
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0)
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
10
/0
0,
 2
31
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
61
10
0)
Le
ve
l 2
- G
AC
, 1
20
60
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
40
60
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
30
60
0)
- G
AC
, 1
00
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
55
/0
0,
 0
60
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
10
70
0)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 2
40
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
61
/0
0,
 1
80
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
81
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
80
/0
0,
 0
51
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
- G
AC
, 2
01
10
0 
(p
os
sib
ly)
408 Annex 6
Cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n
M
in
im
um
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t
Ve
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y
Di
ffe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 1
- F
ei
ra
 EC
, 1
9-
20
06
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
47
50
/0
0,
 1
40
60
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
M
ed
ia
n:
 2
.5
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
tim
in
g
- P
G,
 2
50
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
15
/0
0,
 2
40
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
ou
rt 
of
 A
ud
ito
rs
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
24
02
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 2
- P
G,
 1
40
40
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 SN
 5
02
/0
0,
 1
10
40
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
70
40
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
70
40
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 9
- G
AC
, 1
20
60
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
40
60
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
30
60
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 1
8
- F
ei
ra
 EC
, 1
9-
20
06
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
47
50
/0
0,
 1
40
60
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 1
9
- G
AC
, 1
00
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
55
/0
0,
 0
60
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
10
70
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
2
- P
G,
 1
40
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
58
/0
0,
 1
10
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
40
70
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
2
- C
on
cla
ve
, 2
40
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
61
/0
0,
 1
80
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
4
- P
G,
 0
40
90
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
66
/0
0,
 3
00
80
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
50
90
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
0
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
81
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
80
/0
0,
 0
51
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
4
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
 o
f 1
3-
14
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 3
5
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0,
 1
81
00
0:
 IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
7 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 3
01
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
86
/0
0,
 1
81
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
11
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
8
- P
G,
 0
41
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
90
/0
0,
 0
31
10
0 
an
d 
SN
 5
06
/0
0,
 0
31
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
51
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
8
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
98
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
51
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
0
- G
AC
, 2
01
10
0:
 IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
1 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 2
51
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
10
/0
0,
 2
31
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
61
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
1
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
15
/0
0,
 3
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
2
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
28
.6
 (-
29
.7
)
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
 (n
on
-d
ec
isi
on
)
Ex
te
rn
al
 e
ve
nt
s a
nd
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
1)
 - 
Im
pe
nd
in
g 
en
la
rg
em
en
t: 
en
ab
lin
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- S
pe
ec
he
s o
f F
isc
he
r a
nd
 C
hi
ra
c p
oi
nt
in
g 
to
 p
os
sib
ilit
y o
f c
lo
se
r c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
ou
ts
id
e T
re
at
y f
ra
m
ew
or
k: 
en
ab
lin
g 
(m
or
e 
th
an
 co
ns
tra
in
in
g)
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t
1)
 Im
pe
nd
in
g 
en
la
rg
em
en
t: 
en
ab
lin
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 409
Ta
bl
e 
13
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 (i
nfl
ue
nc
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.2
8-
7.
30
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 co
m
po
sit
io
n
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Ye
s: 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
(D
 o
nl
y i
n 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 e
qu
al
 ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 D
en
m
ar
k, 
23
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fi
nl
an
d,
 1
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- B
en
el
ux
 co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
, 0
11
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Ye
s
Au
st
ria
Ye
s: 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
 in
 th
e 
da
ta
Be
lg
iu
m
Ye
s: 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
De
nm
ar
k
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
No
rd
ic 
Co
un
cil
 (D
en
m
ar
k, 
Ice
la
nd
, F
in
la
nd
, 
No
rw
ay
 an
d 
Sw
ed
en
), 0
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
te
le
xp
re
ss
, 0
61
10
0)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Fin
la
nd
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
Se
e 
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Fr
an
ce
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ge
rm
an
y
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
- M
ee
tin
g 
Pr
od
i-S
ch
rö
de
r (
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
26
09
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Sc
hr
öd
er
-B
la
ir,
 1
61
10
0
- M
ee
tin
g 
Sc
hr
öd
er
-P
ro
di
 +
 C
om
m
iss
io
n,
 2
21
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l, 2
01
10
0)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Gr
ee
ce
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ire
la
nd
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ita
ly
Ye
s: 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
>B
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
>B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
410 Annex 6
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 co
m
po
sit
io
n
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Sp
ai
n
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Sw
ed
en
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
Ye
s: 
10
 (s
m
al
l) 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 in
 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 an
d 
2 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
>D
)
Se
e 
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Ye
s: 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
/C
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
/C
Se
e 
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Ye
s: 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
>B
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
>B
Se
e 
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 (d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
):
2)
 D
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 o
f d
iff
er
en
t C
om
m
iss
io
ne
rs
: D
/C
 
ve
rs
us
 B
 (F
ra
nk
fu
rte
r R
un
ds
ch
au
, 2
01
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
ar
ch
ive
); F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t o
f b
ila
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
gs
 w
ith
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
Co
un
cil
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t, 
09
11
00
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
Ye
s: 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
/B
No
: n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f D
/B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 d
iv
isi
ve
ne
ss
Ta
bl
e 
14
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 (i
nfl
ue
nc
e 
at
te
m
pt
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.2
7 
an
d 
7.
31
)
Ta
bl
e 
14
a
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 co
m
po
sit
io
n
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 
B 
(D
 o
nl
y u
nd
er
 ‘st
rin
ge
nt
 
co
nd
iti
on
s’)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: B
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: B
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 It
al
y (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
 in
 R
om
e, 
12
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E/
ES
DP
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
12
09
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y i
n 
Be
rli
n,
 1
91
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- S
ev
er
al
 m
ee
tin
gs
 (a
t l
ea
st
 tw
o)
 w
ith
 C
ou
nc
il S
ec
re
ta
ria
t i
n 
Br
us
se
ls,
 0
81
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0)
- S
ev
er
al
 m
ee
tin
gs
 (a
t l
ea
st
 tw
o)
 w
ith
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
in
 B
ru
ss
el
s, 
08
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
09
11
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 It
al
y i
n 
Th
e 
Ha
gu
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E f
ax
, 1
51
10
0)
- F
ax
 fr
om
 It
al
y, 
15
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E f
ax
, 1
51
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Ko
k-
Sc
hr
öd
er
 (G
er
m
an
y)
, 1
81
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l, 2
01
10
0)
- C
on
ve
rs
at
io
n 
Ko
k-
Ch
ira
c (
Fr
an
ce
), u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y 1
20
0)
 (F
A/
DI
E/
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- S
ee
 Fi
nl
an
d
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- M
ee
tin
g 
Sc
hü
ss
el
-S
ch
rö
de
r (
Ge
rm
an
y)
, 2
11
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l, 2
01
10
0)
- S
ee
 Fi
nl
an
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 411
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 co
m
po
sit
io
n
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: B
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: B
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fr
en
ch
 P
re
sid
en
cy
, 2
41
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
te
le
xp
re
ss
, 2
41
00
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Ve
rh
of
st
ad
t-S
ch
rö
de
r (
Ge
rm
an
y)
, 2
11
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l, 2
01
10
0)
- S
ee
 Fi
nl
an
d
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- M
ee
tin
g 
Ra
sm
us
se
n-
Sc
hr
öd
er
 (G
er
m
an
y)
, 1
71
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l, 2
01
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Fr
en
ch
 P
re
sid
en
cy
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E n
ew
sp
ap
er
 re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
- S
ee
 Fi
nl
an
d
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Bi
la
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
gs
 w
ith
 al
l 1
0 
sm
al
l m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s (
ch
ar
ge
d 
by
 Fr
en
ch
 P
re
sid
en
cy
), 1
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
te
le
xp
re
ss
, 0
61
10
0)
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- M
ee
tin
g 
as
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 w
ith
 P
or
tu
ga
l, 0
21
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
te
le
xp
re
ss
, 0
61
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
as
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 w
ith
 Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g,
 0
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
te
le
xp
re
ss
, 0
61
10
0)
- F
re
nc
h-
Ge
rm
an
 su
m
m
it 
in
 V
itt
el
, p
ro
ba
bl
y 1
41
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
po
lit
ica
l fl
as
h 
re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
as
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 w
ith
 Sw
ed
en
, 2
81
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
Le
s E
ch
os
, 0
11
20
0)
- S
ee
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
Au
st
ria
, B
el
gi
um
, D
en
m
ar
k a
nd
 Fi
nl
an
d
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 D
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- M
ee
tin
g 
Sc
hr
öd
er
-Ju
nc
ke
r (
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g)
, 2
01
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l, 2
01
10
0)
- S
ee
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
Au
st
ria
, B
el
gi
um
, D
en
m
ar
k a
nd
 Fr
an
ce
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Fin
la
nd
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 C
om
m
iss
io
n,
 1
00
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- S
ee
 Fi
nl
an
d
Ita
ly
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
17
/0
0,
 0
30
30
0:
 
D/
B 
(B
 ‘a
s a
 co
m
pr
om
ise
’)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
46
/0
0,
 2
60
50
0:
 D
 
(2
0;
 in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
‘Le
 n
om
br
e 
de
s C
om
m
iss
ai
re
s’:
 
un
kn
ow
n 
(FA
/D
IE
 
m
em
or
an
du
m
, 2
11
10
0)
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 
07
03
00
: B
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 
19
10
00
: B
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 
m
em
o)
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
‘A
id
e-
m
ém
oi
re
 d
u 
Go
uv
er
ne
m
en
t l
ux
em
bo
ur
ge
oi
s 
su
r l
a C
on
fé
re
nc
e 
in
te
rg
ou
ve
rn
em
en
ta
le
’: B
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Fin
la
nd
, F
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
Ge
rm
an
y
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Fin
la
nd
 an
d 
Fr
an
ce
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
412 Annex 6
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 co
m
po
sit
io
n
Fo
rm
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Fin
la
nd
 an
d 
Fr
an
ce
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 D
/C
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 
D 
(2
0)
/B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
rit
te
n:
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
no
te
 o
n 
th
eo
re
tic
al
 ro
ta
tio
n 
m
od
el
, 
30
05
00
: D
 (i
m
pl
ici
t)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
le
tte
r o
f P
re
sid
en
t 
Pr
od
i, 1
01
00
0:
 C
 (i
n 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 e
qu
al
 ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
- J
oi
nt
 w
rit
te
n:
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 Ir
el
an
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 
D 
(2
0)
/B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
un
cil
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t
No
 fo
rm
al
 o
pi
ni
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Ta
bl
e 
14
b 
(fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
1s
t  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 1
40
79
9
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
07
99
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 2
00
30
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
28
03
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
28
03
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
05
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
00
70
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
11
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
80
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
, 2
40
70
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
11
09
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, 
12
-1
30
90
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 1
20
90
0)
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Pr
es
id
en
cy
 as
ke
d 
fo
r a
tte
nt
io
n 
to
 
be
 p
ai
d 
to
 in
te
rn
al
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n,
 
bu
t ‘m
an
y d
el
eg
at
io
ns
 st
ill 
re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
siz
e 
of
 th
e 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n’
‘C
er
ta
in
 d
el
eg
at
io
ns
 re
pe
at
ed
 
th
ei
r i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
[A
m
st
er
da
m
] P
ro
to
co
l o
n 
th
e 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 w
ith
 th
e 
pr
os
pe
ct
 o
f e
nl
ar
ge
m
en
t: 
on
e 
Co
m
m
iss
io
ne
r p
er
 m
em
be
r 
st
at
e 
[B
] w
ou
ld
 b
e 
ac
qu
is’
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B;
 FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: D
 
(p
os
sib
ly)
B
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Au
st
ria
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 h
ie
ra
rc
hy
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Be
lg
iu
m
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 413
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
1s
t  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 1
40
79
9
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
07
99
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 2
00
30
0
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
28
03
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
28
03
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
05
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
00
70
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
11
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
40
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
80
70
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
, 2
40
70
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
11
09
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, 
12
-1
30
90
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 
re
po
rt,
 1
20
90
0)
De
nm
ar
k
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Fin
la
nd
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Fr
an
ce
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
D 
(‘a
ro
un
d 
20
’)
D 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
D 
(im
pl
ici
t)
‘R
ef
or
m
in
g 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
us
ef
ul
 if
 sm
al
le
r C
om
m
iss
io
n,
 
bu
t a
bs
ol
ut
e 
ne
ce
ss
ity
 if
 o
ne
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
ne
r p
er
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
’ 
(P
re
sid
en
cy
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D 
(<
20
)
Ge
rm
an
y
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
D 
(‘a
ro
un
d 
20
’)
D 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
un
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
D
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D
Gr
ee
ce
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Ire
la
nd
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Ita
ly
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
D 
(‘a
ro
un
d 
20
’)
D 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Po
rtu
ga
l
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Sp
ai
n
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
D 
(‘a
ro
un
d 
20
’)
D 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
un
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
D 
(o
th
er
w
ise
 B
 in
 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
hi
er
ar
ch
y)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D
Sw
ed
en
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
D 
(‘a
ro
un
d 
20
’)
D 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
D
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
 
(tw
o)
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
s: 
D/
B 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: B
/D
D 
(2
0)
/B
‘Q
ue
st
io
n 
of
 si
ze
 sh
ou
ld
 al
so
 b
e 
se
rio
us
ly 
st
ud
ie
d 
un
til
 e
nd
 IG
C’
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
D 
(2
0)
/B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
414 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
14
c 
(fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
 c
on
tin
ue
d)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
80
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
 (t
w
o)
, 
19
09
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
 fo
r b
ila
te
ra
l 
m
ee
tin
gs
 o
n 
19
 an
d 
23
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
31
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
13
11
00
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 1
91
10
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
19
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
24
11
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
27
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
31
20
0
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
M
os
t a
ct
or
s w
er
e 
no
t v
er
y s
pe
cifi
c 
in
 te
rm
s o
f t
he
ir 
pr
ef
er
re
d 
op
tio
ns
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
- F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
14
11
00
: ‘A
lth
ou
gh
 
sm
al
l m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
to
 st
ick
 
to
 p
rin
cip
le
 o
f o
ne
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
ne
r p
er
 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 an
d 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s t
o 
id
ea
 
of
 sm
al
le
r C
om
m
iss
io
n,
 
it 
w
as
 g
ra
du
al
ly 
be
co
m
in
g 
cle
ar
 
th
at
 ‘B
ia
rri
tz
 m
od
el
’ 
[C
] w
as
 co
ns
id
er
ed
 
by
 e
ve
ry
on
e 
to
 b
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 co
m
pr
om
ise
’
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
:
‘D
el
eg
at
io
ns
 ag
re
ed
 
th
at
 [C
] s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
co
up
le
d 
w
ith
 d
at
e 
an
d 
no
t n
um
be
r o
f m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
’
- ‘C
on
fir
m
at
io
n 
of
 
po
sit
io
ns
 o
f p
rin
cip
le
 
[sm
al
l m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s B
, 
bi
g 
D]
, b
ut
 b
ig
 m
aj
or
ity
 
w
illi
ng
 to
 e
xp
lo
re
 th
ird
 
w
ay
 [C
]’
- ‘E
qu
al
 ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 ac
ce
pt
ed
’
- T
he
re
 st
ill 
ap
pe
ar
ed
 to
 b
e 
th
re
e 
sc
ho
ol
s, 
on
e 
th
at
 as
su
m
ed
 
ce
ilin
g 
th
at
 w
ou
ld
 
st
ar
t f
ro
m
 w
he
n 
EU
 
ha
d 
27
/2
8 
m
em
be
rs
 
w
ith
ou
t m
en
tio
ni
ng
 
sp
ec
ifi
c d
at
e, 
on
e 
th
at
 as
su
m
ed
 fi
xe
d 
da
te
 o
f 2
01
0 
an
d 
on
e 
th
at
 d
id
 n
ot
 
ac
ce
pt
 ce
ilin
g 
at
 al
l 
[S
w
ed
en
, G
re
ec
e 
an
d 
De
nm
ar
k]
- P
re
fe
rre
d 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 C
om
m
iss
io
ne
rs
 
va
ry
in
g 
fro
m
 2
0 
to
 2
7
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
B
B(
/C
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B(
/C
 o
nl
y u
nd
er
 
co
nd
iti
on
 o
f e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0:
 
B(
/C
 u
nd
er
 co
nd
iti
on
 o
f 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
:
- B
/C
 (2
00
5/
20
10
: >
20
)
- C
 o
nl
y a
cc
ep
ta
bl
e 
if 
co
nd
iti
on
s f
or
 e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
 cl
ea
rly
 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 in
 Tr
ea
ty
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: C
 
(2
0;
 as
 fr
om
 2
01
0)
, b
ut
 
(th
e 
gu
ar
an
te
es
 fo
r) 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 
in
 Tr
ea
ty
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: C
 (e
.g
. 
20
; e
.g
. a
s f
ro
m
 2
01
0)
, 
bu
t c
on
di
tio
ns
 fo
r e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
 sh
ou
ld
 
be
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
pr
ec
ise
ly 
in
 Tr
ea
ty
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 415
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
80
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
 (t
w
o)
, 
19
09
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
 fo
r b
ila
te
ra
l 
m
ee
tin
gs
 o
n 
19
 an
d 
23
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
31
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
13
11
00
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 1
91
10
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
19
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
24
11
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
27
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
31
20
0
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
Au
st
ria
B
B 
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B/
C 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
B
B(
/C
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B(
/C
 o
nl
y u
nd
er
 
co
nd
iti
on
 o
f e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
:
20
10
 (w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 C
); 
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B/
C 
(2
00
5/
20
10
: >
20
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B/
C 
(2
00
5/
20
10
)
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B(
/C
 o
nl
y u
nd
er
 
co
nd
iti
on
 o
f e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B/
C 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
D 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
- D - C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
of
 P
G 
of
 3
01
00
0,
 
30
10
00
: e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
C 
(in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
) 
(P
re
sid
en
cy
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D/
C 
(2
00
5/
20
10
: m
ax
. 
20
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
D 
(a
nd
 ag
ai
ns
t 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
- D - C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
of
 P
G 
of
 3
01
00
0,
 
30
10
00
: e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
‘Sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 to
 fi
nd
 
so
lu
tio
n 
w
ith
 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
’
D(
/C
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D/
C 
(2
00
5/
20
10
: m
ax
. 
20
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
B
B
D 
m
ea
ns
 w
ea
ke
r 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
is 
no
t a
cc
ep
ta
bl
e 
to
 G
re
ek
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B/
C 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
416 Annex 6
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
80
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
 (t
w
o)
, 
19
09
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
 fo
r b
ila
te
ra
l 
m
ee
tin
gs
 o
n 
19
 an
d 
23
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
31
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
10
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
10
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
13
11
00
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 1
91
10
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
19
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
24
11
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
27
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
31
20
0
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ou
nc
il, 
07
-1
11
20
0
Ita
ly
D 
(2
0;
 e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
- D - C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
of
 P
G 
of
 3
01
00
0,
 
30
10
00
: e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
B ‘
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 in
 
Tr
ea
ty
’
D(
/C
 in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 e
qu
al
 ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D/
C 
(2
00
5/
20
10
: m
ax
. 
20
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B(
/C
 o
nl
y u
nd
er
 
co
nd
iti
on
 o
f e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B/
C 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B/
C 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
D 
(a
nd
 ag
ai
ns
t 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
- D - C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
of
 P
G 
of
 3
01
00
0,
 
30
10
00
: e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
D(
/C
) (
‘on
ly 
ac
to
r 
th
at
 w
as
 n
ot
 ye
t 
co
m
pl
et
el
y c
on
vi
nc
ed
 
of
 e
qu
al
 ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
’)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D/
C 
(2
00
5/
20
10
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
B
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
B/
C 
(u
nc
le
ar
)
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
D
- D - C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
of
 P
G 
of
 3
01
00
0,
 
30
10
00
: e
qu
al
 
ro
ta
tio
n 
sy
st
em
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
D(
/C
)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
:
20
10
 (w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 C
); 
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
D/
C 
(2
00
5/
20
10
; m
ax
. 
20
; f
re
e 
ch
oi
ce
  fo
r 
Pr
es
id
en
t i
ns
te
ad
 o
f 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
D>
B
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: D
/C
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: C
 
(c
ou
pl
ed
 w
ith
 d
at
e 
an
d 
in
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: in
  t
he
 
ca
se
 o
f C
: 2
0;
 fr
om
 d
at
e;
 
eq
ua
l r
ot
at
io
n 
pr
in
cip
le
 
in
 Tr
ea
ty
, c
on
cr
et
e 
lis
t 
la
te
r (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 417
Ta
bl
e 
15
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 (d
om
es
tic
 a
ct
or
s a
nd
 fa
ct
or
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
e 
7.
32
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 co
m
po
sit
io
n
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 P
G,
 3
01
00
0:
 ‘H
ow
 to
 se
ll d
ec
isi
on
 o
pt
io
n 
C 
to
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l p
ar
lia
m
en
ts
?’ 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 - 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C,
 1
3-
14
10
00
: P
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 in
 o
w
n 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- P
G,
 3
01
00
0:
 ‘C
an
 C
 b
e 
so
ld
 to
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
?’ 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0)
- N
ice
 EC
, 7
-1
11
20
0:
 P
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 in
 g
en
er
al
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
3)
 P
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 in
 g
en
er
al
 as
 an
 ar
gu
m
en
t o
f t
he
 sm
al
l m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
B 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r b
ila
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
gs
 o
n 
19
 an
d 
23
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
Be
lg
iu
m
De
nm
ar
k
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
1)
 2
51
00
0:
 D
an
ish
 p
ar
lia
m
en
t a
ga
in
st
 C
 an
d 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
te
le
xp
re
ss
, 2
51
00
0)
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) A
ga
in
st
 C
, d
om
es
tic
al
ly 
po
lit
ica
lly
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 (r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 re
fe
re
nd
a)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 7
-1
11
20
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Fin
la
nd
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) A
ga
in
st
 C
, d
om
es
tic
al
ly 
po
lit
ica
lly
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 (r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 re
fe
re
nd
a)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 7
-1
11
20
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 - 
PG
, 3
01
00
0:
 ‘C
an
 C
 b
e 
so
ld
 to
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
?’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0:
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 in
 g
en
er
al
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
Gr
ee
ce
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 P
G,
 2
31
00
0:
 ‘D
 is
 n
ot
 ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 to
 o
ur
 p
ar
lia
m
en
t’ (
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
Ire
la
nd
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) A
ga
in
st
 C
, d
om
es
tic
al
ly 
po
lit
ica
lly
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 (r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 re
fe
re
nd
a)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 7
-1
11
20
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
418 Annex 6
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Siz
e a
nd
 co
m
po
sit
io
n
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 - 
GA
C,
 1
80
90
0:
 P
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 in
 g
en
er
al
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
90
90
0)
- P
G,
 3
01
00
0:
 ‘C
an
 C
 b
e 
so
ld
 to
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
?’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Po
rtu
ga
l
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 P
G,
 3
01
00
0:
 M
aj
or
 d
ou
bt
s a
bo
ut
 C
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f d
iffi
cu
lt ‘
po
lit
ica
l s
itu
at
io
n’ 
(im
pl
ici
tly
 p
ro
ba
bl
y: 
pa
rli
am
en
t) 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) A
ga
in
st
 C
, d
om
es
tic
al
ly 
po
lit
ica
lly
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 (r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 re
fe
re
nd
a)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 7
-1
11
20
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 3
01
00
0:
 ‘C
an
 C
 b
e 
so
ld
 to
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
?’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r r
ef
er
en
du
m
En
ab
le
d:
4)
 an
d/
or
 3
) A
ga
in
st
 C
, d
om
es
tic
al
ly 
po
lit
ica
lly
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 (r
at
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 re
fe
re
nd
a)
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 7
-1
11
20
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
/n
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
Ta
bl
e 
16
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 (c
on
te
xt
ua
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
) (
se
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.3
3-
7.
35
)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Si
ze
 an
d 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
le
ve
l
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 0
70
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
no
te
, 0
30
30
0)
- P
G,
 2
80
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
27
/0
0,
 2
40
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
80
30
0)
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
44
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- P
G,
 1
40
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
57
/0
0,
 1
10
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
80
70
0)
- P
G,
 1
10
90
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, 1
2-
13
09
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
12
09
00
)
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
- P
G,
 3
01
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 419
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Si
ze
 an
d 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
97
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
- P
G,
 2
41
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
10
/0
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
Le
ve
l 2
- G
AC
, 2
00
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- G
AC
, 1
00
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
55
/0
0,
 0
50
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
10
70
0)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 2
40
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
62
/0
0,
 1
80
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
- G
AC
, 1
80
90
0 
(tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, 1
90
90
0)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
02
/0
0,
 1
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
13
/0
0,
 0
11
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 1
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r b
ila
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
gs
 o
n 
19
 an
d 
23
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 3
01
00
0,
 3
01
00
0)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
M
ed
ia
n:
 3
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
tim
in
g
- P
G,
 0
70
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
no
te
, 0
30
30
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
- G
AC
, 2
00
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 6
- P
G,
 2
80
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
27
/0
0,
 2
40
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
80
30
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 7
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
44
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 1
6
- G
AC
, 1
00
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
55
/0
0,
 0
50
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
10
70
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
2
- P
G,
 1
40
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
57
/0
0,
 1
10
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
80
70
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
2
- C
on
cla
ve
, 2
40
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
62
/0
0,
 1
80
70
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
40
70
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 2
4
- P
G,
 1
10
90
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, 1
2-
13
09
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
12
09
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 3
1
- G
AC
, 1
80
90
0 
(tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rts
, 1
90
90
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
2
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r b
ila
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
gs
 o
n 
19
 an
d 
23
10
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 o
f 3
01
00
0,
 3
01
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
5
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
7
- P
G,
 3
01
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
11
00
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 3
01
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
8
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
97
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
0
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
02
/0
0,
 1
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
0
- P
G,
 2
41
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
10
/0
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
1
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
31
20
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
13
/0
0,
 0
11
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
2
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
25
.9
Ex
te
rn
al
 e
ve
nt
s a
nd
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
1)
 Im
pe
nd
in
g 
en
la
rg
em
en
t: 
co
ns
tra
in
in
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
420 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
17
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 v
ot
es
 (i
nfl
ue
nc
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.3
7-
7.
39
)
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
E(
/D
) o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
/B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 E(
/D
) o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- F
ax
 fr
om
 Sw
ed
en
 w
ith
 Sw
ed
ish
 sq
ua
re
 ro
ot
 m
od
el
, 2
90
20
0 
an
d 
13
04
00
 
(FA
/D
IE
 fa
x, 
29
02
00
 an
d 
13
04
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sw
ed
en
 b
et
w
ee
n 
offi
cia
ls 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 in
 Th
e 
Ha
gu
e, 
01
03
00
 (F
A/
DI
E f
ax
, 2
90
20
0)
- A
gr
ee
m
en
t w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y i
n 
Be
rli
n 
on
 1
00
30
0 
to
 co
lla
bo
ra
te
 o
n 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 1
20
90
0)
- D
ut
ch
 FA
 M
in
ist
er
 (p
os
sib
ly)
 re
m
in
di
ng
 h
is 
Ge
rm
an
 co
lle
ag
ue
 to
 
ag
re
em
en
t o
f 1
00
30
0 
in
 m
ar
gi
ns
 o
f m
ee
tin
g 
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 1
20
90
0)
- T
el
ep
ho
ni
c c
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y a
bo
ut
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 
an
d ‘
ne
w
’ G
er
m
an
 p
ro
po
sa
l a
bo
ut
 w
hi
ch
 in
fo
rm
al
 ag
re
em
en
t w
ou
ld
 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
re
ac
he
d 
w
ith
 Sp
ai
n;
 It
al
y a
nd
 U
K 
su
pp
os
ed
ly 
fo
un
d 
pr
op
os
al
 
in
te
re
st
in
g,
 b
ut
 Fr
an
ce
 re
m
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t; 
20
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 2
00
90
0)
- C
on
ta
ct
s o
f F
or
ei
gn
 A
ffa
irs
 an
d 
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
w
ith
 G
er
m
an
 
co
lle
ag
ue
s a
bo
ut
 G
er
m
an
 p
ro
po
sa
l, p
ro
ba
bl
y 1
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 
28
09
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Ge
rm
an
 FA
 M
in
ist
er
s a
nd
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Ko
k-
Sc
hr
öd
er
 (G
er
m
an
y)
, s
ho
rtl
y b
ef
or
e 
Bi
ar
rit
z E
C 
of
 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E 
m
em
o,
 2
80
90
0)
- V
isi
t D
ut
ch
 St
at
e 
Se
cr
et
ar
y t
o 
Be
rli
n,
 1
91
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 n
ot
e, 
09
10
00
)
- T
ril
at
er
al
 m
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h,
 A
us
tri
an
 an
d 
Sw
ed
ish
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
ab
ou
t 
Au
st
ria
n 
al
te
rn
at
ive
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
pr
op
os
al
 in
 m
ar
gi
ns
 o
f P
G 
of
 2
31
00
0 
(FA
/
DI
E n
ot
e, 
24
10
00
) (
Al
re
ad
y c
on
ta
ct
ed
 b
y A
us
tri
a: 
Po
rtu
ga
l, B
el
gi
um
, 
Fin
la
nd
 an
d 
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g)
- E
-m
ai
l w
ith
 Sw
ed
ish
 p
ro
po
sa
ls 
to
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
De
nm
ar
k a
nd
 Fi
nl
an
d,
 
31
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l, 3
11
00
0)
- T
el
ep
ho
ni
c c
on
ta
ct
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Sw
ed
ish
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
ab
ou
t S
w
ed
ish
 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
02
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 0
21
10
0)
- F
in
ni
sh
 re
ac
tio
n 
to
 Sw
ed
ish
 p
ro
po
sa
ls 
in
 e
-m
ai
l t
o 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
Sw
ed
en
 an
d 
De
nm
ar
k, 
03
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l, 0
31
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Sw
ed
ish
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
ab
ou
t S
w
ed
ish
 p
ro
po
sa
ls,
 
ar
ou
nd
 0
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
21
10
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- V
isi
t L
ip
po
ne
n 
(F
in
la
nd
) t
o 
Th
e 
Ha
gu
e 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 Fi
nn
ish
 m
od
el
 an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
, 1
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 1
41
10
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
- C
on
su
lta
tio
n 
of
 G
er
m
an
y w
ith
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
Sp
ai
n 
an
d 
UK
 ab
ou
t t
hr
ee
 
Ge
rm
an
 p
ro
po
sa
ls 
of
 2
31
10
0,
 u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
(s)
 (F
A/
DI
E n
ot
e, 
‘R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
um
b 
fo
r t
he
 n
ew
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s i
n 
th
e 
Co
un
cil
. D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
0’
)
Ye
s
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 421
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Au
st
ria
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
B 
on
 Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 an
d 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s i
n 
th
e 
da
ta
Be
lg
iu
m
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
B 
on
 al
l is
su
es
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
De
nm
ar
k
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
B 
on
 G
en
er
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Fin
la
nd
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
E o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 is
su
e
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Fr
an
ce
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
E/
D 
on
 Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
/D
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
):
2)
 D
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 in
 d
iff
er
en
t p
ar
ts
 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 (P
re
sid
en
t: 
A 
an
d 
Pr
im
e 
M
in
ist
er
/o
th
er
 M
in
ist
er
s: 
B)
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o 
re
po
rti
ng
 te
le
ph
on
ic 
co
nt
ac
t 
w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y, 
20
09
00
)
- N
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
Ge
rm
an
y
- Y
es
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f C
/B
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
A 
on
 o
th
er
 is
su
es
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
- N
o 
(d
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
):
2)
 D
iff
er
en
t p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 in
 d
iff
er
en
t p
ar
ts
 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 (C
ha
nc
el
lo
r: 
un
cle
ar
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
an
d 
Fo
re
ig
n 
Aff
ai
rs
 
M
in
ist
ry
: A
) (
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o 
re
po
rti
ng
 
te
le
ph
on
ic 
co
nt
ac
t w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y, 
20
09
00
)
- N
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s o
n 
ot
he
r i
ss
ue
s
422 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Gr
ee
ce
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
B 
on
 Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 an
d 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Ire
la
nd
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
B 
on
 Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 an
d 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Ita
ly
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
E o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
B 
on
 Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 an
d 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Po
rtu
ga
l
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
B 
on
 Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 an
d 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Sp
ai
n
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
E/
F o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
iss
ue
s
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
E/
F o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Sw
ed
en
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
E o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e, 
of
 B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f  
E o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 is
su
e
- Y
es
: 9
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f B
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
: in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e, 
of
 A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 an
d 
of
 B
 o
n 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
o:
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f E
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 is
su
e 
an
d 
of
 A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 423
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: p
ivo
ta
l
Po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
: m
aj
or
ity
Ne
tw
or
ks
In
te
rn
al
 co
he
re
nc
e
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 G
en
er
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 G
en
er
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
- N
o:
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 G
en
er
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- Y
es
: 8
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s +
 2
 EU
 ac
to
rs
 in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f k
in
d 
of
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- U
nk
no
w
n 
on
 G
en
er
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Co
un
cil
 
Se
cr
et
ar
ia
t
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- U
nc
le
ar
 (p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 is
su
e
- U
nk
no
w
n 
(p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
- N
ot
 ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
to
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 in
te
rn
al
 
di
vi
siv
en
es
s
Ta
bl
e 
18
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 v
ot
es
 (i
nfl
ue
nc
e 
at
te
m
pt
s)
 (s
ee
 s
um
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.3
6 
an
d 
7.
40
)
Ta
bl
e 
18
a 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, 
E o
r F
)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 re
-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
) 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 re
-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
:
Al
l k
in
ds
 o
f w
ei
gh
tin
g 
pr
op
os
al
s o
f m
an
y a
ct
or
s, 
bu
t p
re
cis
e 
nu
m
be
r a
nd
 
na
tu
re
 is
 u
nc
le
ar
- B
en
el
ux
 co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 ab
ou
t t
he
 1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o 
on
 al
l t
hr
ee
 is
su
es
, 0
11
29
9 
(FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 0
11
29
9)
- F
ax
 1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o,
 0
11
29
9 
(FA
/D
IE
 fa
x, 
01
12
99
)
- B
en
el
ux
 su
m
m
it 
pr
ob
ab
ly 
de
al
in
g 
w
ith
 Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s, 
06
12
99
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- L
un
ch
 m
ee
tin
g 
Va
n 
Aa
rts
en
-B
el
gi
an
 FA
 M
in
ist
er
 in
 B
ru
ss
el
s p
ro
ba
bl
y a
lso
 ab
ou
t T
yp
e 
of
 sy
st
em
 an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s, 
31
01
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 2
70
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Ko
k-
Ch
ira
c (
Fr
an
ce
), 2
8-
29
02
00
 (F
A/
DI
E P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
18
04
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Be
ns
ch
op
-It
al
ia
n 
St
at
e 
Se
cr
et
ar
y R
an
ie
ri 
in
 R
om
e, 
14
03
00
 (F
A/
DI
E/
ES
DP
 m
em
o,
 1
50
30
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Ko
k-
Bl
ai
r (
UK
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
 in
 Lo
nd
on
, 1
50
30
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 Lo
nd
on
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
11
05
00
)
424 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
- M
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Br
iti
sh
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 in
 Lo
nd
on
 p
ro
ba
bl
y a
bo
ut
 al
l t
hr
ee
 is
su
es
 in
clu
di
ng
 tw
o 
Br
iti
sh
 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
10
04
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 1
20
40
0)
- F
ax
 fr
om
 U
K 
w
ith
 tw
o 
Br
iti
sh
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
pr
op
os
al
s, 
11
04
00
 (F
A/
DI
E f
ax
, 1
10
40
0)
- T
hr
ee
 m
ee
tin
gs
 w
ith
 Fr
en
ch
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
in
 P
ar
is 
ab
ou
t T
yp
e 
of
 sy
st
em
 an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s, 
17
04
00
 (F
A/
DI
E 
Pa
ris
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
18
04
00
)
- ‘S
ix 
se
m
in
ar
’ in
 P
ar
is,
 2
8-
29
04
00
 (F
A/
DI
E P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
18
04
00
)
- T
ril
at
er
al
 m
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h,
 Fr
en
ch
 an
d 
Ge
rm
an
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
ab
ou
t w
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s i
n 
Pa
ris
, 0
50
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
m
em
o,
 0
80
50
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Br
iti
sh
 o
ffi
cia
l in
 Lo
nd
on
 at
 le
as
t a
bo
ut
 G
en
er
al
 an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s, 
05
00
 
(FA
/D
IE
 Lo
nd
on
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
11
05
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Ita
lia
n 
offi
cia
l (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
 in
 R
om
e, 
06
00
 (F
A/
DI
E R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y f
ax
, 1
60
60
0)
- S
ev
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
 (a
t l
ea
st
 tw
o)
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Gr
ee
k o
ffi
cia
ls 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 in
 A
th
en
s p
ro
ba
bl
y a
bo
ut
 Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 
an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
s (
FA
/D
IE
 e
-m
ai
l, 0
60
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Ita
lia
n 
offi
cia
ls 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 in
 R
om
e 
ab
ou
t I
ta
lia
n 
m
od
el
, (p
ro
ba
bl
y o
n)
 1
20
90
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/
ES
DP
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
12
09
00
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
Du
tc
h,
 Fr
en
ch
 an
d 
Br
iti
sh
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
in
 m
ar
gi
ns
 P
G 
of
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
 2
31
00
0 
ab
ou
t I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 (F
A/
DI
E e
-m
ai
l, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- V
isi
t D
ut
ch
 St
at
e 
Se
cr
et
ar
y t
o 
Co
pe
nh
ag
en
, 2
61
00
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- ‘O
ld
 si
x’ 
m
ee
tin
g 
in
 B
er
lin
 p
ro
ba
bl
y (
al
so
) a
bo
ut
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s, 
pr
ob
ab
ly 
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 0
21
10
0)
- F
ou
r m
ee
tin
gs
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
an
d 
Fr
en
ch
 o
ffi
cia
ls 
pr
ob
ab
ly 
ab
ou
t a
ll t
hr
ee
 is
su
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
s, 
pr
ob
ab
ly 
11
00
 
(FA
/D
IE
 P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
1 
De
ce
m
be
r 2
00
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Ko
k-
Ve
rh
of
st
ad
t (
Be
lg
iu
m
), u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (‘r
ec
en
t m
ee
tin
g’
) (
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 2
01
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
Va
n 
Aa
rts
en
-V
er
ho
fst
ad
t (
Be
lg
iu
m
) a
bo
ut
 al
l t
hr
ee
 is
su
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (a
fte
r 2
01
10
0)
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 
20
11
00
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
- T
al
k b
et
w
ee
n 
Du
tc
h 
PR
 an
d 
Fr
en
ch
 C
ha
irm
an
 af
te
r P
G 
of
 2
41
10
0 
ab
ou
t T
yp
e 
of
 sy
st
em
 an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
- C
on
ve
rs
at
io
n 
Ko
k-
Ch
ira
c (
Fr
an
ce
) p
ro
ba
bl
y a
bo
ut
 al
l t
hr
ee
 is
su
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
, p
ro
ba
bl
y 1
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- B
en
el
ux
 co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 in
 Th
e 
Ha
gu
e 
pr
ob
ab
ly 
de
al
in
g 
w
ith
 al
l t
hr
ee
 is
su
es
, 0
11
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 
no
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
on
 ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
; Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 ri
se
 (E
/D
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
:
Al
l k
in
ds
 o
f w
ei
gh
tin
g 
pr
op
os
al
s o
f m
an
y a
ct
or
s, 
bu
t p
re
cis
e 
nu
m
be
r a
nd
 
na
tu
re
 is
 u
nc
le
ar
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 425
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 re
-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
) 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 re
-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
:
Al
l k
in
ds
 o
f w
ei
gh
tin
g 
pr
op
os
al
s o
f m
an
y a
ct
or
s, 
bu
t p
re
cis
e 
nu
m
be
r a
nd
 
na
tu
re
 is
 u
nc
le
ar
- ‘B
ila
te
ra
l c
on
ve
rs
at
io
ns
’ b
et
w
ee
n 
Be
lg
iu
m
 an
d 
Fr
an
ce
 at
 le
as
t a
bo
ut
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 (B
el
gi
um
: n
o 
op
en
in
g 
to
w
ar
ds
 A
), u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
s (
be
fo
re
 0
50
50
0)
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 0
80
50
0)
- S
ee
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 
C 
(Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
ar
ou
nd
 
cu
rre
nt
 le
ve
l +
 at
 le
as
t 
50
%
 p
op
ul
at
io
n)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 
07
03
00
: E
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- T
el
ep
ho
ni
c c
on
ta
ct
 C
hi
ra
c-
Bl
ai
r (
UK
) a
t l
ea
st
 ab
ou
t c
ou
pl
ed
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s o
f t
he
 N
et
he
rla
nd
s-B
el
gi
um
 
an
d 
Ge
rm
an
y-
Fr
an
ce
, 1
60
30
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 Lo
nd
on
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
11
05
00
)
- F
re
nc
h-
Ge
rm
an
 su
m
m
it 
in
 M
ai
nz
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
 (F
A/
DI
E m
em
o,
 1
20
90
0)
- F
re
nc
h-
Ge
rm
an
 su
m
m
it 
in
 V
itt
el
 at
 le
as
t a
bo
ut
 Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s, 
pr
ob
ab
ly 
14
11
00
 (F
A/
DI
E B
er
lin
 e
m
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
15
11
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
po
lit
ica
l fl
as
h 
re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 P
or
tu
ga
l in
 Li
sb
on
, 0
21
10
0 
(B
ul
le
tin
 Q
uo
tid
ie
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 7
82
9,
 2
61
00
0;
 in
clu
de
d 
in
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
ar
ch
ive
)
- M
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 Sp
ai
n 
in
 M
ad
rid
 at
 le
as
t a
bo
ut
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 (F
ra
nc
e:
 B
), p
ro
ba
bl
y 1
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y n
ot
e, 
01
12
00
)
- S
ee
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
Be
lg
iu
m
 an
d 
UK
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, 
E o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 
sy
st
em
 (C
, w
ith
 e.
g.
 6
0%
 
of
 p
op
ul
at
io
n)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- M
ee
tin
g 
Sc
hr
öd
er
-A
m
at
o 
(It
al
y)
, a
ro
un
d 
20
09
00
 (F
A/
DI
E/
ES
DP
 R
om
e 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
12
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
00
0)
- S
ee
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
Fr
an
ce
 an
d 
UK
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 
‘if
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 w
er
e 
to
 b
e 
ch
an
ge
d’ 
B 
(6
0%
 +
 6
0%
)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
426 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 an
d 
jo
in
t
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Ita
ly
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
17
/0
0,
 
03
03
00
: E
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
51
/0
0,
 
16
06
00
: E
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
:
Al
l k
in
ds
 o
f w
ei
gh
tin
g 
pr
op
os
al
s o
f m
an
y a
ct
or
s, 
bu
t p
re
cis
e 
nu
m
be
r a
nd
 
na
tu
re
 is
 u
nc
le
ar
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t, 
Ge
rm
an
y a
nd
 U
K
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 re
-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
) 
(1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 re
-
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
) o
r d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
) 
(2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
Se
e 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Se
e 
Fr
an
ce
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Se
e 
Fr
an
ce
 an
d 
UK
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 
ha
pp
y t
o 
co
ns
id
er
 b
ot
h 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 
or
 F)
 an
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 
sy
st
em
 (t
hu
s A
, B
 o
r C
), 
bu
t p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
fo
r r
e-
w
ei
gh
tin
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 w
ith
 G
er
m
an
y, 
Fr
an
ce
, It
al
y a
nd
 Sp
ai
n 
ab
ou
t t
w
o 
Br
iti
sh
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
m
od
el
s, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
s (
ar
ou
nd
 
04
00
) (
FA
/D
IE
 m
em
o,
 1
20
40
0)
- S
ee
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t a
nd
 Fr
an
ce
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 
01
02
00
: A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 
03
05
00
: A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 427
Ta
bl
e 
18
b 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 (f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
)
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
 
(a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 1
50
99
9
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
09
99
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 C
ou
nc
il, 
20
03
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
04
04
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
04
04
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 3
00
50
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
06
07
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
09
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
26
09
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 
08
10
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
09
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Ha
rd
ly 
an
y 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 d
ou
bl
e 
m
aj
or
iti
es
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
PG
 
of
 0
40
40
0,
 0
40
40
0:
‘P
os
iti
on
s o
f 
de
le
ga
tio
ns
 [o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
sy
st
em
 is
su
e]
 h
ad
 n
ot
 
ch
an
ge
d 
fro
m
 G
AC
 o
f 
20
03
00
’
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt 
an
d 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 b
ot
h 
26
09
00
: ‘P
os
iti
on
s o
f 
de
le
ga
tio
ns
 h
ad
 n
ot
 
ch
an
ge
d’
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
t a
ga
in
st
 D
 (o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E
E
E (
de
riv
ed
 fr
om
: ‘a
ll 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s s
tu
ck
 to
 
th
ei
r o
rig
in
al
 p
os
iti
on
s’)
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
D
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: E
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Au
st
ria
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B 
(se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
B 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt:
 
op
en
 to
 d
isc
us
s d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; F
A/
DI
E 
re
po
rt:
 m
os
t m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 fa
vo
ur
in
g 
du
al
 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 
+ 
60
%
)
06
06
00
C 
(A
m
st
er
da
m
 m
od
el
: m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 
m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 cu
rre
nt
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
+ 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
te
st
 o
f 6
0%
)
B 
or
 C
 (d
er
ive
d 
fro
m
: ‘a
ll 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s s
tu
ck
 to
 
th
ei
r o
rig
in
al
 p
os
iti
on
s’)
B 
or
 C
 (s
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B 
(se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
B 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt:
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t: 
m
os
t m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 fa
vo
ur
in
g 
du
al
 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 
+ 
60
%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (C
: 
ex
tra
po
la
tio
n,
 p
os
sib
ly 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 co
rre
ct
in
g 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
te
st
 
of
 6
0%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
 o
r C
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
C 
(se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
C 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt:
 
‘A
m
st
er
da
m
 fo
rm
ul
a’;
 FA
/
DI
E r
ep
or
t: 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 
sy
st
em
)
06
06
00
B 
(1
st
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e)
/C
 (A
m
st
er
da
m
 
m
od
el
: m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 
cu
rre
nt
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
+ 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
te
st
 o
f 6
0%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
 o
r C
)
Am
st
er
da
m
 m
od
el
 (C
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
428 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
 
(a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 1
50
99
9
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
09
99
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 C
ou
nc
il, 
20
03
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
04
04
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
04
04
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 3
00
50
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
06
07
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
09
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
26
09
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 
08
10
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
09
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Fin
la
nd
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E
06
06
00
E
E
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
- D
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
- W
illi
ng
 to
 co
ns
id
er
 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E
E
E (
de
riv
ed
 fr
om
: ‘a
ll 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s s
tu
ck
 to
 
th
ei
r o
rig
in
al
 p
os
iti
on
s’)
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E (
3-
33
 vo
te
s)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B 
(se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
B 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt:
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t: 
m
os
t m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 fa
vo
ur
in
g 
du
al
 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 
+ 
60
%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y B
; 
al
so
 m
en
tio
ne
d 
C:
 e
xt
ra
po
la
tio
n,
 
po
ss
ib
ly 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 co
rre
ct
in
g 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
te
st
 o
f 6
0%
)
No
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
(in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 
sy
st
em
: p
op
ul
at
io
n 
at
 
le
as
t 6
0%
)
Un
kn
ow
n 
(se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- D
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
- W
illi
ng
 to
 co
ns
id
er
 E 
(3
-3
3 
vo
te
s)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B 
(se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
B 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt:
 
op
en
 to
 d
isc
us
s d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; F
A/
DI
E 
re
po
rt:
 m
os
t m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 fa
vo
ur
in
g 
du
al
 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 
+ 
60
%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y B
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
 o
r C
); a
lso
 
w
illi
ng
 to
 co
ns
id
er
 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
E o
r B
 (s
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l)
E o
r B
 (?
)
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt:
 E;
 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt:
 B
 (m
os
t 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s f
av
ou
rin
g 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 
+ 
60
%
))
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (C
: 
ex
tra
po
la
tio
n,
 p
os
sib
ly 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 co
rre
ct
in
g 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
te
st
 
of
 6
0%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
 o
r C
)
Am
st
er
da
m
 m
od
el
 (C
)
- D
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
- W
illi
ng
 to
 ac
ce
pt
 re
-
w
ei
gh
tin
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E
E
E
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E (
3-
33
 vo
te
s)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 429
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
 
(a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 1
50
99
9
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
09
99
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 C
ou
nc
il, 
20
03
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
04
04
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
04
04
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 3
00
50
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
06
07
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
09
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
26
09
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 
08
10
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
09
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B 
(se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
B 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt:
 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t: 
m
os
t m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 fa
vo
ur
in
g 
du
al
 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 
+ 
60
%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y B
; 
al
so
 in
te
re
st
 in
 C
: e
xt
ra
po
la
tio
n,
 
po
ss
ib
ly 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 co
rre
ct
in
g 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
te
st
 o
f 6
0%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
 o
r C
)
B 
or
 C
 (s
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
B 
(se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
B 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt:
 
op
en
 to
 d
isc
us
s d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; F
A/
DI
E 
re
po
rt:
 m
os
t m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 fa
vo
ur
in
g 
du
al
 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 5
0%
 
+ 
60
%
)
06
06
00
C 
(A
m
st
er
da
m
 m
od
el
: m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 
m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 cu
rre
nt
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
+ 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
te
st
 o
f 6
0%
)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
 o
r C
)
B 
or
 C
 (s
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- D
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(‘a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
od
el
s’)
- W
illi
ng
 to
 d
isc
us
s 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 
co
nc
re
te
 n
um
be
rs
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
F (
on
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E (
in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
70
%
)
F
F (
as
su
m
ed
 fr
om
: ‘a
ll 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s s
tu
ck
 to
 
th
ei
r o
rig
in
al
 p
os
iti
on
s’;
 
in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
: 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
70
%
)
Re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y 
F)
F
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E
E
E
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y B
)
E
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 su
pp
or
t 
an
ym
or
e 
fo
r d
ua
l 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
; E
 
(o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E
06
06
00
E
E
E (
se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
)
E
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
- A
 (s
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
 
(tw
o)
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
A
A
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
A
06
06
00
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
430 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
 
(a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 1
50
99
9
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
09
99
)
Ge
ne
ra
l A
ffa
irs
 C
ou
nc
il, 
20
03
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
04
04
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
04
04
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 3
00
50
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0;
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
06
07
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
70
0)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
25
09
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
26
09
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 
08
10
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
09
10
00
; F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Co
un
cil
 Se
cr
et
ar
ia
t
D 
(o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
18
c 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 (f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
 c
on
tin
ue
d)
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
 
(a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
31
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
25
10
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 1
91
10
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
19
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
27
11
00
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
‘T
he
re
 se
em
ed
 to
 
em
er
ge
 g
ro
w
in
g 
co
ns
en
su
s 
ab
ou
t F
in
ni
sh
 
pr
op
os
al
 [o
f P
G 
of
 2
31
00
0]
 th
at
 
de
cis
io
n 
m
ad
e 
by
 Q
M
V 
sh
ou
ld
 
al
w
ay
s r
ep
re
se
nt
 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 an
d 
of
 
po
pu
la
tio
n,
 
w
he
th
er
 o
ne
 
w
ou
ld
 ch
oo
se
 
fo
r d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 
sy
st
em
 o
r n
ot
’
Al
l d
el
eg
at
io
ns
 st
uc
k t
o 
pr
in
cip
le
s o
f m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s a
nd
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
in
 n
ew
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
fo
rm
ul
a. 
Ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 re
po
rt,
 
th
is 
m
ea
nt
 p
ro
gr
es
s i
n 
so
 fa
r a
s 
on
e 
w
as
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 st
ick
in
g 
to
 
ei
th
er
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 o
r 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s; 
sin
gl
e 
fo
rm
ul
a c
on
ta
in
in
g 
bo
th
 
pr
in
cip
le
s m
ig
ht
 su
ffi
ce
.
Cl
ea
r d
iv
isi
on
 ap
pe
ar
ed
 fr
om
 
di
sc
us
sio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
bi
g 
an
d 
sm
al
l m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 b
lo
ck
in
g 
m
in
or
ity
. 
Bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s c
la
im
ed
 th
at
, 
as
 w
as
 th
e 
ca
se
 n
ow
, t
hr
ee
 b
ig
 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 ab
le
 
to
 b
lo
ck
 d
ec
isi
on
.
A 
la
rg
e 
m
aj
or
ity
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 Fr
an
ce
 
an
d 
th
e 
UK
, w
as
 o
f t
he
 o
pi
ni
on
 th
at
 
a Q
M
V 
sh
ou
ld
 al
w
ay
s b
e 
su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 a 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f t
he
 m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s. 
Th
es
e 
ac
to
rs
 w
er
e 
th
er
ef
or
e 
ag
ai
ns
t 
th
e 
Ita
lia
n 
m
od
el
 (E
).
Ch
ai
rm
an
 V
im
on
t h
ad
 al
te
rn
at
ive
 
pr
op
os
al
, a
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y s
im
ila
r t
o 
Ita
lia
n 
m
od
el
) 
w
ith
, in
 ca
se
 a 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
 
co
ul
d 
no
t a
gr
ee
 w
ith
 d
ec
isi
on
, 
as
 ‘sa
fe
ty
 n
et
’ a
dd
iti
on
al
 re
qu
es
t 
of
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s. 
In
 ca
se
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s, 
de
cis
io
n 
w
as
 n
ot
 
m
ad
e. 
Th
is 
w
ou
ld
 e
na
bl
e 
sm
al
l 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s t
o 
st
ill 
ag
re
e 
to
 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
fo
rm
ul
a. 
Th
e 
ot
he
r 
re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
m
od
el
s, 
su
ch
 as
 
Sw
ed
ish
 m
od
el
, d
id
 n
ot
 (a
lw
ay
s) 
gu
ar
an
te
e 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
. A
s n
ob
od
y p
os
se
ss
ed
 
al
te
rn
at
ive
 p
ro
po
sa
l, d
el
eg
at
io
ns
 
re
ac
te
d 
pr
ud
en
tly
 to
 it
. U
K 
w
as
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 431
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
 
(a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
31
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
25
10
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 1
91
10
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
19
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
27
11
00
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
M
aj
or
ity
 o
f s
m
al
l m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
, o
n 
ot
he
r h
an
d,
 ap
pe
ar
ed
 
to
 b
e 
w
illi
ng
 to
 ab
an
do
n 
du
al
 
m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 if
 b
lo
ck
in
g 
m
in
or
ity
 w
as
 fo
rm
ed
 b
y a
t 
le
as
t f
ou
r m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s a
nd
 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 w
as
 n
ot
 
to
o 
hi
gh
. S
om
e 
w
er
e 
in
di
ffe
re
nt
 
to
 e
ve
nt
ua
l f
or
m
ul
a c
ho
se
n 
if 
ba
sic
 p
rin
cip
le
s w
er
e 
en
su
re
d,
 
ot
he
rs
 e
xp
re
ss
ed
 th
em
se
lve
s 
to
 b
e 
cle
ar
ly 
fo
r S
w
ed
ish
 m
od
el
 
(E
) i
f i
t c
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d 
w
ith
 
ex
am
pl
es
.
ve
ry
 e
xp
lic
it 
in
  s
ta
tin
g 
th
at
 it
 
w
ou
ld
 b
oy
co
tt 
ev
er
y s
ol
ut
io
n 
in
 N
ice
 th
at
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 e
nv
isi
on
 
po
ss
ib
ilit
y f
or
 th
re
e 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 to
 b
lo
ck
 d
ec
isi
on
. If
 th
is 
w
as
 n
ot
 re
al
ise
d,
 U
K 
w
ou
ld
 
no
t c
ol
la
bo
ra
te
 o
n 
so
lu
tio
ns
 
pr
op
os
ed
 fo
r a
ny
 o
f o
th
er
 
su
bj
ec
ts
. In
 th
is 
re
sp
ec
t, 
on
ly 
Ita
lia
n 
m
od
el
 (E
) w
as
 ac
ce
pt
ab
le
. 
Th
is 
re
su
lte
d 
in
 so
m
e 
sm
al
l 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s s
ta
tin
g 
th
at
 
th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 th
en
 fa
ll b
ac
k o
n 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n’s
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 
sy
st
em
 (A
).
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
- E
 (o
n 
QM
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
 +
 5
8%
 
po
pu
la
tio
n
- F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: E
; d
oe
s n
ot
 
ex
clu
de
 d
ua
l m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
, 
if 
th
re
sh
ol
ds
 ar
e 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
- F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: E
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y)
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
E (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
m
em
o 
fo
r C
OR
EP
ER
 
of
 2
21
20
0,
 2
21
20
0:
Ag
re
e 
w
ith
 
co
m
pr
om
ise
 if
 al
l 
ot
he
r m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 d
o 
th
e 
sa
m
e. 
If 
no
 co
ns
en
su
s, 
st
ick
in
g 
to
 p
os
iti
on
 
ea
rli
er
 ta
ke
n 
du
rin
g 
CO
RE
PE
R 
di
sc
us
sio
ns
 
(in
st
ru
ct
io
n)
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
432 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
 
(a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
31
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
25
10
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 1
91
10
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
19
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
27
11
00
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
De
nm
ar
k
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
va
rio
us
 p
os
sib
ilit
ie
s, 
bu
t o
ne
 sh
ou
ld
 al
w
ay
s r
ec
ko
n 
w
ith
 se
co
nd
 p
ar
am
et
er
 (e
ith
er
 
po
pu
la
tio
n,
 o
r n
um
be
r o
f m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
Fle
xib
le
 o
n 
fo
rm
ul
a, 
bu
t i
n 
pr
in
cip
le
 at
 le
as
t 5
0%
 o
f 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
an
d 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
pr
es
en
te
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
E
Su
pp
or
ts
 It
al
ia
n 
m
od
el
 (E
); Q
M
V 
ne
ed
 n
ot
 al
w
ay
s b
e 
su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y 
B 
or
 C
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (w
illi
ng
 
to
 co
ns
id
er
 re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
if 
‘de
m
og
ra
ph
ic 
fa
ct
or
’ w
ou
ld
 
co
nt
in
ue
 to
 p
la
y a
n 
im
po
rta
nt
 
ro
le
 (A
 o
n 
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
)
- R
eg
re
ts
 th
at
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 h
as
 
ab
an
do
ne
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 
sy
st
em
; o
pe
n 
po
sit
io
n,
 as
 lo
ng
 as
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic 
fa
ct
or
 is
 ta
ke
n 
in
to
 
ac
co
un
t
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
A
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y 
B 
or
 C
)
- R
eg
re
ts
 th
at
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 h
as
 
ab
an
do
ne
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- R
eg
re
ts
 th
at
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 h
as
 
ab
an
do
ne
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- S
up
po
rts
 It
al
ia
n 
m
od
el
 (E
)
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Ag
ai
ns
t I
ta
lia
n 
m
od
el
 (E
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y 
B 
or
 C
)
- R
eg
re
ts
 th
at
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 h
as
 
ab
an
do
ne
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y 
B 
or
 C
)
- R
eg
re
ts
 th
at
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 h
as
 
ab
an
do
ne
d 
du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 433
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 of
 sy
ste
m
 
(a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
31
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
25
10
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
09
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
41
10
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 (i
nf
or
m
al
 G
AC
), 1
91
10
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
19
11
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 2
41
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 
27
11
00
)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
Sp
ai
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
- S
up
po
rts
 It
al
ia
n 
m
od
el
 (E
)
- S
ee
 ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
Re
-w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(th
us
 D
, E
 o
r F
; 
im
pl
ici
t)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
E (
Sw
ed
ish
 m
od
el
; w
illi
ng
 to
 
in
qu
ire
 va
ria
nt
s t
o 
th
is 
m
od
el
)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Su
pp
or
ts
 It
al
ia
n 
m
od
el
 (E
); Q
M
V 
ne
ed
 n
ot
 al
w
ay
s b
e 
su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Du
al
 m
aj
or
ity
 sy
st
em
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y 
A)
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: A
 (b
ut
 o
pe
n 
to
 o
th
er
 
m
od
el
s u
nd
er
 sp
ec
ifi
c c
on
di
tio
ns
) 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
A
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
Se
e 
ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Ta
bl
e 
18
d 
G
en
er
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s
Ge
ne
ra
l w
eig
ht
in
g
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 
an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
 (‘p
op
ul
at
io
n 
de
cid
in
g 
fa
ct
or
’)/
B 
(‘b
al
an
ce
’)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (‘r
ep
re
se
nt
at
ive
ne
ss
’)/
B 
(‘b
al
an
ce
’) (
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
co
nfi
rm
ed
 b
y F
A/
DI
E m
em
o 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
n 
dr
af
t B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o 
of
 0
11
29
9,
 0
11
29
9)
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (‘p
op
ul
at
io
n 
siz
e’)
/B
 (‘
ba
la
nc
e’)
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
Se
e T
ab
le
 1
8a
 (T
yp
e 
of
 
sy
st
em
)
Se
e T
ab
le
 1
8a
 (T
yp
e 
of
 
sy
st
em
)
Au
st
ria
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
2/
00
, 1
50
20
0:
 B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (‘r
ep
re
se
nt
at
ive
ne
ss
’)/
B 
(‘b
al
an
ce
’) (
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
co
nfi
rm
ed
 b
y F
A/
DI
E m
em
o 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
n 
dr
af
t B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o 
of
 0
11
29
9,
 0
11
29
9)
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (‘p
op
ul
at
io
n 
siz
e’)
/B
 (‘
ba
la
nc
e’)
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
De
nm
ar
k
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
2/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 B
 (‘
ba
la
nc
e’)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Fin
la
nd
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
3/
00
, 0
70
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Gr
ee
ce
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
9/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Ire
la
nd
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
434 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s
Ge
ne
ra
l w
eig
ht
in
g
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 
an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Ita
ly
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
17
/0
0,
 0
30
30
0:
 A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
51
/0
0,
 1
60
60
0:
 A
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Se
e T
ab
le
 1
8a
 (T
yp
e 
of
 
sy
st
em
)
Se
e T
ab
le
 1
8a
 (T
yp
e 
of
 
sy
st
em
)
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
 (‘r
ep
re
se
nt
at
ive
ne
ss
’)/
B 
(‘b
al
an
ce
’) (
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
co
nfi
rm
ed
 b
y F
A/
DI
E m
em
o 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
n 
dr
af
t B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o 
of
 0
11
29
9,
 0
11
29
9)
 (1
st
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
 (‘p
op
ul
at
io
n 
siz
e’)
/B
 (‘
ba
la
nc
e’)
 (2
nd
 B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 A
 (d
ou
bl
y 
co
m
pe
ns
at
in
g 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
CO
NF
ER
 4
70
1/
00
, 0
10
20
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
/n
ot
 
ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
(in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 is
su
e)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
6/
00
, 0
30
50
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
/n
ot
 
ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
(in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f A
 o
n 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 is
su
e)
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Ta
bl
e 
18
e 
G
en
er
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
)
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ge
ne
ra
l 
we
ig
ht
in
g
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 
15
09
99
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
09
99
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
40
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
05
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
06
06
00
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
06
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
60
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 09
10
00
; 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 1
91
10
0
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
Ac
to
rs
 in
 g
en
er
al
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t 
ap
pl
ica
bl
e
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A?
/B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A/
B
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
26
09
00
: A
/B
A/
B
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: 
A 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
/B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: A
/B
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 m
em
o 
fo
r 
CO
RE
PE
R 
of
 2
21
20
0,
 2
21
20
0:
Ag
re
e 
w
ith
 co
m
pr
om
ise
 if
 al
l 
ot
he
r m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s d
o 
th
e 
sa
m
e. 
If 
no
 co
ns
en
su
s, 
st
ick
in
g 
to
 p
os
iti
on
 e
ar
lie
r t
ak
en
 
du
rin
g 
CO
RE
PE
R 
di
sc
us
sio
ns
 
(in
st
ru
ct
io
n)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 435
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ge
ne
ra
l 
we
ig
ht
in
g
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 
15
09
99
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
09
99
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
40
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
05
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
06
06
00
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
06
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
60
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 09
10
00
; 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 1
91
10
0
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
Au
st
ria
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
De
nm
ar
k
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(im
pl
ici
t)
B 
(im
pl
ici
t)
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
A 
(‘B
ig
 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s 
ac
ce
pt
 o
ve
r-
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
sm
al
l m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
, b
ut
 w
an
t 
ba
la
nc
e’)
A
A 
(d
ou
bl
y 
co
m
pe
ns
at
in
g 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(im
pl
ici
t; 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
A 
(‘B
ig
 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s 
ac
ce
pt
 o
ve
r-
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
sm
al
l m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
, b
ut
 w
an
t 
ba
la
nc
e’)
A
A 
(d
ou
bl
y 
co
m
pe
ns
at
in
g 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Gr
ee
ce
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ire
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
436 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ge
ne
ra
l 
we
ig
ht
in
g
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 
15
09
99
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
09
99
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
40
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
05
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
06
06
00
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
06
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
60
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 09
10
00
; 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 1
91
10
0
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
Ita
ly
A 
(‘B
ig
 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s 
ac
ce
pt
 o
ve
r-
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
sm
al
l m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
, b
ut
 w
an
t 
ba
la
nc
e’)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
A 
(‘B
ig
 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s 
ac
ce
pt
 o
ve
r-
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
sm
al
l m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
, b
ut
 w
an
t 
ba
la
nc
e’)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(im
pl
ici
t)
B
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
A 
(‘B
ig
 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s 
ac
ce
pt
 o
ve
r-
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
sm
al
l m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
, b
ut
 w
an
t 
ba
la
nc
e’)
A
06
06
00
A 
(d
ou
bl
y 
co
m
pe
ns
at
in
g 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 437
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
Ge
ne
ra
l 
we
ig
ht
in
g
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 
15
09
99
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 
16
09
99
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
40
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
30
05
00
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y G
ro
up
, 
06
06
00
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
06
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
60
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 09
10
00
; 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 1
91
10
0
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
No
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t
Ta
bl
e 
18
f I
nd
iv
id
ua
l w
ei
gh
tin
g
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s
In
di
vid
ua
l w
eig
ht
in
g
Fo
rm
al
 
in
di
vi
du
al
w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Fo
rm
al
 jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
Se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 in
di
vi
du
al
 
an
d 
jo
in
t w
rit
te
n 
pr
op
os
al
s
In
fo
rm
al
 b
ila
te
ra
l a
nd
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 co
nt
ac
ts
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
CO
NF
ER
 4
72
0/
00
, 0
60
30
0:
 A
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
/B
 (‘e
qu
al
 d
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
ap
pl
ica
tio
n 
to
 si
m
ila
r s
itu
at
io
ns
’) (
1s
t  
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
 (i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
n 
co
nfi
rm
ed
 b
y F
A/
DI
E m
em
o 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
n 
dr
af
t 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o 
of
 0
11
29
9,
 0
11
29
9)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
/B
 (‘c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
so
lu
tio
ns
 b
ei
ng
 ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 co
m
pa
ra
bl
e 
sit
ua
tio
ns
’) (
2n
d  B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
Se
e T
ab
le
 1
8a
 (T
yp
e 
of
 
sy
st
em
)
Se
e T
ab
le
 1
8a
 (T
yp
e 
of
 
sy
st
em
)
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
21
/0
0,
 0
70
30
0:
 A
/B
 (‘e
qu
al
 d
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
ap
pl
ica
tio
n 
to
 si
m
ila
r s
itu
at
io
ns
’) (
1s
t  
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o)
 (i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
n 
co
nfi
rm
ed
 b
y F
A/
DI
E m
em
o 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
n 
dr
af
t 
Be
ne
lu
x m
em
o 
of
 0
11
29
9,
 0
11
29
9)
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
87
/0
0,
 1
91
00
0:
 A
/B
 (‘c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
so
lu
tio
ns
 b
ei
ng
 ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 co
m
pa
ra
bl
e 
sit
ua
tio
ns
’) (
2n
d  B
en
el
ux
 m
em
o)
Fr
an
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Ge
rm
an
y
CO
NF
ER
 4
73
3/
00
, 3
00
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Ita
ly
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
17
/0
0,
 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
- C
ON
FE
R 
47
51
/0
0,
 1
60
60
0:
 B
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Sp
ai
n
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Sw
ed
en
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
CO
NF
ER
 4
71
8/
00
, 0
30
30
0:
 n
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
No
 fo
rm
al
 p
os
iti
on
 p
ap
er
438 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
18
g 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
(fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 IG
C 
m
ee
tin
gs
)
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
In
di
vid
ua
l 
we
ig
ht
in
g
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 
15
09
99
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 1
60
99
9)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
40
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
00
50
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
60
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
 P
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
19
11
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
Ac
to
rs
 in
 
ge
ne
ra
l
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t; 
co
nfi
rm
ed
 
by
 FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: A
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y)
FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 m
em
o 
fo
r 
CO
RE
PE
R 
of
 2
21
20
0,
 2
21
20
0:
Ag
re
e 
w
ith
 co
m
pr
om
ise
 if
 al
l 
ot
he
r m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s d
o 
th
e 
sa
m
e. 
If 
no
 co
ns
en
su
s, 
st
ick
in
g 
to
 p
os
iti
on
 e
ar
lie
r t
ak
en
 
du
rin
g 
CO
RE
PE
R 
di
sc
us
sio
ns
 
(in
st
ru
ct
io
n)
Be
lg
iu
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
Op
en
 to
 A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ge
rm
an
y
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ita
ly
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
B
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sp
ai
n
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Sw
ed
en
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A 
(im
pl
ici
t)
A
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
‘N
o 
po
sit
io
n 
on
 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
tio
n.
 
W
ill 
em
er
ge
 
la
te
r o
n 
in
 th
e 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
’
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 439
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 
vo
te
s
In
di
vid
ua
l 
we
ig
ht
in
g
2n
d  t
ec
hn
ica
l 
m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
IG
C,
 
15
09
99
(FA
/D
IE
 P
R 
re
po
rt,
 1
60
99
9)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
40
40
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
05
04
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 3
00
50
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
)
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 0
60
70
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
 P
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
Gr
ou
p,
 2
50
90
0
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 
GA
C)
, 0
81
00
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
10
10
00
)
Bi
ar
rit
z 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 1
3-
14
10
00
Pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
Gr
ou
p,
 1
31
10
0
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
)
Co
nc
la
ve
 
(in
fo
rm
al
 G
AC
), 
19
11
00
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0)
Ni
ce
 Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Co
un
cil
, 0
7-
11
12
00
CO
RE
PE
R,
 2
0-
22
12
00
Co
un
cil
 
Se
cr
et
ar
ia
t
A 
(fo
r G
er
m
an
y-
Fr
an
ce
) n
o 
lo
ng
er
 ta
bo
o,
 
if 
re
vi
sio
n 
al
so
 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 
co
un
tri
es
 th
at
 
fo
llo
w
 b
el
ow
 
(e
.g
. A
 fo
r D
ut
ch
 
ca
bi
ne
t-B
el
gi
um
)
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Ta
bl
e 
19
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 v
ot
es
 (d
om
es
tic
 a
ct
or
s a
nd
 fa
ct
or
s)
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
Au
st
ria
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 0
40
40
0:
 ‘C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f v
ot
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 m
y c
ou
nt
ry
’ (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0)
Be
lg
iu
m
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 0
40
40
0:
 ‘C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f v
ot
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 m
y c
ou
nt
ry
’ (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0)
De
nm
ar
k
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n 
an
d/
or
 re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 0
40
40
0:
 ‘C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f v
ot
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 m
y c
ou
nt
ry
’ (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
40
0)
Fin
la
nd
No
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
un
d
Fr
an
ce
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 B
ila
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
17
04
00
: ‘H
ow
 to
 e
xp
la
in
 d
ec
isi
on
 o
pt
io
n 
A 
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 to
 p
ar
lia
m
en
t?
’ (F
A/
DI
E P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
18
04
00
)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 - 
PG
, 0
40
40
0:
 ‘C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f v
ot
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 m
y c
ou
nt
ry
’ (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0)
- B
ila
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
17
04
00
: ‘H
ow
 to
 e
xp
la
in
 A
 o
n 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
 to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic?
’ (F
A/
DI
E P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
18
04
00
)
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0:
 ‘U
nd
er
-re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
nc
re
as
in
gl
y d
iffi
cu
lt 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n’ 
(F
re
nc
h 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
) (
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
440 Annex 6
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
El
ec
tio
ns
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 B
ila
te
ra
l m
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t, 
17
04
00
: U
nc
le
ar
/n
o 
ex
pr
es
sio
n 
of
 th
e 
Fr
en
ch
 p
os
iti
on
 o
n 
th
e W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s d
os
sie
r d
ue
 to
 p
os
sib
le
 ‘e
le
ct
or
al
 o
bs
ta
cle
s’ 
in
 2
00
2 
(FA
/D
IE
 P
ar
is 
em
ba
ss
y r
ep
or
t, 
18
04
00
)
Ge
rm
an
y
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 3
00
50
0:
 ‘U
nd
er
-re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
nc
re
as
in
gl
y d
iffi
cu
lt 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n’ 
(F
re
nc
h 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
) (
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Gr
ee
ce
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n 
an
d/
or
 re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 0
40
40
0:
 ‘C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f v
ot
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 m
y c
ou
nt
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
05
04
00
)
Ire
la
nd
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n 
an
d/
or
 re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 0
40
40
0:
 ‘C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f v
ot
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 m
y c
ou
nt
ry
’ (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
40
0)
Pa
rli
am
en
t
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 P
G,
 2
50
90
0:
 ‘E
ac
h 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ab
le
 to
 re
tu
rn
 w
ith
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
to
 it
s p
ar
lia
m
en
t’ (
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Ita
ly
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 3
00
50
0:
 ‘U
nd
er
-re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
nc
re
as
in
gl
y d
iffi
cu
lt 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n’ 
(F
re
nc
h 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
) (
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n 
an
d/
or
 re
fe
re
nd
um
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 0
40
40
0:
 ‘C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f v
ot
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 m
y c
ou
nt
ry
’ (F
A/
DI
E r
ep
or
t, 
05
04
00
)
Po
rtu
ga
l
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 an
d/
or
 2
) P
G,
 2
50
90
0:
 ‘W
e 
ha
ve
 al
so
 th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 o
f h
ow
 to
 se
ll t
he
 re
su
lt’
 (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Sp
ai
n
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 - 
PG
, 0
40
40
0:
 ‘C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f v
ot
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 m
y c
ou
nt
ry
’ (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0)
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0:
 ‘U
nd
er
-re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
nc
re
as
in
gl
y d
iffi
cu
lt 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n’ 
(F
re
nc
h 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
) (
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Sw
ed
en
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
Co
ns
tra
in
ed
:
3)
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e 
fo
r N
ice
 EC
 o
f 0
7-
11
12
00
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
: S
w
ed
ish
 sq
ua
re
 ro
ot
 m
od
el
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
na
bl
e 
to
 b
ro
ad
er
 p
ub
lic
 an
d 
pr
es
s (
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 se
ve
ra
l a
ct
or
s)
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 441
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s
Do
m
es
tic
 ac
to
rs
 an
d 
fa
ct
or
s
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
/o
r p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 an
d/
or
 2
) P
G,
 2
50
90
0:
 ‘W
e 
ne
ed
 p
os
iti
ve
 re
su
lt 
on
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s, 
as
 w
e 
ca
nn
ot
 p
re
se
nt
 cl
os
er
 co
op
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
ex
te
ns
io
n 
of
 Q
M
V 
as
 g
oo
d 
re
su
lts
’ (C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
60
90
0)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 P
G,
 3
00
50
0:
 ‘U
nd
er
-re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
bi
g 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
nc
re
as
in
gl
y d
iffi
cu
lt 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 to
 p
op
ul
at
io
n’ 
(F
re
nc
h 
Pr
es
id
en
cy
) (
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 3
10
50
0)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n
Pa
rli
am
en
ts
 (i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l)
En
ab
le
d:
3)
 P
G,
 3
00
50
0:
 ‘A
 ca
n 
be
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 to
 o
ur
 p
ar
lia
m
en
ts
 an
d 
pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n 
w
he
n 
ra
tif
yin
g 
th
e T
re
at
y’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
Pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n
En
ab
le
d:
2)
 - 
GA
C,
 2
00
30
0:
 ‘A
 ca
n 
be
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 to
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 w
he
n 
ra
tif
yin
g 
th
e T
re
at
y’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
- P
G,
 0
40
40
0:
 ‘A
 ca
n 
be
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 to
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 w
he
n 
ra
tif
yin
g 
th
e T
re
at
y’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0:
 ‘A
 ca
n 
be
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 to
 o
ur
 p
ar
lia
m
en
ts
 an
d 
pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n 
w
he
n 
ra
tif
yin
g 
th
e T
re
at
y’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
- P
G,
 0
60
70
0:
 ‘A
 ca
n 
be
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 to
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 w
he
n 
ra
tif
yin
g 
th
e T
re
at
y’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
- P
G,
 0
41
10
0:
 ‘A
 ca
n 
be
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 to
 p
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 w
he
n 
ra
tif
yin
g 
th
e T
re
at
y’ 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
pr
ob
ab
ly)
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
No
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
/n
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 fo
un
d
442 Annex 6
Ta
bl
e 
20
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 ca
bi
ne
t’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 v
ot
es
 (c
on
te
xt
ua
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
) (
se
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
Ta
bl
es
 7
.4
1-
7.
43
)
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 (a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
le
ve
l
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 0
70
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
no
te
, 0
30
30
0)
 (p
ro
ba
bl
y: 
do
ss
ie
r i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- P
G,
 0
40
40
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
28
/0
0,
 2
40
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
40
0)
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
; t
w
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- P
G,
 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0)
- P
G,
 0
60
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
54
/0
0,
 0
30
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rts
, 2
60
90
0)
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
- P
G,
 0
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
96
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- P
G,
 2
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
Le
ve
l 2
- G
AC
, 2
00
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
81
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
81
/0
0,
 0
51
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
00
0)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
01
/0
0,
 1
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 1
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
M
ed
ia
n:
  3
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 0
70
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
no
te
, 0
30
30
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly
: 
do
ss
ie
r i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- P
G,
 0
40
40
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
28
/0
0,
 2
40
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
40
0)
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
)
- P
G,
 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0)
- P
G,
 0
60
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
54
/0
0,
 0
30
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rts
, 2
60
90
0)
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 0
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
96
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
)
- P
G,
 2
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly)
Le
ve
l 2
- G
AC
, 2
00
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
81
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
81
/0
0,
 0
51
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
00
0)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
01
/0
0,
 1
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 1
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
M
ed
ia
n:
 3
Le
ve
l 3
- P
G,
 0
70
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
no
te
, 0
30
30
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly
: 
do
ss
ie
r i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- P
G,
 0
40
40
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
28
/0
0,
 2
40
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
40
0)
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
)
- P
G,
 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 0
60
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
54
/0
0,
 0
30
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
)
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rts
, 2
60
90
0)
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
(p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 0
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
96
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
)
- P
G,
 2
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
 (p
os
sib
ly)
Le
ve
l 2
- G
AC
, 2
00
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
) (
po
ss
ib
ly)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
81
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
81
/0
0,
 0
51
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
00
0)
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
01
/0
0,
 1
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
Le
ve
l 1
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
)
M
ed
ia
n:
 3
Detailed tables process analysis (all actors) 443
W
ei
gh
tin
g 
of
 vo
te
s
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 (a
nd
 Q
M
V 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
Ge
ne
ra
l w
ei
gh
tin
g
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g
Ne
go
tia
tio
n 
tim
in
g
- P
G,
 0
70
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
no
te
, 0
30
30
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y: 
do
ss
ie
r i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- G
AC
, 2
00
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 6
- P
G,
 0
40
40
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
28
/0
0,
 2
40
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
40
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 8
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
; t
w
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 
w
ee
k 1
6
- P
G,
 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 1
7
- P
G,
 0
60
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
54
/0
0,
 0
30
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 2
1
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rts
, 2
60
90
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 
33 - C
on
cla
ve
, 0
81
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
81
/0
0,
 0
51
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
4
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): 
IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
5
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 
37 - P
G,
 0
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 3
8
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
96
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 
40 - C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
01
/0
0,
 1
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
0
- P
G,
 2
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
1
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
27
.5
- P
G,
 0
70
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
no
te
, 0
30
30
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
 
(p
os
sib
ly
: d
os
sie
r i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- G
AC
, 2
00
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 6
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 0
40
40
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
28
/0
0,
 2
40
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
40
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 8
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 1
6
- P
G,
 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 1
7
- P
G,
 0
60
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
54
/0
0,
 0
30
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 2
1
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rts
, 2
60
90
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 
33 - C
on
cla
ve
, 0
81
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
81
/0
0,
 0
51
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
4
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): 
IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
5
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 
37
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 0
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 3
8 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
96
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
0
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
01
/0
0,
 1
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 
no
te
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
0
- P
G,
 2
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
1 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
28
.7
 (-
27
.5
)
- P
G,
 0
70
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
no
te
, 0
30
30
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
 
(p
os
sib
ly
: d
os
sie
r i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l)
- G
AC
, 2
00
30
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 se
m
i-f
or
m
al
 P
re
sid
en
cy
 le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
le
tte
r, 1
60
30
0;
 tw
o 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
es
, u
nk
no
w
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 6
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 0
40
40
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
28
/0
0,
 2
40
30
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
40
40
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
50
40
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 8
- P
G,
 3
00
50
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
31
05
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 1
6
- P
G,
 0
60
60
0 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
47
45
/0
0,
 2
40
50
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
60
60
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
70
60
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 1
7 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 0
60
70
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
54
/0
0,
 0
30
70
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
07
07
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 2
1
- P
G,
 2
50
90
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
an
d 
FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rts
, 2
60
90
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
3
- C
on
cla
ve
, 0
81
00
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
81
/0
0,
 0
51
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 0
91
00
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 1
01
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
4
- B
ia
rri
tz
 EC
, 1
3-
14
10
00
 (F
A/
DI
E p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): 
IG
C 
w
ee
k 3
5
- P
G,
 2
31
00
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
51
00
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 
37
 (p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 0
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 0
91
10
0;
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 3
8 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- P
G,
 1
31
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
47
96
/0
0,
 0
91
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 re
po
rt,
 
14
11
00
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
0
- C
on
cla
ve
, 1
91
10
0 
on
 b
as
is 
of
 C
ON
FE
R 
48
01
/0
0,
 1
61
10
0 
(C
om
m
iss
io
n/
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 1
91
10
0;
 FA
/D
IE
 p
re
pa
ra
to
ry
 n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
; C
om
m
iss
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 
w
ee
k 4
0
- P
G,
 2
41
10
0 
(FA
/D
IE
/C
om
m
iss
io
n 
re
po
rt,
 2
71
10
0)
: IG
C 
w
ee
k 4
1 
(p
os
sib
ly)
- N
ice
 EC
, 0
7-
11
12
00
 o
n 
ba
sis
 o
f C
ON
FE
R 
48
16
/0
0,
 0
61
20
0 
(FA
/D
IE
 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y n
ot
e, 
un
kn
ow
n 
da
te
): I
GC
 w
ee
k 4
3
Av
er
ag
e 
IG
C 
w
ee
k n
um
be
r: 
30
 (-
27
.5
)
Ex
te
rn
al
 e
ve
nt
s a
nd
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
1)
 Im
pe
nd
in
g 
en
la
rg
em
en
t: 
co
ns
tra
in
in
g 
Du
tc
h 
ca
bi
ne
t w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 G
en
er
al
 an
d 
In
di
vi
du
al
 w
ei
gh
tin
g 
iss
ue
s

445
Summary
The Dutch cabinet has exerted its influence with regard to roughly half of the Nice Treaty 
issues selected for this study. Interestingly enough, these were all issues resulting in deci-
sions, whereas issues that were not put on the agenda (non-decisions) or not decided on 
(not-decisions) to a considerable degree account for the Dutch cabinet’s lack of influence. 
How can this be explained? Based on this study, it appears that this can be explained by 
the extent to which the Dutch cabinet was a part of a network, was internally coherent, 
undertook influence attempts and was enabled or constrained by domestic actors and 
factors.
The formation of EU Treaties in general and the Treaty of Nice in particular is a complex 
process, whose outcome cannot be predicted. It entails a negotiation process in which dif-
ferent actors, with diverging preferences, are intervening on their own or within coalitions 
of actors at different moments, in order to achieve an outcome that is as close to their 
preferences as possible. As a result, an EU Treaty negotiation process is to a high degree a 
black box. How can we open the black box of the Nice Treaty negotiation process and, in 
doing so, explain this process and its resulting outcome?
The main objective of this study is to explain the outcome of the Nice Treaty negotiation 
process. Within EU studies, only a few scholars have examined the process of EU Treaty 
negotiations in order to explain its outcome. The literature on EU Treaty negotiations that 
is discussed in Chapter 2 draws our attention to the participating actors – both member 
state and EU level actors – and several elements that structure the negotiations, such as the 
existence of different levels of negotiation. As such, these agency and structural variables 
affect the negotiation process and thus co-determine its outcome. It is argued, however, 
that these variables insufficiently touch on the core of an EU Treaty negotiation process: 
the mutual exertion of influence by the participating actors. Although scholars often explic-
itly or implicitly refer to power and influence (‘bargaining power’, ‘influence’, ‘impact’), 
they do not treat power and influence as empirical Political Science concepts, indicating 
how they define these concepts and aim to measure them. Therefore, until now, relatively 
little attention has been paid within EU studies to EU Treaty negotiations as a process 
and – within this perspective – to the question of how to conceive of and measure power 
and influence. This study aims to make a contribution to filling this gap by approaching 
the explanation of the Nice Treaty negotiation process from the perspective of power and 
influence.
In order to achieve this, the Political Science and International Relations literature are 
turned to in Chapter 3. Power and influence are core concepts in Political Science. Yet 
within Political Science generally and International Relations in particular, the study of 
(international) politics has been mainly focused on the resources, or potential influence 
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of actors, without examining the process in which these resources are employed, resulting 
in the mutual exertion of actual influence as a relation between actors. As the study aims 
to focus on the process of the Nice Treaty negotiations in order to explain its outcome, it 
adopts a relational influence perspective. In doing so, this study also aims to contribute to 
filling a gap in the Political Science and International Relations literature on power and 
influence.
Applying a relational influence perspective to an EU Treaty negotiation process is sci-
entifically not only relevant because it enables us to examine the actual influence of (one 
or more of ) the participating actors, but also because the challenge of how to measure 
this influence must be met. As with the concept of influence itself, the measurement of 
influence has long been debated in Political Science and International Relations. This study 
takes up this debate and by applying a method of actual influence measurement in the 
context of EU politics, also aims to make a methodological contribution. In adopting a 
relational influence perspective and applying a method of actual influence measurement, 
the study aims to open up the black box of the Nice Treaty negotiations.
In applying a relational influence approach to explain the outcome of the Nice Treaty 
negotiation process, this study focuses on the influence of the Dutch cabinet in the context 
of the other participating actors (14 member states, the European Commission, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council Secretariat). This has resulted in the following research 
question for this study:
To what extent has the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence during the negotiation process that 
resulted in the Treaty of Nice, and how can this influence be explained?
Combining the partly overlapping variables that are put forward in the EU literature on 
the one hand (Chapter 2) and the Political Science and International Relations literature 
on the other (Chapter 3) results in the building blocks for the conceptual model of this 
study. This model is further specified and presented in Chapter 4. The dependent variable 
is the extent of influence of actor A (the Dutch cabinet) on actor B (the other 17 actors) 
in making a decision on a specific Nice Treaty issue. The influence resources of actor A 
form the independent variable. The influence resources of policy positions, networks and 
internal coherence were selected for this study. The crucial intervening variable is formed 
by the influence attempt mechanism of explicit influence, which is deductively and induc-
tively specified by all kinds of influence attempts that the Dutch cabinet as actor A, but 
also the other participating actors, have undertaken during the negotiation process. Finally, 
this conversion process is in turn affected by several structural, contextual variables, which 
enable or constrain the extent to which the influence resources of actor A are converted 
into actual influence through influence attempts. These are domestic structure (actors and 
factors), negotiation structure (levels and phases, particularly timing) and external events 
and developments at the European level. In Chapter 4, the kinds of expectations that can 
be identified for each of the variables of the conceptual model are also explicated upon.
As the research question of this study focuses on the exertion of actual influence during 
a negotiation process, a method is required that studies influence as a relation between 
actors and as an effect brought about during a process. Being a process-oriented method, 
Dahl’s decision method – making a comparison between the influence attempts of the 
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participating actors and the ultimate decisions – forms the starting point of the influence 
analysis. In the author’s view, however, such an analysis should begin with establishing the 
original preferences of the participating actors on specific Nice Treaty issues and examining 
the extent to which they have realised these preferences in the outcomes of the negotiation 
process. In other words, the extent of goal-achievement of the participating actors should 
be assessed on the basis of a before-after analysis.
In Chapter 5, the before-after analysis is executed for the Dutch cabinet for all 24 selected 
issues within the five selected dossiers of the Nice Treaty negotiation process (Court of Au-
ditors, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Closer cooperation, Commission 
size and Weighting of votes in the Council). To what extent has the Dutch cabinet achieved 
its goal? The Dutch cabinet has fully achieved its goal regarding six of the 24 issues and 
partially regarding seven issues. In total, the Dutch cabinet has therefore achieved its goal to 
a greater or lesser extent on 13 of the 24 issues. In general, the Dutch cabinet has partially 
or fully achieved its goal for nine of the 20 issues of the Court of Auditors, ESDP and 
Closer cooperation dossiers and for all four issues of the Commission size and Weighting 
of votes dossiers. In total, the Dutch cabinet has not achieved its goal with regard to 11 of 
the 24 issues. This was not due to the fact that the outcomes for these issues were decision 
options the Dutch cabinet did not prefer, but because these issues either did not reach the 
agenda-setting and decision-making phases, resulting in non-decisions (five issues) from 
the perspective of the Dutch cabinet, or did reach these phases but were ultimately not 
decided on, resulting in not-decisions (six issues).
In Chapter 6, the before-after analysis is carried out for the other participating actors 
regarding the ‘sample selection’ of 16 issues of the five dossiers. In general, with regard to 
the issues (resulting in decisions) on which the Dutch cabinet has partially or fully achieved 
its goal, a considerable number of other actors have also partially or fully achieved their 
goals.  For some dossiers and issues – Closer cooperation (Veto possibility), Commission 
size and Weighting of votes (Type of system and General weighting), all the actors have 
even achieved their goals to a greater or lesser degree. In addition, other actors have also 
achieved their goals on the issues (resulting in not-decisions or non-decisions) on which 
the Dutch cabinet has not achieved its goal. This applies most clearly to the NATO and 
Military Staff issues of the ESDP dossier, but probably also to one or more of the issues for 
which the extent of goal-achievement of the other actors is unclear or unknown: Appeal 
ECJ and Instruction (Court of Auditors dossier) and Differentiated membership (Closer 
cooperation dossier).
The assessment and explanation of the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence with regard 
to the 16 issues of the sample selection is the goal of the three-step process analysis, carried 
out in Chapter 7. In terms of the first step of assessing the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s 
influence, how do we know whether the Dutch cabinet has caused its goal-achievement 
by itself, i.e. has actually exerted its influence? To answer this question, the descriptive 
before-after analysis should be complemented with an explanatory process analysis. It 
is precisely this process, or mechanism, of causation that should be studied in order to 
examine whether a correlation between an actor’s preference and a decision – an actor’s 
goal-achievement – is also a matter of causation by the actor itself.
This study focuses primarily on influence attempts as the mechanism through which the 
exertion of influence takes place. Therefore, when we want to know whether the Dutch 
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cabinet has actually exerted influence regarding the issues on which it has partially or fully 
achieved its goal, the influence attempts undertaken by the Dutch cabinet as well as the 
other participating actors are particularly important. The first step of the process analysis 
therefore begins with an examination of these influence attempts regarding the 16 issues 
of the sample selection.
Based on this, the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence is assessed by examining rival 
mechanisms – mechanisms other than explicit influence – to which specific combinations 
of (lack of ) influence attempts and goal-achievement might be attributed. In doing so, it is 
considered which mechanisms plausibly applied (verification) and which did not (falsifica-
tion) for each of the issues of the sample selection.
To what extent has the Dutch cabinet exerted its influence during the negotiation process 
resulting in the Treaty of Nice? It can be concluded that the Dutch cabinet has exerted 
explicit influence regarding nine of the 20 Nice Treaty issues of the sample selection (four 
issues have been split up into two issues each in the course of the analysis resulting in a 
total of 20 issues). This was the case regarding the SOA-1 and Contact Committee-1 issues 
(Court of Auditors dossier), Treaty change and PSC-1 issues (ESDP dossier), Minimum 
requirement and Veto possibility-1 issues (Closer cooperation dossier), Commission size is-
sue (Commission dossier) and General weighting and Individual weighting issues (Weight-
ing of votes dossier). In addition to exerting explicit influence, the Dutch cabinet got a 
free ride from other actors in the case of the Minimum requirement, Veto possibility-1, 
Commission size and General weighting issues.
The Dutch cabinet has not exerted explicit influence with regard to 10 of the 20 issues of 
the sample selection. In one case the Dutch cabinet’s goal-achievement was a matter of sheer 
luck (Court of Auditors size issue). In the case of the Instruction issue (Court of Auditors 
dossier), the Dutch cabinet’s lack of goal-achievement was related to its internal divisive-
ness. This mechanism also played a subordinate role in the case of the NATO issue (ESDP 
dossier), on which the Italy and Benelux network was internally divided. In five cases, the 
Dutch cabinet’s absence of goal-achievement had to do with a failure: SOA-2, Contact 
Committee-2 and Appeal ECJ (Court of Auditors dossier), NATO (ESDP dossier) and Veto 
possibility-2 (Closer cooperation dossier). The unforced error mechanism possibly played a 
subordinate role with regard to the SOA-2, Contact Committee-2, Appeal ECJ and Veto 
possibility-2 issues. The bad luck mechanism possibly played a subordinate role regarding 
the Veto possibility-2 issue. In three cases, the Dutch cabinet’s lack of goal-achievement had 
to do with the issues being a non-priority for the Dutch cabinet and/or with anticipation by 
the Dutch cabinet of (possible) resistance from other participating actors (Military Staff, 
Differentiated membership and PSC-2 issues). In addition, the anticipation mechanism 
possibly played a subordinate role with regard to the SOA-2, Contact Committee-2 and 
Appeal ECJ issues. Concerning the Type of system issue (Weighting of votes dossier), it is 
not known whether or not the Dutch cabinet has exerted explicit influence.
Moreover, it can be concluded that the Dutch cabinet has thus exerted its influence with 
regard to an ample majority (nine) of the 15 – including the four extra issues – decisions 
of the sample selection. With regard to five decisions the Dutch cabinet has not exerted 
influence, but to a considerable degree the non-decisions and not-decisions (also five is-
sues) account for its lack of influence. Focusing only on the decisions that have been made 
during the Nice Treaty negotiation process and the influence the Dutch cabinet has exerted 
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in this respect would thus disregard the lack of influence of the Dutch cabinet – and the 
influence that other participating actors have exerted – with regard to the decisions that not 
have been made. For a proper assessment of an actor’s influence, it is therefore important to 
include not only decisions, but also non-decisions and not-decisions in the analysis.
How can the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence thus found be explained? To answer 
this question, the second step of the process analysis in Chapter 7 involves examining the 
explanatory value of the variables of the conceptual model. Based on the deductive testing 
of the expectations of the conceptual model, it can be concluded that the extent to which 
the Dutch cabinet was a part of a network, was internally coherent, undertook influence 
attempts and was enabled or constrained by domestic actors and factors can, to a certain 
degree, explain its extent of influence. In the nine cases in which the Dutch cabinet has 
exerted its influence, it was often a part of a network, was internally coherent, undertook 
many influence attempts and was enabled by domestic actors and factors. In the 10 cases 
where it has not exerted influence, on the other hand, it was often a part of a divided 
network or of no network at all, was internally divided, undertook hardly any or few 
influence attempts and was constrained by domestic actors and factors.
Yet these variables cannot fully explain the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. The 
third and final step of the process analysis in Chapter 7 therefore aims to consider whether 
still other variables not included in the model can offer an explanation. Based on induction, 
it can be concluded that the exchange of dossiers and issues among the participating actors, 
the timeliness of influence attempts and networks, anticipation of (possible) resistance 
from other participating actors and the collective and individual saliency of an issue also 
seem to contribute to the explanation.
Chapter 8 presents, after the empirical results and the answer to the research question, 
some reflections on the theory, methodology and practice of influence on the basis of this 
study. For the practice of influence, the following recommendations are suggested to the 
Dutch cabinet with the aim that it will exert more influence during EU (Treaty) negotia-
tions in the future. First, it pays off to invest much in agenda-setting and decision-making. 
Second, and as a specification of this, it is recommended to include a limited number of 
clear and prioritised preferences in its stake for the negotiations. Third, being internally coher-
ent contributes to the exertion of influence. Fourth, the number and timeliness of networks 
with like-minded member states matter to the extent of the Dutch cabinet’s influence. 
Fifth, this also applies to the number and timeliness of influence attempts. Sixth, while it is 
questionable whether the Dutch cabinet itself has a reputation for influence, it would do 
well to regularly evaluate its estimation of other actors’ reputation for influence. After all, 
anticipation by the Dutch cabinet of the (possible) reactions, i.e. resistance, from these 
actors is based on this estimation. Seventh, it pays off to more actively adopt the influence 
strategy of making use of and referring to domestic actors and factors, such as the parliament 
and public opinion. Eighth, the Dutch cabinet might examine in advance which dossiers 
and issues are interlinked and will thus probably be exchanged, and proactively consider 
what linkages it prefers (to construct) itself in order to realise more of its preferences. Ninth 
and perhaps most importantly, as so much depends on the specific issue and the specific 
situation when negotiating an EU Treaty, the Dutch cabinet should invest heavily in pre-
paratory homework. This homework could successively consist of mapping the negotiation 
environment, prioritising the issues and one’s preferences and developing negotiation 
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scenarios for these issues. Considering that EU Treaty reform is an ongoing but contingent 
process and that the Dutch cabinet has major interests in this regard, it is recommendable 
to set up a semi-permanent, high-level Taskforce at the European Integration Department 
(DIE) of the Foreign Affairs Ministry to do this preparatory homework.
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Samenvatting
Het Nederlandse kabinet heeft invloed uitgeoefend ten aanzien van ongeveer de helft van 
de issues van het Verdrag van Nice die zijn geselecteerd voor dit proefschrift. Interessant 
genoeg zijn over al deze issues besluiten genomen, terwijl issues die niet op de agenda 
zijn gezet (non-decisies) of waarover niet is besloten (not-decisies) in behoorlijke mate 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor het gebrek aan invloed van het Nederlandse kabinet. Hoe kan 
dit worden verklaard? Uit dit proefschrift blijkt dat dit kan worden verklaard door de 
mate waarin het Nederlandse kabinet deel uitmaakte van netwerken, intern coherent was, 
invloedspogingen ondernam en gefaciliteerd dan wel gehinderd werd door binnenlandspo-
litieke actoren en factoren.
Europese Verdragsvorming in het algemeen en de totstandkoming van het Verdrag van 
Nice in het bijzonder betreft een complex proces, waarvan de uitkomst niet kan worden 
voorspeld. Het gaat om een onderhandelingsproces, waarin verschillende actoren met uit-
eenlopende preferenties alleen of gezamenlijk interveniëren op verschillende momenten, 
om zo tot een uitkomst te komen die zo dicht mogelijk bij hun preferenties ligt. Europese 
Verdragsonderhandelingen zijn daarom in grote mate een zwarte doos. Hoe kunnen we de 
zwarte doos van de onderhandelingen over het Verdrag van Nice openen en zodoende dit 
proces en de uitkomst daarvan verklaren?
Het hoofddoel van dit proefschrift is om de uitkomst te verklaren van de onderhande-
lingen over het Verdrag van Nice. In de EU-literatuur zijn slechts enkele auteurs te vinden 
die het proces van Europese Verdragsonderhandelingen hebben bestudeerd om tot een 
verklaring te komen van de uitkomst ervan. De literatuur die we in dit verband bespreken 
in hoofdstuk 2 vraagt onze aandacht voor de deelnemende actoren – zowel lidstaten als 
Europese instellingen – en voor diverse elementen die de onderhandelingen structureren, 
zoals het bestaan van verschillende onderhandelingsniveaus. Als zodanig werken deze ac-
tor- en structuurvariabelen in op het onderhandelingsproces en bepalen mede de uitkomst 
ervan. Wij betogen echter dat deze variabelen onvoldoende de kern raken van Europese 
Verdragsonderhandelingen: de wederzijdse uitoefening van invloed door de deelnemende 
actoren. Hoewel auteurs vaak expliciet of impliciet verwijzen naar de begrippen macht en 
invloed, vatten zij deze begrippen niet op als empirische politicologische concepten in de 
zin dat ze aangeven hoe zij hen definiëren en van plan zijn te meten. Tot op heden is dus 
relatief weinig aandacht besteed in de EU-literatuur aan Europese Verdragsonderhande-
lingen als een proces en – binnen dit perspectief – aan de vraag hoe macht en invloed te 
definiëren en te meten. Dit proefschrift beoogt een bijdrage te leveren aan het vullen van 
deze leemte door de verklaring van het onderhandelingsproces resulterend in het Verdrag 
van Nice te benaderen vanuit het perspectief van macht en invloed.
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Hiertoe wenden we ons in hoofdstuk 3 tot de literatuur van de Politicologie en de In-
ternationale Betrekkingen. Macht en invloed zijn kernbegrippen binnen de Politicologie. 
Toch is de studie van (internationale) politiek binnen de Politicologie in het algemeen 
en de Internationale Betrekkingen in het bijzonder vooral gericht geweest op de hulp-
middelen, ofwel potentiële invloed van actoren, zonder het proces te bestuderen waarin 
deze hulpmiddelen worden aangewend resulterend in de wederzijdse uitoefening van 
daadwerkelijke invloed als een relatie tussen actoren. Aangezien wij ons willen richten op 
het onderhandelingsproces om de uitkomst – het Verdrag van Nice – te verklaren, hanteert 
dit proefschrift een relationeel invloedsperspectief. Zodoende beoogt het proefschrift ook 
een bijdrage te leveren aan het vullen van een leemte binnen de genoemde literatuur over 
macht en invloed.
De toepassing van een relationeel invloedsperspectief op het onderhandelingsproces over 
een Europees Verdrag is wetenschappelijk gezien niet alleen relevant omdat het ons in staat 
stelt de daadwerkelijke invloed vast te stellen van (één of meer van) de deelnemende actoren. 
Het is ook relevant omdat we de uitdaging aan moeten gaan hoe deze invloed te meten. Net 
als het invloedsbegrip zelf is de meting van invloed langdurig onderwerp van debat geweest 
binnen de Politicologie en Internationale Betrekkingen. Dit proefschrift mengt zich in 
dit debat en beoogt ook een methodologische bijdrage te leveren door een methode van 
daadwerkelijke invloedsmeting toe te passen in de context van de Europese politiek. Door 
een relationeel invloedsperspectief en een methode van daadwerkelijke invloedsmeting toe 
te passen, beogen we de zwarte doos van de onderhandelingen over het Verdrag van Nice 
te openen.
Bij het toepassen van een relationeel invloedsperspectief om tot een verklaring van de 
uitkomst van het onderhandelingsproces te komen, richten wij ons op de invloed van 
het Nederlandse kabinet in de context van de andere deelnemende actoren (14 lidstaten, 
Europese Commissie, Europees Parlement en Raadssecretariaat). Dit heeft geresulteerd in 
de volgende probleemstelling voor dit proefschrift:
In welke mate heeft het Nederlandse kabinet invloed uitgeoefend tijdens het onderhandelings-
proces resulterend in het Verdrag van Nice, en hoe kan deze invloed worden verklaard?
De deels overlappende variabelen die naar voren komen in de EU-literatuur in hoofdstuk 
2 en de literatuur van de Politicologie en de Internationale Betrekkingen in hoofdstuk 3 
vormen samen de bouwstenen voor het conceptuele model van dit proefschrift. Dit model 
wordt nader gespecificeerd en gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 4. De afhankelijke variabele is de 
mate van invloed van actor A (het Nederlandse kabinet) op actor B (de andere 17 actoren), 
die een besluit neemt over een bepaald issue van het Verdrag van Nice. De invloedsbronnen 
van actor A vormen de onafhankelijke variabele. Voor dit proefschrift werden de invloeds-
bronnen beleidsposities, netwerken en interne coherentie geselecteerd. De cruciale inter-
veniërende variabele wordt gevormd door het invloedspogingsmechanisme van expliciete 
invloed, dat deductief en inductief wordt gespecificeerd door allerlei soorten invloedspo-
gingen die het Nederlandse kabinet als actor A, maar ook de andere deelnemende actoren 
hebben ondernomen tijdens het onderhandelingsproces. Op dit conversieproces werken, 
ten slotte, op hun beurt verscheidene structurele, contextuele variabelen in, die de mate 
waarin de invloedsbronnen van actor A worden omgezet in daadwerkelijk invloed door 
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middel van invloedspogingen faciliteren dan wel verhinderen. Het gaat hierbij om de bin-
nenlandspolitieke structuur (actoren en factoren), de onderhandelingsstructuur (niveaus 
en fases, met name timing) en externe gebeurtenissen en ontwikkelingen op Europees 
niveau. In hoofdstuk 4 expliciteren we ook wat voor soort verwachtingen kunnen worden 
onderscheiden voor elk van de variabelen van het conceptuele model.
Aangezien de probleemstelling van dit proefschrift gericht is op de uitoefening van 
daadwerkelijke invloed tijdens een onderhandelingsproces, hebben we een methode nodig 
die invloed benadert als een relatie tussen actoren en als een effect dat teweeggebracht 
wordt tijdens een proces. Als procesgeoriënteerde methode vormt Dahl’s besluitvormings-
methode – die een vergelijking maakt tussen de invloedspogingen van de deelnemende 
actoren en de uiteindelijke besluiten – het startpunt van onze invloedsanalyse. Naar onze 
mening zou een dergelijke analyse echter moeten beginnen met het vaststellen van de 
oorspronkelijke preferenties van de deelnemende actoren ten aanzien van specifieke issues 
van het Verdrag van Nice en moeten nagaan in welke mate zij deze preferenties hebben 
gerealiseerd in de uitkomsten van het onderhandelingsproces. Met andere woorden, we 
dienen de mate van doelbereiking van de deelnemende actoren vast te stellen op basis van 
een voor- en nameting.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt deze voor- en nameting uitgevoerd voor wat betreft het Nederlandse 
kabinet ten aanzien van alle 24 issues binnen de vijf Nice-dossiers die zijn geselecteerd voor 
dit proefschrift (Europese Rekenkamer, Europees Veiligheids- en Defensiebeleid (EVDB), 
Versterkte samenwerking, omvang van de Commissie en Stemmenweging in de Raad). In 
welke mate heeft het Nederlandse kabinet zijn doel bereikt? Het Nederlandse kabinet heeft 
volledig zijn doel bereikt ten aanzien van zes van de 24 issues en gedeeltelijk als het gaat 
om zeven issues. In totaal heeft het Nederlandse kabinet daarom in meer of mindere mate 
zijn doel bereikt ten aanzien van 13 van de 24 issues. In het algemeen gesproken, heeft 
het Nederlandse kabinet gedeeltelijk of geheel zijn doel bereikt ten aanzien van negen van 
de 20 issues van de dossiers Europese Rekenkamer, EVDB en Versterkte samenwerking 
en ten aanzien van alle vier issues van de dossiers omvang van de Commissie en Stem-
menweging. In totaal heeft het Nederlandse kabinet zijn doel niet bereikt als het gaat om 
11 van de 24 issues. Dit had niet te maken met het feit dat de uitkomsten voor deze issues 
besluitvormingsopties betroffen die het Nederlandse kabinet niet prefereerde. In plaats 
daarvan bereikten deze issues ofwel de fases van agendavorming en besluitvorming niet, 
resulterend in non-decisies vanuit het perspectief van het Nederlandse kabinet (vijf issues), 
ofwel ze bereikten deze fases wel maar werden er uiteindelijk geen besluiten over genomen, 
resulterend in not-decisies (zes issues).
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt de voor- en nameting uitgevoerd voor de andere deelnemende 
actoren voor wat betreft de ‘geselecteerde sample’ van 16 issues binnen de vijf dossiers. In 
het algemeen gesproken, hebben een aanzienlijk aantal andere actoren ook gedeeltelijk of 
geheel hun doel bereikt ten aanzien van de issues (resulterend in besluiten) waarvoor dit 
ook geldt voor het Nederlandse kabinet. In het geval van een aantal dossiers en issues heb-
ben alle actoren zelfs in meer of mindere mate hun doel bereikt. Dit geldt voor Versterkte 
samenwerking (Vetomogelijkheid), omvang van de Commissie en Stemmenweging (Type 
systeem en Algemene weging). Daarnaast hebben andere actoren ook hun doel bereikt als 
het gaat om die issues (resulterend in not-decisies of non-decisies) ten aanzien waarvan het 
Nederlandse kabinet zijn doel niet heeft bereikt. Dit is het meest duidelijk het geval voor 
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de NAVO en Militaire staf-issues van het EVDB-dossier, maar waarschijnlijk ook voor 
één of meerdere van de issues waarvoor de mate van doelbereiking van de andere actoren 
onduidelijk of onbekend is: Beroepsmogelijkheid op het Hof en Instructie (Europese 
Rekenkamer) en Gedifferentieerd lidmaatschap (Versterkte samenwerking).
De procesanalyse bestaande uit drie stappen, uitgevoerd in hoofdstuk 7, heeft als doel 
om de mate van invloed van het Nederlandse kabinet vast te stellen en te verklaren voor 
wat betreft de 16 issues van de geselecteerde sample. Als het gaat om de eerste stap (in-
vloedsvaststelling), is de vraag hoe we weten of het Nederlandse kabinet zijn doelbereiking 
zelf teweeggebracht heeft, i.e. daadwerkelijk invloed uitgeoefend heeft. Om deze vraag 
te beantwoorden, moet de beschrijvende voor- en nameting worden aangevuld met een 
verklarende procesanalyse. Het is precies dit oorzakelijke proces, of mechanisme dat be-
studeerd moet worden om na te gaan of een correlatie tussen de preferentie van een actor 
en een besluit – de doelbereiking van een actor – ook aan deze actor zelf kan worden 
toegeschreven.
Dit proefschrift richt zich met name op invloedspogingen als het mechanisme waardoor 
de uitoefening van invloed plaatsvindt. Wanneer we daarom willen weten of het Neder-
landse kabinet daadwerkelijk invloed uitgeoefend heeft ten aanzien van de issues waarop 
het gedeeltelijk of geheel zijn doel bereikt heeft, zijn de invloedspogingen die zijn onder-
nomen door het Nederlandse kabinet en de andere deelnemende actoren van bijzonder 
belang. De eerste stap van de procesanalyse begint daarom met een inventarisatie van deze 
invloedspogingen voor wat betreft de 16 issues van de geselecteerde sample.
Op basis hiervan wordt de mate van invloed van het Nederlandse kabinet vastgesteld 
door rivaliserende mechanismen – andere dan expliciete invloed – in ogenschouw te ne-
men waaraan specifieke combinaties van (gebrek aan) invloedspogingen en doelbereiking 
zouden kunnen worden toegeschreven. Door dit te doen, wordt geprobeerd aannemelijk 
te maken welke mechanismen wel (verificatie) en welke niet (falsificatie) van toepassing 
waren in elk van de 16 gevallen.
In welke mate heeft het Nederlandse kabinet invloed uitgeoefend tijdens het onder-
handelingsproces resulterend in het Verdrag van Nice? We kunnen concluderen dat het 
Nederlandse kabinet expliciete invloed uitgeoefend heeft ten aanzien van negen van de 20 
issues van de geselecteerde sample (vier issues zijn in de loop van de analyse gesplitst in 
elk twee issues, wat resulteerde in een totaal van 20 issues). Dit was het geval ten aanzien 
van de issues Betrouwbaarheidsverklaring-1 en Contactcomité-1 (Europese Rekenkamer), 
Verdragswijziging en PVC-1 (EVDB), Minimumaantal en Vetomogelijkheid-1 (Versterkte 
samenwerking), omvang van de Commissie (Commissie) en Algemene weging en Indi-
viduele weging (Stemmenweging). Naast dat het Nederlandse kabinet expliciete invloed 
uitoefende ten aanzien van de issues Minimumaantal, Vetomogelijkheid-1, omvang van 
de Commissie en Algemene weging, kreeg het ook een free ride van andere actoren in deze 
gevallen.
Het Nederlandse kabinet heeft geen invloed uitgeoefend ten aanzien van 10 van de 20 
issues van de geselecteerde sample. In één geval was de Nederlandse doelbereiking een 
kwestie van puur geluk (omvang van de Europese Rekenkamer). In het geval van het 
Instructie-issue (Europese Rekenkamer) had het gebrek aan doelbereiking te maken met 
interne verdeeldheid. Dit mechanisme speelde ook een ondergeschikte rol in het geval van 
het NAVO-issue (EVDB) ten aanzien waarvan het netwerk van Italië en de Benelux-landen 
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intern verdeeld was. In de volgende vijf gevallen had het gebrek aan doelbereiking van het 
Nederlandse kabinet te maken met falen: Betrouwbaarheidsverklaring-2, Contactcomité-2 
en Beroepsmogelijkheid op het Hof (Europese Rekenkamer), NAVO (EVDB) en Vetomo-
gelijkheid-2 (Versterkte samenwerking). Het onnodige fout-mechanisme speelde mogelijk 
een ondergeschikte rol als het gaat om de issues Betrouwbaarheidsverklaring-2, Contact-
comité-2, Beroepsmogelijkheid op het Hof en Vetomogelijkheid-2. Het mechanisme van 
pech speelde mogelijk een ondergeschikte rol ten aanzien van het issue Vetomogelijkheid-2. 
In drie gevallen had het gebrek aan doelbereiking te maken met het feit dat deze issues een 
non-prioriteit waren voor het Nederlandse kabinet of was er sprake van anticipatie door 
het Nederlandse kabinet van (mogelijke) weerstand van andere deelnemende actoren. Het 
gaat hier om de issues Militaire staf, Gedifferentieerd lidmaatschap en PVC-2. Daarnaast 
speelde het anticipatiemechanisme een ondergeschikte rol in het geval van de issues Be-
trouwbaarheidsverklaring-2, Contactcomité-2 en Beroepsmogelijkheid op het Hof. Wat 
betreft het Type systeem-issue (Stemmenweging) weten we niet of het Nederlandse kabinet 
expliciete invloed uitgeoefend heeft.
We kunnen bovendien concluderen dat het Nederlandse kabinet aldus invloed uitge-
oefend heeft ten aanzien van een ruime meerderheid (negen) van de 15 – inclusief de 
vier extra issues – besluiten van de geselecteerde sample. Ten aanzien van vijf besluiten 
heeft het Nederlandse kabinet geen invloed uitgeoefend, maar zijn gebrek aan invloed kan 
in behoorlijke mate op het conto worden geschreven van de non-decisies en not-decisies 
(ook vijf issues). Alleen de aandacht richten op de besluiten die zijn genomen tijdens de 
onderhandelingen over het Verdrag van Nice en de invloed die het Nederlandse kabinet in 
dit verband heeft uitgeoefend, zou dus verhullen dat het Nederlandse kabinet geen invloed 
heeft uitgeoefend – en andere deelnemende actoren juist wel – ten aanzien van de besluiten 
die niet zijn genomen. Voor een adequate vaststelling van de invloed van een actor is het 
daarom van belang om niet alleen besluiten, maar ook non-decisies en not-decisies in de 
analyse te betrekken.
Hoe kan de mate van invloed van het Nederlandse kabinet die aldus is vastgesteld worden 
verklaard? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, gaat de tweede stap van de procesanalyse in 
hoofdstuk 7 na wat de verklarende waarde is van de variabelen van het conceptuele model. 
Op basis van de deductieve test van de verwachtingen van het conceptuele model kan 
worden geconcludeerd dat de mate waarin het Nederlandse kabinet deel uitmaakte van 
netwerken, intern coherent was, invloedspogingen ondernam en gefaciliteerd dan wel ge-
hinderd werd door binnenlandspolitieke actoren en factoren tot op zekere hoogte zijn mate 
van invloed kan verklaren. In de negen gevallen waarin het Nederlandse kabinet invloed 
uitgeoefend heeft, was het vaak onderdeel van een netwerk, intern coherent, ondernam 
het veel invloedspogingen en werd het gefaciliteerd door binnenlandspolitieke actoren en 
factoren. In de 10 gevallen waarin het Nederlandse kabinet geen invloed uitgeoefend heeft, 
was het daarentegen vaak geen onderdeel van een netwerk of was dit netwerk verdeeld, was 
het zelf intern verdeeld, ondernam het nauwelijks of weinig invloedspogingen en werd het 
gehinderd door binnenlandspolitieke actoren en factoren.
Toch bieden deze variabelen geen volledige verklaring voor de mate van invloed van het 
Nederlandse kabinet. De derde en laatste stap van de procesanalyse in hoofdstuk 7 beoogt 
daarom na te gaan of nog andere variabelen, die geen onderdeel van het model uitmaken, 
mogelijk verklarende waarde hebben. Op basis van inductie kan worden geconcludeerd 
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dat de uitruil van dossier en issues tussen de deelnemende actoren, de tijdigheid van 
invloedspogingen en netwerkvorming, anticipatie van (mogelijke) weerstand van andere 
deelnemende actoren, en de gevoeligheid van een issue voor het collectief van deelnemende 
actoren en voor een actor individueel ook lijken bij te dragen aan de verklaring.
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt na de empirische resultaten en het antwoord op de probleem-
stelling een aantal reflecties gepresenteerd over de theorie, methodologie en praktijk van 
invloed op basis van dit proefschrift. Voor wat betreft de praktijk van invloed doen we de 
volgende aanbevelingen aan het Nederlandse kabinet met als doel dat het meer invloed 
zal uitoefenen tijdens toekomstige Europese (Verdrags)onderhandelingen. Ten eerste, het 
betaalt zich uit om er sterk naar te streven dat issues daadwerkelijk op de agenda komen 
en er over besloten wordt. Ten tweede en als een specificatie hiervan, het is aanbevelens-
waardig om een beperkt aantal duidelijke en geprioriteerde preferenties op te nemen in de 
inzet voor de onderhandelingen. Ten derde, interne coherentie draagt bij aan de uitoefening 
van invloed. Ten vierde, het aantal en de tijdigheid van netwerkvorming met gelijkgezinde 
lidstaten doen er toe voor de mate van invloed van het Nederlandse kabinet. Ten vijfde, dit 
geldt ook voor het aantal en de tijdigheid van invloedspogingen. Ten zesde, terwijl het kan 
worden betwijfeld of het Nederlandse kabinet zelf een invloedsreputatie heeft, zou het er 
goed aan doen zijn inschatting van de invloedsreputatie van andere actoren regelmatig te 
evalueren. Deze inschatting vormt immers de basis voor anticipatie door het Nederlandse 
kabinet van de (mogelijke) reacties, i.e. weerstand van deze actoren. Ten zevende, het 
betaalt zich uit om meer actief als invloedsstrategie gebruik te maken van en te verwijzen 
naar binnenlandspolitieke actoren en factoren, zoals het parlement en de publieke opinie. 
Ten achtste, het Nederlandse kabinet zou van te voren kunnen nagaan welke dossiers en 
issues met elkaar samenhangen en daarom waarschijnlijk zullen worden uitgeruild. Daarbij 
kan het tegelijk overwegen welke verbanden het zelf wenst (aan te brengen) om zo meer 
van zijn preferenties te realiseren. Ten negende en misschien wel het meest belangrijk, het 
Nederlandse kabinet zou grootschalig moeten inzetten op voorbereidend huiswerk, aange-
zien zo veel blijkt af te hangen van het specifieke issue en de specifieke situatie bij Europese 
Verdragsonderhandelingen. Dit huiswerk kan achtereenvolgens bestaan uit het in kaart 
brengen van de onderhandelingsomgeving, het prioriteren van de issues en preferenties 
dienaangaande en het ontwikkelen van onderhandelingsscenario’s voor deze issues. Gezien 
het feit dat Europese Verdragsvorming een doorgaand, maar contingent proces is en het 
Nederlandse kabinet grote belangen heeft in dit verband, is het aanbevelenswaardig om 
een semi-permanente Taskforce op hoog niveau in te stellen binnen de Directie Integratie 
Europa (DIE) van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken om dit voorbereidende huiswerk 
te doen.
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